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PREFACE
This volume is the result o f the conference R edefin ing Regional Rela- 
tions in Southeastern Europe: Political Challenges and Economic Opportunities“, 
held in Nicosia, Cyprus on 20-22 March 1995 under the sponsorship o f  the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Modem Greek Studies 
Program at the University o f Minnesota, the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft in Mu- 
nich, and several host institutions such as the University o f Cyprus. One o f the 
objectives o f the conference was to bring together scholars from the United 
States and Europe, especially from the countries discussed in this volume. We 
aimed for as comprehensive a geographic coverage o f the region as possible and 
for this reason we included Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. Regrettably, the invited 
scholar from Turkey was unable to attend the conference but Turkey figured 
prominently in the deliberations. Another objective was to explore ways by 
which the political challenges confronting the region should not be allowed to 
obscure the emerging economic opportunities which could lead to interaction 
and cooperation among the Southeastern European states and in the process help 
redefine not only the economic but also the political landscape of the region. As 
John Lampe points out in his introduction, economic integration is the alterna- 
tive to isolation o f the Balkan states from each other, and of the Balkan region 
from the rest o f Europe.
The volume is conveniently divided into two parts reflecting the two 
overarching themes o f political challenges and economic opportunities. Several 
clusters highlight the issues that preoccupied the conference participants. The 
first three essays by R. H. Linden, Daniel N. Nelson, and Radovan Vukadinovič 
deal with broad and complex security issues, themselves in need o f redefinition 
in this ״age o f uncertainty“ and ״ collective security“ in Europe in general, and 
Southeastern Europe in particular. Throughout the conference, Yugoslavia was a 
constant point o f reference, and this is reflected in the present volume. The es- 
says by Predrag Simić and Dušan Reljić respectively focus on the dynamics o f 
Yugoslav crisis and the ״ possiblilities for reintegration of former Yugoslavia“. 
They are followed by case studies o f countries affected in varied degrees by the 
Yugoslav crisis. In the case o f Greece, the only country in the region enjoying 
stability and European Union membership, one detects hopeful signs in the evo- 
lution o f Greek foreign policy in the post-Cold War environment. According to 
Theodore Couloumbis1 contribution, Greece has been increasingly moving in the 
direction o f playing the role o f a mediator in the region, despite some challenges 
it faces because o f political remapping in the Balkans and in Cyprus. The Re-
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public o f Cyprus, which despite its political uncertainty has experienced an eco- 
nomie miracle during the last two decades, aspires for membership in the Euro- 
pean Union which will also play a positive role in effecting a political solution to 
its own conflict. The island republics ״ long march to Europe“ and the chal- 
lenges it faces as a result o f the attitude o f Turkish leadership in Cyprus and 
mainland Turkey are discussed in great detail by Nicholas Emiliou. In short, 
each state in the region has its own sets o f challenges and opportunities. Agim 
Nesho reminds us o f Albania,s agonizing efforts at reconstruction and opening 
up to its immediate neighbors and beyond. This is also the story o f Romania as 
discussed by Vlad-Andrei Moga. All in all, despite divisions and rivalries, the 
opportunities for political dialogue and actual collaboration are expanding.
The second half o f the volume deals first with economic challenges af- 
fecting the whole region - ״  the economic dimension of conflict“ as Franz-Lothar 
Altmann puts it -  and the nature o f  economic transformation which is uneven, to 
say the least, as we are reminded by Ognian Hishow. Yet, despite disruptions 
and uneven development, regional cooperation in the Balkans has to be the way 
o f the future, although in her essay Nada Švob-Dokic cautions against great ex- 
pectations in the immediate future from this ״ polymorphous“ Balkan structure. 
Bulgaria, whose trade relations with its neighbors are judiciously assessed by 
Michael L. Wyzan, is a case in point. In fact Hansjörg Brey argues that, in the 
case o f Cyprus, economic cooperation and integration between Greek and Turk- 
ish Cypriots may prove to be the way to a solution o f the Cyprus conflict.
The last three essays in this volume address specific economic issues, 
such as the role o f  government and banking in development and cooperation, 
topics analyzed by Neven Borak and Franjo Štiblar respectively, and the ques- 
tion o f economic relations between Central and Southeastern Europe discussed 
by Tamás Novák. The imperatives o f the policital challenges and economic op- 
portunities speak more o f the need for economic integration as an antidote to 
politcal conflict and Balkan isolation. Bringing this about is quite a different 
matter. It will require patience and understanding by all involved.
The road was long from the conference in Nicosia to the preparation of 
the manuscript in Minneapolis, to publication of the volume in Munich. But the 
whole project was as rewarding and enjoyable as it was challenging. I want to 
thank my colleagues John Lampe and Hansjörg Brey for their splendid collabo- 
ration in this jo int venture and the participating scholars including those whose 
papers do not appear in this volume. Finally, it remains for me to thank the sup- 
porting staff o f the sponsoring institutions whose tireless efforts made both the 
conference and this volume a reality.
Theofanis G. Stavrou
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Economic Integration versus Balkan Isolation: 
Southeastern Europe 
after the Twentieth Century0
John R. Lampe
The independent states of southeastern Europe now find them- 
selves larger in number—ten countries spread from Slovenia to Romania 
and Turkey—and less important individually to the Western powers than 
at any time during the twentieth centuiy. TĪieir greatest external peril lies 
not in excessive European or American interest but in neglect and isola- 
tion. Held back primarily but not exclusively by the wars of Yugoslav sue- 
cession, the successors to the region's Communist regimes have not pro- 
gressed as far in the transition to a market economy as their central 
European counterparts. Slovenia alone has been spared a growing exclu- 
sion, one that threatens to loosen already weak bonds such as those linking 
the economies of Turkey and Greece, despite the letter’s membership in 
the European Union, to an increasingly integrated Europe. Left 
unchanged, current trends will cut the region off from the rest of Europe 
politically as well as economically but not, we should remind ourselves, 
geographically.
Progress toward economic integration remains the best prescription 
for avoiding political isolation, single-party regimes, media monopolies and 
the further ethnic conflict that will surely accompany them. This article 
explores the promise that economic integration, and the legal framework 
that must go with it, has held for southeastern Europe earlier in this cen- 
tury and still holds as we approach the next century. I will argue that sim- 
ply reconnecting the five now separate economies of the former Yugoslavia, 
not politically feasible if attempted in isolation, or even the ten economies 
of the entire region will not be sufficient. More of the near neighbors 
must also be involved in the process, although nearer and less disparate 
than the unwieldy numbers involved in either the central European or the 
Black Sea initiatives. Both now seem dead letters to many American ob-
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servers, although the progress of the Central European Free Trade 
Association (CEFTA) may prove us wrong.
I propose two smaller versions of these initiatives, whose close co- 
operation with each other would also serve the political purpose of linking 
central and southeastern Europe. One would revive the original 
Pentagonale of the 1980s to connect Slovenia and Croatia with Austria, 
Hungary and Italy. Some link to the Czech Republic and Slovakia would 
also be essential for this politically feasible group, but no more so than ties 
to the other politically feasible group of five—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, an 
acceptably named Macedonia, and the Yugoslav federation of Serbia and 
Montenegro. They in turn would benefit by more open economic connec - 
tion to Romania, Turkey and the region's most rapidly growing trade and 
financial center, the Republic of Cyprus.1 These two tiers might well 
launch their own initiatives and their joint relations by holding the 
European Union and the United States to their promises to rebuild the 
economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unless reconnected to both tiers, none of 
the Bosnian economy׳s three parts can survive with any prospect for retain- 
ing the skilled labor and urban professionals who have not already left or, 
perhaps more importantly, for bringing back those who have left.
This political prescription rests solidly on the region’s economic 
history across the full course of the twentieth century. No shots were fired 
over the few interstate conflicts that arose because of economic issues. 
Initiatives to avoid dependence on too few trading partners have served the 
region well, and political efforts to promote regional economic integration 
surfaced as early as the abortive Serbo-Bulgarian customs union of 1905. 
Let us begin there, at the start of the century.
Politically inspired on the Serbian side in order to gain advantage 
in its government’s trade bargaining with Austria-Hungary, the 1905 
agreement admittedly foundered subsequent revisions dictated from 
Vienna to Belgrade. But the huge Habsburg monarchy failed to win the 
subsequent tariff war of 1906-11, on which Hungarian agricultural interests 
insisted because of competing livestock exports. The small Serbian econ- 
omy carried the day by finding other markets for other products. Nor can 
we make the political fallout from the tariff war as dangerous an ingredient 
in the rising Austro-Serbian antagonism as the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.2 It 
was those two Serbian victories and their Bosnian consequences in particu- 
lar that prompted the monarchy*s preventative war against Serbia and the 
subsequent European war in 1914.
As a result of that much wider war, the region's largest customs 
union, Austria-Hungary itself with a population of 51 million, was dis- 
solved. The monarchy’s economic record has been much debated ever 
since the breakup. The per capita value of its foreign trade was admittedly 
low, 25% of Germany’s or France’s, and declining as a share of national in- 
come during the last prewar years. Combined exchange with the indepen•
2 John К Lampe
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dent Balkan states barely amounted to 4% of this modest total, versus 40% 
with Germany and 10% with the United States. But within the borders of 
Austria-Hungary, as David Good has recently demonstrated, modern eco- 
nomie integration was more widespread and regional growth less uneven 
than many, including the present author, had maintained.3 I am still not 
convinced that Croatia-Slavonia was reducing its disparity or marketing 
much agricultural produce in the face of Hungarian competition, but the 
Vojvodina was clearly suceeding in both regards. Also, as my own work has 
pointed out, Bosnian exports per capita, primarily to the rest of Austria- 
Hungary, exceeded the Serbian figure by more than 50%.4
The interim decades that followed World War I saw the levels of 
foreign trade and investment reduced for all of Europe, not just for the 
successor states to the Habsburg monarchy. Population losses limited the 
entire continent's capacity for economic growth. Southeastern Europe, 
now including the first Yugoslavia and an enlarged Romania, recorded 
trade totals per capita that were only 25% of the figure for Czechoslovakia.5 
Beyond generally reduced demand, transport troubles and increased 
American or Canadian competition cut into prewar markets for Balkan agri- 
cultural goods in Western Europe. The small size of manufacturing enter- 
prises and domestic markets discouraged incorporation as well as foreign 
investment. A round of currency stabilizations in the mid-1920s generated 
little of the lending that prewar Balkan goverments had received from 
European capital markets, despite overvalued exchange rates intended to 
attract new loans. The high rates worked instead to limit exports and to 
prompt higher tariffs in order to protect domestic goods from cheaper im - 
ports. Still, wider interregional trade with Italy, despite its Fascist gov- 
emment, and with Czechoslovakia made up for reduced connections to the 
crippled economies of Austria and Hungary, the core of the former 
Habsburg customs union.
Trade within southeastern Europe amounted to only 9% of the five 
states' total turnover by 1929. But when the onset of the Great Depression 
cut prices for agricultural exports in half, the first thought among the re- 
gion's governments was not to turn to state controls and bilateral clearing 
agreements as they later did. The First Balkan Conference of government 
representatives, convened in Athens in 1930, consciously devoted its 
agenda to economic issues and concentrated on the Yugoslav and Romanian 
proposal to create a customs union for southeastern Europe. A Yugoslav 
delegate pointed out that the combined agricultural exports of the 44 mil- 
lion people represented there were nearly matched by those of free-trading 
Denmark, with 3.5 million. And his country, like all the others except 
Greece, had enjoyed export surpluses with the rest of the region for the 
period 1926-30. Even Greek representatives agreed to go along with the 
proposal. It came to naught, but only because of the spillover from West 
European and Czech protests against the proposed Austro-German customs
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union, a protocol for which was signed and then hastily abandoned in 
1931.6 Subsequent efforts to revive the Balkan project or to make some- 
thing of the much belated economization of the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, 
Romania and Czechoslovakia) failed to make even comparable progress.
During the rest of the 1930s, the region's governments damaged 
their capacity for multilateral free trade by creating state agencies to control 
agricultural exports and signing politically dangerous clearing agreements 
to barter such produce to Nazi Germany. That was however not the only 
damage done, nor the only precedent set for the Communist economic 
regimes imposed after World War II. State-financed military production 
shot up late in the decade, as it did among all the Nazis’ European neigh- 
bors. Much of the scarce capital available for investment was thereby di- 
verted into the branch of manufacturing with the smallest potential for ex- 
port development. For Yugoslavia in particular, such investment tilted the 
concentration of heavy industry toward the Bosnian and Serbian interior, 
making both areas vulnerable to future cuts in military spending and 
meanwhile stirring resentment in Croatia and Slovenia. Only the latter 
problem arose before World War II intervened. Both would reappear in 
the 1960s and blossom like poisonous plants during the 1980s.
It took the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 to reactivate such regional con- 
centration, now primarily in Bosnia-Hercegovina. To the north, a similar 
process was under way in eastern Slovakia. All across southeastern Europe 
inordinate proportions were invested in military production or, especially 
in non-Communist Greece and Turkey, military procurement. The 
Communist economies further mobilized inordinate overall investment— 
30% of national product or more—to cover as many domestic needs as pos - 
sible and to use foreign trade only as a means to obtain necessary imports 
through bilateral clearing agreements, now within the Soviet orbit. 
Yugoslavia had stepped outside that orbit but was also slow to emphasize 
exports until trade with Italy was normalized in 1955. Even then, each of 
the Yugoslav republics favored the development of its own set of the over- 
sized and politically managed industrial enterprises typical of the Soviet 
bloc economies. Like them, they also concentrated on hard-to־export pro * 
ducere’ goods. By the 1960s, however, Yugoslavia’s further concentration 
on military production had begun to wane, leaving Bosnia-Hercegovina, the 
republic most dependent on arms manufacture for employment, at a di sad- 
vantage that would deepen with further spending cuts in the 1980s. Its ef- 
forts to bid for a proportional share of federal funds for less developed re- 
publics and regions were unsuccessful in the face of priority given to 
Kosovo. The 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo only raised false expecta- 
tions. Despite industrial assets per worker that had risen from 82 to 95% 
on the average, by 1988 the republic’s Gross Material Product per capita had 
fallen to 68% of the Yugoslav average, down from 83% in 1953.7
Elsewhere across southeastern Europe, with the sole exception of
4 John R. Lampe
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Albania, the two decades that ended in 1979 with the second Oil Shock 
witnessed an unprecedented increase in foreign trade, industrial produc- 
tion and industrial exports.8 For the period 1970-78, Bulgarian and 
Romanian exports were increasing by 10% a year in real value, Greece's by 
13%, and Yugoslavia's still by 5%. European Economic Community (EEC) 
members had by comparison expanded their exports by 8% annually dur- 
ing the halcyon years from 1960 to the first Oil Shock in 1973. Within 
southeastern Europe, Bulgaria and Greece traded twice the turnover per 
capita for Romania and Yugoslavia, five times the figure for Turkey and ten 
times the tiny Albanian total. Industrial production accounted for 50% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1978 in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Yugoslavia versus 25% in Greece and Turkey. As a result, primaiy goods 
had fallen to 20% of export value for Romania and Yugoslavia, 35% for 
Bulgaria and Greece. Turkey’s non-processed share was still 75%. The 
narrow range of comparable agricultural exports that had previously helped 
to constrain the potential for trade within southeastern Europe had there- 
fore broadened considerably.
Although interregional trade constituted just 6% of the six coun- 
tries’ total by 1978, less than the 9% for 1929, we should recall the several- 
sided political differences that inhibited economic relations until the 
1960s. The differences persisted, but their direct effect on economic re la- 
tions receded, at least to the extent permitted by inconvertible currencies 
with exchange rates again overvalued and the Soviet-style practice of bilat- 
eral trade agreements. The thaw in Greek-Bulgarian trade and tourism be- 
gan by the late 1960s, ironically under the right-wing Colonels’ regime in 
Athens. Greek trade with Yugoslavia had faced no serious obstacles since 
the end of the former’s civil war in 1952. During the 1970s, Greek exports 
to Romania, Bulgaria and Albania shot up sixfold in value, while Turkish 
imports from Romania and Bulgaria rose twenty-fold.
We may only speculate on the political consequences of this eco- 
nomie momentum. It seemed sufficient to encourage a series of inter-gov- 
emmental meetings throughout the 1980s, despite the distinctly more dif- 
ficult environment accompanying the second Oil Shock, the slowdown in 
West European growth, and the gathering crisis in the economies of the 
Soviet bloc. These contacts culminated in what amounted to the First 
Balkan Conference of the postwar period. The foreign ministers of now six 
states met in Belgrade early in 1989 in order to discuss how greater joint 
endeavors might benefit all of them.
By the end of 1989, however, political bankruptcy in the face of ac- 
cumulating economic failures had swept the Zhivkov and Ceausescu 
regimes from power in Bulgaria and Romania, threatened the Alia regime 
in Albania, and pushed Yugoslavia’s Communist party (SKJ) to the brink of 
dissolution. The federal party’s collapse in January 1990 and a series of 
multi-party elections held only in the individual republics set the final
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stage for the wars of Yugoslav succession. As is too well known, they began 
in Slovenia and spread at far greater human cost to Croatia in 1991 and the 
next year in still more tragic proportions to Bosnia-Herzegovina.® The 
economic consequences are less well known, but must be emphasized, de- 
spite the imprecision of available data, if the uigent need for wider re- 
gional reconnection is to be understood. Without such reconnection, all of 
southeastern Europe and some of central Europe will be drawn into the 
subsistence mentality and illegal business that characterizes all parts of the 
present Bosnian economy and too much of the Serbian, Croatian and 
Macedonian economies.
Beyond the numbers of dead, displaced or departed, Bosnian eco- 
nomie output had by 1994 been reduced by perhaps 67% from the 1989 
level. The same frightening fraction probably holds for Serbia- 
Montenegro, with the Croatian loss not far behind at 50%. The informal or 
illegal economy already acounted for 30% of Serbia's GDP in 1992. The 
trade and financial sanctions imposed on Serbia by the international com- 
munity made sure that this fraction would increase significantly over the 
next two years.
Those sanctions and Greece’s subsequent embargo on legal trade 
with what was now the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia trans- 
formed over 50% of that fledgling states’ foreign trade into illegal busi- 
ness. Only Slovenia has managed to divert the 50-60% of its trade that all 
the former Yugoslav republics used to conduct with each other into legal 
trade with a variety of European partners. Even Slovenia’s trade with 
neighboring Austria and Italy has proved to be disappointingly small, re- 
spectively 8 and 15% of total turnover. An initial 14% with Croatia in 1992 
dropped to 8% by 1995.10
Like all neighbors of the war-torn republics from the former 
Yugoslavia, the Slovenian economy has born the burden of trade diversion. 
The bystanders’ governments have all offered estimates of how much trade 
has been foregone or rerouted at higher cost because the main land arteries 
connecting central and southeastern Europe have been largely blocked to 
legal commerce since 1992. Estimates for the neighboring economy most 
grievously affected, Bulgaria’s, nin as high as $4 billion. The Bulgarian 
economist, Roumen Avramov, casts doubt on any of these numerical esti- 
mates, arguing that they are open to exaggeration for domestic political 
purposes (or minimization by international authorities fearing demands for 
compensation). Avramov also points out that these estimates exclude the 
most powerful economic effect of warfare and sanctions across a major trade 
route—the diversion of capital and income as well as trade into a grey 
economy based on illegal business and wide open to political or criminal 
control.11 That was unquestionably the primary effect on the Bulgarian 
economy from the trade diverted to it by the international sanctions on 
Serbia and the Greek embargo on the Former Yugoslav Republic of
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Macedonia. The Macedonian minister of interior recently resigned over 
the failure of all concerned to follow tracks from the attempted 
assassination of President Gligorov to the smuggling interests that were 
the most likely suspects. The president's successful efforts to come to 
terms with the Papandreou government and to crack down on domestic 
corruption as well threatened to restrict the Macedonian role as an 
enterprise zone for illegal trade.
The warfare and wider circle of economic corruption and restriction 
that block the central trade arteries of southeastern Europe have had a pre- 
dictable affect on foreign investment. The limitations that prevail from 
Albania to Romania because of Serbian conditions, and from Slovenia east- 
ward because of Bosniam conditions, have discouraged any large-scale 
commitment. The Austrian investments that have come to Slovenia and the 
Greek ones to Bulgaria are small-scale individually and in sum. Direct 
foreign investment in Bulgaria since 1991 has amounted to barely $500 
million, and the Slovenian total is even less.12 German investment has 
been conspicuous by its absence, even in Croatia after early recognition 
suggested to some observers (but no economists) that this was the opening 
move in a new economic penetration of southeastern Europe. According to 
Wolfram Schrettl of Berlin’s Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 
the entire region has received a scant 1% of Germany’s direct foreign in- 
vestment since 1991.13 Forthat matter, the Golden Triangle of Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic have received only 9% in a total that does 
not include the massive sums spent on the reintegration of the East 
German economy.
This discouraging start to the last decade of the twentieth century 
does not however mean that it must end that way for southeastern Europe. 
Its midpoint in 1995 has after all brought an end to the Greek embargo, the 
Bosnian war and the trade if not yet the financial sanctions on Serbia. Only 
the first of these achievements has received economic reinforcement, in 
the form of the Greek business interests that pushed the Athens govern- 
ment toward accomodation and now reportedly fill Skopje’s hotels with 
their representatives.
Outside the war zone, another promising trend has already ap- 
peared. Greek, and also Turkish, trade has reoriented itself since 1989 
away from Germany and toward east central and southeastern Europe. All 
of the latter economies, with the exception of Albania and to some extent 
Romania, produce a variety of marketable manufactures that are increas- 
ingly exchanged for foodstuffs, including high-quality processed goods, 
from Greece and Turkey. Even Bulgaria’s presumably obsolete metallurgi- 
cal sector has found markets in those two neighbors, for use there or for 
transhipment to the smaller, rapidly growing Asian economies. But how 
can we judge the potential for further expansion of trade within southeast- 
em Europe and the resulting benefit to the region’s comparative advan-
Economic Integration versus Balkan Isolation 7
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tage? Michael Wyzan of Prague’s new Open Media Research Institute 
calculates that the share of Bulgaria’s trade turnover with both Greece and 
Turkey could potentially double from its presently promising level of 10% 
combined. If Thessaloniki became the regional center for legal trade and 
finance for which its superior set of institutions and infrastructure already 
positions it, he adds, trade with Greece could rise much more.14 Western 
investment would thereby find real encouragement to follow, especially if 
the freer movement of labor as well as goods and grater accountability for 
capital were facilitated across the widest possible area. Wages and particu- 
Iarly other costs of location in urban centers are significantly lower for 
southeastern than east central Europe, if protection and other illegal trans- 
action costs are factored out.
Those costs can never be factored out until the war economies of 
Serbia and Croatia as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina are reincorporated into a 
profitable but financially accountable framework for legal business.13 The 
hostilities preceding the Dayton Accords of November 1995 have left far 
too much commercial activity and enterprise management under political 
control by the ruling parties, still clearly three in Bosnia, and in Croatia as 
well as Serbia. The leaderships of Serbia and Croatia, in the likely event 
that they remain unchanged, would nonetheless be attracted to the wider 
economic advantages and political respectablity that would flow from the 
two regional arrangements—five southeastern European states and five 
east central European ones—that I propose. The Serbian side would find 
the connection to Greece and Thessaloniki particularly attractive, as would 
Croatia with Austria and Vienna. Greece is already a member o f the 
European Union (EU) and Austria a pending one. Their political leader- 
ship would be crucial to the official negotiations needed to regularize re- 
gional economic relations and to go beyond CEFTA by establishing in- 
escapable procedures for financial documentation. Slovenian relations w ith 
the other EU member, Italy, would also benefit by their inclusion in a 
wider setting. Both Slovenia and Croatia should welcome reassurances 
that their Austrian, Hungarian and Italian partnership would provide 
against any political possibility for recreating the former Yugoslavia. To the 
southeast, the economic linkage of Greece and Serbia with Albania, 
Macedonia and Bulgaria, with Turkish agreement, might help to diffuse a 
series of political dilemmas—Albania’s connection to the Albanian popula- 
tions of Kosovo and Macedonia, Macedonian anxiety over closer bilateral 
relations with Serbia (or Bulgaria), and excessive Greek and Turkish con- 
centration on their own bilateral relations.
Surrounding Bosnia-Herzegovina with these two legal enterprise 
zones anchored in Vienna and Thessaloniki would also provide an alter- 
native to politically controlled and illegally operated business activity. 
This grey economy’s predominance is, beyond the memories of war, the 
hidden barrier that stands in the way of constructive reconnection of
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Bosnia’s three internal parts. Kept economically separate, even if two are 
incorporated into neighboring Serbia and Croatia, those variously contami- 
nated parts will not survive as modern economies. They will serve instead 
to poison the commercial mainstream of southeastern Europe. No one will 
gain from the region’s isolation in economic fact as a Balkan backwater. 
Isolation will only reinforce the unfortunate Balkan stereotype that belies a 
cultural as well as geographic attachment to the European continent.
Let it also be noted that both European Union members and the 
United States will find it politically difficult to honor their commitments 
to Bosnian reconstruction after 1996. Only if the states of southeastern 
Europe and their central European neighbors take the sort of independent 
initiative advocated above, promising their long-term commitment to re- 
gional stability, can the Western support pledged for 1997-98 stand a good 
chance of actually being delivered.
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The Age of Uncertainty 
The New Security Environment 
in Eastern Europe*
Ronald H. Linden
For forty years a relatively stable, if undesired, division of 
Europe persisted. The political and foreign policy elites of Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe** could count on the persistence of certain 
geopolitical realities, a balance of political and military forces, and cold war 
restraints. After 1948, and especially after 1956, when it became clear that 
the West was not going to challenge Soviet hegemony in the region, the 
pattern of relations became relatively fixed. Although there was some 
diversity in the international behavior of the East European states 
(Romania in the 1960s and 1970s) and some periods of greater or lesser 
tension (those surrounding the Solidarity period in Poland), the political 
and military topography was fairly predictable. The realm of the unknown 
was usually defined as the level of Kremlin tolerance for subordinate 
diversity, and this range was relatively small. In contrast, the primary 
international challenge to the new regimes in Eastern Europe today is the 
high level of uncertainty.1
The Disappearance o f Alliances and Patrons.
In an uncomfortably familiar replay of the interwar period, East European 
states find themselves essentially alone in a rapidly changing and poten• 
tially dangerous world. Each has new freedom, and few would pine for the 
return of the tight strictures of the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, the 
increase in the degrees of freedom of neighbors’ behavior makes designing 
prudent and effective international policy a much more complex task.2 The 
influence of the two superpowers, whose militaiy, political, and economic 
muscle had divided the continent, has diminished. The Soviet Union has 
disappeared, and Russia no longer borders any East European state except
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
Ronald H. Linden14
Poland (through Kaliningrad3). Russia is consumed by domestic changes 
and challenges and is not in a position to reestablish its dominance over the 
region in the foreseeable future. However, the unforeseeable future can 
approach quickly, as we learned in 1989. The right mixture of international 
and domestic circumstances in Russia could produce a renewed drive to 
reestablish substantial influence in this region.4 Russian leaders of all po• 
liticai persuasions have made it clear that the era of obsequiousness to the 
West is over. For East Europeans, the memory of forty years of domina• 
tion has not disappeared, and their leaders are waiy of developments in 
Russia.9
On the other hand, the remaining superpower has not demon• 
strated its constancy. American aid to the region, roughly $400 million per 
year, is puny both in relation to the estimated need and compared to the aid 
extended to Western Europe under the Marshall Plan.6 Neither the Bush 
nor the Clinton administration demonstrated the fortitude to force a cease- 
fire in the former Yugoslavia until years into the war. With the drawdown 
of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and the dominance of 
the domestic agenda in American politics, the staying power of American 
interests in Europe is questionable.7
Weak New Alliances
After 1989, East European leaders made it clear that they saw their 
ultimate destiny as residing with Western Europe. Some also began to 
pursue regional alliances. The best-known, and the most successful, is the 
Visegrad group of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. But 
effective cooperation has been limited, concrete achievements few, and 
even rhetorical commitment short-lived.8 Czech premier Václav Klaus has 
been the most skeptical, worrying that the group might be “an attempt to 
artificially push the countries in question together again.” Klaus has made 
it clear that the Czech Republic would pursue first and foremost its strat- 
egy of integration into Western Europe.® The major substantive result of 
the Visegrad process, the Central European Free Trade Association 
(CEFTA), affects less than 5% of its members’ trade, has had only a 
marginal effect on increasing that trade, and in any case has a limited mem - 
bership.10 Regional groups such as the Black Sea Economic Zone and the 
Central European Initiative have yet to prove their worth even within nar- 
row functional limits.11
Diffidence o f Existing Alliances
Probably no aspect of the new environment has left the East 
European leaders more frustrated than the stiff handshake offered by 
Western alliances. After years of rhetoric, bridge-building, and encourag-
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ing distance from the Soviet Union, when the break occurred, the newly 
divorced suitors were offered only a long engagement. Of the three main 
targets of East European aspirations—NATO, the European Union (EU), 
and the Council of Europe—only the last has embraced the region and 
offered full membership to the Elast European states.
Immediately after the changes of 1989, East European leaders made 
it clear that only NATO membership would ensure their future security. 
In response, the alliance created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 
invited the new democracies into NATO’s parliamentary assembly, and in 
early 1994—four years after the overthrow of the communist regime— 
offered all the post-communist states membership in the Partnership for 
Peace program. Many leaders, especially those in Poland and Hungary, 
grumbled about the hesitancy and inadequacy of the response, but all 
signed on. A fall 1995 NATO study specified the characteristics needed for 
future members but still declined to say which partners could expect to 
become members or when.12 At its ministerial meeting in December 1995, 
NATO would say only that 1996 would be a year of “intensive consulta- 
tions” and warned that “participation in this next phase would not imply 
that interested partners would automatically be invited to begin accession 
talks with NATO.’*13 As Simon Lunn, deputy secretary general of the 
North Atlantic Assembly, stated, “For the foreseeable future, European 
security will continue to be handled through existing organizations in the 
current untidy fashion.”14
The EU has been similarly cautious. It first offered associate mem- 
ber status to the Visegrad states, then Romania and Bulgaria, and over the 
course of several summits has also specified the conditions for member- 
ship.15 The EU declined, however, to specify even a tentative date, 
although some influential leaders such as German chancellor Helmut Kohl 
have called for membership by the year 2000.16
While international institutions move slowly to mitigate the dan- 
gers of a non-ordered world (e.g., in former Yugoslavia), East European 
states can be expected to follow the self-help guidelines that offer them the 
best protection. An alliance made up of Poland, the Baltic states, and 
Ukraine, for example, might be the outgrowth of such a scenario.17 In the 
Balkans there is already evidence of realignment as a result of the collapse 
of both Yugoslavia and the Western community’s attempt to prevent war- 
fare there.18 The uncertainty of the present environment coupled with the 
lack of strong support from the West suggest, as to some within the 
governing coalition in Slovakia, that the best course might be neutrality or 
a renewed alliance with Russia.19 Such overtures will likely grow if NATO 
membership remains “off somewhere in the future,” as U.S. defense sec re- 
tary William Perry has indicated.20
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The cold war division of Europe meant a relatively small variation 
among states' domestic political behavior. For the East European states, 
their neighbors were basically similar (one-party socialist-economy states), 
similar but bigger (the Soviet Union), or like the West (multiparty capital- 
ist states). Now the region's politics encompass a greater variety of possible 
outcomes, as one might expect from electoral, pluralist states. Six govern- 
ments have held power in Poland and only two in Hungary; however, 
reform communists have returned to power in both. Revolving-door 
socialist-opposition regimes have ruled in Bulgaria and Albania. Former 
communists have held on despite splits in Romania, and new states alto- 
gether have emerged from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. For foreign 
policy-makers these developments create an immensely more complicated 
environment.
Consider the international environment now facing Romania. 
Until 1989 it was bordered on all sides by socialist states. The USSR to the 
north and neighbors west and south were all communist states in which 
governmental forms and differences with other regimes stayed within 
predictable parameters. Romania’s only neighbor that was not a Soviet ally 
was Yugoslavia, still a socialist state, with a dominant leader and with 
whom there was little likelihood for conflict. Overall, the possibilities for 
conflict or serious challenge from outside Romania's borders, while not 
nonexistent—as rumors of a possible Soviet invasion in 1968 showed — 
were very low, and the conditions were relatively unchanging.
Now, by contrast, Romania has two new neighbors to the north 
(Ukraine and Moldova), neither of which has much recent experience as an 
independent state. Both states suffer substantial regional cleavages and 
contain territory that in this century was part of Romania. Romanian policy 
under President Ion Iliescu has been cool to the idea of possible reunifica- 
tion with Moldova, despite pressure from nationalists in Romania and, for a 
time, pro-unification forces in Moldova. A change in government following 
the 1994 elections in Moldova led developments in the other direction: 
the new government of Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli moved to put 
some distance between itself and Romania (as well as from Moldovan 
president Mircea Snegur).21 Moldova itself remains functionally divided 
after brief fighting with a breakaway Trans-Dniester Republic in 1992. The 
potential for the réintroduction of Russian troops and increased tension 
with Romania remains real. The overall point, however, is that Romania 
now needs some things it did not need under Ceausescu: a foreign policy 
toward Moldova, an attitude toward pan-Romanianism and reunification, 
and a policy toward Ukraine and Russia that takes account of these issues.
Romania now faces potential problems from other neighbors. Any 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, for example, could have direct and 
unpleasant implications for Romania. To the west, Hungarian governments
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of both the nonsocialist and (to a lesser extent) socialist variety have 
sharply defended their co-nationals living in Transylvania. Romania has 
been unable to secure basic friendship treaties with Hungary or Ukraine. 
Relations with Bulgaria remain cordial, although, due to the changing gov- 
emments in Sofìa, subject to fibrillations that Bucharest never had to con- 
sider before. Finally, the political and economic consequences of 
Yugoslavia's collapse are not just uncertain, but economically devastating 
and physically dangerous.22
Legacies of the Past and Burdens of the Present
For East European states, such new complexity and uncertainty 
requires developing international policies à tous azimuts, as Charles de 
Gaulle once said of French defense policy.23 Inevitably, policy-makers in 
such situations develop worst-case scenarios. Without a long history of 
freestanding cooperation with their regional partners, East European lead- 
ers are vulnerable to the fearful scenarios sketched out by political oppo- 
nents, especially of the nationalist variety. Regimes find international 
cooperation awkward to initiate, cumbersome to negotiate, difficult to 
maintain, and limited in payoff. Witness Romania's attempt to initiate a 
historic reconciliation with Hungary24 and Hungary's attempt to secure 
comprehensive bilateral treaties with Slovakia and Romania.25 Even with 
coveted Western partners, the new democracies have found that attempts at 
cooperation can carry with them both the problems of the present and the 
burdens of the past. The Czechoslovak government discovered this in 
securing a friendship treaty with Germany.26 Cooperation with the West is 
seen by a small but increasingly vocal minority as too costly, too painful, 
and too acquiescent to the demands of an unresponsive West.
Finally, developing effective policy in such circumstances is made 
all the more difficult because the capacity of the new regimes to recruit, 
train, and put in place qualified analysts, diplomats, and policy-makers is 
severely constrained by lack of need in recent history, by limited 
resources, and by continuing ]political struggles over the use of holdovers 
from previous regimes.27
East European Responses: The Search for Identity
Much as they did under Soviet dominion, the East Europeans have 
struggled to find an appropriate response to these new uncertainties. Each 
new democracy has tried to create a new identity (or recreate an old one), 
to adopt polices appropriate to that identity, and to do so in a domestic envi- 
ronment that allows for criticism and debate.
Not eveiy East European state emerged from the communist period 
with an equal capacity to respond to the demands of their new situation.
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Hungary, for example, already had extensive trade and political dealings 
with a supportive West, but one byproduct of this—the highest per capita 
international debt in the region—did not necessarily work to its advantage. 
Romania, on the other hand, had virtually no debt, but by 1989 had 
destroyed whatever Western goodwill it had earned when it was willing to 
be out of step with Moscow on some foreign policy issues.
While proffering a European identity helped to jump-start demo- 
cratic practices and point the way toward future associations, it has pro- 
vided uneven payoffs. Key Western organizations have held East 
European states at arm’s length, except when it comes to lecturing about 
the benefits of tight monetary and austere fiscal policies. The transition 
regimes elected in 1990 thus found their enthusiasm for Europe unre- 
quited. This less-than-fulsome reception undermined public support for 
the new regimes, denied the new governments the symbolic payoff that 
commitment to institutional membership might have offered, and discred- 
ited many advocates of this approach.28
On a policy level, the new governments found themselves caught 
between the demands of the Western economic environment and domestic 
resistance to the erosion of social welfare. Transition governments fell in 
Poland and Hungary partly in response to this pressure, and descendants of 
the old communist parties gained power. Public opinion surveys show 
great skepticism about foreign investment alongside continued, if some- 
what soft, support for joining Western institutions.29
Many East Europeans have taken refuge from uncertainty in what 
they perceive to be the eternal verities of the region—the myths of national 
history, ethnicity, and the pernicious, conspiratorial role of “the other.” 
This was seen most starkly and tragically in the former Yugoslavia but is 
present in the anti-Western rhetoric of parties and groups virtually 
throughout the region. In Romania, Románia Mere, a nationalist party that 
was at one time a member of the coalition supporting the government, pub- 
lished a memorandum in 1995, signed by 300 members of the military, 
accusing the government of “high treason” for cooperating with NATO.30 
In Hungary, Jószef Torgyán, leader of the Independent Small-Holders 
Party (which in 1995 passed the governing Socialist Party as the most popu- 
lar party in Hungary), consistently plays on the theme that the government 
is selling out, causing too much pain, and not following a proper Hungarian 
solution.31 Torgyán’s one-time ally, István Csurka, author of a nationalist, 
anti-Semitic, anti-international tract in 1992, drew thousands to a 
demonstration in Budapest in support of his Justice and Life Party.32
Still one cannot argue that nationalism has triumphed as the domi- 
nant ideology of the region, despite the horror of the Yugoslav example. 
Polish politics, for example, has been relatively free of such posturing, and 
the Czechoslovak velvet divorce stands in contrast to the bloodletting of 
Yugoslavia. Romania and Slovakia, even with nationalists in powerful posi-
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
19The Age o f Uncertainty
tions, have not moved to dramatically reverse their countries' Western- 
oriented posture. Rather, nationalism competes in the marketplace of ideas 
against the pull of pluralism, democracy, the idea of Western Europe, and 
the practice of building an open market economy.33
Foreign Policy as a Domestic Issue
The role of nationalism is important, not because nationalists rule 
throughout Eastern Europe—they do not—but because of a key change in 
the domestic environment for international policy making. During the 
domination of the communist party, prerogatives on all policies were held 
by a tightly controlled oligarchy that tolerated little public input in any 
policy area, least of all in foreign policy. East European regimes had to 
walk the tightrope between Soviet demands and their own domestic needs, 
labeled by James F. Brown as the tension between “viability and cohe- 
sion.”34 Politically, and militarily, leaders faced a "security bind”: they 
needed to do certain things domestically to achieve active support, or at 
least passive acceptance, while avoiding doing things that would incur 
active concern or involvement from Moscow.35
Now not even the communists can rule without parliament, nor can 
they ignore domestic consequences. The new regimes' willingness and 
ability to pursue international agreements is both pushed and potentially 
retarded by the willingness of society to go along. Fragile elected regimes 
are loathe to antagonize key sectors of the public by appearing to be too 
accommodating, for example, or by appearing to abandon their co-nationals 
in neighboring countries. Regimes that ask their publics to pay high prices 
(sometimes literally) for their economic movement west will be eager to 
keep supporters happy—and to gain new supporters—using foreign policy 
issues. This is made all the more difficult when the most important, if 
symbolic, payoff—acceptance into Western organizations—is held out of 
reach.
For the new regimes, the bind is more complex because of a 
broader range of external constituencies: they need to accommodate the 
EU, the Council of Europe, and NATO on civil rights, democratic prac- 
tices, language laws, and minority rights, and they need to satisfy the EU, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), and a host of Western governments and com- 
mereiai banks on economic policy. Appeasing these external constituencies 
requires taking measures that are often politically unpopular, if not impos- 
sible, and economically very painful. The Romanian government, for 
example, is under pressure to satisfy external observers by extending lan- 
guage, cultural, and collective rights to its substantial Hungarian minority. 
Ignoring Western concerns would risk further eroding Romania's second- 
tier position among the East European applicant pool. But bowing to
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external pressure puts the minority government of Prime Minister Nicolae 
Vicároiu at risk of losing at least some of its support to more nationalistic 
competitors.36 Similarly, the socialist government of Hungarian prime 
minister Cyula Horn has been accused of devaluing the issue of Hungarian 
minorities abroad in order to secure integration with Western Europe.37 
When the Hungarian-Slovak Friendship treaty was submitted for ratifica- 
tion in Budapest, all opposition party members, both left and right, either 
abstained or voted against it.38
Foreign Penetration o f Domestic Economies
The economic sphere particularly highlights this domestic- 
international bind. East European governments have opened up their 
economies to foreign trade, investment, and advice by Western financial 
organizations and governments. At Western urging, most East European 
states have dropped tariff barriers, eliminated restrictions on foreign 
investments, and increased trade substantially with Western economies. 
Further, private economic actors have established their own links. As a 
result, the region finds its economic future closely tied to West European 
economic fluctuations.39
The combination of rapid privatization and expanding foreign pene- 
tration leaves most East European governments in the unfamiliar and 
uncomfortable position of having less control over their own economies 
than their socialist predecessors, while being more responsible to their 
populations for their economies' performance. In other words, they are 
now more like other pluralist industrial democracies.40
From a foreign policy standpoint, this means that policy decisions 
that appear essentially domestic, such as raising the minimum wage or pen- 
sions, have serious external consequences. If, for example, the IMF 
becomes displeased, it might withhold standby loans, thus dissuading 
other lenders. In 1995 the Hungarian government, faced with a burgeon- 
ing budget deficit, high inflation, and substantial debt, was obliged to adopt 
a severe austerity program in order to reassure Western bankers and secure 
the loans needed to facilitate economic growth. Prime Minister Horn 
expressed his frustration:
People in the West, be it the EU or any other international organization, 
should formulate this twin demand regarding Hungary: that Hungary 
should advance with reforms while not spending more than it produces, 
but at the same time, it  should also ensure political stability....Now, when 
these two demands clash, not only we, but the international financial 
institutions too, should start thinking.41
Ultimately only part of the program was adopted, and although it
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was effective, Finance Minister Lajos Bokros was obliged to resign.42 
The New Meaning o f Security
After World War II security was generally taken to mean protection 
of a state’s physical boundaries, its territory, and its people from aggression 
by force of arms. This approach informed the policy stances of the two ma - 
jor adversaries of the cold war period and was both derived from and rein- 
forced by the realist school of international relations.43 The world’s two 
most powerful countries saw themselves as seriously threatened only by 
each other and then chiefly by military means. But even before the end of 
the Cold War, recognition of other kinds of threats emerged as relative 
American dominance declined, and some analysts suggested that notions of 
security should be adapted as well.
Modifications of the notion of security have taken several forms. 
One school retains the focus on the nation-state as the central actor in 
world politics but argues that other kinds of threats, such as economic (e.g., 
blockades, embargoes) or environmental, are security issues when they 
affect policy prerogatives or quality of life.44 Others take a broader view 
and argue that a focus on the nation-state is out of date, that human rights, 
environmental threats, and demographic changes should inform the global- 
ist notion of security.45 A third approach accepts the centrality of the state 
but inserts the role of individual perceptions and fears into the analysis.46
Dangers identified by the globalist perspective, such as environ- 
mental destruction and population shifts, are indeed present in Eastern 
Europe, and some analyses have focused on these issues.47 But perspec- 
tives drawn largely from the viewpoint of the major powers will be only 
crude instruments for analyzing the position of smaller, less powerful 
states for whom a much larger range of constraints limit their policy pre- 
rogatives and quality of life. Certainly focusing on external military 
threats would yield a skewed picture of dangers for the regimes. Central 
Europe in particular is now a low-risk military environment.48 Interstate 
conflict over territory and resources has been remarkably absent from the 
region, the tragic example of Yugoslavia notwithstanding. Indeed the 
Yugoslav conflict, the sources of which were primarily internal, casts into 
relief the absence of interstate conflicts, despite the wrenching changes not 
just in Eastern Europe but in the European states of the former Soviet 
Union.49
Our notion of security in the region should recognize something 
the East Europeans themselves demonstrated in 1989: that dramatic chal- 
lenge and resultant changes in the security of East Europe came not from 
an invading army but from the steady decline in the relative standard of 
living and the lack of legitimacy and efficacy of the existing forms of gov - 
e mance.50 The stability and security of the region now depends crucially
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on the nature and effectiveness of democratic governance and the quality 
and vibrancy of economic progress.
Students of the behavior of small- and medium-sized states may 
have an advantage over those who focus on the great powers. Without 
struggling with the idea of decline, they instinctively link the interna- 
tional and domestic futures of the societies and political systems they 
observe. Such a link has been implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, recog- 
nized in the broad statements by the security community leadership in the 
West. In outlining the principles on which the Europe Agreements (which 
created the EU’s associate membership status) are based, the European 
Commission said, “Association agreements should help create a climate of 
confidence and stability favoring political and economic reform and allow- 
ing the development of close political relations which reflect shared vai- 
ues.”51 When the EU made its general commitment in 1993 to eventual 
membership for the East European states, they made it contingent upon 
the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, hu- 
man rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competi- 
tive pressure and market forces within the Union.”52 And when NATO 
offered its Partnership for Peace program, Western leaders pointed out, 
“Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in 
Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of 
democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intim- 
idation are therefore of direct and material concern to us.”53
Democratic security, then, is a function of the degree of participa- 
tion and legitimacy the new system provides. Participatory democracy 
gives more people a stake in the existing system and, presumably, more of a 
say in policies affecting them. Moreover, the broader the democratic sys- 
tem and the longer it works, the greater will be the expectation of those 
who are “out” that they will at one point get “in,” thus reducing the 
incentive to engage in a violent overthrow of the democratic process. As 
Adam Przeworski put it, “Democracy is a system in which parties lose elee- 
tions.”54 At the same time, greater transparency of government and more 
points of access should allow for redress of grievances and the opportunity 
both to know more about government decision-making and to influence it. 
Especially in the case of ethno-national competition, effective functioning 
of the democratic process can work to mitigate rather than exacerbate 
potentially debilitating differences.55
Internationally, creating effective democracy in Eastern Europe 
demonstrates to the ether Europe that East Europeans are ready to join the 
club. The importance of creating a compatibility of major values is clear in 
the alliance statements quoted above and was demonstrated analytically by 
Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago.56 The more East European democra- 
cies look and act like those of Western Europe, the better are their chances
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for meaningful participation in trans-European institutions, which in turn 
improves their chances to build and protect civil society. This is because 
regional organizations can broaden the context and constituency, reduce 
the chances for conflict, and improve the opportunities for cooperation on 
what had previously been bilateral issues. In this way “national” security is 
internationalized. After World War II the political conditions and institu- 
tional framework of post-war Europe defused German-French hostility and 
allowed the region to avoid a replay of decades of deadly competition by 
internationalizing national security. Referring to NATO, Michael Brenner 
writes: ‘T he alliance is much more than an exceptionally durable version 
of the classic security community. Rather, it should be viewed as an 
evolving civic community whose pacific relations are the institutionalized 
norm, rather than merely the calculated preference of states.”57
International institutions can, at least in theory, facilitate interna- 
tional cooperation by expanding the range of information and opportunities 
for negotiation, improving states’ abilities to ensure compliance, and rais- 
ing the cost of noncompliant behavior.58 There is some evidence that com - 
peting East European governments are responding to the new institutional 
environment. Speaking of the treatment of Hungarian minorities outside 
Hungaiy, István Szent-Iványi, political state secretary in the Hungarian 
Foreign Ministry, argued, “Our integration [with Europe] would increase 
these people’s opportunities, because a successful Hungary with greater 
influence and a bigger system of contacts can do more for the ethnic 
Hungarians living in its neighborhood financially, morally, and politi- 
cally.”59 The Romanian government would seem to agree. “Romania’s road 
toward В russe к  passes through Budapest,” said Foreign Minister Teodor 
Melescánu “but also Budapest’s road to Brussels passes through 
Bucharest.”60 In the most optimistic theoretical scenario, involvement 
with international institutions might actually modify state behavior by 
helping to formulate a new collective—as opposed to a nationalistic— 
identity.61
Now the bad news: East Europeans have heard it all before. U nder 
Soviet domination the bright shining future was offered through a differ- 
ent kind of internationalism, one provided by being “in”—Lenin, Stalin, 
and the Kremlin—and embodied in the “socialist commonwealth” and in 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw 
Pact. Therefore one should not be surprised to find a bit of skepticism 
about the new internationalism, especially if joining is accompanied by 
serious economic dislocation and especially if full membership is denied.62 
In such conditions, the new internationalism will find it hard to compete 
with the more powerful myths and apparently simpler solutions offered by 
nationalism.
Economic progress can help to create a constituency for the new 
system by giving more people a greater and more direct stake in its success.
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Election results in Russia and Eastern Europe show that those who per• 
ceive themselves to be losing out as a result of economic changes are more 
likely to vote for parties on both the left and right whose past history or 
contemporary programs give cause to wonder about their commitment to 
democratic progress.63 Although prosperity is not a guarantee of demo- 
cratic stability, the post-war history of Western Europe suggests that the 
combination of democracy and economic progress offers the best hope for 
security in the broadest sense, while economic inequality and relative 
decline spur attacks on the ideology that is seen to have created it—what 
Ken Jowitt calls “democratic Zhdanovism”64—and exacerbate intercom mu- 
nal competition.65
Old and New Threats to Security 
Military
As noted, the standard threats to security in Eastern Europe have 
for the most part receded. There is some terra that for some is still irre- 
denta, especially in places that were part of European Russia, such as 
Ukraine and Moldova. In virtually all these cases, however, the elected 
governments are not pursuing polices aimed at redrawing borders or 
reconquering lost lands, even if some parties advocate such policies. Nor 
does NATO's dominance of the military geography in Europe or the reuni• 
fication of Germany pose a territorial threat to Eastern Europe.
There is ample reason for fearing that Russia could, at some point i n 
the future, constitute such a threat. From the East European point of view, 
the dangers arise primarily from the emergence within Russia of political 
forces that want to turn back the clock. Almost all scenarios of danger from 
the East posit the emergence of a Russian government committed to 
nationalist goals. As the Polish foreign minister, Władysław Bartoszewski, 
put it:
There is fear o f Russia, of course. But this fear comes from extremist 
statements by such stupid people as Zhirinovskii or other unpredictable 
individuals. It is not fear o f Russia’s official policy. I t  is fear o f the 
largeness of the country and o f people such as Zhirinovskii and 20 mil- 
lion people who voted for this fool [in 1Ѳ93]. This creates a certain inse- 
curity, and people sometimes doubt the predictability and stability o f 
Russian politicians.66
Even without an election victory by Zhirinovskii, nationalists of the 
right and left put pressure on the Russian government to be more assertive 
about its role in Europe and the world. After substantial gains by com mu- 
nist and affiliated parties in the December 1995 parliamentary elections,
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Boris Yeltsin removed the most visible symbol of Western accommoda- 
tion—Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev—despite his adoption of the req- 
uisite tough stance toward the U.S. and East European membership in 
NATO. East European leaders view several other Russian actions w ith 
concern: the reabsorption of former Soviet republics into the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, pressure on the Baltic states, the 
military response in Chechnya, and attempts to exercise influence over the 
extraction and sale of natural resources in the near abroad. These are all 
seen as analogues or possible precursors to restoration of Russian control 
over Eastern Europe.
While all the East European states reject the idea of a Russian veto 
over their membership in Western alliances,67 there have been a range of 
reactions to a possible Russian resurgence. The Poles seem least inclined 
to tolerate Russian interference and most insistent that NATO make a 
commitment.68 Czech leaders—ironically, given 1968—seem less worried 
about Russian resurgence perhaps because they lack a common border and 
perhaps because the nature of their complex relationship with Germany 
looms larger.69 Romania is most fearful about being left out of any new 
security arrangements and consistently presses the U.S. and Europe not to 
discriminate among applicants. At the same time, the Romanian leadership 
is most vigorous about reassuring the Russians that their actions are not 
directed against Moscow and that an expanded NATO poses no threat.70
Political
Danger from political developments, especially the emergence of 
nationalist governments, is currently less severe in Eastern Europe. Both 
the Polish communists under Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the Hungarian 
socialists under Gyula Н о т  have proved themselves eager suitors for EU 
and NATO. Horn's socialists have implemented a severe austerity program 
required by the West and allowed the establishment of a full NATO base in 
support of the Implementation Force in Bosnia.
But challenges do exist. In Hungary the Independent Small- 
Holders Party and the more extreme Justice and Life Party have chal- 
lenged the government's eagerness to integrate with the West. In both the 
Czech Republic and Romania, extreme parties of the left and right still 
question their governments' moves to join Europe. The leader of the 
Romanian Workers Party, for example, argues that the West wants 
Romania to stay weak economically so that it can buy up all its assets.71 
While these parties are politically on the margins, in Slovakia the coalition 
partner of Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar has sharply criticized its pro- 
NATO orientation.72
That weakening or disappearance of democracy in the region would 
endanger the security of the region can be seen in several ways. Consider
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a counte !factual. How different would Romanian policy toward Hungary 
be if the nationalist Roaâaia Mare party were able to put in place its version 
of Romanian democracy? Broadly put, the greatest threat to security in 
Eastern Europe comes from those forces within countries whose vision of 
their state is exclusivist and nondemocratic—or democratic in the way that 
democratic centralism was democratic—and who would pursue agendas 
based on aligning the physical state with the historical, ethnic, or even 
mythical nation. A review of the history of conflict among states reveals 
few regularities, but one that does emerge is the democratic peace. While 
democracies tend to go to war about as often as nondemocracies, they 
almost never fight one another. This result holds up over time and geo- 
graphic area. Robust democracy seems to make resorting to international 
conflict more difficult because of its institutional constraints and the ex- 
trapolation of democratic norms to international relations.73 Partial or less 
well developed democratic governments, however, seem more likely to 
engage in disputes that escalate to violent conflict than are states in which 
no regime change has taken place. This is due in part to the absence of 
trust-building experience and the tendency in newly democratizing states 
for elites who survived the old system to manipulate the new system in 
ways that lead to conflict.74
Certainly the cases of Serbia and Croatia seem to fit this descrip - 
tion. Indeed, the conflict in former Yugoslavia has led many to conclude 
that Eastern Europe is a boiling cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds whose 
ferocity was only held in check by authoritarian regimes. As soon as the 
heavy hand was removed, the argument goes, conflict ensues.75 But 
Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria all retained powerful elites, and 
there is hardly an elaborate history of trust-building among them, yet peace 
has held. Hence, viewed comprehensively and not just through the lens of 
the Yugoslav developments, the post-1989 experience in Eastern Europe 
supports the validity of the conclusion that “the spread of democracy in 
international politics...can reduce the frequency of violent conflict among 
nations.”76
Economic
The skewed effects of movement toward a market economy has 
created winners and losers both within East European societies and across 
the region. Rural areas, pensioners, workers at large state-run enterprises, 
women, and state-funded bureaucrats have particularly felt the negative 
impact. Unemployment hovers in the 10-15% range in most of the states, 
and in many, trade unions, labor, and especially rural-based parties have 
posed strong challenges to proposed austerity programs. It is from such 
ranks that communist parties and their allies have been able to make their 
remarkable electoral comeback in Central Europe. The fact that these
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comebacks are electoral and that none of these restored parties have moved 
to change or quash democratic processes is encouraging. But the ranks of 
those who have not seen the gains of Western-inspired capitalism include 
many whose instincts do not seem to reveal a predilection for democratic 
rule. Dangers to continued pluralism and democratic security are particu- 
larly sharp when the economic agendas of extreme groups overlap with the 
region’s many ethnic or regional cleavages.
At the international level, the region has itself already split. 
Central Europe is ahead of Southeastern Europe in terms of aggregate 
growth and standard of living. More significantly for the security of the 
region, the Visegrad states attract significantly more foreign investment, 
trade more with the West, and by most accounts are first in line for mem - 
bership in the EU and NATO. Those left behind may soon see less need to 
align themselves with Western democratic practices at home or in foreign 
policy. The costs of changing the economy may be too high, especially in 
relation to the payoffs. Already throughout the region groups charge that 
their governments have “sold out” their countries to the West, that the 
IMF is the equivalent of the Red Army, and that their countiy should find 
its own path.77 The Hungarian socialists, who pushed hard on this issue in 
the 1994 elections, now find themselves challenged on the same grounds. 
“Gyula Н о т ,” said József Torgyán, “should realize that, this time, he is 
only responsible to the Hungarian society, and not to the Soviets or to the 
West.”78 A region made up of haves and have-nots may find that diverging 
economic paths lead to conflict.
More broadly, the sluggish pace of EU action leaves the whole re- 
gion on the wrong side of trade barriers at a critical time and fosters, in the 
Hungarian foreign minister’s words, “An economic, social, and welfare iron 
curtain—rather than a political and military one...with a secure, stable, and 
flourishing Europe on one side, and an unpredictable East and Central 
Europe stumbling from one crisis to another and eventually threatening 
the stability of West Europe on the other.”79
New Issues
Finally, issues that heretofore were not foreign policy issues, or not 
issues at all, now form part of the security nexus. Conflicts that have oc- 
curred, most notably in Yugoslavia, have created a flow of refugees and a 
scale of emigration not seen in Europe since the end of World War II. But 
even where overt conflict has not broken out, the degree of economic loss, 
personal insecurity, and fear of change have promoted substantia] move- 
ment to better-off areas. Economic, political, and social refugees moving 
from east to west pose a threat to the health of fragile economies and the 
democratic practices of both new and veteran democratic governments.80
Newly salient cross-border environmental issues, like nuclear
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energy production, pointedly illustrate the domestic-international nexus.81 
And the dangerous spread of organized crime, weapons proliferation, and 
smuggling of all sorts are broadly transnational, forcing the new regimes of 
Eastern Europe, and their putative Western partners, to try to fmd ways to 
deal with these new threats.82
Conclusion
The dangers to the stability of Eastern Europe, both political and 
economic, are dangers for all of Europe in two senses. Most obviously, a 
return to revolution, instability, or the appearance of opportunity for 
Russian expansion into the region would have an enormous impact on the 
West European, and American, sense of security, plunging it back to cold 
war or interwar days. Ending the new links between the different parts of 
Europe and returning to substantial defense expenditures or, worse, an 
expansion of the kind of conflict seen in Yugoslavia would create an un- 
avoidable political and economic crisis. This has been recognized most 
clearly in Bonn, which, until its own recent economic difficulties, had been 
Central Europe’s most vigorous champion in the corridors of the EU.
The challenges to the notion of Europe appearing in Eastern 
Europe are evident in Western Europe as well. The cries of pain at the 
cost of adapting to new forms of multinational integration come not only 
from Hungary but also from France. The suspicion that enough 
sovereignty has been given away is voiced not only in Romania but in Great 
Britain. This dimension of the security environment within which 
Eastern Europe operates is not so different from that which faces Western 
Europe and for which effective and sensible responses are needed. It is 
worth recalling the speed and depth of the changes of 1989. That tidal 
wave, was, for the most part, peaceful. We might not be so lucky next time.
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America and Collective Security 
in Europe
Daniel N. Nelson
As leaders of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) members assembled for photo opportunities and ponderous state- 
ments during their July 1992 Helsinki II summit, Bosnian Foreign 
Minister Haris Silajdzic noted poignantly that “This is what is killing us.”1 
Two hundred thousand deaths later, the horrors of post-Cold War armed 
struggles are all too clear. From the Adriatic to the Caucasus, devastating 
conflicts have raged in Europe largely unaffected by international action. 
Similar tragedies are taking place on other continents, as illustrated by the 
genocidal daughter in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the world imagines worst-case 
scenarios of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.
At the same time, Europe is beset by West Europeans’ second 
thoughts about consummating a political union implied by their Maastricht 
marriage, a right-wing and neo-fascist victory in Italian elections, the 
return of excommunists to power in most of Eastern and erstwhile Soviet 
Europe via open and fair elections, and America’s abandonment of leader- 
ship in the Euro-Atlantic alliance.
This troubling time, coming only five years after declarations of 
Cold War victoiy and four years after the “euphoria, optimism, [and] confi- 
dence” at the November 1990 Summit in Paris,2 requires a wrenching shift 
in our hopes, expectations and preparations for the twenty-first century. At 
issue are no less than our most deeply felt and long-standing assumptions 
about international politics and global affairs.
To some observers, these conditions of a new world disorder 
require a return to realpolitik—the so-called realism of states pursuing 
national interests through the application of power. Such engagement 
eschews multilateral commitments, while implying a calculus o f  when, 
where, and how to use force rooted in the vagaries of state interests— 
staatsrason or raison d ’etat.3 In its crudest form, such a position for the 
United States is nothing less than America first; in a more sophisticated 
expression, it is a Weltanschauung wherein international affairs is a game of 
great powers, concerts and alliances—even to the point where the only
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alternative to creeping systemic disorder is a purposeful spread of nuclear 
weaponry to other great powers so that geopolitical and geostrategic bal- 
ances are maintained.4
Alternative voices advocate a policy of global disengagement for the 
United States—a minimalist foreign presence whereby little that happens 
abroad is of consequence unless an attack on the United States itself or its 
core security interests is imminent. The principal danger to American 
interests, according to the minimalist view, is to become enmeshed in 
European (or other regions') squabbles and turmoil because of alliance 
obligations. Such a proactive isolationism, suggesting that the United 
States “design strategies that will insulate America from the economic and 
political consequences of future European rivalries,”5 has garnered little 
enthusiasm. In large part, that response is because disengagement contra- 
diets the obvious—that the world extant when George Washington and 
other Founders warned against entangling alliances cannot be recreated. 
In an environment of transnational threats and global communications, 
ours is no longer a choice between engagement or disengagement; aggres- 
sion, genocide, ethnic cleansing and other barbarous acts harm us by their 
presence, not only when they reach our borders.
A third path, often disparaged, is that of collective security. Seen as 
a radical or utopian departure by some, and alleged to have a historical 
record of failure, few analysts have explored means by which Euro-Atlantic 
or global security could be pursued collectively.6 But most criticisms, 
including 1992 commentaries by Josef Joffe and Richard K. Betts address 
caricatures of collective security—straw men, rather than sensible alterna- 
tives that could be the product of diplomacy informed by both principles 
and real world threat assessments.
Collective security ought not be viewed as a system in lieu of 
alliances for common defense but, rather, as a robust companion. 
Collective security failures repeated by critics of the concept, for example, 
the oft-cited League of Nations debacle when confronted by fascism and 
Nazism, was less a failure than a misapplication of the concept. Collective 
security and common defense can and should reinforce each other at every 
step; security, as an indivisible commodity, must be sought both by abating 
threats through all поп-lethal means and by heightening capacities to 
defeat aggression if it nonetheless occurs. When a security threat is 
unequivocal and originates from one principal source—as for decades of 
the Cold War—NATO was an adequate means by which to meet communist 
and Soviet dangers. Through NATO, the Unitea Slates and its allies made 
assiduous efforts to deter aggression and meet threat with counter-threat. 
Now, when the sources of threat become more ambiguous and numerous, 
the same counter-threat is ineffective; armored regiments, aircraft carriers 
or even special forces have little effect against ethnic strife, human rights 
violations, terrorism, mass migration, and other destabilizing develop- 
ments. While we need to retain a capacity to project force, we also neea a 
capability to inject monitors, observers, negotiators, and peacekeepers into 
volatile situations. In the broadest sense, Europe and other continents 
need a regional capability to reduce threats at the earliest opportunity.
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Collective security, then, is neither an unnecessary appendage to 
other structures nor a naive feel-good remnant of idealism. Empirical 
studies, indeed, have found suggestive evidence to the contrary—that 
“states [practicing] collective security can expect to fare better [i.e., are 
more likely to survive] than states adhering to any of a number of realist 
strategies.”7
The Failure at Helsinki II
The leaders of fifty-one states came to Helsinki in mid-1992 for 
only the third such high-level CSCE (otherwise known as the Helsinki 
Process) meeting. But that gathering, unlike the Paris summit of 
November 1990, had no upbeat script. Instead, the pallor of warfare from 
the Adriatic to the Caucasus hung ominously over the agenda.
In fairness, Euro-Atlantic security did not leave Helsinki com- 
pletely empty handed. The summit, for example, declared that CSCE is a 
regional arrangement under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, inaugurated a 
steering-group arrangement whereby the whole CSCE membership need 
not convene in a crisis, used for the first time CSCE's consensus-minus- 
one decision mechanism to suspend the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), approved the creation of a CSCE commissioner for minori- 
ties, and agreed that Western military force could be deployed in Bosnia to 
ensure deliveries of humanitarian relief.8
Subsequently, some of these actions—particularly those undertaken 
by the High Commissioner for National Minorities—have proven to be 
extremely valuable. With a shoestring budget and a staff of volunteers and 
people seconded from foreign ministries and nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs) such modest initiatives have become one of the best bargains for 
European security.
But these were not measures generated by the strategic assessments 
of statesmen. Instead, as television vividly depicted intense suffering in 
Sarajevo, Western leaders were forced to recognize that they could not 
remain aloof. The United States, which had sought to confine CSCE to a 
role “principally as a consultative framework for promoting stability in 
Europe,” was pushed by the unconscionable acts of Serbian President 
Slobodan MiloSevid and his allies to reassess its position.9
As tragedies arising from their previous inaction dawned on 
Western leaders, the Helsinki II summit did give CSCE an enlarged 
portfolio. Unfortunately, those small steps were desultory and belated, 
failing to move toward genuine collective security with an unequivocal 
political endorsement or adequate resources. The Western powers took a 
second look at collective security during the Helsinki II meeting, but they 
then turned away from the tasks that would have required political will 
and the commitment of resources.
While people die and principles are trampled, political fears blind 
leaders and analysts to the palpable need for a strategic shift towards truly 
collective security. Helsinki II still tinkered when tragic events
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demanded large scale construction of security architecture. None of the 
temporizing steps taken in July 1992 provided anything more than height- 
enea visibility for a still impotent forum.
Nearly three years later, such lost opportunities have left the West 
with a terrible choice—to endorse the gains of aggression by approving a 
territorial division of Bosnia, thereby inviting a future rekindling of war, 
or to acknowledge that punitive military action is necessary to enforce UN 
resolutions and to exhibit resolve against genocide and aggression.
The Concept o f Collective Security
Collective security differs fundamentally from common defense. 
In the latter, dominant or hegemonic powers gather allies around them, 
sharing not values but opposition to a clear and ominous adversary. 
Alliances for common defense implement strategies of containment and 
deterrence, and attempt to prevent war by balancing military capacities, not 
by reducing threats.
By contrast, collective security begins with the premise that threats 
may arise from within, and that avoiding them is at least as critical as 
countering those external threats with military capacities. Collective secu- 
rity arrangements are bound to include, not exclude, concern for the peace, 
stability and well-being of all participants.
Techniques for non-offensive defense, studies of conflict reduction 
by joint academic/policy centers, mediation via crisis resolution organs, 
collective and binding economic sanctions, and peacekeeping forces to sepa- 
rate disputants are all examples of collective efforts that avoid resorting to 
military coercion. Collective security does not deny the right of self- 
defense, but by dampening threats, it also seeks to minimize the need to 
exercise that right.
Both the League of Nations and the United Nations charters 
invoked images of global commitments to mediation, conflict resolution, 
and peacekeeping. Carrying out the UN's potential collective security role 
proved impossible during the Cold War. The veto power vested in five 
permanent members of the Security Council usually precluded action; 
indeed, the Security Council chamber frequently became merely another 
arena for the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Despite the end of the Cold War, the 
veto power may still prevent effective action, especially in Eurasian con- 
flicts. Chinese intransigence may, for instance, block forceful UN sane- 
tions against North Korea.
The continuing obstructionist potential of the veto power is only 
one source of trouble. Another problem is the rising financial burden. The 
deployment of truce observers/peacekeepers in Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia 
ana other locales has virtually exhausted UN resources.
Secretary Cenerai Boutros Boutros-Ghali has reported to the 
Security Council on suggestions for a substantially enhanced UN capacity 
for military operations along the lines originally considered by Articles 42 
and 43 of the Charter. But the UN's role is unlikely to expand into the
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vast global security role projected in 1945—not, at least, if the states having 
vetoes may be parties to disputes (as Russia is likely to be), and if peace- 
keeping operations cannot be financed through other means. Regional 
organizations such as the CSCE may offer greater potential.
CSCE: Instrument or Obstacle?
CSCE originated in 1973 during the diplomatic endeavors to 
reduce East-West confrontation. Delegates from thirty-five states—all 
European nations, except Albania, plus Canada and the United States—met 
for more than two years to draft the Helsinki Accords (formally, the 
Helsinki Final Act).
Signed on 1 August 1975, the Final Act added significantly to the 
claim that all states must behave in ways consistent with higher stan- 
dards—toward their own citizens and toward each other. Three principal 
areas, or baskets, of agreements enunciated principles on 1) relations 
between states, including mutual security assurances, 2) economic, seien- 
tific and environmental cooperation, and 3) human contacts and exchanges.
Basket 1 incorporated ten principles guiding relations between par- 
ticipating states, “including respect for human rights..., equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, territorial integrity of states, peaceful set- 
tlement of disputes, [the] inviolability of frontiers...and military secu- 
rity.”10
Basket 2 detailed the elements of cooperation outside the realm of 
security, plus reciprocal assistance in “transport, tourism, migrant work- 
ers...and personnel training,” while Basket 3 concerned family reunifica- 
tion and visits across the erstwhile Cold War divide in Europe plus the 
“free flow of information, cultural cooperation and educational 
exchanges.”11
Until the late 1980s the CSCE process remained an instrument of 
Cold War competition. Periodic follow-up sessions to gauge implementa- 
tion of the 1975 Accord—in Belgrade (1977-78) and Madrid (1980-83)— 
were confrontational, affected by worsening Soviet-American relations. 
Additional inter-sessional meetings on more specific topics were begun in 
the late 1970s as well, although most were beset by East-West intransi- 
gence. For the West, CSCE was a cudgel with which to strike blows 
against human rights abuses committed by Soviet and East European com- 
munist regimes.
Human rights monitoring formed a large part of CSCE’s endeavors 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the courageous activities of Helsinki- 
related groups within communist states drove a wedge of conscience into 
Leninist authoritarian systems. But not until Mikhail Gorbachev’s new 
thinking on foreign policy, coincident with the third principal follow-up 
session of CSCE held in Vienna from November 1986 through January
1989, did CSCE’s movement into the realm of security have a chance to 
quicken.
Vienna could have set the Helsinki Process on track toward
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becoming the Euro-Atlantic security architecture for the twenty-first cen- 
tuiy. That potential for CSCE development was not, however, achieved.
No one can doubt that the mandate produced by the Vienna follow- 
up meeting substantially expanded CSCE activities in the realm of confi- 
dence and security-building measures and conventional arms reductions, 
moving beyond the Stockholm agreements of 1986. Variously described as 
a watershed in the CSCE process and a prelude to revolution, the Vienna 
meeting undoubtedly helped by its very existence to accelerate the disin- 
tegration of authoritarianism in Europe’s eastern half.12 Those evaluations 
are particularly relevant in the domains of confidence-building and con- 
ventional arms reductions, where the 1975 Helsinki commitments were 
“elevated...to a higher level of ambition,” with calls for additional work on 
CSBMs, and a mandate for negotiations in the CSCE framework “between 
the Warsaw Pact and NATO...on conventional armed forces in Europe
(CFE).13״
Yet for all that the Vienna follow-up meeting might have been, it 
proved to be the beginning of a disastrous foreign policy blunder. At the 
Vienna meetings, the democratic West lost a chance to transform CSCE 
into a vigorous institution. Had major Western powers been sufficiently 
far-sighted, there could have emerged in early 1989 a security architecture 
more advanced than CSCE is today, even after Helsinki II—a Euro- 
Atlantic security organization that could have ameliorated the threats that 
led inexorably to the full-scale wars now under way in both the Balkans 
and Caucasus. An absence of strategic vision led, instead, to a wasteful and 
indecisive 1989-90 debate in which the United States was joined by Britain 
and other Atlanticists in opposing the strengthening of CSCE.
During that two-year period of far-reaching change, Germany’s for- 
eign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, argued strenuously for a stronger 
CSCE role and a rapid expansion of its duties and resources.14 His posi- 
tion received vocal support from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. 
The Czechoslovaks offered, as early as April 1990, a rather detailed plan for 
a new pan European security institution, within which there would be a 
permanent Commission on Security.13 Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, speaking to the North Atlantic Assembly on 29 November
1990, argued for a parallel development of both an enlarged NATO and an 
all-European security system.16 Meanwhile, prominent U.S. newspapers 
editorialized about the need to think anew about the potential for collective 
security in the form of a European Security Council.17
Unfortunately, as walls fell, playwrights became presidents, and 
tyrants were overthrown, American policymakers congratulated themselves 
for their triumph over communism and concentrated on protecting old U.S. 
prerogatives as NATO’s dominant alliance partner. Because of that myopia, 
U.S. leaders lost a chance to prepare for the onslaught of unattended prob- 
lems from the eastern half of Europe. President George Bush, speaking at 
the Helsinki CSCE summit in 1992, admitted as much when he said that, 
even in 1990, “we did not appreciate what awaited us.”18
When the second CSCE summit was held in Paris during late 
November 1990, signing the CFE treaty, blessing German unification, and
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broadly denoting the end of the Cold War with the Charter of Paris were 
the principal agenda items. And, although the United States consented to 
the establishment of minimal institutions for CSCE—a tiny secretariat in 
Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office of Free 
Elections in Warsaw—the American position on collective security 
remained far more doubtful than that of most of Washington’s European 
allies.
As noted above, the new noncommunist governments in East- 
Central and Southeastern Europe joined with Genscher in 1989-90 to call 
for pan European collective security. Varying proposals came from then 
Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewslci and former Czechoslovak 
foreign minister Jiri Dienstbier. In contrast to these larger and progres- 
sive visions, the NATO-first American position severely limited CSCE's 
structure, staff (until late 1992, only seventeen diplomats and support per- 
sonnel), and budget (totaling a few million dollars per year).
The Bush administration's foreign policy tethered CSCE, preclud- 
ing until late 1990 any metamorphosis into a post-Cold War mechanism for 
collective security. Although Bush spoke often of prudence, his policy 
exhibited a reticence towards CSCE bom of the fear that an invigorated 
CSCE would supplant the North Atlantic Alliance. These fears were 
expressed behind a facade of rationality—that CSCE's consensual process 
would make it incapable of action, that its size alone meant cumbersome 
and irresolute response to crises, and that states would not submit them- 
selves to CSCE authority.19
By 1991 the East Europeans began to back away from pan-European 
solutions, recognizing that the only position compatible with U.S. views 
was a NATO-centered policy. Given their dependence on U.S. and other 
NATO members' financial largesse, East European leaders began pilgrim- 
ages to Brussels, and Atlantic Clubs or similar groups sprouted from Sofia 
to Warsaw, all in close collusion with American embassies. Visionary 
statesmen in the fledgling democracies of post-communist Europe had not 
abandoned their convictions about the importance of collective security; 
rather they knew that the alternative was not feasible without 
Washington’s support.20
Without particular enthusiasm from the United States, a high-level 
consultative network was agreed upon in a supplemental document of the 
November 1990 Paris CSCE summit.21 Foreign ministers form the core of 
this network, meeting as a council at least once a year. A Committee of 
Senior Officials serves as CSCE's coordinating body, convening an average 
of once a month in 1991 and less frequently thereafter (as CSCE processes 
became accepted practice). Other intercessional meetings (e.g., symposia or 
seminars) and noninstitutional mechanisms by which member states con- 
vene to respond to specific problem areas (e.g., unusual military activities), 
formed the bulk of CSCE's presence prior to 1992. Thereafter, the range of 
other endeavors has continued to expand—seminars on the human dimen- 
sion and forums on economic issues nave been long winded and minimally 
productive. More tangibly, the high commissioner on national minorities 
(former Dutch foreign minister Max van der Stoel) has been highly
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effective on a meager budget as an early warning and mediating office in 
the Hague.22 Likewise, the Forum on Security Cooperation—meant to har- 
monize various arms control agreements in the aftermath of German unifi- 
cation, the Warsaw Pact’s demise, and the dissolution of multinational 
states—has made limited but useful progress. Major review conferences 
regarding the human dimension also continue, most recently in Budapest 
from 10 October to 2 December 1994.
Activity within and around CSCE was frequent, visible, and time- 
consuming. Beset by a lack of political will among its largest and most 
powerful members, however, CSCE’s institutions have not been invested 
with the resources or capacity to do much more than talk, observe, and 
report. Opportunities lost in 1989-92 continue to be lost after the 
Helsinki II summit. Notwithstanding a few bright spots, such as the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, the CSCE has none of the impri- 
matur of Washington and other Western capitals. As a consequence, 
although CSCE does much more in the mid-1990s than it has ever done, it 
has relatively little to show for all of its motion.
Policy Failure: The Obsession with NATO
Glaring by its absence is any American willingness to think beyond 
NATO-provided Euro-Atlantic security. Instead, U.S. policy-makers have 
sought to deflect attempts to develop a robust, well-endowed companion to 
NATO—a true Euro-Atlantic security organization that might emerge from 
the nucleus of CSCE. Instead, the United States continues to regard 
CSCE as a tertiary player in a post-Cold War Europe.
Since 1989 providing life support for NATO—revised roles, new 
structures, altered vocabulary—has remained far more important to the 
U.S. State Department and Pentagon than thinking about what might be in 
America’s best interests as we fast approach the twenty-first century. 
Americans officials at NATO and the U.S. State Department have busily 
undertaken the recoding of the venerable Atlantic alliance during the first 
half of the 1990s. A new appendage created in late 1991, the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC), included all NATO and former Warsaw Pact 
members, and was meant, somehow, to address the hemorrhaging security 
in the Continent’s eastern half.
But few people in Eastern Europe, Russia, or other post-Soviet 
states were impressed with NACC. Although the East Europeans were 
able to see the security umbrella, NACC did not open it. This second-class 
association with NATO for former WTO members was a pallid and risky 
substitute for robust collective security that acts to prevent conflict and 
ameliorate threats. People in the eastern half of Europe understood that 
reality so clearly that they sought new bilateral and regional alliances and 
associational ties with every existing Western institution, while simulta- 
neously turning up the heat for NATO membership. The Poles and
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At the March 1992 opening of the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting, 
even as ominous signs mounted that fighting in Bosnia, Moldova, and the 
Caucasus would intensify, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence J. 
Eagleburger spoke only of incremental changes in CSCE. He encouraged 
an expansion of CSCE’s activities in democratic institution-building, 
adding to its longstanding work in human rights and arms control.24 But 
he offered no suggestions for additional CSCE authority concerning the 
increasingly crucial security issues.
At NATO's Oslo meeting in April 1992, another step was taken 
toward ensuring that NATO alone would decide if military force would be 
deployed within Europe as peacekeepers and/or peace-enforcers. NATO 
leaders announced that the Alliance would be willing to consider a CSCE 
reauest for NATO military assets to serve in a peacekeeping role.25 
Although much of the press coverage of that pronouncement conveyed the 
sense that NATO’s public relations apparatus wanted—i.e., that this was a 
step forward, for the first time enabling CSCE to call upon NATO—the 
Oslo agreement was not particularly supportive of CSCE. Given that 
CSCE's decision-making process remained consensus-minus-one, NATO 
will only rarely receive suen requests and, even then, can act only when all 
of NATO’s 16 members agree. And, of course, the agreement can also be 
seen as NATO's marker that deploying military force is its business, and 
that any future development of collective security will be limited to roles 
other than those already staked out by the North Atlantic alliance.
NATO’s hesitant, minimal steps in Bosnia are a product of such 
muted enthusiasm for becoming agents of a collective security organization. 
A chain of command in which NATO implements decisions made by UN 
commanders is met with no enthusiasm in Brussels, and the 
“finger-pointing” among NATO members and between NATO and the 
United Nations has been debilitating and has undermined the effective- 
ness of the peacekeeping operation.26
But the United States has remained tied irrevocably to NATO, 
which is deemed by national officials to be the sine qua non of American 
presence in Europe and the best means of ensuring Washington’s interests. 
NATO is so deeply enshrined in these perceptions of its security and 
national interests that its metamorphosis nas been the leitmotif of U.S. - 
West European relations during both the Bush and Clinton administra- 
tions, within which all other issues (responses to Balkan crises, German 
reunification, force reductions, etc.) are framed. At NATO’s Rome summit 
in November 1991, after a prolonged intra-alliance strategic review, there 
was clear evidence that the United States had dug in its heels; NATO was 
to remain the single pillar of Euro-Atlantic security, with everything else 
in distinctly supporting roles. U.S. president George Bush declared at the 
Rome summit that “the NATO alliance was the guarantor of security and 
stability in Europe and could not be replaced, even in the long term.”27 
More than a year earlier, Secretary of State James Baker stated the same 
position clearly and unequivocally—that “only NATO can continue to guar- 
antee European security and stability.”28
When NATO leaders met again in Brussels in January 1994, the
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survival of the Alliance was still at stake, but with added urgency. As noted 
above, East Europeans—particularly the Poles and Hungarians—had made 
NATO membership an acute issue during 1993, relentlessly arguing that 
their ability to remain stable, democratic and outside a renewed Russian 
orbit depended on entry into the North Atlantic alliance.
By the fall of 1993 the United States had developed a vague 
response to the NATO enlargement issue in the concept of Partnership for 
Peace (PFP). The meaning and significance of PFP was not entirely clear 
the plan was first announced publicly at a NATO defense ministers’ meet - 
ing in October 1993. It vaguely connoted more than the talking-shop of the 
NACC, but far less than NATO membership, with which would come guar- 
antees of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (an attack on one is an attack on 
all).
By the time of the NATO summit in January 1994, the closing 
communiqué could include several articles on PFP, each stressing the real, 
active, concrete nature of Partnerships, e.g., by “creating an ability to oper- 
ate with NATO forces in fields such as peace Reeping.”29
Threading the needle between Eastern Europe's plaintive cries for 
more security and Moscow's objection to enlarging NATO required a 
skillful rendering of words and deeds. Commitments without the mutual 
guarantees, a path toward NATO membership without signposts, military 
cooperation without a political alliance—these and many other juxtaposed 
phrases imply an attempt by the United States and its principal allies to 
offer something to Europe’s eastern half without providing either anything 
very costly or anything very substantial.30
The wars in the former Yugoslavia have spotlighted a grand failure 
of Western, and specifically American, post-Cold War policy. The Chanter 
of Paris of November 1990 commits all states of the Euro-Atlantic region to 
“build, consolidate, and strengthen democracy...to safeguard...freedom of 
expression, tolerance of all groups...and equality of opportunity....”31 The 
Charter’s linkage of regional peace and security to the domestic environ- 
ments of all states for the first time implies a collective responsibility to 
ensure democracy, the rule of law and human rights so that all may live 
peacefully. Specifically, the Charter asserts the right of collective engage- 
ment in internal affairs of states:
We emphasize that the commitments undertaken in the field o f the 
human dimension o f the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate con- 
cem to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the inter- 
nal affairs o f the State concerned. The protection and promotion o f 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the strengthening of 
democratic institutions continue to be a vital basis for our comprehensive 
security.32
But these implied responsibilities ring hollow when there is no 
willingness to enforce commitments. As aggression, genocide (ethnic 
cleansing), and other atrocities went unanswered in Bosnia, Western and 
U.S. priorities became clear. Such a willingness will not come from
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Washington as long as national interests define security and national power 
augmented by alliances are thought to be the premier means of ensuring it.
Only a clouded vision, or none at all, would see security to be well 
served by the hand-holding function of NACC, the competitive lapdog 
behavior encouraged by PFP as former Warsaw Pact members tiy desper- 
ately to be first to sign up or first to hold maneuvers with NATO forces, or 
by post-hoc battlefield policing by UN blue helmets. Soothing talc in 
Brussels or carnage cleanup in Bosnia are inhumane substitutes for the 
ultimate security of conflict prevention.
Roots o f Blindness
How can such a misguided policy be explained? Individual self - 
intererst may provide some of the answer, as careers are endangered by the 
slippage of NATO’s preeminence. There was also some talk in Washington 
among policymakers, members of Congress, and think-tank experts of let- 
ting the Europeans—particularly the French—demonstrate in tne Yugoslav 
catastrophe their incapacity to resolve crises without NATO, and especially 
without U.S. leadership.“  This desire to demonstrate NATO’s inaispens- 
ability led to some observers to suspect that U.S. policy regarding CSCE 
was a calculated effort to ensure its failure in tne growing conflicts of 
Europe’s eastern half. In conversations with many of the key policymakers 
in the United States and Europe, I have found little corroboration for such 
a conspiracy thesis. Nevertheless, the thought that Europe’s indecisive- 
ness and disunity would become apparent, absent American resolve, was a 
hope that many in Washington have been unable to conceal.
The most often cited rationale for minimalizing CSCE was the dan- 
ger of linking national security to a large, amorphous forum when 
American national interests were not threatened by turmoil in the Balkans 
or Caucasus. To take a pass on Yugoslavia, as one senior Bush adviser told 
me in the spring of 1992, was a direct consequence of judging that U.S. 
national interests were unaffected by ethno-nationalist warfare, and that 
involvement in multilateral efforts would needlessly intermingle 
American concerns with those of other states.
Hence, U.S. officials made no effort to heighten CSCE’s profile, 
and let the European Community and, ultimately, the United Nations try 
to deal with the political and security dimensions of the growing Yugoslav 
crisis. Not until 1994, when the failure of multilateral institutions had 
been amply demonstrated, did the great powers act in concert as a “contact 
group” in an effort to bring an end to the vicious Bosnian conflict.
Thus stated, the U.S. position regarding the broad issue of collec- 
tive security, and its specific applicability in Yugoslavia, has the ring of 
rationality. But underlying that mindset is the deeply troubling ideology 
of political realism. Political realism, or realpolitik, is an appealing concept 
for those who seek assurances amidst what some writers have called the 
new world disorder. As uncertainties and dangers of the post-Cold War 
environment become evident, interest in older, comfortable paradigms
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such as realpolitik has grown.
Realists argue that, after the demise of a bipolar concentration of 
power, nation states will return to a general struggle for power, defined 
primarily in military terms, as they pursue national interests. National 
interests require that states seek “military capabilities sufficient to deter 
attack by potential enemies," and that peace and stability “result through 
the operation of a balance of power propelled by self interest.”34 Realist 
tenets emphasize power as tne fundamental commodity of international 
relations, national interests as the guiding principles of policymakers, and 
balances of power as the means by which to pursue such interests without 
war.
That reasoning is at the core of both America's aloofness toward col- 
lective security and of the U.S. decision to take a pass on Yugoslavia. Not 
until the boay count and graphic horrors of ethnic cleansing made it 
impossible to turn away did American policy move perceptibly. America's 
power and interests are thought to be embedded in a tried and trusted 
NATO, while any proportional diminution of the U.S. role (e.g., in a larger 
body without a preponderant American military weight) would throw 
national interests into the cauldron of collective decision-making, which 
the United States does not control.
Both Washington's passivity toward the Yugoslav tragedy and the 
aversion to CSCE are direct consequences of the belief that America's sta - 
tus as the world's last superpower renewed an old standard for foreign 
policy commitments—clear national interests. According to realist reason- 
ing, unless such unequivocal interests are at stake, commitments of 
American political, economic or military resources should not be under- 
taken. By this logic, based on the two crucibles of political realism (power 
and interests), one uses power only when interests are threatened; to do so 
when clear national interests are not threatened would damage security.
But this policy assumes that, as the centuiy draw to a close, unam- 
biguous national interests exist, that such interests can be defended by 
national power alone, and the exercise of power in the name of national 
interests will produce security. Even after one of the most exhaustive and 
exhausting reviews of U.S. defense strategy and force structure ever con- 
ducted, the Clinton administration's own Bottom Up Review came up with 
a vision of American power projection that is unguided by any clear 
national security strategy and increasingly unaffordable.35 Defining 
national interests and matching power to those interests have become an 
extremely murky enterprise.
The Clinton administration has adopted Bush administration poli- 
cies and the same disjointed realist logic. Against Saddam Hussein, the 
U.S. led and dominated the coalition forces. The adversary was malevo- 
lent, and the war's result was sold to the American public as an unqualified 
victory. Power used to protect interests (oil, allies such as Saudi Arabia, 
etc.) seemed to beget security. But as that victory has proved to be far less 
glorious, and the policies that led to the original crisis were traced to the 
White House, the linkage between power, national interests, and a twenty- 
first century understanding of security grew tenuous.
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The Bush administration’s spurious syllogism has gone unchal- 
lenged by Bill Clinton. Clinton, too, has signed on to the old adage that 
national interests must guide security policy, and that power must be the 
principal instrument of such policy. By accepting these norms, neither 
Bush nor Clinton have been able to provide a strategy for post-communist 
Europe. Threats in the region, from turmoil and  collapse in nascent 
democracies to economic dislocation, migration and the spread of warfare, 
are transnational and systemic, affecting not the lives of Americans today, 
but the potential for Americans to live in peace and prosperity in the 
future. Husbanding military resources by avoiding peacemalcing commit- 
ments, for example, does less to conserve power than to erode the bases for 
strength.
Mistaking woodenheadedness for realism, George Bush's foreign 
policy stayed the course and headed for rocky shoals. Bill Clinton has 
failed to take any corrective action. By eschewing collective security, we 
have become increasingly less relevant to Europe’s future, more isolated 
with our missiles and our marines, and unable to offer meaningful altema- 
tives to recurrent strife throughout the Continent’s eastern half36 And, by 
denying to ourselves any tool for trying to ameliorate threats, we are left 
with an unpalatable choice—launching a costly great power intervention 
after the killing has begun or taking a seat from which to watch the slaugh- 
ter.
CSCE could have been far more, and could have been a path to 
avoid Yugoslav-style wars. The U.S. adherence to a misplaced political real- 
ism, evident in both the Bush and Clinton presidencies, has led both to 
CSCE’s stunted development in the post-Cold War era, and to unmitigated 
tragedy in southeastern Europe. Were we to realign U.S. post-Cold War 
strategy dramatically, backing unequivocally a fully institutionalized Euro- 
Atlantic collective security system, we might yet avoid worst-case scenarios 
in Moldova, Kosovo, and Macedonia, as well as in the Caucasus, Crimea, 
and other potential hot spots. The time for accomplishing that task, how- 
ever, has become exceedingly short.
Scenarios for Collective Security
The genesis of regional collective security can only follow one of 
two routes. Either an existing institution must metamorphose, becoming 
an organization to dampen threats effectively, or a new companion entity 
must be inaugurated.
NATO’s functional and territorial expansion—thereby adding to an 
alliance for common defense both the geography and responsibilities of a 
more all-inclusive regional collective security organization—has been 
advocated strongly by American analysts.37 Indeed, that route has become 
the default option for U.S. and Western policy. No one has had the politi- 
cal will to create a Euro-Atlantic collective security system, so the meta- 
morphosis of NATO, the European Union, the Western European Union, 
and the Council of Europe—an amalgam of allegedly interlocking
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institutions—has become the pragmatic alternative. As all struggle to 
broaden and/or deepen, they may yield some of the results sought through 
a more idealistic collective security organization.
At the moment, however, NATO remains the only credible security 
architecture. No matter how real the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat was 
for several decades, NATO unquestionably succeeded in keeping the 
United States engaged in Europe, while contributing to West European 
integration by minimizing fears of a resurgent Germany.
For NATO, however, winning in the short term has meant losing in 
the long term. Gone is an unambiguous adversaiy that gave NATO a clear 
raison a être, and an unarguable threat with which to forge unity and 
diminish domestic opposition to militaiy spending. Since 1989 NATO has 
struggled to come to grips with the end of at least one phase of its career; 
the purpose for which it lived is no more.
After Europe’s tectonic political shifts in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, NATO has sought to repackage and reinvent itself. After strategic 
reviews, defense planning papers, conferences, North Atlantic Council ses- 
sions and Alliance summits, NATO has been trimmed, broadened, and 
stretched. Military forces available to Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
have decreased significantly, while restructuring has meant an abandon- 
ment of forward deployment.
Beyond those specifically military changes, NATO has had to con- 
front the immense political challenge of how to behave toward erstwhile 
Warsaw Pact adversaries. NATO’s response to that challenge has been to 
drift toward expansion, with no one at the helm. Not wanting NATO’s 
preeminence in the security domain to be subordinated to any other orga- 
nization, the U.S. and Western Europe have offered first the NACC and 
then, in January 1994, Partnership For Peace (PFP).
The drift toward danger is evident in several respects. Military 
cooperation under the auspices of PFP implies an obligation to improve the 
capability and compatibility of East European forces. But such 
NATO-ization is expensive, and no one knows from whom the money is to 
come.
Second, Partnerships will not create partners, at least not within 
Europe's eastern half. PFP fosters an unseemly contest among these states 
for Western attention and resources, and competition rather than collabo- 
ration. If one state were to gain rapid advancement into NATO circles, its 
neighbors would not be sanguine, suspecting that NATO's guarantees could 
become a shield for pressures and intimidations.
Also damaging is the continued absence in PFP of clear markers on 
the path toward NATO membership. President Clinton reassured Poles 
while at Warsaw in early July 1994 that they will be at the head of the 
line.38 But will NATO's security guarantees be provided first to those who 
behave best or to those who need it the most? Specific criteria and the rei- 
ative weight of each factor for entering NATO are unstated.
Finally, none of the former Warsaw Pact countries have been 
offered any security guarantees with PFP, but all must fulfill new respon - 
sibilities. For NATO and for the proto-democracies in Eastern and
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post-Soviet Europe, the gap between expectations and responsibilities is 
unhealthy. For regional security, that gap constitutes a real and present 
danger.
All of this means that PFP has fostered a security race, the losers of 
which will exhibit a security envy pushing them toward other patrons — 
Russia, Germany or possibly other states such as France, Italy, and Turkey 
that have served suen a role in the past centuiy for one or more states in 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe. NATO leaders have said repeatedly that 
NATO is open to more members—not if, but when. The pertinent ques- 
tions, however, are who and why, not if or when.
The terrible mistake is being made of again drawing lines in 
Europe, despite rhetoric to the contrary. Rather than seeing security as 
indivisible and collective, it appears that the Western powers will offer 
guarantees to those they like best, not to those whose peace and prosperity 
are most endangered. Furthermore, the Western governments continue to 
imply that the route to the secure environs of NATO lead through PFP's 
scheme for military cooperation.
Yet that is only one component of security. NATO's role in the 
twenty-first century should not mix and confuse the roles of an alliance for 
common defense and an organization for collective security. NATO should 
be NATO. Rather than attempting to transform into a larger, indistinct 
organization that mixes roles, ends and means, NATO should retain its 
West European and North American focus—where membership and capac- 
ity to fulfill responsibilities are coextensive, and where interstate conflicts 
are no longer plausible.
A credible military defense for North Atlantic democracies is a sub- 
stantively different enterprise than is threat abatement for the Vancouver 
to Vladivostok hemisphere. Proliferation, mass migration, terrorism, and 
other transnational threats are palpable but unaffected by most unilateral or 
multilateral military contingencies. Air, naval, or ground forces can do lit- 
tie to mitigate these perils and offer only a blunt and rarely successful 
response to such new threats.
For threat abatement, NATO must have the help of a strong 
companion organization in which membership is universal. Such an 
organization would extend confidence building, early warning, and other 
conflict resolution mechanisms, as well as undertaking observer and 
peacekeeping missions. Those are the roles of a fully-institutionalized 
regional collective security organization, not an alliance that exists to plan 
for power projection and war fighting. The United Nations, overtaxed 
financially ana slow to act, cannot fulfill such regional missions—and need 
not in Europe, where ample regional resources exist.
NATO's future role ought to be to ensure that threat abatement 
works—to provide the essential guarantee absent when previous experi- 
ments with collective security ended in tragedy. Neither half of the secu- 
rity equation will alone suffice; alliances to enhance military capacities 
meant to deter or defeat threats and collective security organizations 
designed to minimize and mitigate threats need each other.
Generating a new Euro-Atlantic collective security organization
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w ill thus depend on NATO and its principal members. The metamorphosis 
o f NATO itse lf is not the answer. The devastation in both the Balkans and 
Caucasus, and the dangers at other flashpoints such as M oldova and 
Crimea, as w ell as the sheer cost o f try ing  to  halt ethno-nationalist warfare 
once it  has produced martyrs and monuments to fuel more atrocities, may 
foster heightened po litica l w ill in the m id and late 1990s to  bu ild  other 
in s titu tio n s .
And, as the pe ril o f new threats that cannot be m itigated by NATO 
o r its appendages becomes more acute, a forum such as a CSCE sum m it 
m ight provide the starting po in t fo r developing a follow -on organization. 
Prolonged negotiations are inevitable, but the start should be soon.
The precise outline o f a Euro-A tlantic collective security organiza- 
tion  lies beyond the scope o f this analysis. Universal membership would 
be essential, but the consensual nature o f CSCE decisions could not con- 
tinue. Actions in the realm o f security must be taken by a smaller subset o f 
the to ta l membership, and decisions w ith in  such a commission ought to  be 
valid i f  supported by a majority.
Many tasks and responsibilities related to  security in  Europe need 
to  be vested in  a permanent commission on security. That commission 
should subsume many o f the confidence build ing efforts, arms control and 
harm onization negotiations, transparencies and observations that reveal 
neighbors' m ilita ry  plans, and other tasks. Some capacity to  deploy peace- 
keeping forces should also be present— to keep feuaing factions apart while 
adjudication, arbitration, o r other conflict-contro l mechanisms are u tilized . 
Small numbers o f such units should be m aintained and dispersed in  
m ultinationa l garrisons throughout Central Europe.39 Contingents from 
all member states, proportional to the ir population, could be assigned to  the 
E u ro -A tla n tic  organization, w ith  accompanying financia l and m aterial 
assets.
These desiderata aside, the purpose o f supporting collective secu- 
rity  is ne ither to  replace the UN's global efforts nor to  supplant NATO. 
NATO  has a place, albeit a much smaller place, in E uro-A tlantic security in 
the post-Cold W ar era. UN blue helmets must be available to  police truces 
and the afterm ath o f carnage in  many continents. But the larger needs o f 
E uroA tlan tic  security are not fo r defensive alliances or fo r cease-fire m oni- 
to ring  and disengagement undertaken by the United Nations. Rather, the 
principal need is one o f conflic t prevention and the reduction o f transna- 
tiona l threats.
For these tasks, no ins titu tion  exists, and no one is prepared. 
Small, d isjo inted N CO  efforts, and courageous solo endeavors (e.g., the 
CSCE H igh  Com m ission fo r National M inorities) w ill no t su ffice . 
N othing that NATO m ight begin to  do, and nowhere to which NATO m ight 
expand, w ill help dim inish ethnonationalism , covert p ro life ra tion , mass 
m igration, o r other threatening phenomena.
The most d iffic u lt path is all that remains— a fundamental realign- 
m ent o f p rio rities in  U.S. and West European security policies, away from 
protecting NATO  by adding to  it, and toward addressing the kinds and 
in tensity o f threats confronting the region. For that goal, there must be
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strategic vision in Western capitals, o f which little  has been present thus 
far.
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The Possibilities for Creation 
of a New Security System 
in the South of Europe
Radovan Vukadinovic
When pointing to a possible process o f creation o f a security system 
in  the Balkans, w ith  the existing Balkan specifics and com plexity, one 
should bear in  m ind the solutions that have already been accepted in  
Europe— the ones achieved in  in ter-b loc relations (the C FE — Treaty on 
Conventional M ilita ry  Forces in Europe, 1990)1— as w ell as measures that 
are being developed w ith in  the Forum  fo r the Security Cooperation o f
CSCE.
Form er member states o f the Warsaw Pact and NATO  have dealt 
w ith  the problem  o f balancing th e ir conventional m ilita ry forces by accept - 
ing the Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (C FE ). O ut o f tne 
vast number o f solutions offered in  this document— all o f w hich were de- 
signed to  elim inate the possibility o f sudden attack— two issues m ight be 
contemplated fo r solutions to  the problem o f Balkan security.
F irstly, in the frame o f huge distributions o f m ilita ry forces and the 
creation o f regional balance w ith in  five NATO  members: Portugal, 
Norway, Spain, Greece, and Turkey have all been supplied w ith  a consider- 
able quantity o f m ilita ry  equipm ent and weapons from  Am erican and 
NATO bases in  Germany and the Netherlands. I t  is significant that, by th is 
new balancing, the Mediterranean countries have gained m ilita ry  strength, 
as the m ajority o f these supplied ended up there. Leaving aside the ques- 
tion  o f what th is means fo r a Mediterranean balance (between the south 
and north coast), it  has become apparent that the m ilita ry grow th o f Greece 
and Turkey have resulted in  a new situation, not only in  tne Balkan region, 
but, most o f a ll, in  the ir bilateral relations.
Gaining from  the e ffo rt to  w ithdraw  arms from  the C FE 
zone, which means central Europe, both o f the Balkan countries have be- 
come the main beneficiaries o f NATO m ilitary supplies. I t  is expected that 
the Turkish m ilita ry  arsenal in 1995 w ill be 25% more up-to-date than it  
was in  1992. In  respect to  the need for m aintaining a Greek-Turldsh bal- 
ance and bearing in  m ind the fra g ility  o f G reek-Turkish relations, the 
Greek army has been m odernized as w ell, w ith  the resu lt tha t both
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countries have increased the ir level o f m ilitary strength.2
Considerine not only the state o f bilateral Greek-Turkish relations, 
but also the new development o f relations in the Balkan region, it  is not 
d ifficu lt to  agree w ith those who believe that this policy o f "cascading w ith 
NATO  weaponry" has led to new complications. Namely, arms have been 
removed from  areas o f Europe where chances are slim that they would ac - 
tua lly be used to  areas very near to  actual conflict and areas that have the 
potential fo r new conflicts. I t  is also obvious that, considering the existing 
situation in  the Balkans, i f  there was an escalation o f conflict in, fo r exam- 
pie, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey would fin d  themselves on opposite 
sides o f the conflict.
This fact has certainly not been considered by NATO planners (or 
perhaps has been) when they were disposing o f arms from the CFE zone. 
Nevertheless, this is one o f the prim ary problems that w ill have to  be 
solved at the Balkan level when conditions fo r the creation o f a new secu - 
rity  system in  this part o f Europe emerge.
Another set o f solutions that could transpire from a balanced lower- 
ing o f tensions in ex-bloc relations, is not related to  east-west relations, but 
rather to  relations w ith in  one country—the form er Czechoslovakia. A fte r 
the disintegration o f ČSSR, the Czechs and Slovenes agreed that the m ili- 
tary should be divided and balanced in a proportion o f 1:2. This very move, 
by which the two countries have emerged from form er federation, decid ing 
to  solve the question o f the ir bilateral relations in the area o f security by 
creating a special bilateral security system, could eventually be im p ie - 
mentea by the countries that have emerged from the form er Yugoslavia. 
Any such organization should probably be connected w ith  the Forum fo r 
the Security Cooperation, but it should be noted now as a possible solution 
fo r balancing national m ilitary forces.
The kind o f relations that w ill be created in the Balkans, the criteria  
that w ill be set fo r keeping armed forces, and questions o f which kinds o f 
arms w ill be tolerated— all o f these can be solved w ith  existing European 
solutions, and th is is where the CFE, although created to  help newly- 
form ing relations between ex-bloc countries, w ill certainly be able to  o ffe r 
useful proposals.
The CSCC (OSCE) Forum  fo r the Security Cooperation was 
form ed in 1992 and in its starting program stated not less than fourteen d if- 
ferent activities in  the fie ld  o f arms control. By this it became the most 
significant form  o f negotiations on m ilitary and security issues that involve 
the OSCE countries.3 Along w ith  possibilities fo r a dynamic approach to 
problems o f security cooperation, the Forum has set the grounds fo r flexi- 
ble enlargement o f the topics that could be discussed. N either security nor 
its realization are viewed as something fixed and unchangeable, but rather 
as part o f the ongoing changes in  contemporary international relations.
Setting security cooperation as a prime task, the Forum has opened 
the possibility fo r numerous conferences and exchanges o f inform ation on 
questions o f security. A t several seminars that have been organized by the 
Forum , topics and possible solutions were prepared fo r meetings on the 
m inisteria l level. But this wide platform  o f topics that penetrate questions
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o f security cooperation have been set and, i f  accompanied by relevant p o liti- 
cal willingness, would make possible movement towards m utually accept- 
able solutions.
Thus far, through Forum activities, several topics were v iv id ly  dis- 
cussed and governm ent support fo r them  has been requested. 
Examination o f each o f these problems can be useful in  the Balkan conflict:
a) The harmonization o f commitments in the fie ld  o f arms contro l 
produced some very interesting suggestions drawn by members o f the so- 
called Vishegrad Croup. I t  was suggested that the main parts o f the C FE 
agreement should be implemented by countries that have not been, nor are 
at present, members o f NATO. This would mean that questions regarding 
the national level o f m ilita ry strength, the supplying o f in form ation and 
notification, verification, control mechanisms and areas o f im plem entation 
should be part o f all new efforts that aim for encompassing countries tha t 
have not signed the agreement.
This has a special significance in  the Balkan region, where nei - 
the r the form er Yugoslavian countries, nor Albania, have signed the C FE 
agreement. In  the process o f drawing the Balkans closer to  Europe, the 
comm itm ent o f these countries to  the notion o f balanced conventional ar- 
senais would be o f great importance, and the CFE could be used as an in - 
strum ent which has already proven its worthiness.
b) The behavior pattern in the fie ld  o f security is a set o f measures 
that are being suggested as a basis in dealing w ith  security issues. 
P rim arily w ith  regard to  the Balkan situation, it  can be assessed that the 
vast m ajority o f European solutions could be directly accepted and incorpo- 
rated in a Balkan security system. This applies, fo r example, to  the Polish 
proposition o f behavior o f countries in conflict and the rules that should be 
followed in conflic t situations. In  jo in t EU and NATO propositions fo r 
Balkan countries, the principles o f early warning, crisis management, activ- 
ities o f peace forces w ith in  CSCE or together w ith  UN forces, contro l o f 
m ilita ry behavior, use o f m ilitary force and its com patib ility w ith  m ilita ry  
doctrine, and m onitoring, should a ll be stressed. The jo in t A ustrian- 
Hungarian proposition o f a security concept should be viewed as a land- 
mark fo r a ll CSCE countries in th e ir mutual relations. I t  calls fo r general 
security, cooperative security, and the wholesome o f the concept. The rela- 
tions between security, disarmament and environm ental protection are 
considered, as well as the rights o f national m inorities.
c) Stabilization measures that are being drawn from NATO  sugges- 
tions from  A p ril 1993 are aimed at lowering tension and preventing the 
eruption o f armed conflict on a regional level. Active cooperation o f a ll 
parties involved in the dispute is demanded, and it is recommended to  use:
- open measures to  ensure the transparency o f the situation and 
o f m ilita ry activities in the region,
- refraining from some activities (cease fire , setting o f d e m ili- 
tarized zones, no fligh t zones, deactivating o f some weapons, treatm ent o f 
param ilitary forces)
- measures to  create mutual trust-m onitoring, liaison teams, 
hot-line communications, jo in t crisis management teams,
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- m onitoring im plem entation and evaluation, which includes 
m onitoring teams o f th ird  party and OSCE ( if  possible), verifica tion o f 
weaponry, etc.
These stabilization measures, as suggested w ith in  the Forum , 
are partly being applied in the Balkan con flic t, and o ther measures could 
easily be incorporated into a Balkan security system.
d) Contacts between m ilitary establishments and m ilita ry  cooper- 
ation are being proposed as a way o f creating an appropriate atmosphere fo r 
development o f new relations in the fie ld  o f security. Numerous visits o f 
m ilita ry  delegations, exchange o f m onitors in  m ilita ry  maneuvers, jo in t 
maneuvers, seminars, etc., are a ll aimed at overcom ing the gap between 
form er blocs and the protagonists o f m ilita ry force.
This is all, on a small scale, being done in  the Balkan area (m ilita ry 
cooperation between some Balkan armies), but w ith  a cessation o f h o s tili- 
ties, such activities could be developed to  a fu lle r extent. C ertain ly, the 
recent Bulgarian suggestion o f a meeting fo r a ll the jo in t chiefs o f s ta ff o f 
a ll the Balkan countries, where the m ilita ry  situation, m ilita ry  doctrines, 
and the general possibilities for m ilitary cooperation in the Balkans should 
be assessed, refers to this.
A special item has been on the Forum  agenda are possible OSCE 
contributions to  m ilita ry security and stab ility  in  the southeast o f Europe 
through arms control, aisarmament, and measures towards increasing the 
level o f mutual trust and security. The Forum senior officials have pointed 
out the necessity for immediate analysis o f the situation whereby Serbia 
and Montenegro are not OSCE members. Because o f this, it  was decided 
to  inform  them about all discussions and proposed measures.4
The conclusion, accepted by a ll participants, was that a ll the mea- 
sures provided for in the CFE Treaty should be extended to the area o f the 
form er Yugoslavia,5 and that efforts should made towards a situation where 
each o f the newly created states should maintain the smallest possible m ili- 
tary force, sufficient only fo r defense. The main obstacle to  this is the exis- 
tence o f a large number o f paramilitary forces. Thus, there is a demand fo r 
a special c rite ria  fo r contro l o f m obilization possib ilities and m ilita ry  
movement. A balance o f weapons o f smaller calibers that are in use in  the 
Balkan region, which is not stipulated in the CFE agreement, is also called 
for.
Bearing in m ind the reality o f the situation, and partly connecting 
disarmament in  the Balkans to  a cessation o f the conflict, top officials have 
suggested that the process should progress in three phases.
D uring the firs t phase, agreements among the form er Yugoslavian 
countries and Albania should be made. These agreements should incorpo- 
rate the main contents o f CFE and parts o f CSBM. In  the second phase, 
th is process should encompass the im m ediate neighbors o f the form er 
Yugoslavia and Albania, who would strengthen th e ir measures fo r security 
ana mutual trust (CSBM) w ith this area. Finally, the whole CSCE should 
become a specific support body and a forum  fo r an o ffic ia l negotiation p ro- 
cess.
By th is in itia tive  on activities in  the Balkans, the Forum  has
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expressed its wish that this part o f Europe should move from  confrontation 
to  cooperation, and tha t, accordingly, the process o f disarm am ent is 
becoming a politica l process, where it is expected that the OSCE countries 
w ill o ffe r po litica l support fo r a ll new efforts. I t  is significant that, in the 
case o f the Balkans, the Forum has chosen a regional approach, w hich has 
been a clear factor in  conflicts and emerging relations there. On the other 
hand, it  is evident that the Forum w ill have to  the wholesome o f its 
activities in to  smaller segments, and that it  w ill seek grounds fo r efficiency 
p rim a rily  on regional levels (Balkans, Caucus, Vishegrad Croup, Baltic). 
This by no way means that security w ill become dividable, but rather that it 
w ill reach a level where, in certain matters o f cooperative security, it  would 
be easier and more competent to discuss them on a regional level.
Measures for Strengthening Mutual Trust and Security— CSBM
The con flic t in the form er Yugoslavia has meant tha t the entire  
structure b u ilt in to  the system o f the OSCE fo r strengthening m utual trust 
and security has been in  d ifficu lty . Aspirations towards a greater level o f 
m utual trust and security were confronted w ith  conflic t in  south Europe, 
and the impotence o f all respected bodies, including the OSCE, to  actually 
do something to  restore peace to  the area. Such was the situation when it  
was decided w ith in  the OSCE to  dismiss the Advisoiy Com m ittee to  the 
C enter fo r C on flic t Prevention and to  pass the m atter on to  the newly 
form ed OSCE comm ittee fo r Political Consultations and Decision Making, 
situated in  Vienna, and to  the Forum for the Security and Cooperation.
The m ajority o f th e ir tasks, as set in basic OSCE documents (such as 
CBM  measures and la ter CSBM), have prim arily been designed as incen- 
tives fo r the im plem entation o f these measures, and th e ir eventual spread.
Bearing in m ind the nature o f the Balkan area, it  can once again be 
stated that these measures (CSBM) are extremely suitable,6 and that the 
Balkan states can clearly benefit, like all the other countries, in  th e ir accep- 
tance. This prim arily reflects
announcement o f m ilitary maneuvers o f certain types, 
annual exchange o f m ilitary inform ation, 
creation o f a constant communication network.
In  relations between some Balkan states, these CSBM measures 
have already been implemented7 and given the conditions o f peace em erg- 
ing in  this area, there should be no problem applying CSBM.
O ut o f the catalog o f measures fo r strengthening o f security that 
could lead to  the creation o f a European security system, o r a regional 
Balkan system, there exists a considerable network o f subjects and issues 
which have already been suggested, or even implemented. This means that 
the Balkan countries do nothave to invent o r suggest new solutions, since 
the framework fo r a security system is already in existence.
But, nevertheless, there is a vital need for a quick peace in  the ter* 
rito ries o f the form er Yugoslavia, in order to  create the conditions fo r a 
gradual im plem entation o f  these measures, and to  begin to  create a Balkan
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security system. In  this case, it is im portant to bear in  m ind all the positive 
and acceptable solutions already modeled in the European security system, 
and only in the case o f specific Balkan circumstances would it  be necessary 
to  insist on other principles and measures. This refers p rim arily  to  a need 
fo r 1) a s tric t respect given to the principle o f firm  and unchanging borders 
after a peaceable solution has been reached, 2) accenting peaceful solutions 
to  the conflict, 3) a special approach to  post-war problems, 4) balancing o f 
the decrease in  m ilita iy  forces, 5) solving the problem  o f param ilitary 
forces, and 6) control o f arms disposal, etc. This w ill probably lead to  dis- 
eussions on dem ilitarization o f certain areas as w ell.8
As far as obstacles to  accepting, at least, some starting measures are 
concerned, the con flic t in  the form er Yugoslavia is certainly at the top o f 
the list. W ithout a quick solution to  this problem, there can be no ta lk o f 
creating some integral Balkan security system. A ll o f the measures o f par- 
tia l character that could strengthen the security on a bilateral or trila te ra l 
level could, at the same tim e, nave negative impacts on other Balkan coun- 
tries that do not participate in them or do not accept them.
The current position, w ith  some Balkan countries having com m it- 
ments towards the CFE (Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania), and others 
not (newly created form er Yugoslavian states, Albania) results in  a situation 
where the C FE member states are insisting on the creation o f a unique 
system o f obligations that w ould be binding fo r all participants. Since 
Yugoslavia, o r what is le ft o f it, has not as yet become an OSCE member, 
and Macedonia has only the status o f an observer, this part o f the politica l 
issue has significance in  the fields o f security.
The fact is that some countries at this moment reject any solutions 
that would lin k  them w ith  the Balkans or w ith  Serbia. Slovenian policy is 
to  emphasize that it  does not belong to  the Balkan area, and instead it  is tiy -  
ing to  approach the Vishegrad group. Croatia, w ith  painfu l war experi- 
ences, also finds it  d iffic u lt to  contemplate belonging to  a security system 
where the main actor o f the Yugoslav crisis, Serbia, would also have a place. 
Nevertheless, a ll th is should be put aside, since in this geographically in - 
tegral region it  w ould be impossible to  bu ild  a security system only to a 
certain point, excluding o r elim inating the rest o f the actors. Besides, by 
using the term  southeast Europe, the doors are being opened wide fo r ac- 
centing the p rim arily  European significance o f reaching a solution.
In  illustra tion o f possible levels on which the architecture o f secu- 
rity  in the Balkan area and in the south o f Europe should be bu ilt, we see 
three possible levels.
F irst, w ith in  the starting phase, all o f the Balkan countries should 
be involved in  contributing, according to  th e ir possibilities, a fast solution 
to  the conflict in  the form er Yugoslavia. This implies the creation o f peace 
in  Bosnia and Hercegovina, achieving a p o litica l solution regarding the 
new entities, and in  Croatia, the peaceful reintegration o f its te rrito ries. 
This could be followed by mutual recognition o f all the new states and 
gradual norm alization o f relations. I t  is obvious that this process would 
need a strong po litica l w ill on the part o f all parties to  the conflict, and the 
strong support o f the international community.
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Second, a fter the peace is achieved, although th is does not mean 
that stability would automatically take place in  th is part o f the Balkans, all 
o f the Balkan countries should plead fo r im plem entation o f a ll the mea- 
sures exsting in the current security structure (CFE, CSBM, and those re- 
suiting from the actions o f the Wiena Com m ittee). S tarting from  the as- 
sumption that, by then, a ll o f the form er Yugoslavian countries w ill be 
OSCE members, there w ill be no so-called uncovered areas, w hich w ill 
ease the implementation o f the mentioned measures. D uring  th is process 
o f accepting OSCE standards, there w ill be tim e and space to  discuss the 
needs fo r creating and prom oting certain measures that w ill have specific 
weight in  the Balkans, measures that w ill result from Balkan specifics, as 
w ell as from the conflict in  the form er Yugoslavia.
Third, based on Chapter 5 o f the Helsinki F inal A ct (which creates 
possibilities fo r creation o f regional arrangements), and on the new way o f 
th inking  w ith in  the OSCE itself, the Balkan countries may wish to  create 
th e ir own, regional security system. Such a system should be p rim arily  
integral— that is, the borders o f the Balkan region (inc lud ing  Slovenia or 
not), te rrito ria l parameters, as well as anything that w ould help iden tify  
actors, should be precisely established.
On top o f all o f the proposed measures, the Balkan states, fo llow ing 
th e ir specifics and historic inheritance, should found a body that w ould be 
perpetually active, that would coordinate the activities, and represent a cen- 
te r fo r all efforts aimed at solving security problems. W hether it  is called a 
Crisis Prevention Center or perhaps a Committee fo r Balkan Security does 
not really matter. The significant th ing here should be the existence o f a 
body that w ill systematically m onitor the development o f security relations 
in the Balkans, that w ill react in proper time, ana have in consideration the 
creation o f a permanent security system. Beyond this, the system should, 
naturally, be firm ly  connected w ith  a ll e ffo rts  in  creating  a unique 
European security system.
To many today, this path may seem a distant and unrealistic one. 
However, one should bear in mind the fact that the firs t step should even- 
tually be made, and that Balkan countries, fo r th e ir own sakes and fo r the 
sake o f Europe, should not be le ft aside from supporting positive European 
trends. Creation o f a security system in  this part o f Europe can fina lly  
bring closer and integrate these parts in to  European space, and help 
European security become efficient, integral, and indivisib le.
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Dynamics of the Yugoslav Crisis
Predrag  Sitnie
States use m ediation as a fo re ign  policy instrum ent. T he ir in te rven tion  as 
m ediators is legitim ized by the goal o f con flic t reduction, w hich they ty p i - 
ca lly  proclaim . The desire to make peace, however, is in te rtw in e d  w ith  
o the r m otives best described w ith in  the context o f pow er p o litic s .... 
M ediators are seldom ind iffe ren t to the terms being negotiated. Even when 
they seek peace, they try  to  avoid terms not in  accord w ith  th e ir own in te r- 
ests, w hich usually a llow  a w ider range o f acceptable outcomes than the 
immediate interests o f the parties .'
The disintegration o f the Yugoslav federation in  the bloody e thn ic 
conflic t and the failure o f international mediation (1991-95) opened one o f 
the most complex international crises in Europe since the end o f b ipo la r- 
ism. And w hile the international public was shocked by ethnic violence, 
policy-makers kept busy w ith  the complex geopolitical consequences o f th is 
war, which threatened to  sp ill over the international borders o f Yugoslavia 
and enfiarne the entire European southeast. A lthough the Yugoslav crisis 
became internationalized ever since the firs t hostilities broke out in  June
1991, and despite the fact that all relevant organizations in Europe (CSCE, 
EU, W EU, NATO, etc.) have been involved in  crisis-management, in te r- 
national mediation failed in yie ld ing the expected results. Q uite the con- 
tra ry, mechanisms fo r co n flic t prevention and management developed 
during the Cold W ar proved largely inadequate in  the case o f the Yugoslav 
crisis.
Those were some o f the reasons why th is crisis, according to  pre - 
va iling opinion, became a threat to  in ternational security as defined in  
Chapter V II o f the C harter o f the United Nations. This opinion was in i- 
tia lly  supported by the fo llow ing three arguments: firs t, the con flic t could 
sp ill across the international borders o f form er Yugoslavia, and become at 
least a Balkan, i f  not a European war; second, it  could become a precedent 
fo r sim ilar conflicts in central and eastern Europe, especially in  the form er 
Soviet Union; th ird , it  endangers the basis o f international security since, 
in the increased instab ility o f the post-bipolar period, any local con flic t in
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Europe poses a threat to international order. A lthough these fears did not 
come true, the Yugoslav crisis continues to be considered a threat to  in te r- 
national security because it jeopardized the po litica l cohesion o f the EU 
and NATO, as w ell as relations o f the West w ith  Russia and the Islam ic 
w orld .*
Therefore, various in ternational factions in  the 1991-95 period 
made repeated attempts at mediation and arbitration which could be classi- 
fìed in to  the fo llow ing six phases:
In  the firs t stage, which preceded the outbreak o f arm ed conflicts, 
the EC and the U.S. tried  to  quiet the conflic t between the Yugoslav re- 
publics, stabilize the federal government and thus preem pt the crisis. 
Characteristic o f this stage was that attempts at m ediation were sporadic, 
w ithou t clear understanding o f the causes o f the crisis, w ithou t adequate 
instrum ents, w ithou t broader coordination o f the leading in ternationa l 
(i.e., W estern) factions, and w ithout consensus as to  how it  should be re- 
solved.
The second stage started w ith  the war in  Slovenia in  June 1991 and 
ended w ith  the fa ilure o f the Lisbon conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(C u tille ro  plan) in  March 1992. A lthough the EC led the in ternationa l 
m ediation in  this phase, in  December 1991 the U.S. and the UN qu ie tly 
entered the Yugoslav scene. A lthough th e ir e ffo rts stopped the war in 
Croatia (Cyrus Vance plan), the EC-sponsored recognition o f Slovenia and 
Croatia in December 1991 triggered requests fo r self-determ ination in an- 
other two Yugoslav republics— Bosnia/Herzegovina and Macedonia.
The th ird  stage started w ith  the active participation o f the U.S. in 
the Yugoslav scene in M arch/April 1992 and ended in A p ril 1993 w ith  the 
fa ilure o f the Americans to convince th e ir European allies o f the need for 
N ATO  a ir strikes on Bosnian Serbs a fte r they refused the Vance-Owen 
plan. In  th is phase all international in itia tives concerning Yugoslavia were 
made through the UN Security Council and In ternational Conference on 
Form er Yugoslavia (ICFY).
In  tne fourth phase, the EC (now the European U nion) assumed 
again the leading role and tried  to  end the war in  Bosnia/Herzegovina on 
the basis o f the so-called Kinkel-Juppe in itia tive  and the Luxem bourg plan 
w hich established 51%:49% form ula fo r division o f th is fo rm er Yugoslav 
republic. A t the same tim e, Germany tried  fo r the firs t tim e to  end the war 
among Bosnian Croats and M uslim s by proposing a federa tion  o f 
Bosnia/Herzegovina (Petersburg in itia tive ). This attem pt fe ll through in 
December 1ѲѲЗ after Bosnian Muslims, supported by the U.S., refused to 
accept the Owen-Stoltenberg plan.
The fifth  phase (February 1994-January 1995) began w ith  the NATO 
m ilita ry  involvem ent in Bosnia/Herzegovina and the reappearance o f 
Russian diplomacy in the Balkans. The five major in ternational factions in- 
volved in  the management o f the Yugoslav crisis— U.S., Russia, U nited 
Kingdom , France and Germany (the la tte r three nom inally representing 
the EU )— came together in  the so-called Contact Group, w hich at the end 
o f A p ril assumed the coordination o f th e ir d ip lom atic in itia tives. This 
phase ended w ith  the failure o f the U.S. to  persuade the Bosnian Serbs to
66 Predrag Simić
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
67Dynamics of the Yugoslav Crisis
accept the Contact Croup plan for Bosnia/Herzegovina.
The sixth phase started w ith  the proposal o f the French foreign 
m in is te r Juppe fo r a tr ip le  sum m it (Yugoslavia, C ro a tia  and 
Bosnia/Herzegovina), fo r m utual recognition o f the form er Yugoslav re- 
publics, and fo r making public the Z-4 (Zagreb 4) plan on UNPAs (Krajinas) 
in Croatia prepared by the so-called M in i Contact Group (U.S., Russia, and 
IC FY  representatives)
The armed conflic t in  Yugoslavia thus escalated in to  probably the 
most complex crisis on the continent since the end o f the Cola W ar. This 
crisis reflects not only the conflicting interests o f the form er Yugoslav re - 
publics, but also o f the leading factions o f post-bipolar Europe. Any attem pt 
to  answer fo r the failure o f the international m ediating efforts should firs t 
consider the internal and external causes o f this crisis.
Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart
Like most m ultie thnic states, Yugoslavia relied on a double consen- 
sus: on the consensus o f ethnic groups which made i t 3 and, on the consen- 
sus o f w inners in W orld W ar I  and I I ,  which supported the creation o f this 
state w ith in  the international order as defined in  Versailles and Yalta. In  
spite o f deep economic, cultural, religious and po litica l divergences among 
tne southern Slavs (“Yugoslavia”  means “ the State o f the Southern Slavs” ), 
the new state creatively responded to  the com peting claim s o f se lf- 
determ ination in  southeastern Europe and, w ith  the exception o f a short 
period (1941-45), fo r seventy-three years managed, relatively successfully, a 
complex ethnic and po litica l balance in  the Balkans. However, one should 
note that tw o major Yugoslav ethnic groups— the Serbs and the Croats—  
had d iffe rent perceptions o f a common state. W hile Serbs basically opted 
fo r a unitarist goal, i.e., creation o f a new Yugoslav nation, a large part o f the 
Croat po litica l e lite  saw Yugoslavia merely as a necessary step towards a 
fu lly  independent Croat nation-state. These differences, often prom oted 
by outsiders, were the source o f permanent po litica l crisis in the Kingdom 
o f Yugoslavia that led to its collapse and dismemberment under Nazi attack 
in  1941 and bruta l in te r-e thn ic war during W orld  W ar I I . 4 A lthough it  
rendered possible the reintegration o f Yugoslavia, the com m unist v ictory 
in 1945 suppressed rather than redressed the traumas o f e thn ic violence 
and genocide during the war.
Towards the end o f the 1980s, the collapse o f communism and the 
disintegration o f bipolárisai in  Europe underm ined the cornerstones o f the 
second Yugoslavia. On the home fron t, self-management socialism has 
been in crisis ever since the early 1970s. In  addition, bureaucratic decen- 
tralization made possible by the 1974 constitution created eight com peting 
communist nomenclatures, which largely relied on national m obilization to  
provide legitim acy to  th e ir power. Profound crisis in  the country has 
weakened the in ternationa l position o f Yugoslavia,3 w h ile  geopo litica l 
changes in  Europe after 1989 marked the end o f the European architecture 
created in  Versailles and Yalta and, according to in flu e n tia l W estern
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circles, rendering buffer states like Yugoslavia superfluous, i f  not contrary 
to  what used to be considered a desirable in ternationa l order in  the 
Balkans since the end o f bipolarism .6 For the firs t tim e since 1950 the U.S. 
ceased support to  the socia list Yugoslavia, encouraging instead the 
coun try 's  dem ocratic and m arket transfo rm a tion ,7 while in  C entra l 
European po litica l circles emerged revisionist ideas that Yugoslavia is an 
a rtific ia l creation and even a diplom atic e rro r o f W orld W ar I allies. The 
un ifica tion  o f Germany was a trium ph o f the p rinc ip le  fo r the righ t o f 
peoples to  self-determ ination (P rincip le No. 3 o f the H elsinki A ct) over 
other CSCE principles. This outcome was also helped by the assessment 
that only ethnically homogeneous states may successfully carry out painful 
m arket and dem ocratic reforms in  Eastern Europe. In  the tide  o f the 
revolutions o f 1989, almost nobody was ready to  face the ugly consequences 
o f u n re s tric te d  im p lem enta tion  o f the rig h t o f nations to  se lf- 
determ ination— fragmentation o f states, c iv il wars, ethnic cleansing, etc.—  
which soon became the main security threat to  post-bipolar Europe.
Under such circumstances all Yugoslav peoples faced two options, to 
remain w ith in  Yugoslavia o r create th e ir own independent state, to  which 
th e ir ru ling  elites responded in  accordance w ith  th e ir own perceptions o f 
the national interest. For example, w hile the more developed and e th n i- 
cally homogeneous Slovenia d ia not want to  w ait fo r o ther republics to  
meet the requirements fo r association w ith  the EC, nor d id it want to be 
burdened w ith  Kosovo or other ethnic conflicts among the Yugoslav peo- 
pies, undeveloped and ethnically heterogeneous Bosnia/Herzegovina con- 
sidered Yugoslavia as a condition fo r survival. The go-it-alone approach o f 
the most developed republics was also encouraged by analyses o f west 
European experts, particularly in Germany and Austria, who at the tim e as- 
sessed that certain Yugoslav republics would jo in  the Com m unity as inde- 
pendent states rather than as Yugoslavia. Slovenia, according to  those ex- 
perts, could do so by the end o f the century i f  it  seceded from Yugoslavia, 
w hile the other republics could not count on that possib ility u n til the next 
century, when the last group o f European countries would be adm itted. 
U nlike Slovenia, the main pressure in  th is d irection in  Croatia came from  
the pow erful and revisionist po litica l émigrés. Since the Yugoslav federa- 
tion  was a complex system o f checks and balances, departure o f any republic 
disturbed the entire ethnic balance, forcing the others to  follow.
The Yugoslav republics divided according to  th e ir a ttitude to th is 
dilem m a: 1) Slovenia and C roatia, w hich wanted to  secede from  
Yugoslavia,8 escape from the Balkans and jo in  the central European group o f 
states; 2) Serbia and M ontenegro, w hich advocated firm ly  in tegra ted 
federation having in view security concerns o f the numerous Serb popula- 
tion  in  Bosnia and Croatia,8 separatist demands o f ethnic Albanians in  the 
Serbian province o f Kosovo, as w ell as th e ir own po litica l interests; and 3) 
Bosnia/Herzegovina and Macedonia, which took a compromise a ttitude , 
fearing both o f the country’s breakup and o f rem aining in  the Serbian- 
dom inated Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav People’s Arm y (JNA) represented a 
special pow er-factor, w hich advocated not only the preservation o f the 
country’s unity, but maintenance o f its socialist system. Almost all actors in
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the crisis soon took extreme stands, grossly overestimating th e ir power and 
making the conflict intractable from the very beginning.
In  the complex system o f relations among the Yugoslav nations, the 
central one is the relationship between the two biggest ethnic groups, the 
Serbs and the Croats. A t the tim e when the conflict between national po lit- 
ical elites made the breakup o f the Yugoslav com m unity inevitab le, the 
Serbian leadership came out w ith the demand that a ll Serbs should live in 
a single state, which would encompass Serbia, Montenegro and Serbian- 
populated areas in Croatia and Bosnia/Herzegovina. The Croatian leader- 
ship pursued the demand fo r Croatia w ith in  its h istoric borders, w hich 
would encompass Croatia and all o f Bosnia/Herzegovina.10 Since Serbia and 
Slovenia reached consensus (January 1991) on the le tte r’s separation from  
Yugoslavia,11 the focus o f the crisis shifted to  Serbian-populated areas in 
C roatia, and then to Bosnia/Herzegovina. U nlike the e thn ic con flic t 
between the Serbs and the Croats during W orld  W ar I I ,  when the local 
M uslim  population12 largely sided w ith  Zagreb, in  1991/92 Muslims acted 
independently, demanding independent Bosnia/Herzegovina, w hich gave 
the con flic t a triangular character, w ith  inevitable sh ifting  coalitions o f 
various partners. S im ilar strategic configuration was created in  the so- 
called southern triangle (Serbs-Albanians-Macedonians) due to  A lbanian 
aspirations toward Kosovo and western Macedonia, but so far it has not es- 
calated in to  an open armed conflic t thanks to  the power balance on the 
south o f the Balkans.
In  short, the thesis that Yugoslavia was a tragic mistake and the vie- 
tory o f m ilitan t nationalist forces at the firs t post-war free elections in  a ll 
Yugoslav republics le ft no room for doubt that the country was heading to - 
ward an extremely complicated c iv il war. This fact was underlined in C IA  
report that leaked into the public in  November 1990.13 Since it was obv i- 
ously not the intelligence fa ilure and since there were enough reasons to 
assume that c iv il war w ill cause great destruction in  Yugoslavia and deep 
geopolitical disturbances in  Southeastern Europe, it  is surprising tha t 
Western governments stood idle u n til it became too late. To t iy  to  answer 
why this happened, it  is necessary to  review strategic p rio rities o f the EC 
and the U.S. by the end o f the 1980s and early 1990s.
The EC: Barefoot in the Balkans
The Yugoslav crisis broke out at a delicate moment, when the co l- 
lapse o f bipolarism  forced a ll international structures on the continent to 
redefine th e ir roles. That was one o f the reasons why almost no one among 
them was prepared to deal w ith  the new security threats and risks. The 
disintegration o f the W TO and the Soviet U nion and the un ifica tion  o f 
Germany created a new situation, the international com m unity focused its 
attention on the changes in central/eastern Europe and the form er USSR. 
Under such circumstances, Yugoslavia d id not enjoy p rio rity  in the strate- 
gic th inking o f the U.S., which at firs t took the stance that th is crisis was a 
problem in Europe's backyard and as such should be le ft to  E urope.14
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Thomas Pickering, then U.S. ambassador to  the UN, stated b lun tly  that the 
UN had no role in Yugoslavia unless other international organizations had 
fa ile d .1* Since the CSCE soon reached the lim its  o f its in fluence in  the 
Yugoslav cris is,18 the leading role in  in ternationa l m ediation was re lin - 
quished to  the EC, whose good offices became accessible to  a ll sides in 
Yugoslavia by m id-1991.
The EC at the tim e had strong reasons to  mediate. The war in 
Yugoslavia threatened to  destabilize a ll o f southeastern Europe, two EC 
members, Ita ly  and Greece, border on Yugoslavia, the tw o other neighbors, 
Austria and Hungary, were strong candidates fo r EC membership, while 
a ll central/east European countries expected the EC to  assume the leading 
role in the crisis management on the continent. A fte r its  fa ilu re  in  the 
G u lf war, the Community had to  try  to repair its image in  the firs t armed 
con flic t in Europe in more than four decaaes. However, the role o f a me- 
d ia to r found the Community w ithout proper foreign policy instrum ents17 
and amidst the preparations fo r the M aastricht summit, i.e., in  a sensitive 
moment o f transform ation from economic com m unity to  po litica l union. 
This could explain the belated reaction o f the Com m unity to  the American 
warnings that Yugoslavia was at the brink o f c iv il war ana the in itia l under- 
estimation o f the complexity o f the crisis. Despite its desire to  assert its e lf 
as the leading politica i factor on the continent, the EC at the tim e d id  not 
have appropriate instruments fo r crisis prevention and crisis management, 
so that early mediating efforts did not go beyond offers o f generous finan- 
cial assistance (4 b illion  ECU) in an attem pt to  bribe Yugoslav republics to 
stay in  the federation.
In itia lly  the EC supported unconditionally the un ity o f Yugoslavia 
try ing  to deter secessionist republics from th e ir goals. The EC Declaration 
on Yugoslavia o f 26 March 1991 reads: “ In  the view o f the Twelve, a united 
and democratic Yugoslavia stands the best chance to  integrate itse lf harmo- 
niously in  the new Europe” , while the Statement on Yugoslavia dated 
8 May 1991 underscored the follow ing: “ ...only dialogue between a ll the 
parties concerned w ill provide a lasting solution to  the present grave crisis 
and ensure a future for a democratic and united Yugoslavia.” 18 A t the tim e, 
however, an opposite thesis emerged, that preservation o f the Yugoslav 
federation was impossible, while the Yugoslav republics had to  be treated 
as separate entities w hich w ould en te r in to  re la tionsh ip  w ith  the 
Com m unity one-by-one. According to  this opinion, only the most devel- 
oped and ethnically homogenous Yugoslav republic, Slovenia, at the tim e 
fu lfille d  the requirements fo r association w ith  the EC. O ther Yugoslav re- 
publics would not become candidates fo r association w ith  the EC u n til the 
next cen tu iy .1® Although these ideas reflected d iffe re n t positions w ith in  
the Community on the integration o f the form er com m unist countries in to  
the EC, they encouraged a go-it-alone approach fo r Slovenia and hardened 
positions fo r other republics.
However, at the tim e two main W estern actors, the EC and the 
U.S., had already been trapped by the contradiction in  the CSCE p rin c i - 
pies: invio lab ility o f borders (3rd princip le o f the H elsinki Act), te rrito ria l 
in te g rity  o f states (4th princip le) and non-intervention in  the in te rn a l
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affairs o f another state (6th principle) against the righ t o f peoples to  se lf- 
determ ination (8th princip le). W nile countries concerned by geopolitical 
balance in  the Balkans such as the U nited Kingdom, France, Greece, 
Romania, Spain and Turkey supported the firs t set o f CSCE princip les, 
o the r countries such as Germany, Austria, Belgium , Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Hungary and Ita ly  took the opposite side. The position o f the 
Twelve soon polarized around these principles, since fo r Germany, which 
just un ited due to  the recognition o f the righ t to  self-determ ination, th is 
princip le  was the p rio rity , while for most other European countries, aware 
that a peaceful dissociation o f Yugoslavia was not possible, preservation o f 
Yugoslavia in  one form  or another was a precondition fo r peace on the 
continent.
F irs t realizing and then taking advantage o f the contradictory posi- 
tion  o f the Twelve, Slovenian re a l-p o litik  defined a clear strategy based on 
the fo llow ing assessments: 1) Slovenia was m ilita rily  prepared fo r armed 
conflic t, since it  disposed o f considerable stocks o f armaments and w e ll- 
tra ined  police forces and te rrito ria l defense;*0 2) the proclam ation o f 
Slovenia's independence rushed the secession o f Croatia and the Serbian- 
Croat conflict, moving the focus o f the war away from Slovenia; 3) the abil - 
ity  o f Slovenia to  resist the intervention o f the federal army and the per- 
spective o f the Serbian-Croatian conflict made the interests o f Slovenia and 
Serbia complementary; 4) Slovenia could count on EC impatience as it was 
in a hurry on the eve o f Maastricht to attain visible results in the manage - 
m ent o f th is  c o n flic t, as w e ll as on in flu e n tia l c irc les in  the  
Arbeitsgemeinschaft A lpen-Adria (above all in  Bavaria, Austria, and north - 
em  Ita ly ); and 5) these moves enabled Slovenia to side w ith  the W estern 
position on the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia/Herzegovina, thus consolidat- 
ing its international position and at the same tim e avoiding any com m it- 
ment toward Croatia and other secessionist republics.
U nlike Slovenia, the Serbian leadership based its policy on the 
wrong strategic assumption that the EC and U.S. w ill not allow the d isin- 
tegration o f Yugoslavia. Therefore, in the firs t stage o f conflict, they le ft 
the in itia tive  to  the federal government and JNA, which trie d  to  prevent 
the secession o f Slovenia by force. When lim ite d  m ilita ry  action in  
Slovenia fe ll through, the Serbian leadership demanded that the federal 
army w ithdraw  to  tne Serbian-populated territories in Croatia (Krajina) and 
Bosnia/Herzegovina, but the JNA general sta ff refused, continuously try ing  
to  preserve tne country's unity by force. A t the tim e the federal rum p 
Presidency probably made another strategic mistakewhen it  fa iled to  adm it 
that it  was unable to  control the situation in the country and to  appeal to  the 
UN Security Council demanding that it undertake mediation in  the crisis. 
Instead, it  declared a state o f emergency in  the country, try ing  in  vain to 
end the c iv il war by m ilita ry force. This, however, favored the secessionist 
republics' propaganda which claimed that they were victim s o f aggression 
by the Serbian-Bolshevik federal army.*1 In  this way the republics man- 
aged to  m obilize both the local and international communities in support o f 
tne ir cause. Despite pressures by the new nationalist elites, the Yugoslav 
option at the tim e was not completely rejected in any Yugoslav republic.
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O nly the destruction o f Vukovar and the ruthless siege o f D ubrovnik by 
the federal army in the fa ll o f the same year unified the Croats around the 
policy o f the ru ling  Croatian Democratic Union (H D Z ) and prom pted the 
international com m unity to  recognize secessionist republics.
The EC reacted to  the firs t armed conflicts in Slovenia by sending a 
m in isteria l tro ika  to convince Yugoslavs to  accept the Luxem bourg form ula 
(cease-fire and return o f troops to  barracks, three-m onth suspension o f the 
Slovenian and Croat declarations o f independence, and restoration o f the 
federal presidency). When the conflicting parties agreed to  this plan, there 
was cause fo r optim ism  in Brussels, as reflected in  Jacques Poos's state- 
ment: “This is the hour o f Europe.”  Forty-e ight hours later, however, 
hostilities  were renewed, prom pting the Com m unity at the m in isteria l 
conference at the Hague (July 5) to  suspend economic assistance and in tro - 
duce an embargo on arms deliveries to  Yugoslavia. O nly during the next 
mission o f the tro ika  was the so-called Brioni form ula accepted and the war 
in Slovenia came to an end. Despite the break-up o f hostilities in Croatia 
in  August, the B rion i form ula remained one o f the rare successes o f 
European diplomacy in  Yugoslavia. But already the EC m ediation in  the 
Yugoslav crisis was facing the problem that eventually led to  fa ilure o f a ll 
previous peace in itia tives in  Yugoslavia— the sides co n flic ting  were more 
interested in  w inning the war than in  accepting a po litica l compromise. 
M ilita ry  predominance, firs t o f the federal army and then o f the armies o f 
K ra jina  and Bosnian Serbs, was the reason why both C roatia  and 
Bosnia/Herzegovina placed emphasis on the propaganda war, try ing  to  cause 
W estern m ilita ry  in tervention in Yugoslavia and re jecting any proposed 
peace in itia tive  that could permanently preserve the te rrito ria l status quo. 
Defeat in the media war le ft Krajina and Bosnian Serbs only w ith  the m ili- 
ta ry option, which is why they refused peace in itia tives tha t requ ired a 
change in  the situation created at the battlefield.
Becoming early aware o f the importance o f in ternational support, 
lim its  o f foreign m ediation and the d iffe ren t interests o f external actors, 
the warring parties trie d  to  take advantage o f m ilitary, d ip lom atic and pro- 
paganda instrum ents to  manipulate the international com m unity and thus 
in fluence the views o f in ternational m ediators.22 Some o f the  most 
atrocious episodes in  the Yugoslav c iv il war have been the consequence o f 
the logic o f psychological warfare, aimed as much to  the d irect opponent, as 
to  the international com m unity. Specifically, the violence was aimed at 
severing h istoric ties among the Yugoslav peoples in order to  prove that 
liv ing  together was impossible (that the idea o f  a Yugoslav com m unity was 
fina lly  dead), and that the only alternative to ethnic conflicts was creation 
o f e thn ica lly  homogeneous national states.23 On the other hand, the long 
duration and com plexity o f this con flic t have made Yugoslavia over tim e 
the scene o f conflic t between d iffe rent interests and convictions, and hence 
a catalyst o f broader change in post-bipolar Europe. In  short, in ternational- 
ization o f a basically local and anachronistic ethnic conflict gave c iv il war in 
Yugoslavia tw o im portant and contradictory dimensions, local and in te rna - 
tio n a l, which coula be used to explain the failure o f the in ternational me- 
diation in armed conflicts in the 1991-94 period: ‘T he  very fact that since
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the outbreak o f the war (June 25, 1991) all propositions to  reach a com pro- 
mise fo r putting  an end to  the conflict have originated from the activities o f 
the in te rnationa l mediators, w h ile  noth ing sim ilar and/or cred ib le  has 
come from  warring parties—which preferred inv iting  foreign in te rvention , 
ch ie fly w ith  the aim o f crushing th e ir enemies— may serve as confirm ation 
o f the lack o f real goodwill on the part o f the Yugoslav leaders to  start out 
along an alternative route, and not the road o f war.”*4
These reasons made the Yugoslav crisis intractable fo r foreign m ili- 
tary mediators, and were among the main reasons fo r mass violence during 
the war in  Croatia and, particu larly, in  Bosnia/Herzegovina. Faced w ith  
such a situation, the EC countries soon divided over th e ir approach to  the 
Yugoslav crisis and sided w ith  d iffe ren t parties in  the con flic t, w hich had 
grave consequences fo r the po litica l cohesion o f a ll foreign m ediators in  
Yugoslavia. A lthough the war started in Slovenia in June 1991, the tu rn ing  
point d id not occur u n til August o f the same year under the im pact o f two 
events: 1) on 15 August an unsuccessful coup in Moscow announced the 
end o f the Soviet Union, which fo r a tim e removed Russian in fluence in  
the Balkans and changed the en tire  in te rnationa l fram ew ork o f the 
Yugoslav crisis; and 2) at the tim e a. profound cleavage occurred in  the po i- 
icy o f the EC members toward this crisis, above a ll between Germany and 
France. For the firs t tim e since the W orld W ar I I  united Germany w ent 
its own way convinced that it  only understood the problem  in  Yugoslavia. 
Moreover, on the one side in  Yugoslavia, there were Slovenes and Croats, 
nations w ith  historic, religious, and cu ltu ra l ties w ith  Germany, w h ile  on 
the o ther there were Serbs, tra d itio n a lly  considered by German pub lic  
opinion as troublemakers in the Balkans.
By early June 1991, German po litica l parties reached a consensus 
regarding the de fin ition  o f the war as Serbian aggression, and demanded 
that the crisis be ended by recognition o f secessionist republics and in te r- 
nationalization o f the crisis which the international com m unity w ould re- 
gard in accordance w ith  Chapter 7 o f the UN Charter. The depth o f the 
French-German cleavage over the war in Yugoslavia was illustra ted  by the 
reaction o f the French foreign m inister Roland Dummas to  in form ation 
that his German colleague Hans D ie trich  Genscher w ould propose to  
Bundestag to  recognize Slovenia and Croatia: “ By doing so, you w ill re tu rn  
French-German relationships tw enty years back.” *® That was probably the 
reason why the EC missed its last chance fo r m ilita ry in tervention to  pre - 
vent fu rthe r tragedy in  Yugoslavia. A compromise was found in  convoking 
The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia and setting up the B ad in te r 
A rb itra tion  Committee. Both initiatives fe ll through, however, because o f 
the intransigence o f the con flic ting  parties in Yugoslavia tha t used the 
Hague conference as a stage fo r war propaganda, so lic iting  in ternationa l 
support fo r th e ir war goals. Assuming the role o f arb ite r, fo r w hich they 
lacked the mandate o f the co n flic ting  parties, the EC and B adin ter 
Commission, by the end o f 1991, in  a very innovative way in terpreted the 
norms o f in ternational law regarding sovereignty, secession, and succes- 
sion o f states,*7 which fina lly  alienated Serbs from the m ediation efforts o f 
the EC.
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The con flic t w ith in  the Com m unity broke out at the m in isteria l 
m eeting in  Brussels on December 16/17 (a day after the Maastricht confer- 
enee) when the German foreign m in ister u ltim ate ly demanded recogni- 
tion, threatening that Germany would otherwise recognize them unila ter- 
ally, w hich would lead to the collapse o f the nascent Common European 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). A ttem pting to  preserve un ity w ith in  
the Com m unity, Roland Dummas proposed principles o f recognition, and 
invited the Yugoslav republics which so wished to  subm it an application to 
the EC. In  this way the Community missed its last chance to  spare the rest 
o f Yugoslavia, in particular Bosnia/Herzegovina, from tragic war. W ithou t 
w aiting u n til January 15, 1992, the deadline fo r submission o f requests by 
the Yugoslav republics fo r recognition, w ithou t taking in to  account the 
findings o f the Badinter commission (according to  Badinter only Slovenia 
and Macedonia fu lfille d  the required conditions), and disregarding U.S. 
demands, Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia on December 23, thus 
presenting the Community w ith a fa it  accom pli.
The failure o f the Hague conference, the escalation o f war, and the 
approaching M aastricht conference led to  a sh ift in  EC policy— from the 
role o f mediator to  the role o f arbiter. The price o f the EC fa ilure was firs t 
fe lt a t the  L isbon conference on Bosnia/Herzegovina, where the  
C om m unity no longer had the power to  put in to  operation the solution 
that, even after a three-year war, proved to  be the only realistic solution (at 
the tim e C utille ro  and later Owen-Stoltenberg and the Contact group plans 
were based on sim ilar premises). Thus the Com m unity was tem porarily 
pushed to  the sidelines o f the war in  Yugoslavia, w hile the U.S. assumed 
the leading role, a fte r a rather inexplicable sh ift in  its policy in  spring 
1992, when it  started to  lead international policy on Yugoslavia in a new 
d irection .
The Olive and the Branch: The U.S. and the Yugoslav Crisis
Longstanding U.S. support fo r the second Yugoslavia as the baiane- 
ing factor between east and west, and W ashington’s cautious stand in the 
firs t stage o f the Yugoslav crisis were reasons why Belgrade remained con- 
vinced u n til early 1992 that the U.S. w ould oppose the breakup o f 
Yugoslavia. This assessment considerably affected Belgrade’s policy, as il-  
lustra ted by the fact that w ith  the centennial anniversary o f Serbian- 
Am erican d ip lom atic relations and other moves in  early 1992 S lobodan 
M iloševič’ s regime trie d  to send a message to  Washington that it  expected 
U.S. help in the dénouement o f the crisis.** However, the U.S. policy to- 
ward Yugoslavia started to  change during the 1980s due to  its fa ilure  to  
keep pace w ith  changes in Eastern Europe, leading to  open confrontation 
w ith  Serbian leadership over the po licy tow ard e thn ic Albanians in  
Kosovo,“  but also because o f a statement by Serbian leaders that they would 
not hesitate to  resort to  force in  solving in te r-repub lican  disputes.30 
According to  experts on U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, by underestim ating 
the depth o f the constitu tional crisis in  Yugoslavia, W ashington in  the
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m id-eighties missed the opportunity to  intervene in the in te r-repub lican  
dis putes and by preemptive diplomacy prevent it.31
When the constitutional crisis in  Yugoslavia escalated in  1991, U.S. 
policy was motivated by contradictory goals. On the one hand it  wanted to 
encourage democratic and m arket-oriented reforms by supporting not only 
reform s in itia te d  by the federal government bu t also by the national 
movements in  the Yugoslav republics, on the other hand it  feared that a 
predominance o f m ilitan t nationalism could lead to  the d isin tegration o f 
the country. These dilemmas were obvious in  W ashington's a ttitude to -  
ward the Yugoslav crisis. W hile Congress as early as the late 1980s consid- 
ered that the end o f the Cold W ar elim inated the need fo r a bu ffe r state 
like Yugoslavia and that nationalist movements should be supported,32 the 
adm inistration kept a cautious stance u n til the beginning o f 1992. When 
the war started in  the summer o f 1991, the Bush adm inistration thought 
that in tervention would bear great risk and little  benefit fo r the U.S. and 
therefore it  relinquished the in itia tive  to  the EC. However, w ith in  the 
adm inistration there developed a reasoning that the Europeans should not 
m erely be allowed to  handle the Yugoslav crisis, but they should be pushed 
to  do so. Then Secretary o f State James Baker stated tha t reasoning 
strongly: “ Many, i f  not most, senior and sub-cabinet-level officia ls argued, 
fu rthe r, that Europe w ould fa il the test, and so w ould be p a in fu lly  re - 
m inded o f its continuing need fo r a strong American presence. In  that 
ligh t, the test would be a useful one” .33 Nevertheless, by the end o f 1991 
the U.S. became involved in  the Yugoslav crisis through the fo rm er 
Secretary o f State Cyrus Vance, whose plan brought a long-awaited truce in 
Croatia, which is s till in force.
However, even though it was apparent that conflicting parties were 
tired  and ready fo r compromise, the U.S. torpedoed the Lisbon conference 
on Bosnia/Herzegovina, encouraging the Sarajevo government to  reject the 
C u tille ro  plan. American diplomacy in  Bosnia in  spring 1992 caused nu- 
merous controversies, particu larly after the statement by the form er U.S. 
ambassador to  Yugoslavia that he personally encouraged M uslim  leader 
A lija Izetbegovič to reject the C utille ro  plan.34 Thus U.S. missed its last 
chance to  preserve an ethnic balance in Bosnia/Herzegovina and prevent 
the la ter tragedy. Accepting the thesis that recognition was the only way to  
prevent war, the EC and the U.S. recognized Bosnia/Herzegovina on 
6-7 A p ril 1992, despite the fact that the M uslim -dom inated government in  
Sarajevo d id not control a large part o f the territo ry, that there was no con- 
sensus among the three constituent ethnic communities, tha t the referen- 
dum on independence was contradictoiy to  the Yugoslav C onstitution, and 
against the advice o f the Badinter A rb itra tion Commission.3* Recognition 
o f Bosnia/Herzegovina on 6 A pril, i.e., on the anniversaiy o f the Nazi attack 
on Yugoslavia in 1941, added insult to in jury. Bosnian Serbs took it  as a 
clear message that they could achieve independence only by force. Due to  
the fact that the Bosnian Serbs controlled most o f JNA forces in Bosnia, and 
that they had already reached a compromise w ith  the Croats on te rrito ria l 
division in May, thev soon outgunnea Sarajevo government forces and took 
almost tw o-thirds ot the te rrito ry  o f this form er Yugoslav republic.38
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Mass-scale war crimes against civilians and ethnic cleansing, re- 
ported by the Western media as committed solely by the Serbian side, have 
aroused the American public, which strongly pressed the adm inistration 
and the Congress to  do something to  stop fu rthe r c iv ilian  suffering. 
Bosnian-Serb refusal to  accept the secession o f this republic caused anger 
and frustration in  Washington, which soon took the lead in W estern policy 
toward Yugoslavia, defin ing the crisis as Serbian aggression against an in - 
tem ationaliy recognized state (even though secession its e lf dism antled the 
country that was one o f the founding members o f the U N ) and used all its 
weight in  the UN and NATO to  force Serbs to  accept the independence o f 
Bosnia/Herzegovina. “The indictm ent rested fundamentally not on the vio- 
lations o f the laws that Serbs comm itted on a lavish scale, but on the deci - 
sion to  use force in the firs t place. In  the U.S. view, the war its e lf was a 
crim e. Although Serb's violations o f ius in  bello have been seen to  confirm  
and compound th e ir violation o f ius ad bellum , the presumed existence o f 
the aggression itse lf has played a decisive role in shaping the policy o f the 
U.S. government.”37 Despite the strong moralizing tone o f U.S. politics, it  
is somewhat paradoxical that the U.S. so far was not prepared to do much to  
stop the war in Bosnia/Herzegovina, least o f all to  engage its land forces in 
peacekeeping o r peacemaking operations. An obnoxious propaganda war 
and diplom atic and m ilita ry pressures on the Serbs sent confusing signals 
to  the government in  Sarajevo and the Bosnian-Serb Republic— to  the fo r- 
mer tha t NATO  m ilita ry  intervention in Bosnia is im m inent and to  the 
la tte r that only by force o f arms could they attain the ir goals, since the West 
remained deaf to  th e ir legitim ate security concerns, which were not d iffi-  
cu lt to  meet at the beginning o f the war.
Since Bosnian-Serbs refused the Vance-Owen plan in  spring 1993, 
openly challenging American policy, the U.S. adm inistration became fo r 
tne firs t tim e trapped by its own policy toward Bosnia, since the only 
logical answer to  the Serb's decision would be NATO m ilita ry intervention 
in Bosnia. When Secretary o f State Warren Christopher, in  spring 1993, 
trie d  to  so lic it an agreement from his European allies for a ir strikes against 
the Serbs, he faced resolute opposition in London and Paris, a fte r w hich 
the U.S. tem porarily w ithdrew  from the Yugoslav scene. I t  is w orth noting 
that, like the EC policy, the U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia made a fu ll c ir- 
cle, from  in itia l support to  the sovereignty o f Yugoslavia, the endorsement, 
early in  1992, o f the secession o f the Yugoslav republics, and fu rtherm ore 
when the U.S. undertook the p ro tection  o f th e ir new ly acquired 
sovereignties.
Balkan Security Issues after Bosnia
The fa ilure o f American mediation in Bosnia, the outbreak o f war 
between Muslims and Croats and the approach o f 1 November 1993 (the 
date the M aastricht agreement would come in to  force) prom pted France, 
Germany, and the UK to  assume a more active role. The French and 
German fore ign m inisters launched an in itia tive  by w hich te rrito ria l
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
00063378
concessions o f Bosnian Serbs in favor o f the Muslims would be rewarded 
by partia l liftin g  o f sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The K inke l- 
Juppe in itia tiv e  was accepted at the EC m in is te ria l conference o f 
22 November, w ith the addition o f the demand fo r an agreement (modus 
vivendi) in  UNPA areas in Croatia. According to  Lord Owen, co-chairman 
o f the IC FY, the sh ift from the policy which supported the in te g rity  o f 
Bosnia/Herzegovina to its te rrito ria l division was the consequence o f the 
fact tha t Washington had destroyed his plan fo r preservation o f Bosnia as a 
m ultie thn ic state. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan reflected a new approach o f 
the Com m unity and proposed te rrito ria l division and creation o f three na- 
tiona l states in  Bosnia/Herzegovina. A t the same tim e, Germany trie d  to  
create new bonds between the Muslims and the Croats. Both attem pts 
fa iled since the Muslims believed that the return o f the U.S. to  the Bosnia- 
Hercegovina scene would bring them more favorable conditions.
The next stage o f the war started early in  February 1994 w ith  an 
explosion in  the Sarajevo marketplace. Although it  was never established 
who fire d  the mine that killed many civilians, the West im m ediately ac- 
cused the Bosnian-Serbs o f responsibility fo r this massacre. NATO gave an 
ultim atum  to  Bosnian Serbs to  dislocate th e ir heavy weaponry at a distance 
o f 20 kilometers from Sarajevo under the threat o f NATO  a ir strikes. This 
was setting a precedent in  many ways: NATO fo r the firs t tim e form ally 
acted out-of-area sending the firs t ultim atum  in  its history. The Sarajevo 
crisis, w hich threatened to  escalate in to  war between N ATO  and the 
Bosnian Serbs, was unexpectedly resolved by Russian deputy foreign m in- 
ister V ita ly Churkin. W ith these moves, the U.S. and Russia took the lead 
in international mediation in Bosnia. Such casting o f roles was confirm ed 
during the Goraîde crisis in A p ril when NATO  planes bombed the posi- 
tions o f the Bosnian Serbs and lost its firs t a ircra ft in  combat. In  th is way, 
the international mediation became a kind o f Concert o f powers, re flecting 
the new balance o f powers in Europe. The newly created Contact Group 
included diplomats from the U.S., Russia, the U nited Kingdom , France, 
and Germany (the last three represented the EU as w ell as th e ir national 
interests). Although the Contact group managed fo r the firs t tim e to  reach 
a consensus on the relevant international factors in  the solution o f the 
Yugoslav crisis, it also burdened the negotiating process w ith  the relations 
o f its ind ividual members, since all three sides embarked on th is assign- 
ment starting from th e ir own political interests and security concerns.
The war in Bosnia occasioned the firs t significant debate over fo r- 
eign policy o f the post-Cold W ar period. Unlike previously, when in  the 
Congress an interventionist Republican party was p itte d  against a non- 
interventionist Democratic party, in the case o f Bosnia, the iden tity  o f the 
participants changed. Debate over the American role in  the Yugoslav war 
stirred the emotions o f the participants, who fe lt that U.S. fa ilure to  in te r- 
vene on the M uslim  side would be tantamount to  a defeat o f a ll values on 
which the U.S. wanted to  base a new system o f international relations since 
the end o f bipolarism: “ ...the United States promised to  stay in  Europe a f- 
te r the Cold W ar in order to help keep peace and sustain the dem ocratic 
revolution; but a war o f aggression has been waged and won by a most
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undemocratic regime. The United States proclaimed principles o f peaceful 
change for a new era; but those principles have been wantonly disregarded. 
We said ‘never again’; but again the intolerable has happened in Europe.’,3e
In  Russia, which is pa in fu lly recovering from  the breakup o f the 
Soviet Union, the Yugoslav crisis also came in to the focus o f internal p o liti- 
cal disputes, becoming the firs t test o f its new international role and one o f 
the places where Moscow should check the expansion o f NATO. However, 
support extended by Russia to  Bosnian Serbs has been lim ited  by outbursts 
o f Serbian nationalism and power relations between Russia and the West. 
According to  Russian foreign-policy experts, in  th e ir po licy tow ard the 
Yugoslav crisis the West should answer three questions and Russia only 
one question. The West, above a ll the U.S., must answer the fo llow ing: 
1) does it  want to  continue punishing the intransigence o f the Serbs at the 
cost o f continuation o f the war or would it  w ill be w illin g  to  accept a com - 
promise solution; 2) is it  ready to accept Russia as an unavoidable factor in  
con flic t management and; 3) is it  w illin g  to  com m it its e lf m ilita rily  to  
peacemaking in  the form er Yugoslavia. Russia, however, must find  ways to  
help the Serbs w ithout sending them wrong signals, i.e., it must avoid s tir- 
ring  up war. According to  Alexei Arbatov, the U.S. have found in  small 
Serbia a replacement fo r the Soviet Union, which justifies the preservation 
o f the NATO at the tim e when disappearance o f W TO and the USSR have 
made this organization superfluous.
Finally, through participation in the Contact Group, the EU  has re- 
tained its place in  international crisis-management in  the Yugoslav crisis, 
avoiding conflicts among the Twelve (now F ifteen) that seriously jeopar- 
dized its po litica l cohesion in 1991 and showed the Europeans’ lim ite d  
a b ility  to  handle security problems on the continent w ithout an American 
and Russian presence. Since the focus o f difference in  the approach to  this 
crisis has been transferred to  the relations between W ashington and 
Moscow, the EU obtained a relatively com fortable position, which allowed 
its leading members to  increase th e ir own role in crisis-management and to 
have another chance at influencing the course and outcome o f the war in 
the Balkans. The European influence is visible in the strong m ilita ry pres- 
enee o f France and the UK in UNPROFOR, as w ell as the EU (German) 
adm inistration in  Mostar, which could end only i f  the blue helmets w ith - 
draw because o f the liftin g  o f the arms embargo against the Sarajevo gov- 
em m ent. The threat o f w ithdrawal o f its troops from  Bosnia has enabled 
France and the UK to  check the U.S. lif t  and strike strategy in  Bosnia.
In  essence, in te rn a tiona l crisis-m anagem ent in  the  fo rm e r 
Yugoslavia is polarized between two definitions o f the con flic t and hence 
between two possible strategies fo r its solution.
The firs t is based on the assessment that Serbia is waging an aggres- 
sive war against the other form er Yugoslav republics to  form  a G reater 
Serbia. The only way to  stop that tendency, according to  th is opinion, is to  
use NATO armed force against the Serbs which leaves two options: ‘T h e  
firs t option, and the po litico -m ilita rily  more consistent one, is to  state that 
the war objectives are 1) destruction o f the Serbian state, 2) complete 
occupation o f the respective region, 3) establishm ent o f a m ilita ry
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governm ent, and 4) maintenance o f a strong m ilita ry  presence fo r 
decades”41 The problem  is tha t such m ilita ry  in tervention w ould im ply:
1) between 500,000 and 1,000,000 soldiers im m ediately engaged to  avoid a 
W estm oreland-type reauest fo r more and more soldiers; 2) tha t nations 
partic ipa ting  in  this e ffo rt must be prepared to  accept a N orthern Ire land- 
type o f engagement once the war is over; 3) that major losses w ould have to  
be accepted; 4) that it  w ould be v irtua lly  impossible to  reach consensus fo r 
such an action not only between the West and Russia but also among the 
W estern countries themselves and would risk con flic t w ith in  N ATO  as air- 
raids against Bosnian and Krajina Serbs in  1994 proved; and 5) tha t m ilita ry 
action would probably provoke large-scale war due to  the central position o f 
th is country in  the Balkans (both attempts in  th is century to  punish Serbia, 
in  1914 and 1941, eventually ended in failure).
The second and much more lim ited  option fo r m ilita ry  deploym ent 
w ould be a strategy o f containment, i.e., to  enforce the no-fly resolution by 
the U N , or to  destroy ground targets in  Serbia, in  order to  achieve a more 
equal balance o f power between Serbs and Bosnian M uslim s.42 The effects 
on the ground war would, in  all like lihood, be lim ited , given the lim ita - 
tions o f a ir power under the specific conditions o f the Balkans as had been 
argued above: “ But the main problem, even w ith  the decision to  enforce 
the no-fly  resolution, is that decision inherently includes becoming a party 
o f the war.” 43 The main obstacle to  th is option is the presence o f peace- 
keepers in  the territory. In  the case o f UN m ilita ry action against one side, 
they would probably become combatants and risk being taken hostages. To 
avoid th is, UNPROFOR w ould probably have to  w ithdraw  early, thus 
leaving highly-dependent civilians w ithout protection. Even the attem pt 
to  replace UNPROFOR by NATO in  early 1995 in  order to  create a more 
credible m ilita ry threat caused fierce conflic t w ith in  NATO and doubt that 
Germany wanted to enforce its m ilita ry  presence in  the Balkans at the 
expense o f the UK and France.
The second strategy starts w ith  the assumption that war in  ex- 
Yugoslavia is a m ixture o f everything: a war between states, a c iv il war, a 
secession war, an ethnic conflict, a conflict between nations, to  some extent 
a religious war, and, certainly, a war which includes much hate. Since m il- 
ita ry intervention would endanger NATO's cohesion and risk a sp ill-over 
o f the war to  the southern Balkans which could end in war between Greece 
and Turkey and broader Balkan con flic t, and since Slobodan M iloševič’s 
regime in  Serbia proved resistant to  external pressures, it  has been p ro - 
posed that the West, using sticks (threat o f m ilita ry  intervention) and car- 
rots (gradual liltin g  o f UN sanctions) encourage Belgrade to  continue the 
isolation o f the Bosnian Serbs and start a process o f reforms in  the country 
as the only way toward predictable, manageable and, above all, stable secu - 
rity  order in the Balkans. In  a recently published discussion paper, form er 
B ritish  chargé d'affaires in  Belgrade, M ichael Robinson, states: “There are 
arguments fo r turn ing a b lind eye to  what happens in  Serbia in  the interest 
o f a Bosnian settlement. But i f  nothing is done to  encourage a stronger and 
more democratic and pro-European centre, Serbian po litics  w ill became 
increasingly unstable, w ith  demographically s ign ifican t m ino rities w ith in
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Serbia and Montenegro— particularly ethnic Albanians— to most like ly  tar- 
get o f such vo la tility . The present state o f flux in the nationalist commu- 
n ity  offers a w indow o f opportunity for a concerned Western e ffo rt beyond 
Bosnia to  persuade not only M iloševič but the people o f Serbia as a whole 
that they stand to  gain more from working w ith  the international commu- 
n ity  than against it.”44
Both strategies revealed that, a fte r three years o f war in  ex- 
Yugoslavia, m ajor powers found themselves trapped between strong public 
pressures to  do som ething about the bloodshed in  Bosnia and lim ite d  
geopolitical interests in the region which is at a safe distance from the main 
areas o f security concerns in  Europe and Mediterranean. This dilem m a 
also revealed that the West and Russia, fo r that matter, are mostly in te r- 
ested in  ending the high-level war in Bosnia, but also that they are not 
ready to  com m it themselves to  providing long-term  po litica l strategy and 
solutions to  Balkan security problems after the breakup o f Yugoslavia. This 
reactualized the o ld  assumption that the Balkans are w ithou t a se lf- 
s ta b iliz in g  a b ility  and heavily exposed to  extra-Balkanic influences. 
Therefore, the main question— What after Bosnia?— remains unanswered 
as fa r as international policy toward the Balkans is concerned, opening 
various options fo r the conflicting parties. The lack o f an answer to  this 
question, however, is leaving conflic ting  parties w ith  the option o f war 
only, trapped between an in a b ility  to  w in the war and achieve the 
nationalist aspirations that they proclaimed and acceptance o f a compromise 
solution that w ould expose them to the pressures o f the nationalist genie 
they released from  the bottle and which m ight eventually destroy them.
Except fo r Slovenia, which successfully le ft the Balkans, in  other 
republics the prevails a be lie f that the end o f war would en tire ly marginal- 
ize th e ir current position as clients o f the leading European powers, and 
reduce the like lihood o f a kind o f Marshall Plan fo r the Balkans, as the 
necessary prerequisite fo r economic and po litica l recovery. Achieving a 
modus vivend i w ithout a lasting solution for the current (Croatia, Bosnia) 
and potentia l sources o f crisis (Kosovo, Macedonia) w ould leave these 
countries on the one side in  a politica l and economic vacuum, in w hich 
th e ir regimes w ould face frustrated nationalist am bitions, m utual revan- 
chism, and numerous security concerns, and on the other w ithout access to  
European po litica l, economic and security structures. Fear that the end o f 
war m ight make them the backwater o f Europe and mutual threat percep- 
tions s till fuel the war logic in the Balkans, in spite o f the fact that a fte r 
three years o f conflict the ru ling  regimes, academic and business circles are 
qu ite  aware o f its long-term  devastating consequences fo r national 
economies which increasingly assume catastrophic proportions.
In  short, the rebalkanization o f the Balkans caused by the breakup o f 
Yugoslavia, is re turn ing Balkan geopolitics to the situation before W orld  
W ar I, when small Baltcan irredentists tried  and managed to  em broil the 
m ajor European powers in  th e ir conflicts only to  become victim s o f 
European power-politics. Therefore, the only comprehensive solution to  
the problems caused by the violent disintegration o f Yugoslavia would be a 
simultaneous search fo r a modus vivendi in actual and potential crisis spots
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and a defin ition o f long-term and credible strategis fo r re integration o f the 
region in to  Europe which would be attractive not on ly to  the  ru lin g  
regimes but also to whatever remains o f the m iddle class in  an e ffo rt to  re- 
define national interests toward negotiated compromises and dem ocratic 
and m arket-oriented reforms. Otherwise, the only alternative w ill be a 
neither־war־nor־peace situation, w ith  long-term  destructive consequences 
for stab ility  in  Europe, transatlantic relations, and relations o f the West 
w ith Russia and the Islam ic world.
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Political Disintegration and Possibilities for 
the Reintegration of Former Yugoslavia
Dušan Reljić
ģ'l f  Serbs 1vere asked to declare what they prefer—to be fa t and living in 
Croatia or to be emaciated and independent, 1 am positive that they would 
choose the latter“— Foreign minister o f the self-styled Krajina Milan ВяЬіс 
“Nationalism is war"— French president Francois Mitterrand speaking to 
the European parliament
In  a few months the fra tricida l war in  form er Yugoslavia w ill have 
raged longer than W orld W ar I I  had lasted in  this region. The danger o f a 
spillover to  the southeast is s till im m inent. Thus, contemplating modes o f 
reintegration fo r the region appears to  be an exercise in fu tility . Yet w ith  • 
out a new framework, the form er Yugoslav area cannot be pacified, and 
Europe and the w orld w ill remain uneasy, to  say the least.
Federal Yugoslavia is buried in history and there is no return to  it, 
but the political and economic nexus o f the Yugoslav area is a fact that even 
the most radical ideologies cannot obliterate. Genuine stability can only be 
established i f  structures in trinsic to  the region are reintegrated.
The population o f the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) w ill have to  labor un til the year 2012 to recover the level o f 
liv ing standard enjoyed in  1990.1 In  Slovenia, the most developed part o f 
the fo rm er Yugoslav Federation, the 1993 Gross N ational P roduct 
amounted to only 82.1% o f the 1989 level. In  war-torn Croatia, it  reached 
just 46.0% o f the 1989 figu re .2 The disintegration o f the Yugoslav federa- 
tion caused havoc in  the economies o f its constituent republics. I t  p ro- 
duced material and financial disruptions to a ll the new independent states 
irreparable in the near future.
Among the immense new handicaps are the destruction and human 
losses caused by the war and the drain o f human resources generated by 
the em igration o f hundreds o f thousands o f the young generation’s best 
and brightest.
In  any foreseeable future, the Yugoslav area w ill remain a high-risk 
zone marginally attractive to  foreign investors. This w ill, in  tu rn , deprive 
the economies o f new states o f desperately needed foreign capital.
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Presently, the Yugoslav area breeds prim arily  poverty and social anom ie.3 
I t  is a wasteland excluded from European integration, not only po litica lly  
and economically, but also in terms o f civilization processes4.
The fina l stage fo r the Yugoslav catastrophe was set in  the late 
1980s. A t the tim e, economic indicators d id  not appear to  lead to  disaster. 
Q uite the contrary, the last federal government under prim e m in ister Ante 
M arkovid introduced reforms that jum p-started the national economy in to  
something o f a boom.5 O f a ll eastern and southeastern states, Yugoslavia 
came closest to  future membership in  the European Com m unity. Yet, 
w ith in  a short tim e the reform ist M arkovié government was sent in to ob liv - 
ion by the leaders o f ethnic chauvinist movements in the federal republics. 
The powers o f anti-reform ism , provincialism , and national to ta litarianism  
emerged victorious.6
T he ir po litica l programs were not based on pragmatic plans fo r mar- 
ket-oriented economic changes and c iv il po litica l reform  but on “ talism anic
Erenouncem ents.”7 These consisted essentially o f promises to  save the b io- )gical survival o f the nation which, in  the irra tiona l ideology o f the ethnic 
chauvinism movements' leaders, was jeopardized by demonic designs o f 
other Yugoslav nations.
Two im portant mechanisms provided for the homogenization o f the 
Yugoslav nations in to ethnic chauvinism movements. The firs t was the in - 
vention o f histories o f eternal antagonism between the nations reaching 
back in to  the dark ages.8 I t  thereby became easier to  in te rp re t the u -tu rn  
from  bu ild ing  a modern Yugoslav nation (in  the po litica l, not ethnic sense) 
towards m utual exterm ination as the inevitable re turn  to  a quasi-natural 
state o f relations between Serbs, Croats, Moslems, and others. The second 
was dehumanization o f the adversary nation and tu rn ing  it, in the percep- 
tion  o f the masses, in to hordes o f satanic creatures.8
A t the same tim e national rom anticism , much along nineteenth- 
century German and other western European prototypes, was prom oted by 
the authorities to  become the o ffic ia lly  approved cu ltura l m odel.10 Alm ost 
absolute command over mass media was essential fo r establishing d irect 
rule o f power centers in the republics over homogeneous, autistic masses.
Despite the drastic change o f the dominant po litica l paradigm in  the 
post-Yugoslav states, power structures stayed much in  place, especially in 
the hard core o f power in the Balkans, the security forces. The state appara- 
tus o f the Yugoslav republics remained mostly intact during the m etam or-
f)hosis from  Com m unist to  ethnic chauvinist status. The nom inally new eadersh ips11 in  the Yugoslav republics, in  rea lity em anating from  the 
Com m unist party nomenclature, sim ply phased out th e ir trad itiona l basic 
leg itim iza tion  claim  that they were the guarantee o f social justice , and 
aaopted a new self-styled role as the warrant o f national justice.
This somersault in to  a new po litica l leg itim iza tion  posture could 
not appear credible because, after all, there were no young, po litica lly  un- 
tarnished new leaders around. The collective transform ation from  perm is- 
sive communism to  authoritarian nationalism w ith in  the ranks o f leader- 
ship in  the Yugoslav republics was bound to  be rid icu led by public opinion, 
had a rational po litica l dispute been perm itted. But this was not to  be and,
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therefore, the venom o f ethnic chauvinistic hatred was in jected in to  the 
psychology o f the masses to  make them po litica lly b lind, deaf and m ute .12 
A t the same tim e, the grip o f a rig id  state apparatus on a feeble society w ith  
little  dem ocratic trad ition  was excessively increased.
The key factor in  the disintegration o f the form er Yugoslav society 
and state was the “ unwillingness ana the inab ility  o f the po litica l e lite  to  
lead the process o f m odernization and system transform ation— nationalism  
Served as an instrum ent o f the Communist e lite  to  survive and to  p ro fit 
from  the new situation.” 13
Regimes based on fear and hatred are not capable o f rational behav- 
io r .14 When economic cooperation and regional integration are discussed 
as ways out o f the Balkan politica l conflicts, it appears unavoidable to  con- 
elude that no po litica l preconditions exist fo r th is o p tio n .19 Even i f  by 
some miracle tne post-Yugoslav states would decide to  enhance cooperation 
w ith  the outside world, it  is doubtful that th e ir national economies and po- 
litica i cultures, deformed by war and authoritarian rule, could be m utually 
com patible or w orld com petitive.16
The impetus fo r a solution has to  be introduced from  the outside. 
But why should the outside w orld care, especially a fter the Yugoslav na- 
tions preferred to  vote fo r m utually assured ann ih ila tion17 and fo r remain- 
ing submissive to  th e ir respective leaderships a fte r so much destruction 
and k illing?  And why should the national leaderships accept foreign m edi- 
ta tion  i f  it  runs counter to  th e ir interests?
Apart from  the general moral outrage at the ongoing carnage in  fo r- 
mer Yugoslavia, there are other, more com pelling reasons fo r outside in - 
tervention, especially from the West.
One reason is that providing reintegration mechanisms fo r a se lf- 
sustained recovery in the Yugoslav area is cheaper than spending W estern 
tax-payers' money on peacekeeping forces and humanitarian aid.
Another is that other southeastern European states are negatively 
affected by the Yugoslav war in  th e ir transition towards m arket economy 
and po litica l pluralism . Trade, tra ffic , economic cooperation, and a ll other 
forms o f communication in the region are severely damaged by the con flic t. 
The shortest land connections between western and central Europe and 
Greece, Turkey, and the M iddle East have been severed by the Yugoslav 
war.
A th ird  reason has to  do w ith  broader security interests. A lthough 
the Yugoslav war is s till only a regional conflict, European and w orld  sta- 
b ility  are also at stake. Albania and Bulgaria could be drawn in to  the new 
phase o f war i f  i t  would spread south. Greece and Turkey appear poised to  
participate in  a Balkan shoot out.
The French-Germ an re la tionsh ip ,18 the new Russian-Am erican 
partnership, the fu ture o f NATO, even domestic U.S. p o litics— a ll have 
been adversely influenced by the conflic t in  form er Yugoslavia. Russian 
foreign m in ister Andrey Kozyrev was not overstating when he repeatedly 
warned that th is co n flic t contains the potentia l fo r trig g e rin g  W o rld  
W ar I I I .
Furtherm ore, i f  one is to indulge in the newly fashionable theories
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about “conflicts o f civilizations,”  there is a potential in  the Yugoslav war 
even fo r such Armageddon-like scenarios.
NATO secretary general W illy  Claes recently voiced his be lie f that 
Is lam ic  fundam entalism  poses a greater th rea t to  the W est than 
Communism ever d id 19. There is almost no Western diplom at who does 
not, in  private conversations, point out that fo r European standards, an in - 
tolerable degree o f influence by Moslem fundamentalism is already estab- 
lished in  Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The fate o f Yugoslav Moslems is also an issue in  the in tra-Is lam ic 
com petition fo r prestige and power. Moderate and radical po litica l streams 
in  Turkey clash on the Bosnia issue. Even fundamentalist states like Iran 
and Saudi Arabia compete fo r influence in  Bosnia and the neighboring 
Islam ic com m unities.
Two conflicting approaches have emerged regarding how to  put an 
end to  the dismemberment o f Federal Yugoslavia. One, o rig ina lly  pro- 
moted by German diplomacy under form er foreign m inister H ans-D ietrich 
Genscher, was to  stop the disintegration at the borders o f the six con- 
stituent republics. The righ t to  self-determ ination was proclaim ed to be 
equal to  the right to  create separate national states as long as they pledged 
to  trea t national m inorities aecently. Through Germany’s pressure on 
o ther European countries to  recognize the separatist republics, it  has 
eventually become the general Western approach, adopted fina lly  by the 
U .S.20 as well. I t  is also, at least nominally, the platform  o f the five-power 
Contact Group fo r Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bonn’s ch ie f argument fo r the arm wrestling o f its partners to  opt 
fo r recogn ition  o f tne  breakaway republics was to  preclude tne 
“ radicalizatíon o f the righ t to  self-determ ination by the Serbs” 21 and in th is 
manner prevent fu rthe r con flic t and fragmentation in the region.22
In  the meantime, the in itia l German/Western approach has been 
abandoned both in  the Contact Group plan for Bosnia ana Herzegovina and 
the Z~4 plan for Croatia. T errito ria l partition o f the two form er Yugoslav 
republics affected by war is the essence o f the plans, although th in ly  veiled 
by rather fantastic proposals, how to organize the future states to  keep the 
pretense o f preserving existing intra-Yugoslav borders. The w arring sides 
reject these plans exactly because o f the ir hermaphrodite character. The 
Serbian side feels cheated out o f exacting a price fo r its m ilita ry  victory, 
the self-styled Serb states in  Bosnia and Krajina, whereas the Croat and 
Moslem sides refuse to  accept the loss o f the ir sovereign states, recognized 
by the international community.
The other basic approach was rarely elaborated in  exp lic it term s. 
Professor Svetozar Stojanovic , ch ie f adviser to the form er president o f 
FRY Dobrica Cosić, was one o f the few im portant figures to  state pub lic ly  
tha t “only a radical reorganization o f the state structure in  the Balkans” 
could end the conflict. This concept o f radical reorganization means noth - 
ing less than new borders, including the recognition o f Albania’s claims to  
some parts o f Kosovo. In  the eyes o f the Western public, th is plan amounts 
to  the creation o f Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia, and Greater Albania, and 
possibly the disappearance o f Bosnia, Herzegovina, and FYR Macedonia as
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sovereign states.
Bearing in m ind the depth o f foreign involvem ent in  the Yugoslav 
co n flic t a fter four years o f war, reorganizing the Balkans entails a modern 
remake o f the San Stefano and Berlin congresses o f 1878. In  other words, a 
deal has to be struck between great powers exerting th e ir influence to  up - 
hold the interests o f th e ir particular client-states in  the region.
The five powers determ ining now the future o f the Yugoslav area 
have publicly rejected this radical approach, but have private ly incorporated 
decisive elements o f it  in the two existing peace plans and in th e ir own po- 
litic a i maneuvering in  the area.
Surprisingly enough, it  was Germany, the foreign power tha t had 
insisted on preserving the form er internal borders o f the Yugoslav federa- 
tio n  to  prevent fu rther conflicts, that in itiated the creation o f new state en- 
titie s 23 obliterating the form er borders. The U.S., having vowed not the 
accept the fru its  of aggression, took over this German suggestion and gave 
life  and guidance to  the M oslem -Croat Federation in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and its Confederation w ith  C roatia,24 and th is a fte r Croatia 
d id  itsDest to grab as much as possible o f Bosnia, a fter Bosnian Serbs, sup- 
ported by Belgrade, launched the ir attack on the Bosnian Moslems.
In  practical terms, the U.S. and Germany accepted and prom oted 
the creation o f new state entities in the Yugoslav area.2*5 Furtherm ore, by 
signing a m ilita ry cooperation treaty w ith  Croatia and provid ing m ilita ry  
support to  the Moslem government in Sarajevo and tne Moslem-Croat 
Federation o f Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by establishing a vis ib le  m ili-  
tary presence in  Albania and Macedonia, the U.S. also marked its new areas 
o f influence in  the Balkans. Russia’s recent m ilita ry treaty w ith  the FRY 
rounded o ff th is new set o f dependencies.
Presently, the politica l stage in form er Yugoslavia is dom inated by 
extrem ist chauvinist leaders. They are involved in  subordinate re la tion - 
ships w ith  outside powers. But events have proven that ne ither the U.S. 
and Germany on one side nor Russia on the other can exert fu ll remote 
control over the w ill o f th e ir protégés. Foreign influence s till prevents the 
worst possible outcome, a total war in the Balkans, but outside powers can- 
not impose a settlem ent.26 Both foreign protectors and th e ir Yugoslav 
clients have arrived at an impasse that could easily perpetuate the present 
Balkan entropy. A new approach appears appropriate.
In  dealing w ith  post-Yugoslav states, the outside powers, incom pre- 
hensibly, have never addressed the roots o f the war, the m ilita n t, an ti- 
democratic character o f the newly established regimes and th e ir almost to - 
tal grip  on society. Foreign support to  c iv il and democratic po litica l a lte r- 
natives in  the new states is almost non-existent.27 And c iv il rights and 
individual human rights seem to be a marginal issue when foreign officials 
deal w ith  post-Yugoslav leaders.
A strategy to drain the roots o f war would reject existing regimes as 
the sole representatives o f the new states and treat them fo r what they are, 
authoritarian and anti-democratic aliens in the international com m unity.28 
The new strategy w ould take up proposals developed by c iv il p o litica l 
groups in  post-Yugoslav states and grant them equal im portance. Newly
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formed dependencies on foreign protectors could help overcome the resis- 
tance o f tne autocratic regimes to foreign intervention in  what they con- 
sider to  be internal affairs.
For example, the Belgrade chapter o f the European movement has 
id e n tified  in  its charta o f Rights ana Freedoms29 ways and means fo r 
reintegrating the area. For instance, the authors propose that every holder 
o f citizenship o f form er Yugoslavia would enjoy the same rights in  a ll sue- 
cessor states. D iscrim inatory laws and practices against new foreigners 
should be abolished, and constant international control over human rights 
issues introduced....These and other proposals pursue a roll-back strategy 
against ethnic chauvinism by demanding supra-national rights and fre e - 
doms, modeled on EU legislation.
C iv il po litica l parties, groups, institu tions and media in  post- 
Yugoslav states, no matter how m arginally relevant at th is stage, deserve 
support from the international community. Peaceful change ana reintegra- 
tion in  the region depend on the emergence o f alternative po litica l options 
to  the present hegemony o f authoritarian ethnic chauvinists.
Somewhere in the halls o f the Palais Des Nations in  Geneva, the 
London Conference on form er Yugoslavia s till survives. Through an e ffo rt 
o f the participating foreign powers and by drawing on the expertise o f civic 
po litica l parties and personalities in  the post-Yugoslav states, th is forum  
could be the birthplace o f a reintegration project fo r the area. Rather than 
attem pting sim plisticly to  slice form er Yugoslavia in to  grotesque new e n ti- 
ties, the new plan should provide a general solution.
The starting point must be the rehabilitation o f the rights and free- 
doms o f the individual and the lim ita tion o f the power and importance o f 
the nation-state.
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Greece in a Post-Cold War Environment
Theodore A. Couloumbis
Follow ing M ikha il Gorbachev's perestroika policies, we have w it- 
nessed the momentous events that led to the reunification o f Germany, the 
desegregation o f the form er Soviet Union, the dissolution o f the Warsaw 
Pact ana the Comecon, and the general collapse o f the system o f applied 
M arxism -Leninism  on the European continent.
Despite the historic peace breakthroughs on the Israeli-Palestinian, 
South A frican, N orthern Ire land and even tne Bosnian questions, George 
Bush's op tim istic vision o f an emerging new w orld order o f like-m inded 
states was soon challenged by a long chain o f crises, especially in  Africa, the 
Balkans, and in  some o f the form er Soviet republics on the Black Sea and 
Caucasus regions. This, in  tu rn , gave rise to  a number o f pessimistic as- 
sessments raising nightm arish images o f a “ new world disorder,'’ a “ re turn 
to  history,”  “ from Sarajevo to  Sarajevo,”  and so forth.
Foreign policy analysts in  Greece and elsewhere were qu ickly d i- 
vided in to  schools o f optim ism  and pessimism. The optim ists highlighted 
global order, consensus among the powerful permanent members o f the 
UN Security C ouncil, and collective in ternationa l action undertaken 
against violators in  places such as Iraq, form er Yugoslavia, Somalia, and 
H a iti as w e ll as lim ite d  hum anitarian assistance and action in  Rwanda, 
Burundi, Bosnia and elsewhere.
In  contrast, the pessimists viewed the w orld as moving back in to  a 
state o f m u ltipo lar anarchy in  which the strong do what they can and the 
weak suffer what they must. The optim ists counseled the employment o f 
po litica l diplom atic and economic leverage and placed special emphasis on 
Greece’s ins titu tiona l connections w ith  m ultila tera l mechanisms such as 
the EU , NATO , and the W EU. The pessimists, on the contrary, empha- 
sized the m ilita ry  dim ension and recommended policies o f tem porary 
regional alliances and the taking o f bold and decisive steps includ ing  the 
preemptive use o f force in  favorable but fleeting conditions.
The optim ists could be labeled as m ultilateralists and international- 
ists who are guided by the philosophy o f Jean Monnet. The pessimists, in  
tu rn , could be labeled as unilateralists and nationalists who are s till in - 
spired by the teachings o f the Prussian general and theoretician Karl von 
Clausewitz (1780-1831).
As the post-Cold W ar international realities unfold, it  appears that
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the tru th  lies somewhere between the optim istic and the pessimistic pro- 
jections. A new global b ipolarity seems to be emerging, d ivid ing the w orld 
in to  a trila te ra l (N orth America, Europe, and Japan ), advanced and stable 
north  and a transitional, developing, and unstable south, which now in- 
eludes portions o f the fo rm er Soviet Union and the post-communist 
Balkans.
Future po litica l relations w ill focus mainly on a north-south axis, 
but the global concert o f powers w ill not autom atically energize its e lf in 
every instance where there are threats to  peace and/or violations o f in te r- 
national law and norms. The stable north w ill more than like ly  continue to 
react to  escalating conflicts in the unstable south according to  c rite ria  o f 
interest, cost, ana capability.
There w ill be zones o f vital interest, such as the G ulf, where the 
like lihood o f collective and decisive m ilita ry responses against aggressors 
w ill be quite high.
There w ill also be zones o f moderate interest, e.g., Bosnia, where 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding w ill be the order o f the day.
F ina lly, in  a classic triage fashion, there w ill be zones o f in d iffe r- 
enee and benign neglect, such as the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, or 
Rwanda in which the international community w ill stand by helplessly and 
watch the bloody struggles fo r the survival o f the fitte s t ana the most 
ferocious.
This article w ill address two questions that are related to  Greece’s, 
and to  a certain extent to  Cyprus’, foreign policy profile  in the post-Cold 
W ar era. The firs t question relates to an assessment o f the comparative sta- 
b ility /c o n flic t quotient in  the Balkans as o ld  and newly born post- 
communist states navigate in  the treacherous waters o f transition to  dem oc- 
racy and to  market economy. The second question addresses Greek foreign 
policy vis-à-vis  Turkey and assesses the cost/benefit ratios o f mapping out a 
realistic strategy (and tactics) o f tension reduction and con flic t resolution 
w hich could, hopefully, lead to  a historic reconciliation modeled on the 
Venizelos-Ataturk rapprochement ofthe early 1930s.
O nly a short decade ago it  was fashionable for scholar practitioners 
such as Henry Kissinger and Jeanne K irkpatrick to  differentiate clearly be- 
tween authoritarian regimes (e.g., Latin American and southern European 
va rie ties  o f m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ips) and to ta lita ria n  regim es (e.g., 
Com m unist systems such as those o f the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, 
Asia, and the Caribbean). They viewed the form er as less objectionable 
than the la tter, despite th e ir equally atrocious human rights records, be- 
cause authoritarian regimes were considered reversible (in that under cer- 
ta in  conditions they could evolve to democracy) while tota litarian regimes 
were pronounced permanent and irreversible. The post-perestroika  co l- 
lapse o f European com m unist regimes exploded in  the face o f the 
K irkpatrick/K issinger thesis but has not necessarily destroyed its logic.
A num ber o f po litica l scientists have been recently asking them - 
selves whether the processes o f transition and consolidation o f dem ocratic 
institu tions experienced by Southern European countries such as Portugal,
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Spain, Ita ly  (after W orld War II) , Greece, and Turkey could be considered 
as useful models for partial emulation by post-communist societies.
Before proceeding to respond to  this question, we should define fo r 
w orking purposes the concepts o f transition and consolidation. T ransition 
to democracy is norm ally a short-lived span o f tim e involving the consti tu  - 
tiona l specification and the establishment o f institu tions w hich are de- 
signed to  safeguard the separation o f powers, the development and fune- 
tion ing  o f two o r more politica l parties, the holding o f frequent elections 
(at least every four/Гіѵе years), the functioning o f representative parliam en- 
tary bodies, the protection o f human rights and freedoms, and the devel- 
opment and operation o f a genuine and p luralist press and other mass me - 
dia.
The concept o f consolidation o f democracy is o f special relevance to  
post-communist countries that are currently undergoing the d iffic u lt task 
o f transition to  democracy as well as to market economy. Dem ocratic in s ti- 
tutions may be considered to  have been consolidated when at least three 
im portant preconditions are satisfied: 1) the developm ent o f consensus 
among the politica l parties and groupings in  a given country concerning the 
structure and the characteristics o f democracy (e.g., presidential republic, 
parliam entary republic or constitutional monarchy); 2) the successful rota- 
tion  o f power between parties and/or coalitions o f the righ t and the le ft 
w ithout m ilita ry  intervention and/or c iv il conflic t; and 3) the maintenance 
o f an overall in ter-party agreement regarding the external o rien ta tion  
(strategy) o f a country. In  the case o f Greece, fo r example, the choice made 
in the late 1970s and subsequently accepted by the whole spectrum o f its 
po litica l forces was that the country ought to  seek m em bership in  the 
European Com m unity and maintain membership in NATO  over tne a lte r- 
native op tion  (vocally prom oted in  the 1970s by the Socialist and 
Com m unist parties) tnat Greece would have been better o ff as a non- 
aligned/neutral state.
Based on the discussion so far, we can propose tw o w orking hy- 
potheses regarding the path toward democracy o f post-com m unist countries 
in  southeastern Europe (excluding from consideration three constituent 
states o f form er Yugoslavia, i.e., Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia).
F irst, five post-communist countries, Albania, Bulgaria, the Form er 
Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia (FYROM), Romania, and Slovenia are w e ll 
into the stage o f the ir transition phase, but we cannot, unfortunately, speak 
at th is tim e about consolidated democratic institu tions in  any o f the five. 
In  the case o f Bulgaria, however, the rotation power between righ t and le ft 
has moved the country one notch closer to consolidation.
Second, the tra n s itio n  and co n so lid a tio n  processes in  
metacommunist countries, unlike the case o f transition/consolidation o f 
southern European states, face the special and nearly insurm ountable 
problem  o f drastic and simultaneous changes taking place not on ly in  the 
po litica l system but also in  the economic system. Perhaps resurrecting 
some old Marxist dialectics, we can appreciate how d ifficu lties o f economic 
transition can spill over and complicate politica l developments. In  sum, the 
creation o f a c iv il society which is the sine qua non o f every consolidated,
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p lu rá lis t democracy presupposes the substantive function ing  o f a free 
market mechanism not only on the level o f trade and consumption but also 
on the level o f production which, in  tu rn , calls fo r an effective privatization 
campaign, a most d ifficu lt task indeed.
The m ajor threat facing post-com m unist regimes in  southeastern 
Europe and elsewhere stems from extreme nationalism (chauvinism ) and 
its Siamese tw in, populism. The ideological vacuum that was created in the 
wake o f the collapse o f communism in  Europe has been fille d  in  the past 
fou r years by new o r recycled politicians that have resorted to  rom antic, 
atavistic and attention-catching strategies. In  th e ir attempts to  m obilize the 
d isoriented masses, they have employed sim plistic ana divisive slogans. 
By waving the flags o f ethnic separatism and irredentism  these new elites 
are re tu rn ing  to  anachronistic visions regarding a “ greater”  A lbania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, “ Macedonia”  and so forth.
By em ploying Manichean tactics subdividing peoples and govern- 
ments in to  angels and devils, these new politicians feed the fires and pas- 
sions o f po litica l polarization. Polarization, in  tum , blows up the bridges o f 
consensus on fundamental questions o f regime-type and external orienta- 
tion , leading fina lly to  internal conflicts (coups, revolutions, and c iv il wars) 
and in te rvention  by foreign antagonistic (regional o r global) centers o f 
power. The firs t v ictim  o f uncontrolled polarization is democracy itself. 
The war in  form er Yugoslavia, especially the tragic butchery in  Bosnia, is a 
recent example o f the fate o f a people w ithou t Tong dem ocratic trad itions 
undergoing acute economic crisis and being at the mercy o f im prudent and 
populist politicians.
I t  behooves post-communist po litica l leaderships in  the Balkans to 
avoid the fate o f Bosnia and, worse s till, the potential o f a w ider war that 
m ight begin in places such as Kosovo, Voyvodina or elsewhere and escalate 
to  involve countries such as Albania, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, FYROM, 
Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey.
I t  is the duty o f the European Union and NATO  (whose member 
states enjoy consolidated democratic institutions) to  act qu ickly and efTec- 
tive ly  in  order to  safeguard the peace agreements in Bosnia, ending all 
speculation about fa lling dominoes leading to  another great European war. 
O ur watchword should be: “ No more Bosnias.”  The W est's duty is, fu r- 
ther, to  safeguard democracy wherever social and econom ic conditions 
perm it its growth and sustainability. This obligation is rendered im pera- 
tive by what we m ight call the democratic paraaox. I t  has been arguea, fo r 
instance, by social scientists such as Rudolph Rummel, tha t the incidence 
o f war was the lowest among democracies and v irtua lly  non-existent be- 
tween what Rummel calls libertarian states (i.e., free-enterprise-oriented 
constitutional democracies). The paradox today is that we have been w it- 
nessing the rise o f internal and international con flic t taking place sim ulta- 
neously w ith  the transition to  democracy in  regions o f form er Yugoslavia 
and the form er Soviet Union. Had th is phenomenon, corre la ting democ- 
racy and conflic t, been perm itted to  continue fo r long, the ve iy reputation 
and legitim acy o f dem ocratic institu tions w ould have been seriously ta r- 
nished.
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The solid foundations upon which a strong ed ifice  o f southeast 
European peace and cooperation can be erected include respect fo r the in* 
v io la b ility  o f international boundaries, the consolidation o f dem ocratic in - 
s titu tions, comprehensive and dem onstrated protection o f the  human 
rights o f a ll citizens in  each state (w ithout discrim ination against m in o ri- 
ties on the basis o f language, relig ion, o r other preferences) and a free- 
m arket economy (together w ith  the m utually advantageous networks o f 
interdependence the free market entails).
Peace and transnational cooperation w ill be cemented fu rth e r as 
programs o f economic aid, technical assistance, free trade and investm ent 
become linked w ith  the peaceful and dem ocratic behavior o f recipients. 
The EU's and NATO's strategy o f preventive diplomacy should, therefore, 
emphasize rewards (not only sanctions) which w ill contribute to  the devel- 
opment and consolidation o f an arc o f peace and cooperation in the Balkans 
and elsewhere in  the form er Warsaw Pact regions. Such a strategy w ill 
isolate disorienting conceptions/slogans that allude to  the developm ent o f 
an Islam ic arc ana an Orthodox arc in  the Balkan region. F or alliances, 
based on religious a ffin ity  and o ther exclusivist premises, w ould surely 
lead to  the revival o f bloody e thn ic/re lig ious con flic ts  and the se lf- 
m arginalization o f those involved. The task fo r consolidated democracies 
in  the post-Cold W ar era is to  pronounce a new doctrine o f containm ent 
where the target to  be contained in  the place o f com m unism  w ill be 
chauvinism ana its ethnic-cleansing variants.
The nations and the peoples o f southeastern Europe in  the 
post-Cold W ar period must resist the siren-songs o f a bygone era. They 
must avoid nationalist and irredentist claims at the expense o f th e ir neigh- 
bors, and must shy away from  policies o f subregional alliances, spheres o f 
in fluence, revanchist campaigns, preem ptive strikes, d isproportionate  
reprisals, a ll o f which are remnants o f a glorious but also self-aestructive 
(a lbeit self-defm ing) past.
We should not forget that it  took two w orld  wars, and tens o f m il- 
lions o f dead, fo r conditions to  ripen and perm it trad itiona l European r i-  
vals (e.g., the French and the Germans) to  move forward w ith  the rem ark- 
able experim ent o f European integration that has gradually given b irth  to  
the European Union. In  the post-Cold W ar Balkans we have already suf- 
fered the tragedy o f carnage and destruction in  Bosnia. In  addition to  o f- 
fering our hopes and prayers, we should try  to  support leaders who are 
cautious and prudent so that the Cassandran prophesy about the Balkans 
becom ing once again the powder kee o f Europe w ill no t become 
s e lf-fu lfillin g .
In  the twenty-two years that have elapsed since the Greek Colonels’ 
coup and the Turkish invasion o f Cyprus, the Greek and C yprio t govern- 
ments have managed to  keep the issue w ide open by em ploying s tric tly  
economic and po litica l leverage on Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots w hile 
avoiding recourse to  the threat and employment o f m ilita ry means.
Turkey, given its apparent m ilita ry  superiority in  the Cyprus re- 
gion, has insisted on perpetuating the post-1974 partition , being the only
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country to  have recognized the self-procla im ed T urk ish  R epublic o f 
N orthern Cyprus (which unilaterally declared its independence in  the Fall 
o f 1983). Since then the Turkish-C ypriot population has been prevented 
from  reintegrating itse lf in to  the mainstream o f a single and prosperous 
C yprio t economy.
T h ird  parties (e.g., the U.S., Great B rita in , Germany and Russia), 
gauging, at tim es overestimating, the strategic and commercial importance 
o f Turkey, have adopted a stance o f benign neutra lity on the Cyprus ques- 
tion , urging both sides to  move quickly and decisively toward a m utually 
acceptable settlem ent o f th e ir pricldy dispute.
In  the view o f this autnor, the negotiating position o f Greece and 
Cyprus v is-à -v is  Turkey has been enhanced since 1990 fo r (at least) the 
fo llow ing three reasons:
1) the end o f the Cold W ar and the gradual decline o f Turkey's 
strategic importance in  the security calculus o f the U.S., EU , and NATO,
2) The convergence, in  terms o f domestic and foreign policy orien- 
tations, in the positions o f Greece’s politica l parties (center-le ft and center- 
righ t) fo llow ing the healing o f the wounds le ft by the Greek c iv il war 
(1946-49) and the reintegration o f Greece’s le ft (Comm unist and Socialist) 
in to  the po litica l process after the restoration o f democracy in  1974,
3) The new European option o f Cyprus and its policy seeking accès- 
sion to  the EU  ( I t  should be remembered that in  1960-90, Cyprus had 
openly id e n tifie d  its UN-focused foreign po licy w ith  the non-aligned 
movement).
Today Greece and the Republic o f Cyprus are proposing a fram e- 
work fo r the settlement o f the Cyprus question which does not in  any way 
challenge the interests and objectives o f Great B rita in  and the U.S. in the 
eastern Mediterranean given that the ultim ate settlem ent package includes 
C yprio t membership in the EU  and an increased role fo r NATO  (Cyprus 
accession to  NATO  being the maximum objective and a NATO  post- 
settlem ent im plem entation force being the m inim um ).
Free o f cold war servitude (which among other things included a 
fundam ental divergence o f orientations, i.e., m em bership in  N ATO  fo r 
Greece and non-alignm ent fo r Cyprus) the two governments can easily 
fo llow  a w ell orchestrated and diplom atically energetic foreign policy that 
w ill be founded on two pillars. The firs t p illa r, s tric tly  defensive, is de - 
signed to  m aintain a state o f sufficiency in the balance o f G reek-Turkish 
forces in  the Aegean, Thrace, and Cyprus. I t  involves a defensive and de- 
te rren t mission fo r the Greek and C ypriot armed forces designed to  safe- 
guard Greece’s te rrito ria l in tegrity  in the Aegean and Thrace, and in  the 
case o f Cyprus to  prevent any fu rthe r extension o f the Turkish armed 
forces beyond the so-called green line (i.e., the line separating the occupied 
te rrito ries in  the north from  the rest o f Cyprus). In  sum, the firs t p illa r 
involves a defense policy o f two countries that want to  avoid a war w ithout 
losing the peace.
The second p illa r covers the political/econom ic/diplom atic range o f 
activ ity  and it  calls fo r fle x ib ility , imagination, and energy com bining the 
use o f politico-econom ic instrum ents o f leverage on Turkey and the
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Turkish-C yprio t com m unity in  Cyprus w ith  a comprehensive and long- 
term  set o f proposals designed to  reach a m utually acceptable settlem ent in  
Cyprus and in  the Aegean. Abandoning the single-issue, reactive policies 
o f the past, Greece and Cyprus could now take the in itia tive  by iden tify ing  
viable and m utually reassuring avenues o f con flic t resolution in  a m u lti- 
lateral framework provided by the EU and NATO.
Since 1974 and the tragic events in Cyprus that triggered the co l- 
lapse o f the Greek m ilita ry  dictatorship, Greek foreign policy, in  deeds i f  
not always words, has been a synthesis o f power and pruaence. Despite oc- 
casional bursts o f emotional and populist rhetoric, especially in  pre-election 
periods, the Greek governments (whether New Democracy o r Pasok) have 
adopted a cautious and pragmatic set o f external policies.
The fundamental premises o f what has been a consensual approach 
to  external challenges and opportunities can be summarized as follows:
1) Greece post-1974 is perceived as facing a major revisionist chal- 
lenge from  neighboring Turkey. This challenge calls fo r the maintenance 
o f an adequate balance o f m ilita ry power sufficient to  deter any thought o f 
employment o f m ilita ry force as an instrum ent o f Turkish policy v is -à -v is  
Greece.
2) Greece is classified in  the category o f po litica lly  and econom i- 
cally developed states which have forged, since W orld W ar I I ,  linkages o f 
po litica l ana economic interdependence in  accordance w ith  the general 
princip les o f democracy and the market economy. Accession to  the 
European Com m unity (U nion) in 1981 is the center o f gravity o f a Greek 
strategy o f integration w ith in  a region that has abandoned since 1945 the 
modus operandi o f form ulating national interests in terms o f te rrito ria l ex- 
pansion, irredentism , spheres o f exclusive influence, unbrid led ethnocen- 
trism , economic protectionism , mercantilism, and colonialism .
3) Greece's integration into a zone o f global s tab ility  (E U , W EU , 
and NATO) reinforces its already consolidated dem ocratic institu tions and 
contributes to  protracted deterrence and the resultant safeguarding o f the 
country's te rrito ria l in tegrity . Naturally, w e ll-tra ined  and w ell-equ ipped 
armed forces remain at tne inner core o f Greece's deterrence mechanisms.
4) In  the case o f the Balkans, and given the w idely shared percep- 
tion  o f a Turkish threat, Greece has spearheaded policies o f m u ltila te ra l 
and m ultifunctional cooperation, even during the confin ing period o f C old 
W ar bipolarity. These initiatives were an end in  themselves, but they were 
also designed to  im prove Greece’s bargaining power vis-à -v is  Turkey by 
avoiding the creation o f a m u lti-fron t diplom atic (and potentia lly m ilita ry) 
confrontation. Unfortunately, Greek policies w ith  respect to  FYROM in  
the 1992-95 period almost managed to derail the country from  its prudent 
course. However, the renormalization o f relations w ith  A lbania (early in
1995), the growing chances o f a lasting settlem ent o f Greece-FYROM a iffi-  
culties w ith  the mutual acceptance o f a hyphenated name fo r FYROM such 
as “ New Macedonia,”  and the continuation o f excellent po litica l and com- 
mereiai contacts w ith  Bulgaria and Romania are restoring Greece to  its 
form er course as an active peacemaker in  the Balkans.
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5) Greece, as a consolidated democracy w ith an advanced economy, 
has every reason to  remain a status quo power and to  avoid atavistic tem pta• 
tions (nationalist and te rrito ria l revisionism) that have so bru ta lly affected 
regions o f form er Yugoslavia and particularly Bosnia.
Greece can, together w ith  its partners in the European Union and 
NATO, contribute to  the reconstruction o f war-torn form er Yugoslavia by 
partic ipating in peacebuilding projects, offering humanitarian assistance to  
refugees, prom oting principles and practices o f inv io la b ility  o f fron tie rs 
coupled w ith  the protection o f human rights o f m inorities, and emphasiz- 
ing the comparative advantage o f economic interdependence.
A successful strategy o f peace and m utually advantageous coopera- 
tion  in  the Balkans is like ly to  sp ill over into the troubled G reek-Turkish 
relationship once elites in  both countries realize that a war would be catas - 
troph ic fo r both and that the perception o f high tension in diplom atic rela - 
tions u ltim ate ly hurts the m ultila tera l nexus o f relationships that each o f 
them is involved in.
Greece and Turkey have been involved in the past twenty-two years 
in  a costly and protracted diplomatic/economic cold war reaching at tim es 
very close to  the brink o f outright warfare.
W ith  the peace process in fu ll swing in  critica l areas such as the 
M idd le  East, N orthern Ireland, South Africa, and form er Yugoslavia, it  is 
now tim e to  address the complicated issues separating Greece and Turkey 
w ith  the aim o f devising tactics and strategies toward tension reduction 
and reconciliation.
I f  we were to  move forward w ith  this line o f reasoning we should 
accept two major premises. The firs t premise is that a Greek-Turkish war is 
unthinkable and unwinnable because, to begin w ith, it  would isolate both 
belligerents from th e ir Western institutional affiliations. Even if, a fte r the 
firs t battles, one o f the two countries were to  secure marginal te rrito ria l 
gains at the expense o f the other, a chain o f revanchist conflicts w ill surely 
fo llow  classifying both as high risk zones w ith a devastating impact on th e ir 
economies and societies.
The second premise is that perpetuating the current cold war atm o- 
sphere does not serve the interests o f e ither Greece or Turkey. Am ong 
other costs both countries are being obliged to maintain disproportionately 
high m ilita ry  expenditures (on the average over 5% o f th e ir GNPs) at the 
expense o f v ita l economic stabilization and development programs.
A clim ate o f reconciliation, cooperation, and friendship cannot be 
restored as long as the Cyprus question remains unresolved. A genuine 
settlem ent o f the Cyprus problem would exclude en osis (union o f Cyprus 
w ith  Greece) and taksim  (partition o f Cyprus into Greek and Turkish seg- 
ments). A historic compromise, therefore, calk fo r independence o f a fed- 
era l, bizonal, and bicom m unal state along the lines o f the Makarios- 
Denktash (1977) and Kyprianou-Denktash (1979) agreements.
The federal state o f Cyprus that w ill emerge a fte r settlem ent w ill 
be given an excellent chance to  survive and prosper i f  at the tim e o f its 
genesis it  were to  become simultaneously a member o f the European
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Union and NATO. EU membership together w ith  genuine collective guar- 
antees, dem ilitarization (except fo r the B ritish base areas), and a N ATO - 
commanded m ultinational police force (un til mutual confidence is securely 
established), w ill allow the troubled Cypriots to  forge a long-lived un ity  
based on all rights, duties, and freedoms that democracy provides.
Shifting to the Aegean area, we can project a rapid process o f re con- 
c ilia tion  fo llow ing a Cyprus settlement. For th is to  happen, both sides 
have to  abandon maximalist aspirations and accept what is m utually accept- 
able rather that what is individually desirable.
A much needed historic compromise between Greece and Turkey in  
the Aegean must rest on two general and two operational principles o f fo r- 
eign policy. The firs t general principle involves the m utual denunciation 
o f the use o f force by Greece and Turkey. The second general p rincip le  
provides that the Greek-Turkish differences in  the Aegean w ill fo llow  the 
road o f peaceful settlement involving tim e-tested methods such as bilateral 
negotiations and, in case o f deadlocks, conciliation, good offices, mediation, 
arb itra tion, and adjudication. The two operational p rincip les apply to  
Turkey and Greece respectively. For the benefit o f Turkey, it  must be un- 
derstood that the Aegean w ill not be transformed in to  a “ Greek lake.”  For 
the benefit o f Greece, it  must be also understood that the Aegean w ill not 
be partitioned or subdivided in a fashion that leaves enclaves o f Greek te r- 
ritories (the eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands) as a Turkish zone 
o f functional responsibility. Follow ing a potentia l grand settlem ent, both 
Greece and Turkey would increase significantly th e ir trade, tourism , in - 
vestment, and jo in t ventures at home and abroad. Greece w ould also, and 
gladly, abandon its policy o f linkage o f Turkey's accession strategy to  the 
European U nion and would, in fact, seek to  fac ilita te  T urkish  entry. 
Simply, a European Turkey w ill be fo r Greece a much easier neighbor to  
live w ith than an alienated and m ilitaristic Turkey.
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Cyprus: The Long March to Europe
N icholas E m ilio u
Introduction
The development o f relations between Cyprus and the European 
C om m unity1 has, on occasion, been riddled w ith  po litica l d ifficu lties. The 
unresolved po litica l problem o f Cyprus has dictated to  a great extent the 
a ttitude ana policy objectives o f both the government o f the Republic o f 
Cyprus and the C om m unity w ith in  the fram ework o f th e ir relations. 
Economic considerations have, at least since 1974, played a secondary role.
On the po litica l level, two distinct trends can be iden tified  w ith  
regard to  the development o f EC־Cyprus relations.2 On the one hand, 
there is the e ffo rt on the part o f Cyprus to  encourage a more active in •  
volvement o f the Com m unity in efforts fo r a solution to  the Cyprus p rob• 
lem; on the other hand, there is the reluctance o f the Community to  get in - 
volved in this problem. This reluctance can be attributed partly to  the lim i- 
tations o f Com m unity mechanisms in  the sphere o f foreign policv and 
partly to  the conflicting  interests o f its member states. However, tne es- 
tablishm ent o f the common foreign and security policy by the Treaty on 
European U nion could gradually change the situation and encourage a 
more active involvement o f the Community in efforts towards a solution o f 
the Cyprus problem.
The Early Stages
Cyprus has pursued close relations w ith  Europe since its indepen- 
dence in 1960. In  1961 it  became a member o f the Council o f Europe. As 
early as 1962, the government o f the Republic o f Cyprus explored tne pos- 
s ib ility  o f establishing formal links w ith the European Community.
The decision to  pursue closer relations w ith  the C om m unity in
1962 was connected w ith  the firs t B ritish  app lica tion  to  jo in  the 
Com m unity, which was subm itted at that tim e. Cyprus’s economy was 
heavily dependent on B ritish  Commonwealth preferentia l trade ta riffs . 
The prospect o f dism antling Commonwealth trade preferences as a result o f 
B rita in ’s accession to  the EC prompted the Cyprus government to  seek an 
institu tiona lized  trade arrangement w ith  the Com m unity. The B ritish
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application was effectively blocked by General De Gaulle and as a result 
Cyprus’s interest in  the Community faded, only to  be revived a few years 
la ter when once again B ritain applied to jo in  the EC in  August 1970.
The reasons behind Cyprus’s revived in terest in  the Com m unity 
were once again m ainly economic. B rita in was Cyprus’s single most im por- 
tant export market. I t  was therefore necessary to  find  new export outle ts 
fo r C yprio t agricu ltura l and manufactured products.3 M oreover, around 
the same tim e, the Com m unity launched its preferentia l trade policy to - 
wards o the r M editerranean countries. These pre feren tia l traae agree- 
ments, especially w ith  Spain and Israel, would adversely affect the compet- 
itiveness o f C yprio t agricultural products exported to  EC countries.4 In  
the face o f new realities, it  was in the best interests o f Cyprus to  pursue a 
special trade relationship w ith the Community.
In  addition to  economic reasons, there were also good po litica l rea- 
sons fo r an opening on behalf o f Cyprus towards the Com m unity. In  late
1963 violence broke out between the two communities in  Cyprus, resulting 
in loss o f life  and property on both sides. The adm inistration had ceased to 
function e ffective ly on a bi-communal basis. "The Turkish-Сур riots had 
carried th e ir separatism...to the furthest extent.”5
The government o f the Republic o f Cyprus, under the pressure o f 
Turkish threats o f an im m inent invasion o f the island, took the m atter to  
the U n ited  Nations. The Security Council, on 4 M arch 1964, recom- 
mended the creation o f a peacekeeping force in Cyprus to  help the prevent 
a recurrence o f figh ting and to  contribute to the restoration o f law and o r - 
der and a re turn  to  normal conditions. A mediator was also appointed to  
help prom ote a peaceful solution. The secretary-general o f the U n ited  
Nations, in  his report to  the Security Council, described the Turkish policy 
in th is way:
The Tи rkish-Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any 
measures whicn might involve having members o f the two communities 
live and work together, or which might place the Turkish-Cypriots in sit- 
uations where they would have to acknowledge the authority o f 
Government agents. Indeed, since the Turkish-Cypriot leadership is 
committed to physical and geographical separation o f the [two] communi- 
ties as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish- 
Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits o f an al- 
temative policy. The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy o f 
self-segregation by the Turkish-Cypriots.6
Despite th is policy o f segregation, only 25,000 Turkish-C yprio ts, 
under pressure from  th e ir leadership, moved in to  the Turkish quarters o f 
towns or to  large Turkish villages. The Turkish-C ypriot enclaves were scat- 
tered all over the island and covered only 5% o f the te rrito ry  o f the repub- 
lie . The governm ent o f Cyprus remained in  contro l o f the state. The 
Turkish and Turkish-C ypriot side have ever since denied the legitim acy o f 
the government o f Cyprus and refused any form  o f cooperation w ith it.
Follow ing these events, the government o f Cyprus engaged in  an
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intensive po litica l and diplom atic campaign aim ing at safeguarding the in • 
dependence o f the Republic o f Cyprus and the legitim acy o f its  govern- 
m ent. Thus, the e ffo rt o f the Cyprus government to  reach an association 
agreement w ith  the Com m unity also aimed at strengthening its in terna- 
tiona l standing.
Negotiations between Cyprus and the Com m unity began in  early 
1972 fo llow ing the mandate adopted by the Council o f M in isters on 30 
Decem ber 1971.7 The association agreement was signed on 19 December 
1972 and came in to  effect on 1 July 1973.8 The agreement was based on 
A rtic le  238 o f the EC Treaty. Agreements under th is provision are usually 
not lim ited  to  trade but extend to other sectors o f tne economy as w ell. 
The EC-Cyprus Association Agreement provided fo r the gradual abolition 
o f a ll customs duties and quantitative restrictions in  trade between Cyprus 
and the Com m unity. The final aim was the establishm ent o f a customs 
union between the parties in two stages. The firs t stage w ould have been 
com pleted by 30 June 1977, and the second, whose negotiating process 
w ould have started eighteen months before the com pletion o f tne firs t 
stage, would have in itia lly  covered a five-year period and w ould in  sub- 
stance become a transitional period for the com pletion o f a customs union.9
The Cyprus crisis in the summer o f 1974 had d irect consequences 
on the development o f EC-Cyprus relations. The Turkish invasion o f 1974 
upset in eveiy respect the social, political, and economic life  o f Cyprus. 
Ever since, EC-Cyprus relations have been influenced and to  a great ex- 
te n t defined by the developments relating to  the p o litica l problem  o f 
Cyprus. The firs t period o f EC-Cyprus institu tiona lized  relations, from  
1972 to  1984, was a period o f stagnation. The second period, from  1985 to
1992, was a period o f norm alization. The th ird  period, from  1993 to  the 
present, is a period o f development o f EC-Cyprus relations.
The Years o f Stagnation: 1972-1984
D uring the firs t period, under the influence o f B rita in  and the 
U.S., the Community adopted a reserved attitude towards Cyprus, try ing  to 
keep equal distance from  both communities in  Cyprus.10 Thus, when the 
firs t stage o f the Association Agreement was com pleted, the C om m unity 
was reluctant to  proceed in to the second stage envisaging the establishm ent 
o f a customs union. Some EC member states led by B rita in, fo r pure ly po - 
litica i reasons, reacted to  the commencement o f negotiations in  the b e lie f 
that they were thus exerting pressure on the tw o com m unities to  show 
moderation in  the intercom m unal dialogue then under way. Some other 
member states, such as France and Italy, which had products com petitive to  
C yprio t products, supported postponement o f the negotiations to  pro tect 
th e ir own products.1*
Thus, the im plem entation o f the Association Agreem ent was de- 
layed and, instead o f  progressing into the second stage, the firs t stage was 
extended effectively, on successive occasions, u n til 1985. D uring the same 
period a number o f additional protocols were signed im proving s ligh tly  the
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provisions o f the orig ina l agreement and adapting them to  the develop- 
ments that were taking place. The firs t two o f the four EC-Cyprus financial 
protocols were also signed during this period. The apparent unwillingness 
o f C om m unity institu tions to  set in m otion mechanisms fo r the com- 
mencement o f negotiations for im plem entation o f the second stage o f the 
Association Agreement created tension in  EC-Cyprus relations and caused 
scepticism in  Cyprus about the Community’s intentions.
The Period of Normalization: 1985-1992
D uring  the second period o f EC-Cyprus relations an attem pt was 
made to  norm alize and foster the development o f these relations. The 
change in  the Com m unity’s attitude towards Cyprus during th is period can 
be a ttribu ted to  a great extent to  two im portant po litica l events that took 
place in  the early 1980s. F irst, the accession o f Greece in to the EC which 
took effect on 1 January 1981. The presence o f Greece in  the EC institu - 
tiona l fram ework undoubtedly helped to  prom ote Cyprus's case in  the 
Com m unity. Despite the fact that in the early years o f her Com m unity 
membership Greece’s p rio rity  was to improve her economic and com m er- 
cia l relations w ith  her new partners, she nevertheless contributed to  the 
prom otion o f EC-Cyprus relations w ith in  the framework o f the association 
process.
The second im portant development was the unilateral declaration o f 
independence (U D I) by the Turkish-Cypriots w ith  regard to  the part o f 
Cyprus under Turkish occupation under the name “Turkish Republic o f 
N orthern Cyprus”  (“TR N C ” ). This en tity  has not been recognized by the 
international com m unity (apart from  Turkey) as possessing the constituent 
elements o f statehood. The Security Council o f the U nited Nations in its 
Resolution 541 o f 18 November 1983:
Deplores the declaration o f the Turkish-Cypriot authorities o f the pur- 
ported secession of part o f the Republic o f Cyprus...considers the declara- 
tion...as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal.
In  Resolution 550/1984 the Security C ouncil repeated “ the call 
upon a ll States not to  recognize the purported state o f the  T u rk ish  
Republic o f N orthern Cyprus' set up by secessionist acts and [called] upon 
them not to  facilitate o r in  any way assist the aforesaid secessionist en tity .” 
This illegal action was also condemned by EC member states w ith in  
the framework o f the European Political Co-operation (EPC), who repeat- 
ed ly expressed th e ir support fo r the un ity, te rrito ria l in te g rity , and 
sovereignty o f the Republic o f Cyprus and the lega lity o f her govern- 
m ent.12 These two events contributed to  a change o f neart towards Cyprus 
and a realization on the part o f the Community that it  had to  take a firm e r 
stand towards the Turkish side w ith  regard to the Cyprus problem.
As a m atter o f fact, on 21 December 1983, follow ing a demarche by 
the government o f Cyprus, the Com m unity decided that a ll C yprio t prod- 
ucts im ported in to the Com m unity ought to  be accompanied only by o ffic ia l
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documents issued by the competent authorities o f the Republic o f Cyprus 
and exported through ports designated by those authorities. On 21 
February 1984, the commission sent the new specimen seals and signatures 
to  the com petent authorities o f the member states but d id  not, however, 
take any b inding measures.
However, some member states (especially B rita in , the Netherlands 
and Germany) occasionally allowed im ports from  the occupied area o f 
Cyprus in to  th e ir territories. Thus, despite the fact that the ban on im ports 
from  the occupied part o f Cyprus was probably the only specific measure 
taken by the Com m unity in  the form o f ‘sanctions' in  respect o f the illegal 
U D I by the Turkish-Cypriots, it  did not take the form  o f a legally b inding 
measure and moreover it  was systematically violated by certa in member 
states.13
The new situation created by Greece’s accession and the proclama- 
tion  o f the illegal “TRNC” created the feeling that the Com m unity had to  
do som ething about Cyprus. The mid-1980s was a good tim e fo r the 
Com m unity to  act, having overcome its budgetary crisis and com pleted ne- 
gotia tions fo r the Single European A ct fo r the Ibe rian  accessions. 
Furtherm ore, the international politica l clim ate was im proving and a new 
period o f detente appeared on the horizon, a fact th a t allow ed the 
Com m unity leeway fo r po litica l maneuvering.
In  lig h t o f the accession o f the tw o Ib e ria n  countries, the 
Com m unity in itia ted  discussions on a new M editerranean policy towards 
non-m em ber M editerranean countries. The negotiations fo r the new 
Mediterranean policy gave Greece the opportunity to  press fo r the promo- 
tion  o f EC-Cyprus relations. L inking the tw o issues, Greece made clear 
that it  w ould not agree to  the new Mediterranean policy unless the council 
issued a mandate to the commission to begin negotiations w ith  regard to  
the second stage o f the EC-Cyprus Association Agreement.
Indeed the move o f the Greek government proved effective. Thus, 
on 20-21 October 1985, at an inform al meeting o f the foreign m inisters in  
Luxembourg, a compromise agreement was reached to  prom ote sim ultane- 
ously the new Mediterranean policy and the negotiating mandate fo r the 
EC-Cyprus Association Agreement. The final form  o f the mandate was o f ־ 
fic ia lly approved by the Council o f M inisters on 25 November 1985, based 
on the proposals o f the commission.14 This decision was o f great po litica l 
importance fo r Cyprus. The decision to  proceed w ith  the negotiations pu t 
an end to  a long crisis between Cyprus and the Com m unity. A t the same 
tim e, the acceptance o f the sovereignty o f Cyprus and the fact that the gov - 
em m ent o f Cyprus legitim ately represented the whole o f the island was
reiterated.
The arduous negotiations that followed lasted fo r almost tw o years. 
On many occasions, it  was fe lt that an agreement w ould never be reached. 
The Com m unity adopted a rig id  negotiating line and proposed lim ited  con- 
cessions and preferences fo r Cypriot products. The most d iffic u lt issues 
were: 1) the transition to  the customs union and whether this w ould be au- 
tomatic, as the Cyprus government wished, or a fte r an agreement, as the 
Com m unity insisted; 2) the abolition o f the rules o f o rig in  demanded by
accepted and
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Cyprus; and 3) the exem ption o f some sensitive products from  the 
Agreem ent.15 F ina lly, a fte r d iffic u lt negotiations a compromise was 
reached. The Protocol was signed on 19 October 1987 and took effect on 
1 January 1988.16
This Protocol governs the second stage o f Association Agreement 
and aims at the establishment o f a customs union between the parties. This 
stage is divided in to  tw o phases. The firs t phase, from  1988 to  1997, in- 
volves, in te r a lia , a fu rther reduction o f customs duties and the abolition o f 
quantitative restrictions. The transition from the firs t to  the second phase 
w ill be decided by the Association Council. The second phase w ill last four 
o r five years. I t  w ill involve: 1) the abolition o f the rules o f orig in and the 
free movement o f goods covered by the customs union; 2) the adoption o f 
measures stemming from the EC Treaty vis-d-vis  com petition, State aids, 
ind irec t taxation etc; 3) the enactment o f measures concerning the free 
movement o f agricultural products covered by the customs union on the ba- 
sis o f reciprocity and the adoption by Cyprus o f the common agricultura l 
policy mechanisms w ith  regard to  the same products; and 4) the application 
o f measures which should have taken effect in  the firs t phase but which 
were not fu lly  applied during that period.
The agreement fo r the transition  to  the second stage o f the 
Association Agreement and the increased interest o f the Community in  the 
Cyprus problem 17 enhanced the image o f the Com m unity in  Cyprus, en- 
couragea the island’s European orientation, and led to  the realization that 
Cyprus could derive great po litica l and economic benefits by fu rthe r de- 
veloping her relations w ith  the EC. In  ligh t o f the above aevelopments, 
the Creek government beginning in 1987 began to  encourage the C yprio t 
governm ent to  subm it an application fo r fu ll m em bership in  the 
C om m unity.
The Creek government believed that the Com m unity was in a bet- 
te r position than any other power to  exert pressure on Turkey to  show 
moderation on the Cyprus problem. Given Turkey’s desire to  strengthen 
its relations w ith  the Com m unity, th is would not have been impossible. 
Moreover, accession o f Cyprus to  the Com m unity w ould be the only real - 
istic guarantee that any solution to  the island’s po litica l problem w ould be 
viable and functional. The basic princip les ana freedoms underlying the 
Com m unity edifice such as free movement o f goods, persons, services and 
capital, respect fo r human rights and democratic procedures would serve as 
safety valves between the two communities o f Cyprus and would guarantee 
the v iab ility  o f any solution. The Greek government considered that the 
best tim e fo r Cyprus to  subm it its application would be during the Greek 
presidency o f the Council o f M inisters in the second semester o f 1988.
The Greek government communicated its views to  the government 
o f Cyprus in  late 1987. These views were received favorably. However, 
the early 1988 presidential elections in  Cyprus brought a new adm inistra- 
tion  in to  power. A lthough supporting Cyprus’s European orientation, the 
new president o f Cyprus, G. Vassiliou, was reluctant to  subm it an applica- 
tion  during that period. In  early 1988 there were new UN in itia tives in  
the o ffing  and a new round o f intercommunal talks had just started. In  this
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context, Vassiliou was discouraged, m ainly by the U.S. and B rita in , from  
subm itting an application to  jo in  the Community lest th is move upset the 
intercom m unal talks under way. The U.S., B rita in, and a num ber o f other 
EC member states held the view that the Cyprus problem should rem ain 
w ith in  the fram ework o f the U N . D uring  a v is it covering several 
European capitals, Vassiliou received the message that Cyprus could not 
expect to  become an EC member as long as the politica l problem  remained 
unresolved.18
The U.S. and B rita in  d id not view favorably the prospect o f accès- 
sion o f Cyprus to  the EC even i f  the Cyprus problem were solved. Both o f 
these countries w ould have preferrea Cyprus to  rem ain outside o f the 
Com m unity, so that they could influence developments in  the island in  a 
more d irect manner. In  addition, they are reluctant to  disappoint Turkey, 
w hich has been strongly opposing Cyprus’s accession to  the Com m unity. 
The oft-repeated Turkish position has been that the government o f Cyprus 
d id  not have the authority to  subm it an application as long as the po litica l 
problem  remained unresolved. Such action, Turkey argued, w ould  un- 
derm ine efforts to  find  a solution to  the Cyprus problem  because Turkey 
w ould w ithdraw  from  negotiations.19
The reluctance o f the Cyprus government to  subm it an application 
created some tension in its relations w ith  Athens, which continued to  sup- 
port the need fo r an application. In  the meantime, the intercom m unal dia - 
logue d id  not lead to  any results, w hile  the C yprio t governm ent was 
dragged from one fruitless round o f negotiations to  the next. By m id -1989, 
there was w ith in  Cyprus itse lf a broad consensus between almost a ll o f the 
po litica l forces that an application fo r fu ll membership in  the EC should be 
made. The House o f Representatives debated the issue on many occasions 
and adopted a resolution ureing the government to  subm it an application at 
the earliest possible po in t.2״ F inally, the collapse o f the Soviet U nion and 
the dem ocratization process in eastern European countries changed the 
character o f the system o f in ternational relations from  the b ipo lar model 
in to  a loose m u lti-po la r dominated by the U.S. These developments in - 
creased the dangers to  the national security o f sm aller states, such as 
Cyprus; th e ir integration in to  a big and powerful supranational organiza- 
tion  associating them w ith  a w ider group o f states would o ffe r security as 
w ell as po litica l and economic advantages. Moreover, the non-aligned 
movement o f which Cyprus is a founding member gradually declined in 
importance w hile the European Com m unity and its ideals were in  th e ir 
heyday.
The emergence o f a ll o f the above factors led the Cyprus govern- 
ment to  reassess its position and realize the importance o f submission o f an 
application fo r fu ll membership in  the EC. The government o f Cyprus 
considered that the prospect o f Cyprus’s accession to  the EC w ould send a 
clear message to  the Turkish-Cypriots that the Com m unity regarded seri- 
ously the prospect o f Cypriot membership as a catalyst in the efforts o f fin d - 
ing a solution to  the politica l problem. A settlement in Cyprus w ould con- 
tribu te  to  the efforts fo r peace and stability in  the Eastern M editerranean. 
I t  w ould also greatly facilita te  the rapprochement between Greece and
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
Nicholas Emiliou112
Turkey and ensure the stability o f NATO’s southeastern flank.
The economic benefits to  be derived in the case o f Cyprus’s mem- 
bership were obvious.21 The government o f Cyprus viewed the customs 
union agreement only as an intermediate stage on the road to fu ll economic 
integration. As a fu ll EC member, Cyprus would also participate in  com- 
mon Com m unity policies such as the common agricultural, transport, envi- 
ronm ent, and development policies, etc. Moreover, Community member- 
ship w ould enable Cyprus to  benefit from the EC structural funds. A ll o f 
the above would speed up the modernization o f Cyprus’s economy and in - 
fra  structu re.
On the basis o f the above considerations, on 4 July 1990, the Cyprus 
government subm itted a form al application to  join the Com m unity under 
A rtic le  237 o f the EEC Treaty.22 Cyprus’s application was discussed in  the 
COREPER on 12 September 1990, and in tne Council o f M inisters on 17 
September 1990. According to  the procedures, the council decided unani- 
mously to  re fer the issue to  the commission fo r its opinion. D uring  the 
discussion in  the council, B rita in , Germany, Holland, and Belgium  in- 
sisted on the adoption o f a statement to  the effect that the benefits o f the 
EC-Cyprus relationship would be enjoyed by the people o f Cyprus as a 
whole. Despite the d iffe ren t opinion o f other member states, th is state- 
m ent was adopted w ith  the m oaification “ in the sp irit o f the UN résolu - 
tions.”  The insistence o f certain EC member states’s governments on such 
a statement can be explained in  ligh t o f the position shared by some mem - 
ber states that Cyprus’s accession to the Community should be linked w ith  
a solution to  the island’s po litica l problem and th e ir concern about the 
Turkish reaction.
Both the Turkish government and the Turkish-C ypriots reacted 
strongly to  Cyprus’s application, threatening not to  cooperate w ith  the UN 
secretary general in his efforts to  find a solution to  the Cyprus problem . 
On several occasions, the Turkish-C ypriot leader, R. Denictash, said that 
Cyprus could accede to  the EC only when Turkey became a member and 
on ly a fte r the Cyprus problem  was resolved. In  o ther statements, 
Denktash said that Cyprus’s accession to  the EC would amount to  the is- 
land’s union w ith  Greece. On 31 August 1990, the Turkish-Cypriot leader- 
ship sent a memorandum to  the Council o f M inisters asking for rejection o f 
Cyprus’s application on the ground that the government o f Cyprus d id  not 
represent the whole o f the island, and that the application as such was un - 
constitu tiona l.
The government o f Cyprus rejected those allegations, emphasizing 
tha t it  was the only in ternationally recognized government representing 
the whole o f the island. I t  pointed out that an illegal regime which had v i- 
olated the provisions o f the 1960 constitution could not invoke its p rov i- 
sions in  order to  h inder the functioning o f the state.23 A t the tim e o f the 
submission o f its application, the government o f Cyprus in v ite d  the 
Turkish-Cypriots to  cooperate and to  jo in  forces w ith  it fo r the preparation 
o f accession negotiations. I t  was pointed out that Cyprus’s accession to  the 
Com m unity w ould be extrem ely beneficial fo r the Turkish-Cypriots, who 
w ould feel more secure in  a European framework and would be able to
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enjoy, to  a greater extent than th e ir Greek com patriots, the econom ic 
advantages that accession to the EC would bring.24
In  the late 1980s the prospect o f Cyprus's accession to  the EC be- 
came one o f the main issues in the negotiations fo r a solution to  the p o liti- 
cal problem . The Cyprus government in  its consultations w ith  the UN 
secretary-general and others brought up the issue o f EC membership and 
argued that Cyprus's accession to  the Com m unity would facilita te  a solu- 
tion  to  the politica l problem. In  two im portant texts on the Cyprus prob- 
lem, the UN secretary-general referred to  the possibility o f Cyprus acced - 
ing to  the EC. In  his June 1989 report, he stated fo r the firs t tim e that spe- 
cial consideration should be given to the possibility o f Cyprus's accession 
to  the EC.
In  his August 1992 report (known as the set o f ideas),25 the 
secretary-general proposed that “matters related to  the membership o f the 
federal republic [o f Cyprus] in the European Economic Com m unity w ill be 
discussed and agreed to, and w ill be subm itted fo r the approval o f the two 
communities in separate referenda.”  This suggestion w ould pose a most 
severe obstacle to  the accession o f Cyprus in  the EC. F irst, th is proposal is 
very vague; it  does not c larify when and at what stage o f the negotiations 
“ matters related to the membership o f the federal republic in the European 
Economic Com m unity w ill be discussed and agreed to .”  I t  is not clear 
whether this question w ill be resolved before o r after the establishment o f 
the federal republic. I t  is almost certain that the question o f C yprio t mem- 
bership in the EC w ill be a point o f contention between the tw o com m uni- 
ties since the Turkish-Cypriot side takes the view that
...in the interest of ensuring parity in the special ties between the respec- 
tive motherlands, Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus, the federation can 
only become a member of, or participate in, any international organiza- 
tion or other body if  (a) both Turkey and Greece are members of, or par- 
ticipate in, such organization or body; and (b) such membership or partie- 
ipation is approved by the two federated states in separate referenda.26
This view would make Cyprus's accession to  the EC almost im pos- 
sible in  the foreseeable future since the EC does not even consider Turkey 
as a serious candidate fo r fu ll membership fo r the tim e being at least.27 
Furtherm ore, the suggestion fo r two separate referenda on the issue o f 
participation in the EC is contrary to  the democratic princip le . W hile the 
great m ajority o f Greek-Cypriots, who constitute 82% o f the population, 
may vote overwhelm ingly in favor o f th e ir country's accession to  the EC, 
Cyprus may not become a member i f  the Turkish-Cypriots, who constitute 
18% o f the to ta l population, vote (narrowly perhaps) against accession.
Given the fact that the enlargement o f the Com m unity became an 
issue o f great p rio rity, the European Council in  December 1991 invited the 
commission to  study the issue and prepare a report fo r discussion by the 
European Council in its June 1992 meeting at Lisbon. In  its report the 
commission laid down the criteria and conditions that, in  its opinion, appli- 
cant countries would have to  fu lfil in  order to  jo in  the EC, as w ell as the
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conditions that the EC itse lf would have to  respect in the process o f its en* 
largement in  order not to  compromise its nature, objectives, and function- 
ing. In  the last part o f its report, the commission set out the situation in 
the d iffe ren t applicant countries and suggested guidelines to  be followed 
on a case-by-case basis. The report serveaas the basis fo r the Conclusions 
o f the Lisbon European Council on the issue o f enlargement.28
In  its report the commission stated that a State applying fo r mem- 
bership must satisfy three basic conditions: 1) European id e n tity ;
2) democratic status; and 3) respect fo r human rights. Another set o f crite  - 
ria related to  the applicant State’s acceptance o f the EC system and its ca- 
pacity to  im plem ent it. This presupposed 1) a functioning and com petitive 
market economy, and 2) adequate legal and adm inistrative fram ework in 
the public and private sector.
Paragraph 10 o f the commission report provided that:
Applicant states should also accept and be able to implement, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy as it evolves over the coming 
years. An applicant country whose constitutional status or stance in in- 
temational affairs rendered unable to pursue the project on which the 
other members are embarked could not be satisfactorily integrated into 
the Union. It w ill be necessary to avoid ambiguity or misunderstanding 
on this point in the context of enlargement.
In  th is conjunction, paragraph 17 o f the report stated:
The Maastricht Treaty provides in Articles J.l-10 for the definition and 
implementation o f a common foreign and security policy, which ‘shall 
include all questions related to the security o f the Union, including the 
eventual framing o f a common defence policy, which might lead in time 
to a common defence.’ Members of the Union w ill subscribe, in princi- 
pie and in practice, to these provisions and have to implement the deci- 
sions taken under the Treaties. Applicant countries should be left with 
no doubts in this respect. Specific and binding assurances w ill be sought 
from them with regard to tneir political commitment and legal capacity 
to fu lfil the obligations.
In  Cyprus’s case there are potentially serious problems w ith  1) the 
Treaties o f Guarantee and Alliance, 2) the proposed dem ilitarization o f the 
island, and 3) Cyprus’s membership in  the movement o f non-aligned 
countries.
The commission also pointed out that membership im plies the ac- 
ceptance o f the acquis com m unautaire. Temporary derogations and transi- 
tiona l arrangements o f lim ited period could be possible, but “ the princip le  
must be retained o f acceptance o f the acquis, to safeguard the achievements 
o f the Com m unity.”  In  this connection the commission was satisfied that, 
M...the integration o f Cyprus...into the Community system would not pose 
insurmountable problems o f economic nature.”  Nevertheless:
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In the case o f Malta and Cyprus, the adoption o f the a c q u is  
com m unautaire would appear to pose no insuperable problems. However, 
both are very small states, and the question o f their participation in the 
Community institutions would have to be resolved in the appropriate 
manner in accession negotiations.
Referring specifically to  Cyprus, the commission observed:
In the case o f Cyprus, there is inevitably a link between the question o f 
accession and the problem which results from the de fa c to  separation o f 
the island into two entities, between which there is no movement o f 
goods, persons or services. The Community must encourage all efforts to 
find a solution, in particular through support for the resolutions o f the 
United Nations ana the initiatives o f the Secretary General. In  the 
meantime, the association agreement should be exploited so that Cyprus 
is enabled to pursue its economic integration.
Follow ing the debate on the. issue o f enlargement in  the European 
Council meeting in Lisbon (June 1992), the Heads o f State o r government 
o f the member states in th e ir conclusions adopted the views o f the com - 
mission stating that the negotiations fo r the accession o f new member 
states should commence only after the Treaty on European Union had been 
ra tified  by all the member states and the provisions o f the so-called second 
‘Delors Package' were approved. The European Council decided that p ri- 
o rity  should be given to  tne EFTA countries and pointed out that the appli- 
cations o f Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta would be dealt w ith  separately and on 
th e ir own merits.
In  its conclusions the European Council emphasized the po litica l 
im portance o f Turkey and suggested the re inforcem ent o f her relations 
w itn  the Community in the economic and po litica l spheres. W ith  regard to  
Cyprus, there was no reference to the politica l problem but the suggestion 
was made that at that stage the relations between the EC and Cyprus 
should be developed on the basis o f the Association Agreement, the app li- 
cation fo r membership, and political dialogue.
For Cyprus, the results o f the Lisbon sum m it were mixed. Cyprus 
did not achieve her objective to be included in the firs t group o f states to 
accede to  the EC. H er exclusion from that group created some disap- 
pointa ient at the tim e. However, there were tw o positive elements in the 
Lisbon conclusions. F irst, the reference that EC-Cyprus relations should 
be developed “ in  view o f the Cyprus application”  signalled the acceptance 
in  princip le  o f the prospect o f Cyprus's future membership; second, the 
conclusions made clear that Cyprus's application was an en tire ly d iffe re n t 
m atter from  that o f Turkey. Follow ing the same line , the European 
Council in  Edinburgh in December 1992 requested the council to  con- 
tinue the development o f appropriate and specific links w ith  Cyprus (and 
Malta) w ith in  the framework o f the Lisbon conclusions.
In  the meantime, the early 1993 presidential elections in  Cyprus 
brought to  power a new adm inistration under G. C lerides. The corner- 
stone o f the new adm inistration's foreign policy was the prom otion o f
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Cyprus's European orientation. The new government, on the strength o f 
the positive elements o f the Lisbon conclusions, in tensified the efforts fo r 
EC membership and made it a p rio rity  to  secure a positive opinion from 
the commission which would allow the Council o f M inisters to decide the 
start o f accession negotiations.
Towards Accession: 1993 to the Present
In  June 1993, the European Council in  Copenhagen, considering 
the relations between EC and Cyprus expressed its satisfaction w ith  the 
commission's in tention  to  present shortly its opinion on the application o f 
Cyprus, emphasizing that this opinion would be examined rap id ly by the 
council taking in to  consideration Cyprus's particular situation.
The commission issued its opinion on the application o f Cyprus on 
30 June 1993.29 In  its opinion, the commission, a fter considering Cyprus’s 
capacity to  adopt w ith in  a reasonable timescale the acquis com m unautaire 
includ ing her capacity to participate in the planned economic and monetary 
union and the common foreign and security policy, concluded tha t Cyprus 
was ready and capable o f becoming a dynamic member o f the Community. 
The commission concluded that the island “ is located in the very fount o f 
European culture and civilization" and that it  possessed beyond a ll doubt a 
European id e n tity  and character and a vocation to  belong to  the 
C om m unity.
I t  pointed out that a politica l settlem ent o f the Cyprus problem  
w ould serve only to  reinforce the island’s European vocation and enhance 
its social, po litica l, and economic position. The commission expressed its 
conviction that “ the result o f Cyprus’s accession would be increased secu- 
rity  and prosperity and that it  would help bring the tw o com m unities on 
the island closer together.״ In  view o f the above, it  concluded that “ the 
Com m unity considers Cyprus as eligible fo r membership and that as soon 
as the prospect o f settlement is surer, the Community is ready to  start the 
process w ith  Cyprus that should eventually lead to  its accession.”  The 
commission repeated the Community's support fo r the UN efforts to re - 
solve the Cyprus problem and gave the undertaking “ to  use all the instru - 
ments available under the Association Agreement to  contribu te , in  close 
cooperation w ith  the Cyprus government, to the economic, social and p o lit- 
ica l trans ition  o f Cyprus towards in tegration w ith  the  C om m unity.” 
F inally, the commission recommended that, in the event that intercom m u- 
nal talks failed to  produce a political settlement, the situation “should be 
reassessed in  view o f the positions adopted by each party in  the talks and 
that the question o f Cyprus's accession to the Com m unity should be re- 
considered in  January 1995.”
Three months later, on 4 October 1993, the council endorsed the 
commission's opinion and welcomed its positive message. The council in - 
v ited the commission to open substantive discussions fo rthw ith  w ith  the 
government o f Cyprus in  order to  help the la tter in  its preparation fo r the 
accession negotiations which would follow. The council also confirm ed the
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
117Cyprus: The Long March to Europe
Com m unity’s support for the UN secretary general’s efforts to  produce a 
po litica l settlem ent o f the Cyprus problem . If, in  spite o f these efforts, 
there was no prospect o f a solution in the foreseeable fu ture, the council 
agreed to  reassess the situation in the ligh t o f the positions expressed by 
each side in  the intercommunal talks and reexamine in  January 1995 the 
question o f Cyprus’s accession to the Community.
The substantive talks between the commission and the governm ent 
o f Cyprus began on 26 November 1993. The prim ary objective o f those 
talks, w hich covered a broad range o f subjects, was to  assist Cyprus's au- 
thorities in  fam iliarizing themselves w ith  the acquis com m unautaire and in  
harm onizing C ypriot legislation and policies w ith  those o f the Com m unity. 
As a m atter o f fact, Cyprus has already harmonized a good deal o f its exist- 
ing legislation w ith  tne acquis and the authorities endeavour to  make sure 
that newly enacted legislation is in  conform ity w ith  Com m unity law and 
policies. There were several rounds o f substantive talks over fifte e n  
months. The talks were successfully completed in February 1995.
The interest o f the Community in  prom oting a settlement o f the po- 
litica i problem  led to  the appointment by the council o f an observer in  the 
intercom m unal talks. The observer was required to  report “to  the council 
on the im plications o f po litica l developments in Cyprus fo r the U nion’s 
acquis com m unautaire, includ ing the progress o f the U n ited  Nations 
secretary general's good offices mission fo r C yprus." The observer 
subm itted his firs t report in A p ril and the second in  June 1994. He 
subm itted his last and fina l report in  January 1995, in  view  o f the 
reassessment o f Cyprus's application by the council. The observer reported 
that despite the lack o f tangible results, “ overtures made by President 
Clerides in  October [1994] were notably courageous.” 30 He also noted that 
"the parties involved in the Cyprus problem  have taken on board the 
significance o f the E U ’s recognition o f Cyprus's su itab ility  to  jo in  the 
Union and its decision to embrace Cyprus in  the next enlargement.”
In  June 1994, the European Council at Corfu discussed EU-Cyprus 
relations and concluded that an essential stage in Cyprus's preparations fo r 
accession could be regarded as completed. I t  also decided that the next 
phase o f enlargement o f the EU would involve Cyprus and Malta. This po- 
sition was reaffirm ed by the European Council at Essen in  December 1994. 
The e ffect o f these declarations was to  clearly disassociate the issue o f 
Cyprus's accession to  the EU from the solution o f the Cyprus problem . 
This view was confirm ed by the then president o f the commission, Jacques 
Delors, in a statement made on 8 December 1994 on the eve o f the Essen 
sum m it.
On 5 July 1994, the Court o f Justice o f the European Communities, 
fo llow ing an application o f Greek-Cypriot exporters o f agricu ltura l prod- 
ucts, ru led that the EC-Cyprus Association Agreement d id  not authorize 
EC member states to  accept, when im porting agricultural goods, movement 
and phytosanitary certificates issued by the so-called ‘TR N C ’ w hich was 
“an en tity  not recognized.” 31 In  its ru ling, the court explained that the 
movement certifica te  system as means o f p roo f o f o rig in  fo r a product 
rested on the princip le o f “ institutional trust”  and cooperation between the
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relevant authorities in the exporter state and the im porter state. I t  then 
stated that that system could only work i f  the adm inistrative procedures 
were “ s tric tly  respected.”  The court said that this was not possible w ith  the 
northern part o f Cyprus:
such cooperation is excluded with the authorities o f an entity such as that 
established in the northern part o f Cyprus which is recognized neither by 
the Community nor by the Member States; the only Cypriot State they 
recognize is the Republic of Cyprus.
The same was true fo r phytosanitary certificates:
it would be impossible for an importing State to address enquiries to the 
departments or officials o f an entity which is not recognized, fo r in- 
stance concerning contaminated products or certificates that are incor- 
red or have been interfered with.
The court concluded: “ C learly only the authorities o f the Republic o f 
Cyprus are in  a position to  take action following complaints connected w ith  
the contam ination o f plant products exported from Cyprus.”
The court rejected the argument put forward by the commission and 
B rita in  that non-acceptance o f certificates from the northern part o f the is - 
land amounted to  the exclusion o f a whole category o f Cypriots from  the 
benefits o f the Association Agreement between the EC and Cyprus. I t  was 
argued that “ factually," it  was practically impossible or at least “ d iffic u lt” 
fo r exporters in  the northern part o f Cyprus to  obtain certificates o ther 
than those issued by the Turkish-Cypriot community. The argument was 
based on A rtic le  5 o f the Association Agreement according to  which the 
Agreement had to  be implemented in a non-discrim inatory manner to  the 
whole population and all C ypriot companies. However, that provision, the 
court stated, could not
in any event confer on the Community the right to interfere in the in- 
temal affairs of Cyprus. The problems resulting from the de facto  parti- 
tion o f the island must be resolved exclusively by the Republic o f Cyprus, 
which alone is internationally recognized.
C learly, this decision has im portant legal and po litica l im plications 
fo r Cyprus's relations w ith  the Community and especially her fu ture  ac- 
cession to  the European Union. In  particular, there should no longer be 
any legal doubts tha t the Com m unity must negotiate on ly  w ith  the 
Republic o f Cyprus and that any internal problems o f the island are prob- 
lems o f the Republic o f Cyprus alone in which the Community has no rig h t 
to  interfere, at least in the context o f the Association Agreement.
Given the lack o f any visible progress towards the solution o f the 
Cyprus problem , the council in  early 1995, pursuant to  its decision o f 
4 October 1993 and taking into account the observer's report, reassessed the 
question o f Cyprus's accession to  the EU. A t its meetings o f 6 February
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and 6 March 1995, the Council o f Ministers:
1) reaffirm ed Cyprus's suitability fo r accession to  the EU  and con- 
firm ed the Union's w ill to  incorporate Cyprus in the next stage o f its en- 
largem ent;
2) decided that accession negotiations w ith  Cyprus w ill commence 
at the latest six months after the conclusion o f the Intergovernm ental 
Conference o f 1996;
3) confirm ed the EU's continued support fo r the UN efforts fo r a 
comprehensive settlement o f the Cyprus problem;
4) com m itted itse lf to  adopting concrete proposals fo r a specific 
strategy in preparation fo r accession including a structured dialogue be- 
tween the EC and Cyprus.
This resolution was adopted in  the framework o f a *package deal’ 
w ith in  the Council o f M inisters relating to  the general fram ework fo r de - 
veloping future relations o f the EU w ith Turkey and Cyprus. In  exchange 
fo r setting out a tim etable for opening accession negotiations between the 
EU and Cyprus, Greece lifte d  her long-standing veto on the EC -Turkey 
customs union agreement.
The Turkish government and the Turkish-C ypriot leadership were 
in fu ria ted  by the council's resolution o f 6 March 1995. On the same day, 
the Turkish foreign m inister stated that:
Turkey disagrees with the decision taken by the Council on the member- 
ship negotiations with Cyprus. The Council’s decision is an unfortunate 
step which could lead to tne permanent division o f the island. The open- 
ing o f accession negotiations before a negotiated settlement is reached 
w ill lead to the talks being held exclusively with the Greek-Cypriot side. 
In such an undesirable eventuality, Turkey w ill be left w ith no option but 
to take steps towards achieving a similar integration w ith the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.32
These remarks provoked strong reaction by the president o f the council, 
then Foreign M inister A. Juppe o f France, who stated that no th ird  country 
could interfere in  the internal affairs o f the EU and that no such in te rfe r- 
enee would be tolerated.
The council resolution o f 6 March was hailed by the Cyprus gov- 
em m ent as the single most im portant development in  the twenty-one years 
fo llow ing the Turkish invasion. The importance o f th is resolution fo r the 
Cyprus government is twofold. F irst, it  has set in tra in  the process that 
w ill eventually lead to  Cyprus's accession to  the EU in  the not so d istan t 
future. Secondly, it w ill nave a considerable impact on the efforts fo r a so- 
lu tion  to  the Cyprus problem. In  other words, i f  Turkey realized that her 
reaction could not stop the process o f Cyprus's accession to  the EU  then 
she would be faced w ith  a policy dilemma fo r the firs t tim e since the inva- 
sion. I f  Turkey chose to  continue her policy o f no-solution o f the Cyprus 
problem , she would, in  essence, condemn the Turkish-C ypriots to  rem ain 
in th e ir present poor economic conditions thus depriving them  o f the sub- 
stantia! economic benefits which would result from  Cyprus's accession to
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the EU . If, on the other hand, given the fact that the process leading to 
Cyprus's accession has irrevocably commenced, Turkey chose to  cooperate 
in  find ing  a solution to  the island's po litica l problem , then the Turkish• 
Cypriots together w ith  all other Cypriots, would be able to  enjoy the bene- 
fits  that EU membership would bring.
In  accordance w ith  the council conclusions o f 6 M arch 1995, the 
sixteenth EU-Cyprus Association Council on 12 June 1995 adopted a reso- 
1 ú tion on the establishment o f a structured dialogue between the EU  and 
Cyprus and on certain elements o f the strategy concerning Cyprus's prepa* 
ration fo r accession. The structured dialogue “on various issues and vari* 
ous levels, o f a quality equivalent to  that which was offered to  the coun- 
tries o f Central and Eastern Europe”  w ill involve: 1) meetings on the oc - 
casion o f the European Council between the heads o f state o r government;
2) meetings and talks at m inisteria l and o ther levels on issues fa lling  
w ith in  the common foreign and security policy and justice and home af- 
fairs; and 3) meetings ana talks at m inisterial o r o ther level, i f  necessary 
and according to  need, on subjects o f common in te rest such as the 
environm ent, tourism , and shipping. M oreover, the existing p o litica l 
dialogue between the EC and Cyprus on common foreign and security 
policy issues w ill be upgraded ana expanded. F inally, the specific strategy 
fo r preparing Cyprus fo r accession w ill include, in te r a lia  : 1) continuation 
o f efforts to  fam iliarize Cyprus authorities w ith  the acquis com m unautaire 
and to  harm onize C yprio t legislation w ith  it; 2) exam ination o f the 
poss ib ility  o f extending to  Cyprus the trans-European sh ipp ing  and 
telecom m unications networks; 3) Cyprus's pa rtic ipa tion  in  C om m unity 
programs such as M E D IA  I I ,  certain tra in ing  programs (LE O N A R D O , 
SO CRATES, Y O U TH  FOR E U R O P E ), A R IA N N E , R A P H A E L , 
KALE ID O SC O PE, and the Fourth Framework Programme o f S cien tific  
and Technical Research, M ATTHAEUS; 4) the possib ility fo r Cyprus to 
benefit from  funds under the Com m unity's fu ture  M editerranean policy; 
and 5) extended cooperation between EUROSTAT and Cyprus's statistical 
and research departments.
D uring tne same Association Council meeting, the fou rth  financial 
protocol between the EC and Cyprus w orth 74 m illio n  ECU was signed 
covering the period u n til 31 December 1998. The objective o f th is protocol 
is to  prom ote the development o f the Cypriot economy and assist the e ffo rt 
o f harmonization o f Cypriot legislation w ith the acquis com m unautaire.
W ith in  the framework o f structured dialogue between the EU  and 
Cyprus, President Clerides was invited to  the European Council m eeting 
at Cannes on 26/27 June 1995. This invitation underlined the special status 
o f Cyprus as a future EU member. The Cannes European C ouncil a f- 
firm ea that EC-Cyprus accession negotiations w ill begin six months a fte r 
the conclusion o f the 1996 Intergovernm ental Conference. F ina lly , the 
C ouncil o f M inisters in  its meeting o f 17 July 1995 defined the precise 
m odalities o f the EU-Cyprus structured dialogue, thus provid ing the op- 
portun ity to  Cyprus authorities to  understand better the function ing o f the 
U nion and exchange views w ith the ir EC counterparts on im portant issues 
o f common interest.
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Conclusions
As already stated, EU-Cyprus relations can be divided in to  three 
phases. The firs t period, from  1972 to  1984, was m arked by the 
Com m unity’s reluctance to  promote its relations w ith  Cyprus. The second 
period, from 1985 to  1992, was a period o f norm alization o f the relations o f 
the two parties. D uring that period the Com m unity adopted a more posi - 
tive attitude towards Cyprus. This change in  the Com m unity’s attitude can 
be a ttribu ted , to  a s ign ifican t degree, to  C reek pa rtic ipa tion  in  the 
Com m unity organs fo llow ing Greece’s accession in  1981. I t  was during  
that period that the customs union agreement was signed, the European 
Political Cooperation through numerous statements expressed support fo r 
the independence and sovereignty o f the Republic o f Cyprus, condemned 
the illegal U D I by the Turkish side, and the application fo r fu ll member- 
ship was subm itted  by Cyprus. But even du ring  th is  pe riod  the 
Com m unity’s interest d id not go beyond expression o f support fo r certain 
guiding principles fo r a solution to  the Cyprus problem  ana the UN in itia - 
tives. Tne Com m unity avoided getting more actively involved in  the p ro - 
cess o f find ing  a solution to  the Cyprus problem; whenever it  attem pted to 
take up an in itia tive  o f its own, the EC was discouraged by the U.S. and 
B rita in .
The th ird  period, from  1993 to the present, is a period o f rapid de- 
velopment o f EC-Cyprus relations. The positive opin ion by the com m is- 
sion on Cyprus’s accession, the Corfu European C ouncil’s decision tha t 
Cyprus w ill be involved in the next enlargement o f the EU , the decision 
o f the C ourt o f Justice on the issue o f illegal exports from  the northern 
part o f Cyprus, the resolution o f 6 March 1995 setting a clear tim etable fo r 
the commencement o f accession negotiations and the adoption o f a struc- 
tu  red dialogue and a preaccession strategy by the Association C ouncil o f 12 
June 1995 re flect the breakthrough in EU-Cyprus relations during  tha t 
period. But perhaps the most im portant development during tha t period is 
the realization by the Com m unity that Cyprus’s European fu tu re  cannot 
remain hostage o f the Turkish army, as was eloquently stated by the EU 
commissioner fo r external afairs Hans Van den Broek.
Thus, despite a variety o f d ifficu lties and delays, relations between 
Cyprus and the EC have been developing and im proving, b ring ing Cyprus 
to  the verge o f fu ll Com m unity membership.
In  the economic sphere, the EC-Cyprus Association Agreem ent has 
been function ing  in  the m utual interest. P articu larly fo r Cyprus, the 
Association Agreement and the prospect o f membership in  the Com m unity 
have contributed to  the rapid development and modernization o f her econ- 
omy.
The key element in EU-Cyprus relations is the po litica l elem ent. 
Cyprus’s po litica l problem has repeatedly proven to  be a form idable obsta- 
cle to the smooth progress o f those relations. This was the case when 
Cyprus was try in g  to  move to  the second stage o f the Association
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Agreement and, more recently, in her attempts to  prom ote her application 
to  accede to  the Community.
Even now, the Community appears to  not have an integrated com - 
mon policy on the Cyprus problem. This is due to  significant differences o f 
opinion between the its member states. On the one hand, B rita in 's A tlantic 
orientation has been dictating B ritish  e fforts to  keep Cyprus outside the 
Com m unity sphere. On the other hand, Greece tries to  b ring  Cyprus as 
close to  the Community as possible.
On the politica l level, there is a tension between the policies o f 
those countries that support Cyprus’s European orientation ana those fa• 
voring a solution o f the Cyprus problem  outside the Com m unity fram e- 
work. Cyprus, supported by a number o f EC member states, believes that 
more active Community involvement in  Cyprus would enhance efforts fo r 
a peaceful, just, functional, and lasting solution o f the po litica l problem . 
Cyprus's accession to  the EU w ill guarantee the v ia b ility  o f any solution 
ana the state itself.
Certain quarters in the U.S. and B rita in  do not share the above 
view, m ainly because Turkey objects to  it. They s till consider that the 
Cyprus problem should be resolved w ith in  the A tlan tic  fram ework taking 
in to  account the politica l and geostrategic interests o f the NATO  alliance. 
Despite this negative attitude, C ypriot and Greek insistence at the negoti- 
ation table has transformed the issue o f Cyprus’s accession to  the EU in to  a 
major parameter in the efforts towards a solution to  the island’s po litica l 
problem.
Cyprus’s accession in to the EU would serve the interests o f a ll the 
parties involved in the politica l problem . I t  w ould o ffe r security to  both 
C ypriot communities and would foster mutual trust. I t  w ould serve as a 
guarantee for the respect o f human rights and democratic principles fo r the 
people o f Cyprus. I t  would also strengthen the economic development o f 
Cyprus, the benefits o f which would be enjoyed by both C yprio t com m uni- 
ties. F inally, it would contribute to  the improvement o f relations between 
Greece ana Turkey and foster long-term  stabilization and peace in  the 
southeastern Mediterranean.
Given Cyprus’s key geographic position and the fact that the island 
has been for many centuries the extreme outpost o f W estern values and 
civilization, her membership in the EU would give the West the opportu - 
n ity  to  enhance its role in  that part o f the world and contribute to the cause 
o f peace, security, and cooperation.
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The Reconstruction of Relations 
between the Albanian State and the 
Southeastern European Countries
A gim  Nesho
The collapse o f communism in  Albania and the reconstruction o f a 
democratic society were associated w ith  d ifficu lt and com plicated processes 
and phenomena. The distinguished western expert, A. Sm olar1 describes 
th is comprehensive transform ation as follows:
We have to deal w ith an extremely intricate process o f interdependent 
and simultaneous change linked to the passage from external dominance 
to fu ll sovereignty, from communist party dictatorship to a liberal, par- 
liamentary democracy, from a command economy to a free market sys- 
tern, from a society stifled by Statism to a democratic civil one.
Hence, such a transform ation would necessarily give rise to  the need o f re- 
constructing Albanian policy towards new bonds, alliances, conceptions, 
and p rio ritie s  w hile  in  the course o f bu ild ing  relations w ith  d iffe re n t 
states. A fte r a long period o f total isolation, a total opening to  the outside 
world was the clearest indication o f a new strategy fo r Albania, whose soci- 
ety needed progress, free circulation o f people, goods, cu lture , and ideas. 
This attitude, as tim e went by, would be lim ited and develop under the c ir- 
cumstances o f the follow ing politica l factors and conditions:
1) the lack o f an established class in Albanian society to  carry out 
the above changes w ith  a firm  and clear vision which would echo national 
interests.(this deficiency was an outcome o f long-tim e rule by severe die- 
tatorship and a leadership which had to ta lly  m onopolized the country’s 
governance);
2) the existence o f pressing issues in the Balkans and crises in  the 
form er Yugoslavia which required m aturity in handling the in te rnationa l 
relations o f Albania;
3) the Albanian national issue (that is, the problem  o f Kosovo) and 
the impact o f interested external and domestic forces over Albanian policy.
A fte r W orld W ar I I ,  Albania belonged to  the group o f so-called 
eastern countries and its relations w ith  the rem aining Ballcan countries 
were defined more by ideological influences than from  the standpoint o f
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geopolitical international relations. The break w ith  the Warsaw Pact o ri- 
ented Albanian policy towards tota l isolation and away from  Balkan and 
w ider European integration.
The implementation o f the policy “neither east nor west”  served the 
purpose o f re ta in ing a relative independence from  superpower blocs. 
W hile defining alliances and priorities o f its own policy, Albania preserved 
its independence (at the expense, o f course, o f isolation) and it chose a 
system o f powerful and distant allies, upholding, however, a cautious policy 
towards neighbors and other nearby countries. This experience seems to 
have been metaphysically transferred to  new po litica l circumstances at 
home and to a new po litica l configuration, especially given that the two 
principal factors which play a crucial role in  defining the foreign policy and 
international relations o f Albania are:
1) the impact o f the external factor, which prevails over A lbanian 
state policy;
2) the lack o f a nationwide strategy in  our foreign policy, which 
views the international relations o f our country from  the point o f view o f 
benefits fo r politica l parties and th e ir survival in  power.
A fte r the paradigm shift in Albania in  1991, Albanian foreign policy 
witnessed two trends: tne firs t one, dating back to  the period 1991-92, was 
characterized by the dom ination o f a pro-European line tha t was an ou t- 
come o f the substantial and continuous assistance that the European coun- 
tries extended to  Albania fo r managing its crises and establishing the 
proper infrastructures o f a democratic state. In  th is fram ework, Ita ly  and 
Greece turned out to  be major partners and useful allies fo r accom plish- 
m ent o f Albanian integration in to  Europe, w hile  not underestim ating, 
however, the major assistance provided by Germany and France, more for 
economic than for po litica l ana geostrategic interests. W h ile  successfully 
applied, th is po litica l line ensured ever-increasing p o litica l s tab ility  and 
provided the proper guarantee for performance o f po litica l, economic, and 
social reforms at home.
This po litica l platform , enshrined in the governm ent o f S tab ility  
which was established in June 1991, was made possible by the consensus o f 
a ll major domestic political forces. The politica l stability o f that period pro- 
vided the necessary grounds fo r m ajor investments and expansion and 
strengthening o f relations w ith  the Balkan countries and beyond. 
M eanwhile, this stab ility  narrowed the scope and opportun ities fo r the 
dem ocratic party, as the form er opposition party o f M r. Sali Berisha, for 
getting to ta l control o f power in its own hanas. Under the name o f the fi - 
nal destruction o f communism, the above-mentioned coa lition was d is - 
solved and at the same tim e new po litica l platform s and allies came to  the 
fore. This new trend predestined the return to  the o ld strategy “ ne ithe r 
east nor west”  by stretching Albanian p rio rities  and alliances in  extrem is 
from  the U.S. superpower to western European and, w ith  less emphasis, all 
the way to  the far east as a member o f the W orld  Islam ic League. From 
outer appearances one could create the image that th is trend expressed in - 
creasing U.S. influence in Albania and the somewhat declin ing ro le  o f 
Europe.
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The new orientation o f Berisha's government may be explained by 
the fo llow ing politica l, psychological, and traditional factors:
1) fearing the impact in  po litica l and economic aid from  Ita ly  and 
Greece, he opted for its reduction;
2) he returned to  the traditional idea o f relying on a pow erfu l and 
distant ally as a security means fo r governing;
3) linkage to  the Islam ic countries was presented as a form  o f pres- 
sure vis-à-vis  Europe fo r increasing the level o f economic aid, ju s tify in g  
this w ith  the image o f Albania as a bridge between the west and the M idd le  
East.
For a long tim e Albania has lacked a democratic state and w id e ly - 
accepted democratic principles necessaiy fo r educating the people w ith  that 
sp irit. Albania has shifted from  a semi-feudal state to  a socialist state after 
W orld W ar I I ,  facing a ruthless dictatorship and a totally-centralized state 
authority.
To retain themselves in power as long as possible, a ll the ru lin g  
classes in  A lbania have manifested m entalities o f regionalism and trib a l 
policies. C ertainly such elements show that the present Albanian leader- 
ship, which retains these tra its, is closer to an eastern m entality on ques- 
tions o f state and society. The new orientation o f Albanian policy since
1992 has established the fo llow ing p rio rity  o f relations w ith  the states o f 
the Balkans, i.e., A lbania— Macedonia— Bulgaria— Turkey, w hich w ould
S rovi de the possibility o f restricting and controlling any escalation o f con - ic t in the form er Yugoslavia, in  the southern Balkans, while safeguarding 
the interests o f the two princip le  NATO partners (Greece and Turkey) as 
w ell as counteropposing the so-called Orthodox axis (Greece— Serbia).
By adm itting this form ula in  exchange fo r broad po litica l support 
fo r the governing party o f the country, under conditions o f major economic 
and restructuring d ifficu lties, (Albania?) accepted the role o f a potentia l by 
nationalistic state, which m ight be employed at every single m om ent as a 
counterbalancing force in the southeastern region.
On the other hand, the idea o f participation in  the W orld  Islam ic 
League would also serve as a possible scenario fo r a greater Albania w hich 
would stem from  the partition  o f the Balkans among the civiliza tions de- 
fined w ith  religious criteria , a scenario much talked o f at the end o f 1991, 
wherein the Moslem religion would serve as the main element o f Albanian 
external linkage and protection.
Conceived in  th is way, the relations o f Albania w ith  the Balkan 
countries would be b u ilt in to  a framework o f conflict and collaboration in - 
eluding its positive and negative points, but at the same tim e Albania w ould 
experience a politica l and economic imbalance which would h inder expec- 
tarions for a speedy European integration. Although Albania does not pre- 
sent any danger o f becoming a fundamentalist bastion in  the Balkans, it  may 
compromise the secular vision o f a newly-bom democracy.
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The National Issue and the Kosovo Problem
The Kosovo question is one o f the main points o f Albanian foreign 
policy. U nfa irly divided from the borders o f the motherland by the d ip lo - 
macy o f the m ajor powers, Kosovo w ill be present in  Albanian foreign poi- 
icy u n til its final settlement. The democratic processes in  eastern Europe 
and the collapse o f the bi-polar balance after the end o f the Cold W ar has 
led to  the escalation o f nationalism , especially from  federalist countries 
such as the form er Yugoslavia. As for the people o f Kosovo, the disintegrat- 
ing processes coupled w ith  the emergence o f new states in  the form er 
Yugoslav republics represents the most ideal tim e for a correct settlement 
o f the national issue and establishment o f proper conditions fo r the reuni- 
fication o f Albania. This strategy was associated w ith  a comprehensive and 
detailed plan which would contain
1) establishm ent o f a Kosovo republic and institu tionalization o f 
the country’s life  w ith  Albanian administration,
2) internationalization o f the Kosovo issue,
3) establishment o f a pro-Kosovo democratic regime to  support the
national question w ith  p rio rity .
The reunification o f Albania w ith Kosovo was sanctioned in the firs t 
Charter o f the Democratic Party o f Albania. These p rio rity  demands were 
motivated even more by the struggle against the old regime and by accus- 
ing Hoxha o f allegedly betraying tne national question and subjecting it to 
com m unist ideology. This po litica l naiveté on the one hand pointed out 
the amateurism and inefficiency o f Albanian leadership and on the other 
hand the determ ination o f settling the national question by every way and 
means. The Albanian diaspora in the U.S. also made pressures and offered 
its support in  th is respect. From the point o f view o f its composition, this 
diaspora represents the po litica l groupings that le ft Albania im m ediately 
a fter the end o f W orld W ar I  and that had in th e ir own programs the re - 
unification o f the country and the establishment o f an E thn ic Albania; and 
these were the parties o f B a lli Kom betar and Legality, the economic 
groupings from  Kosovo which have long been established in the U.S. The 
support provided to  M r. Berisha to  come to power comprised a major com - 
m itm ent fo r reactivation o f the Kosovo question on the part o f Albania, 
hence Albanian foreign policy by in form ing international institu tions o f 
the violence and genocide exercised in  the region o f Kosovo, attempted to  
mediate in  w orld  diplom acy fo r maximum demands and fu ll autonomy. 
For the sake o f even a m inim um  fu lfillm e n t o f these demands, Albanian 
diplomacy during the last two years has offered four d ifferent attitudes:
The protracted war in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the homicides and 
massacres o f  the population over two years, involved international bodies to 
more realistically solve this conflict and prevent the escalation o f the con- 
flic t to  the south, which m ight have had unimaginary catastrophai conse- 
quences fo r a ll Balkan peoples and far beyond. Certainly, th is com m itm ent 
o f in ternational institu tions fo r a settlement o f the crises and even the 
Geneva Summit in June 1994, where the status o f autonomy for Kosovo was
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defined and suggested, influenced the most recent stands o f Albania as an- 
nounced from  M r. Berisha in July 1994, stating that Albania w ould attem pt 
to  observe human rights and freedoms and invites both parties to  s it down 
and ta lk w ith  the mediation o f a th ird  party. This attitude reflects at last a 
realistic orientation in  Albanian stands and leaves in  the shade po litica l 
pressures on the Albanian leadership and is also conditioned by the deteri- 
oration o f the politica l and economic situation w ith in  the country and by 
some other things, among which one may mention the follow ing:
1) fluctuations in the attitudes o f the allies o f the Berisha regime 
on the Kosovo issue, which are d irectly reflected in  the foreign policy o f 
the Albanian state,
2) lack o f a national strategy from all the countiy's po litica l forces 
on the Kosovo issue,
3) lack o f marginal nationalistic sentiments in  A lbania as an ou t- 
come o f Albanian isolation and the national ideology o f the Hoxha regime 
in the form  o f a nationalist socialism. The devastation and hatred towards 
anything inherited from the past, and Albania’s opening to  Europe enabled 
the trium ph o f the idea o f European integration over nationalistic senti- 
ments. This also explains the lack o f a u n ifie d  dom estic position  o f 
Albanian society on the national question.
M r. Rugova is guiding the national question w ith  m a tu rity— his 
“gandist”  policy is designed to avoid severe bloodshed and the fue ling o f a 
con flic t that would involve most o f the Balkan countries. Convinced tha t 
the Kosovo issue cannot be settled w ith the intervention o f the m ajor pow- 
ers, the people o f Kosovo have endeavored to  present th e ir own demands 
for a major autonomy in the form o f a UN protectorate or towards an inde- 
pendent country between Albania and Serbia. The idea o f a protectorate has 
not found support in any international body since it  is an o ld international 
form used in  form er colonial conflicts whereas the existence o f a “ Second 
Albanian Republic,”  independent from Serbia and Albania w ould leave the 
final con flic t and its solution open. The idea proposed in  Geneva is more 
rational and acceptable. Belgrade accepts these negotiations w ith  b ila tera l 
compromise, i.e., Kosovo should give up the separatist idea and Belgrade 
should lif t  the state o f emergency ana restore autonomy w ith in  Serbia. 
The idea o f negotiations is perhaps more rational and more acceptable in  
the European context and for the settlement o f the crises in  the country. 
What is required today from the Albanians in  Kosovo is not to  give up th e ir 
correct demands concerning the respect o f human rights and dignity, but to 
be more reasonable in th e ir ways o f approaching and solving th is question 
by avoiding unnecessary conflicts. On the o ther hand, Serbia should 
acknowledge and consistently observe the rights and freedoms o f an entire 
autonomous people in Kosovo, recognize th e ir rights fo r tu itio n  and cu i- 
tu re , give up violence against them , respect in te rna tiona l law and 
principles, and recognize th e ir legitim ate righ t fo r self-determ ination in 
the future.
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Relations between Albania and Greece
H istorica lly speaking, Albania and the H ellen ic people have cher- 
ished the purest feelings o f friendship between them. The ancient Greek 
cu lture and civiliza tion has been one factor in  the development o f in te llec- 
tua l thought in  the Albanian national renaissance. I t  is common knowledge 
that from  the historic po in t o f view, since ancient times there have never 
been conflicts and wars between the two people. In  1987, the government 
o f M r. Papandreou abrogated the law on the state o f war w ith  Albania as a 
positive step in  the am elioration o f relations between the tw o countries. 
These relations experienced vigorous development and the Greek m in o rity  
in  Albania was viewed as a bridge o f bonds. The sh ift o f the socio-economic 
system in  A lbania a fte r the year 1990 lined Greece up among p rio rity  
countries that helped Albania during the transition crises. I t  is w orth em - 
phasizing that Greece managed to receive a flux o f over 350,000 Albanian 
emigrants tha t le ft Albania under the circumstances o f deep despair and 
suffering. The revenues from  th e ir work have served ana continue to 
serve as a means o f subsistence fo r over one m illion  people in  Albania. 
Since our economy continues to  be paralyzed, the economic aid extended 
by Greece, both fo r the speedy integration o f Albania towards Europe and 
from  the bilateral point o f view is quite substantial. A ll these friend ly ac- 
tions and messages produced a strong bridge o f sp iritua l and m aterial 
bonds between Albania and its natural ally, Greece, which at the same tim e 
increased its own influence among pro-Greek circles in  Albania.
Relations between the two countries were redim ensioned and dis- 
played contradictions after Papandreou's victory last October. That victory 
was viewed w ith  skepticism by the politica l circle in  power in  A lbania since 
it  represented a le ft-w ing  victory in a country w ith  influence on present- 
day Albanian po litics, while it  was viewed positively by the opposition in 
Albania, the la tte r w inning 54% in the last local elections.
The victory o f socialist parties in a series o f eastern countries; major 
errors in  domestic, economic, and social policy in  these tw o years; and the 
presence o f a pro-opposition Greek faction w ith  European views in  Albania 
proved to  be a tu rn ing  po in t in  Greek-Albanian state relations w hile  the 
ever-increasing im pact o f Greek policy in the country's social life  was con- 
sidered a real danger in the forthcom ing elections at nome.
The redimensioning started w ith  the disapproval and restriction  o f 
tu itio n  rights fo r the Greek m inority, rights gained from  the tim e o f d icta- 
torship and protected by international norms and princip les enshrined in  
the Convention on Human Rights o f the C ouncil o f Europe and CSCE 
H elsinki F inal Act. Greece and other democratic forces in  the countries 
could not fa il to  react. The execution o f the policy o f tensions w ith  Greece 
was made by the Albanian government at a tim e when European policy was 
c ritic iz in g  the persistence o f nationalism  in  the po licy re la ted to  the 
FYROM question and the influence o f nationalism  in  the po licy o f the 
Greek governm ent w hich contravened the princip les o f the  European 
Union. A t the same tim e, the existence o f certain chauvin istic Greek
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circles insisting  upon a N orthern Epirus and on te rrito ria l claim s on 
A lbania were offered as accusations o f the Creek state its e lf towards its 
stand on Albania. The means to  carry out such a policy were found in the 
incident in  the Greek-Albanian border and w ith  the tria l o f five Albanians 
fo r espionage. Aggravation o f these relations w ould b ring  the fo llow ing 
consequences, in  the domestic area:
1) contro l and consolidation o f Berisha’s au thorita rian  regime, 
w hich included an attem pt to  d im in ish Creek in fluence in  southern 
Albania, prepare the ground for the forthcom ing elections, and attack the 
opposition forces;
2) drawing the attention o f the Albanian public away from  the grave 
domestic po litica l clim ate created by the im prisonm ent o f the president o f 
the Socialist Party o f Albania and main opposition leader, the im prison* 
m ent o f journalists and escalation o f pressures against the free press, and 
increasing violence against individuals and associations w ith  d iffe re n t po- 
litic a i convictions (this policy has taken advantage o f a tense situation at 
home);
3) increase o f nationalistic feelings and u tiliza tion  o f th is policy to  
realize approval o f the constitution by anti-constitutional forms so as to  in -  
troduce in  Albania a presidential republic;
and in  the external area:
1)) the con flic t in  southern Albania is used to  ju s tify  the giving up 
o f demands o f the Albanian government on the Kosovo question;
2) it  enables avoidance o f Ita ly  and Greece as natural Albanian allies 
w hich w ould serve fo r Albanian integration in to  a un ited Europe w hile 
redim ensioning the p rio rity  o f relations w ith  Europe and by entrusting d i- 
verse distant allies w ith  Albanian policv.
The recent visit o f the Greek foreign m inister M r. C. Papulias to  
Tirana not only established a greater hope fo r im provem ent o f relations 
between the two countries but also unleashed the idea o f a Balkan confer- 
enee w hich w ould enable the easing o f tensions in  the region and create 
opportunities fo r greater cooperation.
Problems o f Albania in its Relations with the Former Yugoslav 
Republic o f Macedonia (FYROM)
D iffe re n t from Albania’s other neighbors, the policy w ith  the fo r- 
mer Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia came to evidence in  the course o f po- 
litic a i shifts in  tne form er Yugoslavia. H istorica lly, the Albanian people 
have been rather cold in  th e ir relations w ith  th e ir neighbor. The new ad- 
m in istrative division brought evidence o f the in tensification o f relations 
between the two countries.
A lbania views the fo rm er Yugoslavia R epublic o f M acedonia 
(FYROM ) w ith  interest on the fo llow ing grounds:
1) as a country wherein allies have vita l interests in  the region and
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are seeking support to realize them,
2) as a counterbalance to  the policy w ith  Greece which is an ally o f 
the Slav-Orthodox axis and presents itse lf as a stum bling block fo r the fu i- 
fìllm en t o f national intentions and the Kosovo issue,
3) fo r the preservation o f the vertica l line  connecting it  w ith  
Turkey which would enable in terruption o f the Serbia-Greece axis,
4) to  utilize it as a means o f pressure and assistance in  its own poi- 
icy w ith  the form er Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia, where 40% o f the 
population are Albanians, fo r the future solution o f the Kosovo issue and
the national question.
Albania was the firs t to  recognize the form er Yugoslav Republic o f 
Macedonia w ithout getting however any message from it  o r w ithout observ- 
ing human rights and freedoms for Albanians and th e ir acknowledgment as 
a constituent element, thereby accepting in silence its geostrategical posi- 
tion  in  the Balkans and its specific role in  the prevention o f the escalation 
o f the conflic t as an interlapping area o f interests o f several countries. This 
was also the reason that Albania rapidly lifte d  its own veto in  the CSCE for 
the recognition o f the rights o f the Albanian population as a constituent el - 
em ent w hile  realizing the message that the U.S. defense secretary M r. 
Perry expressed during his vis it to  Tirana that “ the U.S. has m ajor in te r- 
ests in the form er Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia.”  The only Albanian 
interest in  Macedonia is the consolidation and increase o f awareness o f 
Albanians at large on the rights belonging to  them there. Its  population 
represented in  the parliam ent and in  the governm ent o f tne form er 
Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia, which has the largest and most powerful 
party, m ight react in  case o f an outburst o f a con flic t in  FYROM and it 
m ignt require the establishment o f an Albanian state together w ith  Kosovo 
as its firs t stage. This interest was clearly expressed in the interferences 
from  the Party o f Rugova and Democratic Party o f Berisha in  the sp litting  
o f the Party o f Democratic Prosperity, the Albanian party in the form er 
Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia, in two parts and providing support to the 
most radical party. This long-term strategy is w ith in  the designed projects 
on the partition  o f form er Yugoslavia in  three parts, Great Serbia, Creat 
Croatia, and Creat Albania. This Albanian policy would continue to  be sup- 
ported fo r the sake o f this scheme, otherwise no po litica l and economic in - 
terest justifies the com m itm ent and tota l support o f Albania towards the 
form er Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia.
Relations with Turkey
For Albanian policy, the Turkish state represents a m ajor and pow- 
e rfu l a lly in  the Balkans. Turkish policy has always viewed Albania as an 
area o f its own influence. This occurrence is accentuated given the in te r- 
ests that the Albanian lobby in Turkey presents. I t  has been established 
and strengthened due to the transfer o f Albania at the beginning o f the cen- 
tu ry . The position o f Albanian policy o f “ne ither east nor west”  comes 
closer to  its im portant strategic position as a lin k  between east and west.
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Albania seeks to  use its a lly ’s politica l and m ilita ry potential so as to  feel 
relieved from  other influences, compensating this friendship through its 
accession to  the Islam ic League and In itia tive  o f the Black Sea. The idea 
that Turkey has started to  display interest in Albania on account o f its em - 
p iry  dom inions is viewed w ith  neglectfulness in Albanian policv and it  
does not feel any danger from western civilization on the part o f eastern 
cu lture  bu t quite the opposite it  tries to  consolidate and disseminate it. 
This attitude also indicates the quintessence o f the present Albanian state 
which, in the absence o f a vigorous national awareness to fo llow  the course 
towards European c iv iliza tion  o f which it is an integral part, configures 
Albanian civiliza tion as a m ixture o f d ifferent civilizations.
Conclusions
The lack o f experience and politica l amateurism on the part o f the 
Albanian leadership as w ell as a lack o f po litica l c red ib ility  at home have 
brought as a consequence the lack o f a clear-cut political line in  A lbania’s 
international relations in the Balkans.
The lack o f new ideas fo r the development o f transition in  the 
country’s governing, as w ell as the continuation o f tension in the po litica l 
and economic situation at home, may result in the accentuation o f national- 
istic tones damaging Albanian relations w ith  the countries o f the Balkans 
and beyond.
The Berisha government’s handling o f the national issue (Kosovo) 
may be used as a means o f pressure to control the crises in the country and 
to  seek a broader international participation.
U ltim ately, the idea o f Balkan cooperation is an idea to  be backed 
up; it  is indispensable fo r Albania and the other countries in  the region. I t  
would also have its own impact in  establishing a much-needed détente fo r 
the Balkans, which has unfortunately been fueled w ith conflicts. I t  w ould 
also emancipate Albanian foreign policy and perm it it  to return to  the con- 
cept o f integration and cooperation among European states.
NOTES
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1. A. Smolar, “ Democratization in Central-Eastern European and Interna- 
tional Security,” Part II, London 1155 II, p. 25, 1991-92.
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Romanian Options for 
Reconstructing Southeast Europe
Vlad-Andrei Moga
Democracy, Free Market Economy, and European Integration
As a central European country close to  the Balkan area and to  the 
Black Sea, Romania is deeply concerned, as it  has always been, about devel- 
opments in  the region. Before 1989, the w orld  lived in  a system o f stabil- 
ity—a cold stability, sometimes a te rror stability. A fte r 1989 we witnessed 
the fo llow ing systems: 1) S tability vs. explosive instab ility  in  the border 
area o f the old east-west blocs; 2) instability w ith  risk o f chaos—especially 
in  some parts o f the form er USSR; and 3) stable instab ility nowadays.
The classic conflicts are more and more rare. The Yugoslav crisis 
and the present Chechen con flic t— used only as examples— could be re- 
garded as exceptions. The w orld is facing other kinds o f wars: economic 
wars, psychological wars, image wars, press wars, disinform ation wars, d i- 
version wars, m inority  wars. To quote Gheorghe Tinea, m in ister o f de- 
fense o f Romania, “a country can be defeated nowadays in  ten m inutes 
w ithout its even being necessary to fire  one single bu lle t.”
We live in  a situation in  which the so-called “enemy” may be no- 
body and anyone at the same tim e, including sometimes even ourselves.
I t  has been said that the best security guarantees are democracy and 
the free market economy. W ith all due respect, it  should be rem inded that 
in 1938, fo r example, Czechoslovakia and Romania had them  both, w hich 
did not save them from  the Nazi and Communist horrors o f the next fifty  
years to  come. Democracy and the free market economy are necessary ana 
reassuring, but we need also a stable environment and...some friends.
Therefore Romania tries to do its best in  bu ild ing a democratic so- 
ciety and a free market economy, in build ing good relations w ith  its neigh- 
bors, in  prom oting its European and Euro-A tlantic po litica l, economic, so- 
cial, cu ltu ra l, ana security integration, in prom oting good relations w ith  
the w orld’s major powers and w ith  all the countries so interested.
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Good Relations with its Neighbors 
A Longstanding Tradition
A good clim ate w ith  respect to  its neighbors has always been re- 
garded as very im portant. F u ll respect and honest cooperation are the fun- 
damental premises on which Romania has always b u ilt its relations w ith  
neighboring countries. The basic idea o f our common security is to  seek 
security w ith  other countries rather than against them.
The collapse o f communism added to  the liberties bu t also to the 
problems Romania had up to  1989.
Russian Federation
For the firs t tim e in more than 300 years, Romania has no common 
border w ith  Russia. Yet we can hardly start talking o f our neighbors w ith  - 
ou t m entioning Russia. Its huge potential makes it, and w ill continue to  
make it  in  the future, a main pole o f attraction. The im portant th ing fo r this 
pole o f attraction is not to  behave as a black hole fagocitating everything. 
Romania has, and w ill continue to  have, strong economic ties w ith  Russia. 
I t  is jus t normal to  be so. I t  is also normal that these relations should be 
good ones as w ell as the general relations.
Concerning security matters, Romania seeks integration in to  the 
European and E uro -A tlan tic  structures. As early as Decem ber 1989, 
Romanians, as a single person, turned back towards Europe, towards that 
Europe o f theirs from which thev were separated fo r fifty  years. Common 
history and culture make them feel at home in Europe. A t home do they 
want to  live and feel secure. I t  is the ir defm ite and sovereign wish. Do its 
s im ila r wishes and other countries’ in the region, pose problem s fo r 
Russia’s security? In  the Romanians’ opinion: On the contrary! A secure, 
stable, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous central Europe means only ad- 
vantages fo r the new democratic Russia. I t  may fu lly  contribute to the sta - 
b ility  o f the CIS space and to  the strong implementation o f democracy and 
prosperity o f the fu ture desired w orld ring o f stab ility in  w hich a stable 
democratic and responsible Russia is a most welcomed and desired partner.
Ukraine
Relations w ith  the young democratic Ukraine need a lo t o f good 
care, good w ill, and reciprocal comprehension as both partners inherit some 
faults o f others.
D uring the recent visit to  Romania o f the firs t deputy m inister fo r 
fore ign affairs o f Ukraine, Boris Tarasiuk, the reciprocal wish fo r con- 
eluding a Basic Treaty between the two countries was expressed. Experts 
from  both m inistries fo r foreign affairs w ill soon start to  w ork on it. The 
already existing good economic relations represent an encouraging starting 
po in t— the largest Romanian investment abroad is in  the  K riv ii-R ih
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(K rivo i Rog) m ineral exploitation and steel industry.
Republic of Moldova
Relations w ith  the Republic o f Moldova are o f a special nature and 
there again the more close the cooperation, the more it  has to  be accorri pa - 
nied by fu ll respect fo r the people o f the Republic o f Moldova's options.
Romania's relations w ith  the Republic o f M oldova are special, 
p rio rita ry , and privileged. Based on common history, on common people, 
language, cu lture , and relig ion, they aim to  prom ote an economic and 
cultured integration. Some o f the concrete developments in  th is respect are 
presented in  Appendix I.
Recently (20-22 February) an im portant m inisteria l Romanian del- 
egation, headed by Prime M inister Nicolae Vacaroiu, visited the Republic 
o f Moldova. Im portant businessmen were also members o f the delegation. 
C loser po litica l, cultural, and economic cooperation and in tegration was 
discussed. An example is the envisaged cooperation fo r one o f the power 
units o f the Cemavoda nuclear electric power p lant u n it which could re- 
spond to  the Republic o f Moldova's energy needs. The aim is, as prim e 
m in ister Nicolae Vacaroiu put it, "To do so that the w orld  should under- 
stand that the two Romanian strong states live together in  th is period o f 
history.”  The Basic Treaty between Romania and the Republic o f Moldova 
is now being negotiated by experts and there is a common wish to  see it 
concluded as soon as possible.
However, the main problem fo r achieving s tab ility  in  the region 
remains the presence o f the Fourteenth Russian Arm y in  the Transdniestr 
Region. Its  w ithdrawal, included in  the Russian-Moldovan Treaty, urged 
by the OSCE and recently by President C lin ton, w ill most certa in ly con- 
trib u te  to defusing tension in the area.
Hungary
A new improvement in relations w ith  Hungary came in  1993. The 
v is it o f D r. Ceza Jeszenszky, then Hungary's foreign m inister, to  Romania, 
“solved problems and cleared many misunderstandings”  (from  the declara- 
tion  o f D r. Geza Jszenszky at the press conference at the end o f the visit).
M ilita ry  cooperation between the two countries could be regarded 
as an example to  be followed. The Open-Sky inspection program, inaugu- 
rated in  Europe by Romania and Hungary, is already an o ld but very fru it-  
fu i story. A new development was witnessed during the v is it (5 September 
1994) o f Teodor Melescanu, m inister o f state, m inister o f foreign affairs, to  
Hungary when the treaty between the two countries was discussed w ith  
his colleague the m inister o f foreign affairs, H is Excellency M r. Kóvács 
László. “We have reason to believe,” declared M r. Teodor Melescanu a fter 
the meeting, “  that the Treaty could be signed in May 1995.”
Both countries do the ir best to reach significant improvements w ith  
the S tab ility  (Balladur)— European Pact. Romania and Hungary have
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already signed, on 1 February, in Strasbourg, the M inority Charta. Experts 
from  the m in istry o f foreign affairs o f both countries worked very nard 
during the last months and the treaty is almost ready to  be signed.
I t  is, however, necessary to underline the recent declarations o f the 
W orld Union o f Magyars: “ I t  is not allowed that the solutions fo r the m i* 
norities should be subordinated to  other international po litica l processes.”  
The only solution, they say, is to  have “ internal self-determ ination and ter* 
rito ria l adm inistrative autonomy granted.”  (“ Romania Liberà”— 6 March
1995, p. 9). The U D M R , the ethnic Hungarians party in  Romania, repeat- 
edly declared that they regard the provisions o f tne M inority  Charta as an 
insu ffic ien t starting point.
A Special Chapter—The Balkans
As fo r the Balkan region, Romania, a central European country close 
to  the area, regards it  w ith  special attention. N ot only the long traditional 
h istoric, economic, religious, cultura l and other links matter, but the pre- 
sent and future do as well.
Present S ituation
Up u n til 24 September 1994, when the Security Council decided to  
pa rtia lly  l if t  the embargo on Yugoslavia, any idea o f cooperation in  the 
Balkans was more or less frozen and w ill continue to  be so because o f exist- 
ing conflicts and because o f the absence o f one o f the most im portant actors 
o f the play.
Unhappily, the Yugoslav crisis, which began because o f a very com- 
plex m ixture o f causes sucn as the fric tion  o f the European powers, the end 
o f the Cold War, extreme nationalism, distortion o f national feelings used 
as ideological support fo r the achievement o f politica l interests, and so on, 
once unleashed developed from  a symptom in to a cause o f a generalized 
crisis. I t  became a reason in  itself. W hether we like it  o r not, we have to 
adm it tha t w ithou t its settlement we cannot speak o f Balkan security and 
one may even question European security.
Looking over the entire Balkan area, at present, the fo llow ing hot 
spots can be identified: 1) the problems created by a future reduction o f 
UN forces in  Croatia, which is supposed to take place on 31 March; 2) the 
crisis in  Bosnia— the arm istice expires on 30 A p ril; 3) the Macedonia 
problem; 4) the separatist tendencies in Kosovo, Sandjack, Voivodina, and 
Kraina; and 5) the Greek-Turkish dispute.
Eventual Developments
As things are viewed from Romania, some o f the possible directions 
in  which the Balkans may evolve as far as security is concerned m ight be: 
1) an internal balance o f forces— which would, by its own desired presence 
im ply; 2) an external balance o f forces; 3) the assertion o f some sub-regional
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centers o f power (Greater Serbia, Croatia, Greece, Turkey), fo llow ed by;
4) the tem ptation to  “organize”  systems o f influence in  the Balkans; and
5) the institutional solution— congruent w ith  the European Security mech- 
anism.
The last one is regarded as the only e ffic ien t and desirable one. I t  
has to  be based on measures meant to  increase confidence, to  provide fa ir 
solutions fo r national m inorities, in  accordance w ith  European standards, 
to  improve economic development and integration.
P rio ritie s
Experience shows also that Balkan conflicts tend to  develop some- 
times in to  global ones. Therefore the domino effect should by a ll means be 
avoided. The im plication o f the major powers, the U.S. and Russia, as w ell 
as France, Germany, and. Great B rita in is to  be regarded as useful in  terms 
o f im proving stability in the area.
There is more to  be done from the UN, OSCE, NATO , W EU , o r 
EU, even though they have, w ith no exemption, been subm itted to  a harsh 
test by the present Yugoslav crisis. Peacekeeping, diplomacy, and other 
kinds o f actions, although apparently not very e ffic ient, must continue to  be 
used and improved.
New developments and a new data base o f the play, however en- 
cou raging o r discouraging they may seem to  be, s till impose the same o ld  
p rio rities, namely the dim inishing and extinction o f present conflicts and 
the prevention o f other potential conflicts.
To achieve these ends it  is necessary to  support sim ultaneously
1) the creation o f a framework fo r direct contacts, 2) a ll efforts meant to  im - 
plem ent and maintain cease fires and bring peace, and 3) measures to  en- 
hance humanitarian aid w ith a scrupulous respect fo r the im plem ented em - 
bargo, i.e., on Bosnian Serbs.
Necessary Steps
Some signs o f the burning daylight seem to  appear. But there is 
s till a long way to go and it  reveals mostly that the parties d irectly  involved 
in  the present conflictual situation as well as neighboring actors shou ld  
contribute to  solving these d ifficu lt problems, and the sooner the better.
Some o f the problems w orth m entioning m ight be: 1) reciprocal 
recognition o f the successor states o f the form er Yugoslavia; 2) to  trace the 
o ffic ia l frontiers between the new sovereign states emerged from  the fo r- 
mer Yugoslavia; 3) to have these new borders accepted and recognized by 
the successor states o f the form er Yugoslavia; 4) to have the borders o f the 
new states fu lly  accepted and recognized by the neighboring states o f the 
form er Yugoslavia; 5) the im plementation o f an agreement aimed at con- 
tro llin g  arms in  the area. I t  should be noted here th a t the fo rm er
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Yugoslavia has not been included in  the treaty fo r the reduction o f conven- 
tional arms; 6) the accession o r the readmission o f a ll the successor states o f 
form er Yugoslavia as fu ll members to  international institu tions and forums; 
7) the reestablishment o f normal relations between the successor states. I t  
is not to  be forgotten that the people o f the area have lived together ever 
since, and especially during the period im m ediately after, W orld  W ar I  and 
the interdependent links are s till very strong in spite o f the rivers o f blood 
between them ; 8) the economic reconstruction o f the successor states 
which, perhaps w ith  the exception o f Slovenia, have had th e ir economies 
very seriously damaged i f  not, in some cases, even destroyed. Special pro- 
grams o f assistance w ith  the participation o f the in ternational com m unity 
w ill have to  be implemented; 9) the d ifficu lt problem  o f refugees, the spe - 
cial programs needed fo r resettling these most unhappy persons; 10) the 
same, perhaps even more explosive, problem o f the m inorities in the area, a 
problem  which has already added to  the instab ility both w ith in  the conflict 
zone as w ell as at its periphery.
On the occasion o f the In ternationa l Conference on “ B u ild ing  a 
New Future in  the Balkans”  (Sofia, 21-23 October 1994), the president o f 
the Assembly o f Deputies o f the Romanian Parliam ent, Adrian Nastase, 
said:
W ithin the peace process, it is necessary to involve more the neighboring 
countries o f the former Yugoslavia. On the one hand, these countries 
could act as an incentive in the process o f rebuilding the confidence 
among the newly emerged states in the former Yugoslavia and on the 
other, they coula offer guarantees regarding the inviolability o f the for- 
mer external borders.
Romania as a central European country, as a Balkan state, may 
become an important center o f stability in the area. We have no territo- 
rial interest either in the Balkan region or elsewhere, and at the same 
time, we foster very good traditional relationships w ith all the Balkan 
countries. Despite the difficulties we are facing, Romania has had a 
constant and ascending development in the process o f transition towards 
a market economy ana democracy. We possess a significant economic 
and m ilitary potential, we hold an important geostrategic position and, 
first and foremost, we strongly wish to take part in the settlement o f the 
conflict by diplomatic means.
The good relationships which we foster with other Balkan coun- 
tries could enable us, as it also did in the period between the two world 
wars, to curdle the others’ efforts in order to establish stability and secu- 
rity  in the Balkans.
A t the end o f his speech, President Adrian Nastase suggested a 
Balkan Interparliam entary Conference in Bucharest.
Considering the good relations Romania has w ith  Albania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Turkey on the one hand, and w ith  a ll the o ther new Balkan 
states on the other hand, efforts should be enhanced towards producing 
stab ility  and prosperity in the area.
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Future Plans fo r Cooperation
Yet one cannot jus t w ait and see un til the end o f the co n flic t to  
th ink  about fu ture  cooperation. I t  is im perative to  be prepared fo r the 
happy “ day after.”  Political fu ture and more practical matters have to  be 
taken in to  account.
C oncerning telecom m unications, railroads, rive r and m aritim e 
navigation, the Danubian vector is ready to  play its im portant ro le in  the 
area, i.e., to  lin k  the Black Sea to  the N orth Sea.
I t  is needless to  insist on the necessity o f solving the problem s 
caused by the em bou te illage  at, fo r example, at G iurgiu-R use on the 
Romanian-Bulgarian border, because o f tra ffic  restrictions across form er 
Yugoslavia. Projects fo r one or even two other bridges across the Danube 
are to be implemented.
Energy
Pipelines fo r gas and o il, new electric power connections between 
the Balkan States ana between them and the rest o f central and western 
Europe are o f stringent necessity.
C ulture and re lig ion
The famous Balkanic cu ltura l and religious puzzle existed, exists, 
and w ill exist in  spite o f any other w ill.
The m u ltic u ltu ra l and m u ltire lig io u s  in te g ra tio n  w h ich  the 
European Union is “en tra in  de faire”  is fo r the Balkans an o ld story w ith  
bad but also, and mostly, good aspects. Many other problem s could be 
added among which environment, fo r example, would not be the last one.
The Black Sea Economic Zone
Economic cooperation w ith in  the Black Sea Zone should be taken 
in to  account, especially since exchanges are to  take place anyway, w ith  o r 
w ithout our approval. I t  would most certainly be better to  benefit from  an 
institutionalized formula o f them rather than o f a chaotic one. The general 
secretariat in  Istanbul, the Agreem ent fo r im plem enting the Bank fo r 
Commerce and Developm ent in  Thessaloniki, the In te rparliam en ta ry 
Assembly even w ithout Bulgarian and Greek partic ipation are useful and 
necessary steps in  th is d irection. I t  is to  be expected that the Second 
Summit in  Bucharest at the end o f July w ill add to  the developm ent o f 
in s titu tio n a li za tio n .
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Q uoting  my d istinguished colleague, D r. L iv iu  M uresan, a 
governmental expert, I  w ould add Romania’s six strategic axes fo r devel- 
opment:
1) The Rhin— M ain— Danube Canal ending in  Constanta (the main 
harbor o f the Black Sea and eventually, in  the near fu ture, the second o f 
Europe, opened on 25 September 1992), waits to  prove its enormous u tility .
2) From  north to  south, from the Baltic States and Poland to  the 
Black Sea and the Rhin— Main— Danube Canal.
3) South Russia— Ukraine— Dobroudja focusing also on Constanta.
4) The Central Asian Republics through the Caucasus to  the Black 
Sea. I t  should be mentioned that during the Crans-Montana Forum  in 
A p ril 1994 in  Bucharest, six leaders from  the C entra l Asian Republics 
referred to  Romania as “ the firs t Western European country”  on th e ir way 
towards Europe.
5) The M iddle-East— Europe Axis, through Romania.
6) The Japan— China— Suez Cannai— Black Sea axis. For 30 years 
Rotterdam  and Ham burg harbors were the main European gates fo r 
Japanese goods. Later the choice was Trieste. Follow ing the crisis in  fo r- 
mer Yugoslavia, Japan made its final option for the Black Sea and Constanta. 
Needless to  say, it  is a known fact that China regards Romania as its best 
trad itiona l partner in central Europe.
A ll these possibilities, and we have mentioned only a few o f them, 
do not belong to  Romania, but to  all Balkan and Black Sea area peoples, and 
must be used to  th e ir common benefit.
A Step-by-Step Approach
Attacking these targets step by step could not only make them be- 
come true but it  could also create more solid, reliable, human, regional and 
states relations.
B u ild ing  a new house requires not only com m itm ent and hard 
work but also a little  help from your friends. The Balkan and the Black Sea 
areas need financial support and also openness on the part o f the developed 
countries fo r possible tu ll integration in to  th e ir comm unity.
Strengthening democracy and a free m arket economy w ould not 
only bring in to  this area Western Europe’s stab ility and prosperity but also 
close the gate to  the new forms o f totalitarianism  be they Euro-Asiatic or 
Fundam entalist-Islam ic.
Europe: The Only Future
A t the end o f these remarks, one m ight observe that, in fact, the 
Balkan and Black Sea area’s problems ought to b e  regarded on a larger scale. 
L ike  the other countries o f the region, Romania sees its fu ture  inside
The Six Axes
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Europe. L ike the others, Romania has, as early as the beginning o f its 
modern h isto iy, adopted the European model fo r its po litica l system, fo r its 
institutions, fo r its legislation. Like Bulgaria, Romania is now an associate 
member o f the European Union and o f tne Western European Union. One 
day it  w ill be a fu ll member o f the European U nion ana o f the W estern 
European Union, like Greece, and o f NATO, like Greece and Turkey.
Instead o f the much talked about clash o f civilizations, instead o f 
the false dichotom y, Catholicism -Orthodoxy, instead o f the great fear o f 
G hristian-M uslim  incom patib ility , instead o f endless east-west problem s, 
e fforts should be concentrated towards closer cooperation, towards con- 
structive cooperation w ith  fu ll respect o f each one's specificities, towards 
bu ild ing the Europe o f our dreams. This Europe, which in the century to  
come, when its population w ill barely represent 5% o f the w orld  popula- 
tion, w ill have to  face enough challenges posed by north-south disparities.
The Balkans should cease to  see themselves as a European ap- 
pendix. Enough that others say that, in  fact, Europe is jus t an Asian ap- 
pendix. I t  is our common duty to  envisage future cooperation w ith  the aim 
o f making a decisive step towards European integration. There are good 
reasons to  hope this is possible. From the historic po in t o f view, a long- 
standing trad itio n  o f cooperation, understanding, the m elting pot o f cu i- 
tures, civilizations, and religions witness not just confrontation, as w rongly 
seen from  outside. The lesson to  be leam t from the past is the need fo r ш - 
rect contacts between the parties d irectly involved in  d iffe ren t problems or 
conflicts.
The harm onization o f po litica l views being obviously necessary, 
there is also a need to  regulate the chaotic development o f economic re la- 
tions in  the area and to prove to  ourselves and to  the rest o f Europe our ca- 
pacity to  do so. Communications, energy, culture, relig ion, and the Black 
Sea Zone’s problems are pressing fo r common and firm  solutions. A step- 
by-step approach m ight be the answer. Constructive cooperation w ith  fu ll 
respect o f each country's specificities m ight pave the way to  the Europe o f 
our dreams.
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1) Romania was the firs t state to recognize the independence o f the 
second Romanian state;
2) Transports o f books, medicine and exchange o f scholars, profes- 
sors, and priests immediately started to  be organized;
3) Many Romanian individuals con tribu te  o f th e ir own w ill to  
these actions in  various ways;
4) In  1993, Romania offered 20 m illion  le i’s w orth o f fuel quantity 
fo r the agricultural programs o f the Republic o f Moldova;
5) One m illion  le i’s w orth o f aid fo llow ing the floods in  summer
1994 was offered;
6) A special additional budget was allows in  1993 by the Romanian 
parliam ent to  the Romanian government, w orth 6 m illio n  le i, in  o rder to 
finance p rio rita ry projects o f assistance fo r the Republic o f Moldova;
7) The International Committees regularly meet to  discuss and 
propose common plans. In  July 1994, eleven Romanian m inisters met w ith  
practically the whole government o f the Republic o f Moldova.
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Transition  Europe, o f course, embraces a ll the form er socialist 
countries from  A lbania o r Czechia in  the west to  the fo rm er Soviet 
Republics in  central Asia. Conflicts, com petition, and attempts at reestab- 
lishing cooperation can be observed all over that region, and just one article 
could not suffice to  deal w ith  a ll the d iffe ren t conflicts and cooperation 
ideas that have come up in recent times, e ither s till existing o r having dis- 
appeared. Since at th is conference we are dealing only w ith  southeastern 
Europe, I  w ill restrict my remarks to this area, to analyze economic conse - 
quences and effects, in  particu lar due to the ongoing con flic t in  the te rri- 
to ry o f form er Yugoslavia. But, o f course, occasionally I  w ill also allow my- 
se lf to  m ention sim ilar developments in other parts o f the region which 
fo rm erly embraced the C M E A  countries or member countries o f the 
Warsaw Pact.
In  order to  achieve some kind o f structured discussion o f the topic, 
firs t I  w ould like  to  distinguish between bellicose and non-bellicose con- 
flic ts, whereby in the form er case I  w ill furtherm ore distinguish between 
d irect impacts o f bellicose conflicts on the respective w arring parties and 
ind irect impacts on neighboring countries. Compared w ith  the part o f this 
article  w hich deals w ith  the economic consequences o f conflicts, the part 
which is supposed to  deal w ith  com petition and cooperation must unavoid- 
ably become substantially smaller since, as an outcome o f the conflict situa- 
tion in  the Balkans, real com petition or even cooperation have not so far 
had chances to  develop. A ll I  w ill try  to address nere w ill be com petition 
in a rather narrow, specific sense, plus the notion o f possible regional coop- 
e ration.
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The Economic Dimensions o f Bellicose Conflicts 
Direct Impacts of the War in Former Yugoslavia
C ertainly Bosnia-Herzegovina was most affected by d irect war dam* 
ages. Its  population has shrunk by one th ird  since 1992 when the total 
num ber o f inhabitants was approximately 4.4 m illion. In  August 1994 only 
2.9 m illion  lived in  the war destroyed republic o f D /II o f which according 
to  a demographic study 1.2 m illion were Muslims, 892,000 Serbs, 511,000 
Croats, ana about 1230,000 members o f other nationalities.1 More than
1.3 m illion  people became refugees and live abroad. This num ber in  the 
meantime has increased, and UNHCR now (beginning o f 1996) speaks o f 
some 2 m illio n  refugees tha t have to  be repatriated in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, o f which h a lf a m illion  are so-called domestic refugees. Out 
o f approximately 275,000 dead about 50% are Muslims, 35% Serbs and 
10% Croats. In  spring 1995, 79% o f the 2.9 m illion remaining inhabitants 
lived in  governm ent2 controlled territories, the rest in those parts o f the 
republic held by the Serbs, which represented roughly 70% o f the te rrito ry  
o f Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Since by far most o f the war happened on form er M uslim  dom i- 
nated te rrito ry , the economy o f the internationally recognized Republic o f 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is also h it most, estimates anyhow set the s till fune- 
tion ing  capacities o f those industria l plants that are s till on government 
controlled soil at best at about 25% o f the ir prewar level, but it  is not com - 
pletely clear how th is compares w ith  form er all-Bosnian industria l perfor- 
mance. In  February 1996 the Bosnian Press Agency reported that the 
Federation had 650,000 unemployed and only 210,000 persons “ taking part 
in  production.” 3 Estimates on how much capital is needed fo r reconstruc- 
tion  o f В/H  range from U.S.$6 b illion  as immediate help to  U.S.$60-80 b il- 
lion  fo r complete reconstruction. The la tter sum becomes plausible i f  one 
considers the dimension o f destruction in the countiy (В/H ). The Sarajevo 
government recently published figures o f 673 villages, 917 mosques, 275 
catholic and 34 orthodox churches completely destroyed. For its part, the 
EU also in February said that the reconstruction e ffo rt in  Bosnia is th rea t- 
ened by donors’ fa ilure to  deliver on th e ir pledges o f aid. A lthough more 
than U.S.$700 m illion  was promised fo r reconstruction work in the firs t 
three month o f 1996, only U.S.$62.5 m illion  has arrived so far coming ex - 
clusively from the EU . Meanwhile, U.S. president C linton said he would 
ask Congress fo r U.S.$820 m illion  fo r Bosnia.
There is no question that Serbia-Montenegro o r Rump-Yugoslavia 
must be regarded as the major participant in  this war although no warring 
actions in fact took place on the te rrito ry o f Serbia proper o r o f Montenegro. 
But the Bosnian Serb population never would have started the Bosnian war 
had not Belgrade, i.e. M iloševič (referring to  the fatal memorandum o f the 
Serb Academy o f Sciences), invented ana advocated the idea o f reun ifica- 
tion  o f all Serbs in  one state, and then even more supported strongly the 
self-proclaim ed Republica Sipska by constant deliveries o f heavy m ilita ry
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equipm ent. A lthough MiloSevič now tries to  present h im self as the dom i- 
nant peacekeeping personality, one must not overlook the form er d irect in - 
volvement o f Serbia proper, so that impacts o f the Bosnian war on the econ- 
omy o f Serbia-Montenegro can certainly be seen as d irect outcomes o r re- 
suits, although o f course no direct war damages can be found e ither on the 
te rrito ry  o f Serbia or o f that o f Montenegro.
According to  the Serb m inister o f industry, Fodor, the Serb indus - 
try  today only works at 30-40% o f the 1989 level. This is not only a result 
o f the sanctions imposed on Serbia on 31 May 1992, because already earlier 
the breakup o f the Yugoslav domestic market, which covered about 30% o f 
the GDP o f Serbia/Montenegro and the loss o f the form er lucrative markets 
in Eastern Europe (another 20% o f CDP) as w ell as economic wrong deci- 
sions and structural developments had oppressed industria l production in  
Serbia and triggered an in fla tion  which in January o f 1994 peaked at a 
m onthly rate 0F300 m illion percent.4 The to ta l number o f 2.1 m illion  em - 
ployed (agriculture and private sector not included) is m isleading because 
several hundreds o f thousands in fact are enforced holidays due to  the 
regulation tha t an enterprise which is in  d ifficu ltie s  resulting from  the 
sanctions must not be closed nor is it  allowed to  dismiss its workers. 
Approxim ately 1.5 m illion  people are employed, h a lf o ffic ia lly  and h a lf il-  
legally, in  the private sector. Compared to  th is 3.7 m illion  w orking popu- 
lation Serbia has to deal w ith  2.2-2.3 m illion  recipients o f social support 
(770,000 unemployed and 1.3 m illion  pensioners) plus more than 700,000 
refugees who must be nourished from the scarce production. I t  goes w ith - 
out saying that an immense capital fligh t also occurred, and desperately 
needed foreign direct investment is zero. According to  the m inister o f ed- 
ucation, Radulovic, the economic shortcomings amounted to  some U.S.$45 
b illio n  since 1991,5 other sources quote U.S.$35-40 b illio n  which is about 
four tim es o f the annual GNP.® Some 300,000 w ell trained young people 
were exiled, a brain drain which must and w ill have its negative im pact in  
fu ll scale only when the tim e o f reconstruction comes. A t the same tim e it  
is estimated that some 100,000-300,000 young men are h id ing against con- 
scription in  Serbia. The country is able to  survive only because it  has a suf- 
fic ien tly large agricultural production, great resources o f raw materials, and 
trade relations that s till function due to  large-scale violations o f the sane- 
tions.
In  particular the la tter became indispensable fo r the Serb economy. 
I t  is estimated that some 50,000 people per day are crossing the borders to  
Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, and Romania purchasing merchandise 
w orth U.S.$3 m illio n .7 Taking in to account that in 1993/94 the average 
m onthly income was not higher than U.S.$10-15, a tr ip  to  neighboring 
Hungary o r Romania could be already profitable i f  only the gasoline tank 
was Filled w ith  petrol paying U.S.$1 per lite r and selling it  back in  Serbia 
for two! O f course, such petrol trade also occurred in greater quantities 
providing p ro fits  o f up to U.S.$36,000 per gasoline truck. The estim ated 
p ro fit resulting from smuggling one truckload o f cigarettes is about h a lf o f 
what gasoline brings. I t  seems as i f  the Serbs do not have too great a d iff i-  
cu lty com ing up w ith  the hard currency necessary fo r these im ports.
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Exports o f food and textiles, in  particu lar to Macedonia, from  where those 
goods are re-exported even to  EU countries, provide enough hard currency 
incomes to  cover the necessary imports.
The private black or secondary economy had to be extended just for 
pure survival purposes, and the Serb/M ontenegro state is only pa rtia lly  
try ing  to tighten controls. Even more, regime critics quote a new class o f 
state protected riches p ro fiting  from  war and sanctions and who thus are 
discrim inating against the principles o f market economy and helping to 
equate it  w ith  w ild  Manchester capitalism and organized crim e. I t  is ques- 
tionable whether this is the righ t education and tra in ing  fo r an adequate 
market o r private entrepreneurship behavior.
Croatia, which until fa ll 1995 was in a state o f war, exhibited a ll the 
special problems that such a situation causes, such as high shares o f 
aefense-related expenditures in  the state budget (33% ) and great re- 
luctance o f foreign investors. U n til recently 25% o f the country was de 
facto  occupied divid ing it  in to  a northern, main part o f w hich another the 
eastern part was also occupied, and a southern tie r along the Dalm atian 
coast which under normal, prewar conditions had provided a constant and 
high amount o f hard currency income from tourism  fo r the population and 
the state. The cu to ff o f the main tra ffic  connections between north and 
south o f the Croat te rrito ry  by the secessionist K ra jina Serbs brought 
tourism  to  an almost complete stop which by the way also h it the Krajina 
Serbs (P litvica) themselves very hard. An im portant side aspect already in 
socialist tim es was that much o f the Dalm atian to u ris t business was 
m iddle- and small-scale private entrepreneurship w hich now could not 
receive substance subsidies like state owned firm s. A high burden fo r the 
state budget is certainly the high num ber o f refugees (some 400,000) and o f 
pensioners (700,000) in  add ition to  the (o ffic ia lly  registered) 244,000 
unemployed.8 Only one quarter o f the population is employed, but like in 
Serbia, so here black economy is greatly supporting survival. Extrem e 
endeavors are now needed fo r reconstructing the heavily destroyed 
in frastructure. Croatia claims to ta l war damages o f U.S.$18-23 b illio n  
which is more than a one year CNP (U.S.$16 b illio n ).9 Estimates are that 
25% o f industria l capacity and 25% o f the a g ricu ltu ra l land were 
destroyed.10 Due to the war conditions and insecure expectations, foreign 
d irect investment remained very low although in  princip le  Croatia should 
be an interesting place to  invest, pa rticu la rly  in  services (tourism ) and 
m anufacturing. In  to ta l, however, some U.S.$320 m illio n  have been 
invested in Croat privatized enterprises between 1991 and 1995 despite the 
war situation,11 and the firs t foreign private cred it o f U.S.$35 m illio n  fo r 
the tourist sector has been launched recently by Österreichische Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank.
Direct Impacts of the Yugoslav War on the Neighbors
One can take two examples o f neighbors, one direct, Bulgaria, and 
one which does not have common borders w ith  the te rrito ry  o f form er
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Yugoslavia, Ukraine.
Bulgaria already calculated that the embargoes against Iraq  and 
Libya had cost the country some U.S.$2.5 b illion. Now as a direct neighbor 
o f Serbia/M ontenegro, Bulgaria had, like  other countries, (H ungary or 
Romania), d irect responsibility fo r the strict enforcement o f the UN em- 
bargo. Estimates on the losses o f Bulgaria from the embargo oscillate be- 
tween U.S.$1.4 b illio n 12 and more than U.S.$3 b illio n .13 Tnese losses are 
caused on the one hand by the complete in terruption o f trade w ith  Rump- 
Yugoslavia w hich equals to  a yearly loss o f U.S.$480 m illion , but what 
counts even more are the enormous costs which the transport deviations 
en ta il: 60% o f a ll merchandise w hich Bulgaria traded w ith  W estern 
Europe was conveyed via the embargo region. Hardest h it are industry, 
the international tra ffic , tourism and energy as well as agriculture. Due to 
the com plicated transport situation investment risks increased, and F D Is 
fe ll considerably.14
Like Bulgaria, Macedonia too is suffering heavily from the embargo 
it  is com m itted to  support. 80% o f its trade had form erly been perform ed 
w ith  the other form er republics o f the Federation, 60% w ith  Serbia alone. 
This already extrem ely d iffic u lt situation was fu rth e r aggravated when 
Greece imposed its unilateral embargo on Macedonia. I  w ill come back to 
th is issue a little  later. In te rrup ted  transit routes isolating the country a l- 
most com pletely have caused losses o f altogether at least U.S.$4 b illion  ac- 
cording to  a recent in terview  o f M in iste r o f Finance and Vice Prem ier 
Zuta. 1̂
Ukraine is an example o f a country non-bordering on the crisis re- 
gion. I t  too is claim ing huge losses from the embargo amounting to  an al- 
leged to ta l o f U.S.$4 b illion  by the end o f 1994. The country is arguing that 
the heaviest losses were sustained by Ukraine’s inland water transportation 
enterprises, especially the Danube Steamship Line which has lost a ll its 
clients. Losses were also sustained by smelting plants oriented toward ex- 
porting th e ir products to  Austria.16
Negative impacts, o f course, can also be stated fo r the other coun- 
tries o f the region whether they were neighbors o f the crisis region o r not. 
For Greece as w ell as fo r Turkey the transportation route via Serbia was, 
and s till is, o f utmost importance since 40% o f Greece’s exports in  W estern 
Europe had been conveyed on the land route through form er Yugoslavia. 
O nly Hungary was perhaps able to  gain a little  b it from the embargo; the 
Buaapest a irpo rt registered a d istinct intensification o f fréquentation, be- 
cause it became the nearest gate to the rest o f the world fo r Belgrade.
The Economic Dimensions of Non-bellicose Conflicts 
The Impacts of Separation
The most striking example o f a large scale dissolution is the form er 
USSR. For the three Slavic successor states (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) 
the consequences o f disintegration seem to  be sim ilar to  those faced by all
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form er Soviet republics, and to  some extent they also seem to be character- 
is tic  o f those w ith  w hich the form er CM EA member states had to  deal. 
However, some very substantial differences certainly exist.
In  the form er USSR the slow progress o f stabilization, transforma- 
tio n  and state form ation led to  a chaotic vacuum in  which the republics 
have turned autarldcally inwards. As a consequence in tra  CIS trade which 
form erly was o f substantial importance for the participating republics col- 
lapsed. Some figures may underline this.
In  1990 Russia’s to ta l trade equaled 23% o f its CDP. Interstate im - 
ports covered 47% o f a ll im ports and exports to  the other republics ac- 
counted even fo r 70% o f a ll Russian exports. In  Ukraine foreign trade was 
equal to  one-th ird o f the CDP, and interstate imports and exports covered 
in  a very balanced way 70% o f the total foreign trade. The situation was or 
rather is now even worse fo r Belarus, where foreign trade made up 49% o f 
the GDP, and im ports from  the other republics covered 75% o f a ll imports, 
whereas on the export side even 90% o f a ll deliveries went to  the rest o f 
the Union. A lthough exact figures are not available for respective com par- 
isons, m ainly because prices underwent considerable changes, it  can be as- 
sumed that the rather low figures o f Russian trade decline which were o f - 
fic ia lly  given fo r the near abroad trade are certainly understating the real 
decline. This conclusion becomes evident when one looks at some index 
numbers fo r selected branches that were given in an interesting study by 
the Vienna In s titu te  fo r Comparative Economic Studies.17 There one can 
fin d  that Russian CIS exports/imports declined between 1989 and 1992 in 
crude o il by 43/42% respectively, in paper by 36/7%, in trucks by 47/48%, in 
tractors by 65/48%, and in  consumer goods by 55/79%.
A s im ila r p icture  can be drawn fo r Moldavia w hich before the 
breakup o f the Soviet em pire transacted 90% o f its foreign trade w ith  the 
rest o f the form er USSR. Now deliveries from other parts o f the form er 
USSR have become d iffic u lt and costly. Industria l production decreased 
between 1991 and 1992 by 28%, and agricultural production, o f which a 
large part has trad itiona lly been delivered to  the rest o f the Union, by 18%. 
The con flic t w ith  Transdniester caused additional damage since in 1991 the 
share o f this breakaway part o f Moldova was 36% in  industria l production 
(fo r some products even 100%), 87% in the production o f electrical energy 
and also 26% in  the production o f consumer goods. The breakaway part o f 
Moldova is now even requiring special taxes fo r the transport o f Moldovan 
merchandise through its te rrito ry  which lies like a belt between the rest o f 
Moldova and the CIS.
Disintegration plus Embargo: The Case of FYROM
Macedonia, o r co rrectly  s till called the Form er Yugoslav Republic o f 
Macedonia (FYROM ), has suffered fina lly from three components: d isin- 
tegration, UN-embargo against Serbia, and unilateral trade embargo from 
Greece.
Before the breakup o f form er Yugoslavia the economic ties o f
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Macedonia w ith  the other republics o f the Federation were extraord inarily  
intensive. More than 80% o f its foreign trade was w ith  the rest o f the 
Federation, 60% trade w ith Serbia alone. Thus, the embargo and the sane - 
tions h it Macedonia threefold: 1) through the cut o f 60% (trade w ith  
Serbia),2 ־) w ith  the other 20% (rest o f fo rm er Yugoslavia, m ainly w ar- 
in flic te d  Bosnia and Croatia); and 3) because again the main tra ffic  routes 
from  Macedonia to  the north and the west are crossing Serbia, cu tting  o ff 
the new republic almost completely, in  particu la r when fin a lly  Greece 
started its boycott and complete embargo against what it  called the Republic 
o f Skopje. The Greek trade embargo became so decisive because 
Thessaloniki in  fact had been the major sea port fo r Macedonia w ith  an easy 
tra ffic  connection through the Vardar valley.
An example may be the case o f o il imports. Before the embargo the
o il re fine ry  o f Skopje received 70% o f its raw m aterial deliveries via 
Thessaloniid. In  1993 this was roughly one m illio n  tons w orth  U.S.$125 
m illion. Transport costs fo r one ton o f o il soared by U.S.$50 due to  the fact 
that it  now had to  take the Bulgarian port o f Burgas as en try .18 One hun- 
dred trucks were commuting daily on w ind ing roads in  poor cond ition  
between Burgas and Skopje to secure the basic needs o f the Macedonian 
economy. But also the Greek contribution to  the supply w ith  o ther basic 
products, food included, had always made up some 40% o f Macedonian im - 
ports.
The utilization o f industrial capacities in  FYROM fe ll to  a level o f 
30-50% o f previous performance depending on the respective sectors, and 
it  is amazing that no total economic collapse occurred. I t  was obvious that
1995 was to  become the decisive year since every year Macedonia lost some 
U.S.$3 b illio n  in  exports due to the international embargo on Serbia and 
U.S.$15 m illion per day in  export revenues due to  the Greek blockade.19 A 
rigorous financial and monetary policy was im plem ented bring ing in  fact 
annual in fla tion down to 52% ana reducing the budget de fic it to  a figure o f 
3.5% o f GDP. As a result the rate o f exchange o f the Macedonian denar 
remained stable.
I t  could not be expected that greater amounts o f F D I w ould find  
th e ir way to  Macedonia under these very unfortunate circumstances. In  
early 1995 the country ranked only 150 among 167 countries concerning 
economic attractiveness.
I t  is, however, interesting that Greece too was ind irectly  suffering 
from the embargo it  had imposed on its northern neighbor. N ot only had 
Greece to reorient its own exports (in  1993 Greece exported merchandise 
w orth U.S.$300 m illion to  Macedonia), but also the Greek drachma came 
under pressure on the international markets a fter the embargo announce- 
ment. Furthermore, the Athens Central Bank had to  intervene w ith  some 
U.S.$100 m illion, a sum which is not so insign ificant fo r a small country 
like Greece.20
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Another example o f a non-bellicose conflict in the area is the recent 
dispute w ith  accompanying actions between Tirana and Athens. W ithout 
question this con flic t is detrim ental to  both. Albania is heavily dependent 
on the transmittences o f its 500,000 compatriots w orking abroad o f which 
some estimated 200,000-300,000 try  to  make th e ir liv ing  in  Greece. These 
transmittences enable the Albanian population to  live above th e ir own pro- 
duction capacity and are covering the constant hard currency d e fic it in  
A lbania’s cu rren t account. On the other hand, Greek agricu ltu re  needs 
cheap labor, and farmers are certainly against a complete expulsion o f the 
illega lly w orking Albanians. In  addition, Greek industry is very much in- 
terested in  in tensify ing contacts w ith  the Albanian economy, and disre- 
garding the po litica l tensions; in fact some Greek F D I can already be found 
in  A lbania. In  princip le  it  should not be too d iffic u lt to  come to  an 
agreement where both sides acknowledge some basic demands by the other 
side. Albania should give in  w ith  regard to  th e ir Greek m inority and allow, 
fo r example, school education in  the Greek language where a su ffic ien t 
number o f Greek students exists, and Greece could veiy easily legalize the 
stay o f up to  300,000 Albanians whom the Greek economy needs anyhow.
Some Reflections on the Economic Dimensions o f Com petition
I f  one lim its  this issue to  the Balkans only, it  im m ediately becomes 
obvious that the question o f com petition is too prem ature to  be really o f 
importance. Asking where and w ith  whom the above mentioned troubled 
countries can compete, one can only see one direction, the EU markets. So 
far, however, only Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia (as one o f the successor 
countries o f form er Yugoslavia) are objects in the discussion on future EU 
membership. Albania has just entered negotiations about a possible associ- 
ation treaty, but like other countries in the area, which are successor coun - 
tries o f form er Yugoslavia, it is economically so weak that one cannot speak 
in  terms o f com petition but rather in terms o f development aid. O f course, 
some com petition can arise from the fact that these countries cannot o ffe r 
other products besides some raw materials o r food products, and insofar 
they w ill become competitors on the neighboring, western markets, in  par- 
ticu la r w ith  the southern member states o f the EU and also w ith  some o f 
the already associated countries o f the form er Elast. But one must realisti- 
cally see tha t already now even these associated countries have quite sub- 
stantial problem s w ith  marketing th e ir products. The EU cannot as yet 
open com pletely its so-called sensitive markets (agricultural products, tex- 
tiles and steel) due m ainly to the understandable resistance from  the E U - 
countries o f the southern tie r.
That means that chances are rather slim  fo r the latecomers to  com- 
pete w ith  these more o r less easy products on the only larger market which 
is o f v ita l interest to  them , the EU. Even more problem atic is certa in ly 
com petition  w ith  industria l products, because here too the already
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EU*associated countries are try ing  hard. Some o f them , bu t not the 
southeastern European ones (Bulgaria and FD Is are a condition-sine-qua- 
non fo r rapid modernization as long as domestic saving is extrem ely small 
and thus investment capital is not sufficiently available. As a consequence, 
the firs t real com petition in the immediate future w ill be fo r F D I.
Chances and Perspectives o f Regional Cooperation
Regional cooperation in southeastern Europe has never played an 
im portant role. Even during CM EA times the so-called socialist coopera- 
tion  and division o f labor was mainly b ila tera lly oriented, i.e., not like  a 
spider web but rather like a wheel w ith  a ll spokes leading to  the hub in  
Moscow, on the one side, w hile on the other one could also find  a single 
partner, Poland o r Bulgaria or one o f the other partners. In tra -Balkan trade 
made up jus t some 5% o f the total foreign trade o f the Balkan countries in 
the 1980s. The very last attem pt o f a series o f Balkan cooperation confer- 
ences was then interrupted by the events o f 1989/90.
However, there are s till some more o r less prom ising cooperation 
groupings which w ill be presented here briefly.
Central European Initiative
The firs t serious attem pt derived from the w orking group A lps- 
A driatic (1978), which existed only on a province level between bordering 
provinces in  Austria, Hungary, Ita ly  and Yugoslavia. I t  was la te r, in  
November 1989, lifte d  to  state level and renamed The In itia tive  o f Four 
(countries). W hen Czechoslovakia jo ined in  May 1990, the name was 
changed in to  Pentagonale, and had to  be changed again in to  Hexagonale 
when Poland became a member in July 1991. On 1 December 1991, the 
meeting o f the foreign m inisters in Venice took place fo r the firs t tim e  
w ithout the Yugoslav representative (so one could have spoken again o f a 
Pentagonale), but at the same meeting quick acceptance in to  the group o f 
Slovenia and Croatia, which had already declared themselves independent 
states, should have changed the name to  Heptagonale, w hich w ould have 
been appropriate. However, the general understanding was that too often a 
change o f the name due to  the alternating number o f members w ould be 
rather annoying. Therefore, a new denomination was sought and found, 
Central European In itia tive  (C E I).
This regional cooperative group established several w orking fields: 
transport and tra ffic , environmental protection, inform ation, telecom m uni- 
cations, prom otion o f small and medium size firm s, cu lture and tourism , 
scientific and technical cooperation, energy and m igration. In  some fields 
substantial work has already been in itiated, particu larly in  transport con- 
cepts, energy (pipelines) o r environment, but many o f the projects ju s t be - 
ginning haa to  be put on ice due to the outbreak o f the Yugoslav war. 
Therefore, today the lis t o f cooperative fields looks rather comprehensive, 
but there are not too many actual activities because among other problems,
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the financing o f common activities s till seems to  be extremely complicated.
But, anyhow, the relevance o f th is in itia tive , w hich o rig ina lly  was 
launched by Ita ly , decreased substantially due to  po litica l developments in 
Europe. U n til the late 1980s the East-W est aivide needed the in te r- 
regional dispute as a b ridg ing  instrum ent, today also fo r the fo rm er 
Eastern countries the main po in t o f orientation is Brussels, w hich brings 
us to  the fact tha t larger interregional projects in energy o r tra ffic  are no 
longer discussed on the level o f the C E I. This and the already mentioned 
financial problems have led to  the establishment o f a Permanent Secretariat 
fo r P rojects o f the C E I at the London based European Bank fo r 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Today the Central European In itia tive  has already ten members. In  
addition to  the founding members, Austria, Hungary ana Ita ly , we also fin d  
such d iffe ren t partners like Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(since July 1992) and FYROM (since July 1993). The Czech and the Slovak 
Republics were adm itted ind ividually as members in  January 1993 after 
having been one single member before. A t the Trieste sum m it meeting o f 
July 1994, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine participated fo r the firs t 
tim e as associated members. A t the tim e, the fu ll members d id  not fo llow  
the proposal o f Czech prim e m inister Y. Klaus to  change the status o f the 
la tte r (associated members) in to  fu ll membership in  the near future. One 
can speculate whether this proposal was a tricky attem pt to  d ilu te  the whole 
issue o f regional cooperation rather than to  foster it, i f  one remembers the 
otherw ise clear anti-position o f Klaus in  sim ilar discussions. However, at 
the same m eeting at least accord was reached to  establish a Free Trade 
Zone in  th is region as soon as possible.
This had already happened, although w ith  a d istinctly smaller num - 
ber o f countries, in the framework o f C EFTA which was in itia te d  by the 
ViSegrád Four (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and was enlarged 
to  a group o f Five by accepting Slovenia as fu ll member in  the beginning o f
1996.
Black Sea Economic Cooperation
The necessity o f regional cooperation seems to  be obvious w hich 
explains the existence o f some more interest groupings in  the region o f 
m iddle and southern Europe, like the Danube Cooperation, a loose collab- 
oration o f countries along the river Danube in  some fields o f common in - 
terest (tra ffic , tourism , environm ental and water protection, etc.) o r the 
Carpathian Region Cooperation. On a more comprehensive scale, however, 
only the idea o f intensified cooperation o f the Black Sea Shore C ountries 
m ight have some chance to  develop.
W hen in  1990 the European Com m unity had practica lly tu rned  
down Turkey’s application fo r fu ll membership, the la tte r summoned a 
m eeting o f the deputy foreign ministers o f Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and 
the (then s till) Soviet Union at Ankara in  order to  propose in tensified co- 
operation among countries o f the Black Sea region. A num ber o f
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declarations were announced, particu larly the July 1991 D eclaration o f 
Moscow on Economic Cooperation which aimed at free exchange o f goods, 
capital and services. Already Greece and (the form er) Yugoslavia, although 
not being Black Sea countries in  the geographical sense, partic ipated as 
observers. The signing o f this document had to  be postponed several times 
because ha lf a year later (end o f 1991) this group no longer had fou r bu t six 
(fo rm er USSR republics) plus three, i.e., seven members, where among 
some o f which (Arm enia and Azerbaidshan: Russia and Ukraine) serious, 
even bellicose, conflicts had emerged. Nevertheless when at the end o f 
July 1992 th is document was signed in  Istanbul, A lbania had also already 
jo ined  the club. One can only conclude tha t the w hole in te n tio na l 
declaration must be understood as very superficial in  order to  get approval 
by all. In  December 1992 Poland too applied fo r the status o f observer.
In  fact, the eighteen-paragraph document is very general. The only 
specific aspect is the stress on the intended m ultilateralism  fo r fu ture  eco- 
nomie cooperation. The text often makes reference to  the CSCE process, 
the Charta o f H elsinki and the Charta o f Paris underlin ing that it  is sup- 
posed to  be a model o f cooperation that should have its place in  the new 
European architecture to  which it  should also contribute. I t  should not be 
seen as a substitute fo r the rapprochement to  and the la te r fu ll inclusion 
in to  Europe, but as a regional instrument fo r the European idea.
The Black Sea Cooperation (BSC) has two institu tionalized organs, 
the C ouncil o f Foreign M inisters w hich meets once a year, and a 
Parliamentary Assembly. But it has neither a seat (headquarters) nor a sec- 
retarial. Since the ratification o f the Basic Declaration some activities fo l - 
lowed tha t m ight indicate the potential, but the im plem entation and real- 
ization o f practically a ll programs stagnate. O f course one finds a ll the 
imaginable areas o f possible cooperation i f  one reads the lis t o f pre ferentia l 
sectors: finances and banking, transport and tra ffic , com m unication, 
tourism , exchange o f statistics, science and technology, environm ental 
protection. But even the establishment o f a Black Sea Foreign Trade and 
Investm ent Bank, concluded at the meeting o f the fo re ign m inisters in  
Sofia in December 1993, has not been realized u n til today, although a ll de- 
ta ils were settled: seat in  Thessaloniki, capita l d is trib u tio n  (Greece, 
Turkey and Russia each 16.5%; Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine each 13.5%; 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaidshan, Georgia and Moldova each 2%), and board 
o f directors (Turkish president and a Bulgarian vice-president).
The only more prom ising event in BSC activities in  recent tim es 
was a m eeting held on C halkid iki (Greece) at the end o f May 1994 when 
representatives o f the EU, o f the BSC, and o f the five republics o f central 
Asia trie d  to  launch concrete cooperation between the EU and the BSC in 
the fie ld  o f energy (New Energy Realities in  the Black Sea Region). This 
only indicates that BSC needs a push from outside in  order to  move ahead, 
at least as long as its institu tional framework is so weakly formed.
However, it  must be mentioned that at least business itse lf seems to  
become more aware o f the crucial necessity o f the regional cooperation in  
practice. In  early February 1995, the Greek Am erican C ham ber o f 
Commerce and the Association o f N orthern Greek Industries he ld  a
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conference devoted specifically to  entrepreneuria l cooperation in  the 
Balkans. D uring the conference an Inter-Balkan Council o f Entrepreneurs 
was form ed w hich w ould examine chances fo r cooperation in  trade, 
industria l production and construction. Furtherm ore an E ntrepreneuria l 
C enter fo r the Balkan and the Black Sea was founded, and fo r the firs t 
tim e, the Preparation Committee fo r the Black Sea Bank met. I t  is o f some 
in terest that not least the Russians seem to  be interested in  economic 
cooperation in  the Balkans. A fte r having established a Greek-Russian 
Chamber o f Trade and Industry, an intensification o f the economic (and to  
some extent also po litica l) axis Athens-Sofia-Belgrade-Moscow is again on 
the agenda. This should, however, not disquiet Western Europe but rather 
be viewed as one more necessary attem pt at self-aid fo r the troubled region.
To sum up, regional cooperation in  southeastern Europe is due to  
the unfortunate po litica l disparities and trouble spots in  the region, s till 
more w ishful th inking  than reality. But it  could and should be an area 
where western institutions and organizations could exert very he lp fu l as- 
sistance through targeted financial and expertise support. W hen the 
Economic Commission for Europe o f the UN called fo r a coordinated a ll - 
European support program, the fostering o f regional cooperation could very 
w ell be understooa as one core issue.
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Economic Transformation in 
Southeastern Europe Slows Down— 
The Gap to the Vishegrad Group Deepens*
Ognian Hishow
In  the com m unist era countries w ith  d iffe re n t h isto rica l back- 
grounds, economic development levels and specific industria l and agrarian 
structures were compelled to  unify in a m onolith ic po litica l and economic 
bloc— the Comecon. Despite huge efforts undertaken by the centralized 
planning system to  enhance the level o f the backward socialist system 
members, at the end o f the eighties there occurred s ign ificant qua lita tive  
and quan tita tive  differences between the o ld  in d u s tria lize d  cen tra l 
European members and the most agrarian southeast European economies 
and societies. Yet these differences have been veiled by the planning sys- 
tem, which stim ulated a faster industrialization o f the la tte r countries, es- 
pecially Romania and Bulgaria. Thus statistics seemed to  prove the superi- 
o rity  o f the Comecon over the West concerning growth ratios as w ell as ris- 
ing the nations standard o f living.
This situation changed radically a fter the demise o f communism. 
East European economy suddenly faced the cold w ind  o f in te rna tiona l 
com petition and has been challenged to  adjust as qu ick ly  as possible. 
Better prepared seem to  be the central Europeans. Among th e ir group, to  
w hich we cou ld  include Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, the la tte r seems to  have coped w ith  the system and economic 
transform ation best. Despite it's  considerably earlier start o f cautious eco- 
nomie reforms, Hungary, which had been the economy w ith  the most m ar- 
ket elements during the late socialist era, appears now less trusted in  the 
market powers than it's  Czech neighbors. This is also valid fo r Poland— a 
country which has made great efforts to get rid  o f soviet communism but 
whose less e ffic ien t economic structures are a heavy obstacle to  a sw ift 
transform ation.
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D uring the last Comecon decade Bulgaria showed a h igher national 
income per capita than Poland,1 whereas Romania was somewhat behind. 
Since 1990 Bulgaria and Romania have launched a comprehensive trans- 
form ation, but the pace o f changes appear to  be slower than in  East Central 
Europe. Thus the country-ranking sh ifted— Bulgaria fe ll behind Poland, 
and Romania again occupies the last place among the east Europeans. As a 
result o f the tim id  reforms, o f deep conservatism and fo r trad itiona l rea- 
sons a yawning gap between the western-catholic and Byzantine-orthodox 
members o f the form er CM EA is threatening to  become permanent. 
Rising doubts by the Bulgarians and Romanians as to  whether they can rely 
on the support o f the West have been am plified psychologically by respec- 
tive  statements o f Western politicians, such as that o f NATO ’s secretary- 
general W illi Claes. Claes is not sure the members o f the Byzantine w orld  
are able to  acquire the democratic qualities that are a prerequisite fo r gen - 
uine changes.2 W hether this doubt is reasonable cannot be answered yet. 
Besides the Byzantine world is bigger, th is article emphasizes the results 
obtained by the southeast and east European partners who have association 
agreements w ith  the EU according to  the assumption that th e ir chances to 
jo in  the Western structures are more favorable. These countries have been 
u n til now Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. I t  places special emphasis on the reform  efforts in both Romania 
and Bulgaria as representatives o f the southeast Europeans. Nonetheless, 
it  considers also the transformation achievements o f other countries in the 
region.
GDP-Growth
The starting positions o f the form er small soviet bloc countries 
were d ifferent. According to  the unequal transformation pace up to  now a 
fu rth e r diversification can be expected.
W hile Poland’s economy has grown fo r at least three years, the 
Czech’s and Hungaiy’s have on average shrunk slightly, and the decline in 
Bulgaria’s and Romania’s production has been severe (C hart 1). The 
somewhat larger yearly CDP shrinking in Slovakia in comparison w ith  the 
Czech Republic can be explained by the division o f the form er federal 
state, by unfavorable heavy industrial structures, and by economic policies 
o f more gradualism. D istortions as w ell as ine ffic ien t branch- and firm - 
structures in  Romania and Bulgaria are also responsible fo r the current 
d ifficu lties in  the transformation. In  the past a core o f the economic policy 
in  these countries has been the developm ent o f basic m anufacturing 
branches. They employ a big share o f the labor power and demand huge 
quantities o f raw materials, energy and infrastructure resources. Now they 
have become the most im portant receivers o f state subsidies and credits— at 
the expense o f o ther possible productions and companies w ith  be tte r
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TABLE 1
GDP per Capita 1994 and GDP Growth Rate 1991-1995
GDP Growth Rate
C ountry GDP/capita, $ 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995*
Bulgaria 1.210 -9.1 -11.7 -15.0 -4.2 -1.0 0.0
H ungary 3.010 -3.5 -11.9 -4.5 -2.3 1.0 2.0
Poland 2.160 -11.6 -7.6 1J5 3.8 4.0 5.0
Romania 1.062 -5.6 -12.9 -13.6 12 0.0 0.0
Slovakia 1.671 -3.0 -15.8 -8.7 -4.1 -2.0 2.0
Czech 2.526 -2.0 -14.7 -7.1 -0.3 2.0 3.0
R epublic________________________________________________________________
*Percent change on year earlier 
•*Estimate
Source: D IW  Berlin; IFO  Institute Munich; The Vienna Institu te  for 
_________ Comparative Economic Studies_____________________________________






















Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
00063378
perspectives. These other branches contain increasing growth potential and 
are bound to pu ll the economy out o f its crisis. But they have yet to be 
prom oted sufficiently.
However, structural changes in  southeastern Europe can be fore- 
casted: the share o f services in  the GDP is expected to  rise at the cost o f 
the m anufacturing share as the Bulgarian example has proved (Chart 2). 
This tendency is observed in  Romania and in  the o ther form er socialist 
economies, and can be understood as a “structural norm alization.”  Western 
industria l countries have relatively small industria l and agricu ltura l shares 
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W hile Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary started a consis- 
ten t reform  program which aimed at the sw ift in troduction o f more market 
elements in  th e ir economies, Romania and Bulgaria have been tim id ly  
longer to  launch sim ilar changes. They lost precious tim e and caused a lag 
in  th e ir steps o f transformation compared to  the Vishegrads. W hile p ro - 
duction decline in the central European countries could s till be braked, 
Bucharest and Sofia were ambivalent about how to  create the transform a- 
tion. Bulgaria strongly fe lt the pressure o f its external debt and creditors 
o f the London Club, and it  introduced a price liberalization in the spring o f 
1991— roughly a year later than the so-called Balcerowicz plan had been 
introduced in Poland. Romania hesitated somewhat longer and reluctantly 
agreed to  shock therapy.
There are d iffe rent reasons fo r the reform  delay in  both countries. 
The im perfect party structure in Romania appears as a main obstacle to  the
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reform s. There are no proper coalitions there. Not only do the form er 
comm unists represented a fter the revolution by the F ront fo r National 
Salvation o f president Ion  Iliescu (now renamed as the Party fo r Social 
Democracy) have a hostile attitude towards privatization and “ capitalism ,” 
bu t the strong Romanian nationalist opposition battles also against the 
“d icta tion o f the foreign agents”— and especially against the international 
financial entities, such as the IM F  and the W orld Bank. Iliescu and his 
ru ling  Party fo r Social Democracy depends in the Romanian parliam ent on 
the backing o f the extrem ely nationalist righ t w ing Party o f N ational 
U n ity , whose leader S ilvio Funar rejects “ foreign interference.”  On the 
o the r side the dem ocratic opposition, united predom inantly w ith in  the 
Dem ocratic Convention, is not strong enough to  persuade voters to  support 
consistent reforms. I t  is d iffic u lt to judge why th e ir reform  proposals are 
tim id . They should have to  include not only privatization, but stronger 
monetary policy and intensive enterprise restructuring.
In  Bulgaria the conviction in  the necessity fo r reform s has pre- 
vailed since the collapse o f the o ld system. However, Bulgarian policy has 
not been able to  u tilize  the in itia l confidence in the market powers to  boost 
privatization and reduce the influence o f orthodox communists, who s till 
exercise strong in fluence, especially in  the countryside. S im ila r to  
Romania, the Bulgarian po litica l landscape is dominated by the com m u- 
nists. Nevertheless, in  Bulgaria one meets, at least u n til now, a dual par- 
liam ent structure w ith  only le ft- and right-w ing politica l entities and w ith - 
out a center oriented party. Sim ilar to  some central European countries, 
there  has been strong anticom m unist opposition, even i f  only as o f
12 D ecem ber 1989. I t  is institu tiona lized  th rough the U nion o f 
Dem ocratic Powers (U D F ), which tem porarily (1991-92) has been the 
ru ling  party.
For these reasons both south European countries went backwards 
in comparison to  th e ir Vishegrad competitors. W hether they can jo in  th is 
group in the next years seems unlikely.
In  Yugoslavia4 the industrial output decreased between 1989 and
1993 at an average m onthly rate o f 2.4%. At the beginning o f 1994 the in - 
dustria l ou tpu t index declined at 28.1% compared w ith  100% in  1989. 
Meanwhile it  seems that in  Yugoslavia the bottom has fallen out o f the in - 
dustry, and industria l output is like ly to  rise as a result o f a launched p ro - 
gram o f econom ic recovery. This program has been introduced since 
February 1994. A fu rthe r im portant macroeconomic stabilization e ffect 
seems to be the elim ination o f the hyperinflation w ith  the launching o f the 
program. Since January 1994 the general price level has been kept at a con- 
stant level in the firs t ha lf o f that year.9
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Main Economic Indicators o f Some Economies in  Transition
C ountry
Industry. %* In fla tion . % *• U nem ploym ent %
1992 1993 1994 1992 1993 1994 1992 1993 1994
Bulgaria -16.8 -8.5 -5.0 85 70 120 16 16 18
Romania -21.9 13 2.0 210 256 200 8 10 12
Poland 1 4 16.7b 43 35 30 14 16 15
Slovakia -14.5 -13.9 -8.0 10 25 20 10 15 17
Czech Rep. -13.8 -10.0 -8.2b 11 20 10 3 4 6
Hungary -5 -2 7 5 b 23 22 20 12 12 12
Russia -18.0 -16.2 -10 2500 840 700 0.8 15 -
Ukraine -14 -15 -12 1400 4500 4000 -0.4 • -
Belarus -9.4 -10.0 -34.7a 1100 1700 2000 0.5 1.4 1.7«
Yugoslavia -15 -16 26.8° 9300 1165d 0.1e 24.3 24.7 n. a.
•Real change on year earlier; , *consumer prices, change on year earlier;
*March; *, September; cJan.-June; ^billion times; ®Jan.-Jun.
Source: Die Lage der W eltwirtschaft und der deutschen W irtschaft im 
Frühjahr 1994, DFW-Wochenbericht, 16-17 (1994); Die wirtschaftliche 
Lage Rußlands. DIW -W ochenbericht, 19 (1994); Die wirtschaftliche 
Lage Weißrußlands. DIW-Wochenbericht, 25 (1994); Yugoslav Survey, 2
Restructuring Measures 
Inflation, Fiscal Policy and Money Supply
Since the demise o f the old centralized planned system, reducing 
the high rate o f inflation has been one o f the main economic policy goals in 
southeastern Europe. The respective efforts have not yet been su ffic ien tly  
successful. The desirable in fla tion  rate in  Romania has been exceeded 
many times. Throughout 1993 the increase in prices reached 295% as com- 
pared to  December 1992. The m onthly average increasing rate was at 
12.1%.® In  1994 a lower monthly average can be expected, 9.5%, sim ilar to  
the 1992 figure o f 9.6%. W hile in  1994 the government expected a rate o f 
about 75%, the National Bank reported a considerable higher one. As com- 
pared to  1989 the consumer price index o f 1994 figured an increase o f 9.5. 
This unsatisfying result is caused by the gradual and procrastinating price 
liberalization. Some prices, such as basic foods, medicaments, heating etc., 
have been valid u n til 1993 when the last price contro ls were lifte d . 
Another reason was the delay in freeing the leu-exchange rate, which was 
accomplished on 1 A pril 1994. The fu ll liberalization o f the exchange rates
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was another key provision o f an agreement between Bucharest and the IM F  
fo r a 3. standby cred it to ta ling $700 m illion , to  be realized in 1994 and 
1995. The freeing o f the leu led to  hikes in  prices o f energy and gasoline. 
O ther rises in  price followed for most goods and services, resulting in  an 
overall increase o f 14-15%.7
The higher costs o f the gradual approach to  transform ation and 
libera lization are apparent when a typical gradualistic country is compared 
w ith  a shock therapy one (chart 3). W hile in 1990 the in fla tion  on the base 
o f the consumer prices increased in Romania only by 5.6%, Poland showed 
a figure o f 5.85%. Poland has suffered hyperinflation since 1989 when the 
last com m unist government hesitated to  introduce comprehensive reforms. 
A fte r the Balcerowicz plan went in to  effect in 1990 in fla tion in this countiy 
could come under control. In  the fo llow ing years the in fla tion  rate, the 
rise in  consum er prices, rem ained moderate. In  Romania in fla tio n  
skyrocketed in  1991 and it  has resisted to  slow down fo r several years. As a 
resu lt th is  country recently showed the highest price rates among the 
form er small CM EA members» (chart 3). Rapid shrinking income in  real 
terms provoked a decrease in demand fo r food items and durable consumer 
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Bulgaria too should not be content w ith the results o f the financial 
stabilization efforts. Unlike the Czech Republic, and sim ilar to the other
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form er Comecon partners, the Bulgarians missed tigh ten ing  the budget 
spendings and rising the revenues to date. The in itia lly  introduced policy 
o f hard budgetary constraints were abandoned in  1993. The countiy strug- 
gles w ith  high budgetary disequilibrium  which erodes its in fla tion  control 
program . Among the eastern European partners tha t have association 
agreements w ith  the EU  it  had the highest difference between revenues 
and budget spendings in  1993, 15% o f CDP. Slovakia and Hungary fo l-  
lowed fa r behind w ith  7% and 6%, respectively. Romania and Poland 
recorded a d e fic it o f 2% 8 and 4%, respectively. (The Czech Republics 
budget had a small surplus). Indeed, Bulgaria liberalized prices consider- 
ably qu icker and more consistently than Romania, Russia, and even 
Hungary. The firs t price hike in 1991 helped to  surm ount the im portant 
money overhang w ith in  the Bulgarian economy. But the am bivalent a tti- 
tude o f the Bulgarian po litica l class towards the ensuing steps o f the 
macroeconomic policy slowed its pace and caused fu rthe r sacrifices fo r the 
population. Especially the reluctance o f the Lyuben Berov cabinet to accept 
rapid privatization and fu rthe r budgetaiy constraints, created a negative 
impact on the relationship between Sofia and international financial ins ti- 
tu t ions. They are the most im portant financial partners o f the country, be - 
cause private investors are skeptical, Bulgaria, in the medium term , w ill be 
able to  o ffer desirable standards o f stab ility and security fo r private capital 
in flow . Thus loan packages from the IM F , the W orld Bank, the European 
Bank fo r Reconstruction and Development and other institu tions o f the 
EU  exert a decisive influence on the country’s m onetary and financial 
stability. In  general, the Bulgarian an ti-in fla tion  package was, u n til 1995, 
somewhat more successful than those in Romania, Russia, and the U kraine. 
Yet it  fa iled to  bring in fla tion defin ite ly down, which supposes dangers fo r 
price and currency stab ility and has meant high price indexes since 1989 
(chart 4).
The Berov government lifte d  some o f the fiscal restrictions o f its 
predecessor the U D F  cabinet, which collapsed in  late October 1992. I t  in - 
troduced a wage indexation in the public sector which reduced the spend- 
ing side m aneuverability o f the fiscal policy. The idea o f enhancing the 
standard o f the entire tax system has been rejected, and at the same tim e 
the finance m inister claimed to relax the IM F  requirem ents on financial 
policies in  Bulgaria.10 However, it  also achieved some im provem ents, es- 
pecially in  making tax collecting more effective. In  1993 the ratio between 
planned and collected taxes rose to  83.7% compared to  75.2% in 1992.11 
D uring the same year the volume o f the subsidies on the state budget de- 
c lined s ligh tly  and was about 10% o f CDP. Romania also cut subsidies 
drastically, although they s till show a lower level, 5.5% o f C D P in 1993, 
followed by Slovakia w ith  4.8%. But in  general subsidies in  southeastern 
Europe are not much higher than in  some EU countries. In  1991 Ire land’s 
subsidies (includ ing  those from the EU ) amounted to  6.6% o f CDP; in
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Greece they were over 5%.12
CHART 4
C o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  1 9 9 4
%
Bulgaria Czech R. Romania Poland
1989 =100
Source: NBR, DIW Berlin, IFO Munich, Statistisches Bundesamt
A heavy heritage from  the communist era to  be managed by the 
Bulgarian governments now is a huge external debt, w hich amounts to  
more than the GDP. Together w ith  internal indebtedness it  is one o f the 
most im portant in fla tion  sources fo r the economy. A lthough Bulgaria 
started la ter than Poland and Hungary to  take large-sized credits from  
western governments and banks, it  appeared as a ve iy d iligen t borrower. 
Between 1985 and 1989 the external debt rose four times and as a whole 
Sofìa accumulated more debt than it was able to  serve. In  early 1990 it  was 
com pelled to  announce suspension o f external payments. This step en- 
ta iled  dram atic consequences concerning the confidence o f in te rna tiona l 
creditors.
In  1990 Romania remained on the verge o f a payment collapse and 
some agreements w ith  the IM F  appeared as an urgent necessity to  over- 
come external payment d ifficu lties. Follow ing the exhausted foreign ex- 
change reserves in the second ha lf o f 1990 only agreements concluded w ith  
the Fund helped to avoid bankruptcy. Since 1990 the process o f taking 
credits quickened, and between 1991 and 1993 external debt augmented 
nearly 3 times.
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However, Romania's external debt problem can be seen as not so 
dram atic, whereas Bulgaria is classified by the W orld Bank as belonging to  
the group o f severely indebted countries. The other economies in  transi- 
tion  are Albania and Poland. A large proportion o f the Romanian external 
debt is o f public descent— the biggest borrowers in 1993 remained the IM F  
(31.0%), EU  (15.3%), IB R D  (12.0%) and a range o f western governments, 
whereas more than 80% o f the Bulgarian debt is composed o f credits from  
private borrowers. According to  the criteria used un til now such classifica- 
tio n  is va lid  fo r debtors whose external debt-C D P-ratio, debt service- 
export-ratio and interest payment-export-ratio exceeds 50%, 30% and 20%, 
respectively. As the current statistics show, Bulgaria as w ell as partia lly  
A lbania respond to  th is crite ria  (table 3). Meanwhile, in  1994, Bulgaria 
achieved a great success by obtaining a comprehensive agreement w ith  it ’s 
commercial creditors, who agreed to  w rite  o ff U.S.$3.8 b illion  o f the deb t.13
M onetary policy in both Romania and Bulgaria re flect the general 
ambivalence o f stabilization measures in general. Bucharest relaxed its 
tigh te r m onetaiy policy and enabled easier supply o f the firm s w ith  credits. 
Additional liqu id ity , the expansion o f the broad money М 2,14 is reported to  
have risen by 120% in  1993, w hile GDP stagnated. Several things con- 
trib u te d  to  this: Cash transactions between companies rose to  a great ex- 
ten t enta iling higher money demand. Household deposits rose extraordi- 
narily  because o f massive interest rate capitalization o f the Savings Bank.
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TABLE 3
External Indebtedness Indicators, %
M inim um
W orld Bank Bulgaria Romania Albania
C rite rio n Requirements 1994 1993 1993
Debt:G DP ratio 50 102.0 (1992) 13.6 43
Debt: 275 360 58.5 525
Exports ratio 




20 32* 5.0 50•
•Estimate
Source: W orld Bank; National Statistic Institute, Soda: National Bank o f 
Romania; Pashhko, C., “Albania: The Transition From a Command to 
_________ a Free Market Economy," Südosteuropa, 5 (1994).
The foreign exchange increased and the parallel leu depreciation boosted 
money deposits in  le i terms, etc. The average nominal lending rate o f the 
National Bank remained low, between 136% in  January and 98% in  June 
1994. The same was valid for the commercial banks and it  is the main rea - 
son for the negative real interest rate o f both lendings and deposits.
An underdeveloped banking sector in  both countries and weak 
com petition between the banks causes additional unfavorable influence on 
the interest rate. In  both countries the emergence process o f a tw o -tie r 
banking system is proceeding slowly. Up to  31 December 1993 there were 
only four bigger state commercial banks operating in  Romania. They hold 
approxim ately 77% o f the aggregated balance sheet o f the com m ercial 
banks, whereas twelve smaller state commercial institutes hold about 23%. 
Only two private banks play a significant role, and the share o f private capi- 
ta l w ith in  the banking structure is deficient, although there are five fo r- 
eign bank branches operating in Bucharest. A sim ilar p icture  can also be 
observed in  Bulgaria. The slow pace o f establishing new banks reflects in 
both countries the National Bank’s constrained possibilities to  create a 
sound banking system.
H igh in fla tion  rates in  Romania and Bulgaria exerted sign ificant 
pressure on the exchange rate o f the national currencies and caused th e ir 
devaluation against the hard international currencies (Chart 6).
In  Bulgaria the nominal leva/U.S. dollar ratio, which remained re i- 
atively constant during 1992 and the first ha lf o f 1993, could not resist and
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C H A R T 6
Leu and Lev Devaluation Against the US-$
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Source: National Bank of Romania; Bulgarian National Bank
skyrocketed, especially in November 1993 and in  1994. The leu has contin- 
uously fallen in  nominal terms o f the U.S. dollar since 1989 (Chart 6, le ft-  
hand scale). The development o f both currencies is a result o f an ambigu- 
ous attitude toward currency policy in these countries. W hile in  Romania 
they have maintained a m ultip le exchange rate, an overvalued o ffic ia l rate 
and a market one which d iffe r from each o ther considerably, in  Bulgaria 
the C entra l Bank in terfered periodica lly in  the in terbanking exchange 
market to  back up the lev/dollar ratio. Nevertheless, th is ratio  shifted per- 
m anently, especially in  1994 when some bigger lev devaluations became 
necessaiy. By considering the in fla tion  index the devaluation between 
1989 and 1994 hasn’t  been as huge in  Romania because o f the decline o f the 
U.S. do lla r purchasing power in this country. In  Bulgaria a periodical ex- 
change rate adjustment occurred which has ensured a re lative ly proper real 
exchange rate since 1991 (Chart 6, right-hand scale). Both currencies fe ll 
against the Czech koruna and the Hungarian fo rin t (Chart 7).
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CHART 7
N o m i n a l  L e u  a n d  L e v  D e v a l u a t i o n
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Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics Nr. 1-6/1994; Statistisches Bundesamt
Privatization
A juncture o f a comprehensive economic restructuring is the reduc- 
tion  o f the state share o f the economy. Swift advances depend on the con ־ 
sensus w ith in  the po litica l landscape, and on the intention o f the govern- 
ment to  persuade the parliament and the political parties to  endorse its p ri- 
vatization efforts. In  a recent report the EBRD estimated that 65% o f 
Czech GDP is now produced in the private sector. Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia fo llow  closely behind w ith  55% each.
Thus the privatization advances in Romania and Bulgaria are far 
from  satisfactory. The private sector share on GDP in  Bulgaria was, at the 
end o f 1994 below the results o f the central European economies in  transi- 
tion . In  1994 the respective figure was estimated to  barely exceed the 
35% -frontier. The private sector contribution to  the GDP is expected to  
extend to  at least 40% in  1996 and to employ twice as many persons com- 
pared to 1993.18 Also Romania has u n til now a relatively small private 
sector. O nly 35% o f the GDP were privately produced in  1994.16 The 
contribution o f the private sector to GDP was scarcely 30% in 1993 in  com- 
parison w ith  26% during 1992. That means that the Romanian privatization 
pace between 1989 and 1994 has been only h a lf o f tha t in  the Czech
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Republic, and about two-thirds o f the pace o f the other economies in transi- 
tion  associated w ith  the EU, except Bulgaria.
The uncertainties w ith in  the institu tional frame o f the privatization 
m ight be responsible fo r the delay. There are several responsible entities 
in Romania. The National Agency o f Privatization was founded in 1990 and 
is the oldest one. I t  announced, at the beginning o f 1994, 7,841 assets o f 
state companies for sale. A to ta l o f 37.2% o f them w ith  13,353 employees 
have been sold in  the firs t ha lf o f 1994 w ith  a fie ld  o f activ ity  as follows: 
industry 154 assets, agriculture 85, transport 5, construction 12, trade 1,670, 
tourism  738, services 123 and various other activities 134.17 Small compa- 
nies, especially in  re ta il sales, prevailed and the average assets value 
amounted to  less than U.S.$20,000.
The State Ownership Fund was set up in  1991 in  order to  sell some 
70% o f the state-owned commercial firm s w ith in  a 7-year period. Even i f  
its firs t privatization activities have been tim id , in 1993 the pace had accel- 
erated and 292 companies w ith  80,575 employees were sold in  that year. 
These results are far from satisfactoiy, even i f  the average value o f these 
enterprises amounted to about U.S.$200,000. According to  the inform ation 
available so far, in 1994 2,368 companies were selected fo r sale, o f which 35 
were o f large size and 403 were o f medium size. These companies repre- 
sent 12 to  13% o f the total assets o f the state-owned enterprises.
The five private ownership funds are organized by te rrito ry  and are 
jo int-stock commercial companies. They are determ ined to  privatize about 
30% o f the assets o f the state owned enterprises. Apart from  these entities 
various ins titu tio n s  and m in istries are com peting w ith  the above- 
m entioned state and p riva te  in s titu tio n s  fo r re sp o n s ib ilitie s  in  
privatization.18
In  1994 the private sector accounted fo r 60% o f Romania’s agricul- 
tu ra i output, 48% o f retail sales, 41% o f services, 28% o f im ports and 26.5% 
o f exports. I t  employed about 37% o f the countries labor power. The re- 
spective data for Bulgaria in 1994 are: re ta il sales 70%, agricultural output 
59%, construction 23% and industry 3.3%.
Employment and Income
The economic crisis provoked a contraction o f to ta l employment and 
a rise in  the unemployment rates in  a ll countries in  transition. For the 
firs t tim e since the end o f W orld W ar I I  the population o f those states have 
been confronted w ith  nominal unemployment. Because o f a lack o f o r only 
a marginal social net in  comparison w ith  the western countries, many o f 
those workers who lost th e ir jobs are forced to  search fo r alternatives in 
self-employment. This tendency boosts the expansion o f the private sector 
and supports even i f  only deficiently the economic transition. Jobs created 
w ith in  the private sector relieve the situation in the labor market. Yet the
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new ly created jobs have been less than those lost as a result o f the 
transform ation. Each country tries to  cope w ith  the labor market policy 
considering the threats provoked by a too high unemployment rate. The 









e s t i m a t e
Source: DIW Berlin: IFO-Institute Munich
In  Bulgaria there is a tendency to  stabilize the unemployment rate 
on a high level. Romania's unemployment rate is expected to  rise in 1995, 
w h ile  the Hungarian figure remains lower and constant. A lthough the 
num ber o f people o ffic ia lly  recorded as employed in  the Czech Republic 
fe ll about 12% between 1989 and 1993, the government recorded only a 
slight rise in the unemployment rate. W hether the Czechs w ill be able to 
sustain the “employment m iracle”  in  future, when the big privatization is 
accomplished, and reconstruction o f the heavy industry is launched, ap- 
pears questionable. However, labor force problems in Romania and espe• 
cia lly in  Bulgaria remain d ifficu lt.
A positive effect o f the labor force contraction in  the countries who 
exert a shock therapy is that they could keep th e ir labor productivity, in  
real terms, on a constant level during the last years. In  addition, the labor 
costs, the real wages, stayed behind this productivity as the Bulgarian ex* 
ample proves. They are now very low. In  U.S. dollar terms the average 
m onthly net wages in Bulgaria remain about $100 and w ill probably remain
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though they suffered from  the division o f its previous single market and 
integrated economy, as well as the UN embargo (Table 4).
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TABLE 4
Net Average M onthly Wages In  Bulgaria And Yugoslavia, U.S.$
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Yugoslavia
06^4
Nom inal Wage: 127.11 49.95 82.23 117.14 84.55 111.30
Source: Bulgarian Academy o f Sciences; Yugpslav Survey, 2 (1994).
W hether such favorable conditions and effects w ill be able to  en- 
hance the economies export competitiveness is doubtfu l. U nfortunately 
p roductiv ity  in  crucial sectors such as industry fe ll, but this effect o f the 
transform ation is common in a ll East European countries. The labor pio- 
duc tiv ity  index in  Romania’s industry stayed in  1993 at 68% compared 
w ith  the level in  1988.19
Not only real wages decreased but un til now an unknown process o f 
wage polarization among the receiver o f labor income has been launched in 
the post-com m unist w orld . The form al— deceptive—equality w ith in  the 
society undergoes changes, and the share o f high wage receivers declines. 
M eanwhile the share o f small- and medium-labor income receivers grows 
which is an indication fo r adjustment processes in the economy and better 
labor power allocation by wages. The Bulgarian example proves that such 
dynamic development occurs, and it  seems to  be normal fo r a market econ - 
omy (Chart 9). A proportional d istribu tion is only theoretica lly possible. 
Nonetheless, the form er socialist d istribution has been reluctant to  con- 
sider the productiv ity differences indicated in the wage income. Socialist 
planners have tried  to  keep the distribution curve near the theoretical one 
(s till 1990). The more convex curve in 1993 means an “ unequal”  d is tribu - 
tion  caused by the market allocation o f the labor power. Thus 60% o f a ll 
wage receivers received about 30% o f the wage sum. In  Germany 
(pa rticu la iiy  in  the form er West Germany) about 60% o f the households 
got in  1992 about 35% o f the net retained income.20 Apparendy such frame 
o f d is tribu tion  is fo r a post-communist economy, in  th is case Bulgaria, 
nothing unusual. Analyzed by branches, a tendency is occurring to  keep in - 
come at a socially necessary level despite the d iffe ren t rates in  which th e ir 
activities are dim inishing. O nly in sectors in which state enterprises do 
not prevail, differences in  productivity and payoffs are clearly reflected by 
respective level o f pays.
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In  Romania wages lost the ir purchasing power to  a sim ilar scale as 
in Bulgaria, and in  most other reform  countries. The real net wage was in 
1994 only tw o-thirds o f that o f 1989. The polarization w ith in  the wage re - 
ceivers is in  this country a reality too. W hile in the past workers in  some 
industria l sectors and in construction had the biggest wages, now em ploy- 
ees in  industry, agriculture and in  state-owned service enterprises are 
confronted w ith  bigger decreases o f th e ir income than those in  the banking 
sector and private service firms.
TABLE 5
N et Nom inal Wages in  U.S.$ and Real N et Wage Index in  Romania
(1989 = 100)
Ind icator: 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Nom inal Wages, $: 95.50 38.81 43.05 48.21 102.53 
Wage Index, %: 105.6 87.4 76.1 66.3 66.3 
Source: NBR; The Vienna Institute fo r Comparative Economic Studies.
Also the situation o f the pensioners has deteriorated since 1990, be- 
cause the average net pension in  U.S. dollar terms is deficient and provides
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only a subsistence income. In  Bulgaria it  was $43.57 in 1993, whereas the 
average nominal pension/wage ratio is about 1/3. In  real terms the pensions 
declined to  sim ilar scale as the wages did.
In s titu tio n a liz e d  M u ltila te ra l C oopera tion  (In te n d e d  E U -Accession)
A fter the breakdown o f the form er CM EA, East European central- 
ized economies have been confronted w ith  the necessity to  survive in  a 
new economic environm ent w ithout plans and coordination between the 
governments but w ith  more com petition and defiances. This new interna- 
tional framework is perceived by the post-communist entrepreneurs, who 
were spoiled by centralized planning in  the past, as a heavy obstacle in 
managing the transform ation. Especially in  Romania and Bulgaria, both 
leaders and population expect more support from outside, and feel the west 
treats them worse than the Vishegrad group.
Both Bulgaria and Romania, as w ell as the Vishegrad group, have 
signed association agreements w ith the EU  and each country aspires to  be- 
come a fu ll member. The membership is expected to  be realized more o r 
less in  the coming years. On the other side, the EU does not huny w ith  
the accession o f the East-Europeans and has established preconditions to 
be fu lfille d  by the candidates. Even the satisfaction o f the M aastricht crite- 
ria is not an accession guarantee, because the EU treaties do not contain a 
membership right. The budgeteiy im plications o f a possible EU  enlarge- 
ment are to  be taken into consideration. Besides, the requirem ents on the 
candidates concerning the ir fiscal and money policy are hardly to  be satis - 
fied in the short term . For the last year before the accession decision, 
some o f the Maastricht criterias for the economic and currency union insist 
that
1. the consumer price index must not exceed more than 1.5 per- 
centage points the average inflation rate o f the three best members,
2. the long-term government bond yie ld should not be higher than
2 percentage points o f the three best's average,
3. budget de fic it and outstanding pub lic debt should not exceed 
3% and 60% o f the GDP, respectively.
Another effect o f the examination is that the candidate becomes for 
tw o years a member o f the narrow European Currency System. This 
should not provoke too much tension. Thus it  is evident that scarcely none 
o f the post-communist countries are able to  satisfy such requirements now. 
However, the gap between the average EU level and the level o f the post - 
communist candidates is s till deep. On the o ther side there are also re- 
markable differences w ith in  the Union. They originate from  the accession 
o f the south European countries, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. As they be- 
came members, th e ir economic indicators were comparable w ith  those o f 
the reform  countries in Eastern Europe now.
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TABLE 6
GDP Per Person in  South and East European Countries 1960 ■ 1992 
as % o f the EU  Average (at Purchasing Power Parity)
C oun try 1960 1970 1980 1989 1992
Greece* 32 45 51 49
Portugal* 33 43 49 49
Spain* 51 65 65 69




R om ania 16
Slovakia 33
• Germany =100%
Source: IF O -Schnelldienst, 15 (1994); The Economist, 5-11 November 1994.
Leading w ith in  the  group o f reform  countries is the Czech 
Republic, whereas Romania appears as the most backward member. Now 
the Czech Republic is deemed to  be in  a position comparable w ith  Greece 
and Portugal in  the early seventies. The other form er CMEA-members 
considered (except fo r Romania) are comparable21 w ith  these countries 
level in the early sixties. But even ordinary members cannot respond to  
them and that is why the Union has prepared a scheme o f the two speeds 
convergence. I t  can be expected that in future some o f the form er C M E A- 
economies w ill outdo trad itiona l EU members and satisfy the strong cur- 
rency union crite ria  earlier, obviously the Czech Republic. In fla tion  is the 
biggest macro-economic w orry there now, but it  tends to  be reduced and 
approaches the normal standard in the industrialized countries.
As Table 7 shows, only tw o (ita lics) large countries, France and 
Germany, responded in 1991 to the requirements o f the currency union. 
The Czech Republic can rush to  the club o f the proper economies in  the 
next years. The other East Europeans have to  intensify th e ir reform  e f- 
forts and especially Bulgaria and Romania have to undergo a toilsom e 
transform ation process. This is necessary because at present East 
Europeans appear as com petitors m ainly in  agriculture, steel, textiles and 
particu la rly  construction, which are perceived by the EU as sensitive 
branches. Thus the EU is reluctant to  accept applicants who threaten to  be- 
come an additional burden fo r the EU budget, as this can be expected in 
the case o f most post com m unist economies. I f  the EU  w ould have
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Satisfaction o f the Maastricht Currency Union C riteria, 1991-94
In fla tio n Government Budget P ublic
Rate Bond Yield D e fic it Debt
C ountry % % % O f Gdp % O f Gdp
Belgium 3.2 9.3 6.4 129.4
B rita in 5.9 9.9 1.7 43.8
Denmark 2.4 10.1 1.7 66.7
France 3.2 9.5 1.5 47.2
Germany 3.5 86 3.0 46.2
Greece 18.9 23.0 17.9 96.4
Ire land 3.2 9.2 4.1 102.8
Ita ly 6.4 12.9# 9.9 101.2
Luxem bourg 3.1 8.2 -2.0 6.9
Netherlands 3.9 8.9 4.4 78.4
Portugal 11.4 17.1 5.4 64.7
Spain 6.0 12.4 3.9 45.6
Bulgaria 100.0 49.1a 15.0 140.0
Czech Republic 10.0 9.5a 0.0 24.9c
Hungary 23.0 27.0 7.0 62.7
Poland 30.0 35.0a 5.4 64.5c
Romania 200.0 97.6b 0.0 13.6c
Slovakia 20.0 n.a. 4.0 n.a.
m ax 1991 4.4 10.6 3.0 60.0
a: Rate o f discount in 1993,-
b: NBR average lending rate in June 1994;
c: External debt based 1992
Source: IF O -In s titu te  M unich; W orld Bank; Statistisches Bundesamt;
NBR
approved an immediate enlargement by the Vishegrad Croup, plus Bulgaria 
and Romania, it  w ould have to  provide bigger agriculture and regional 
funding. O nly the Vishegrad group would have caused an extension o f the 
current budget spending between 23.8% and 44.4%.22 The EU sum m it in  
Essen, Germany in December 1994 discussed a b lueprin t about bring ing 
the six East European countries in to the Union. I t  describes how the ap- 
plicants need to  prepare for membership w ithout explaining how the exist- 
ing members w ill pay fo r enlargement. The plan suggests using the exist- 
ing aid program fo r the region amounting to  1.1 b illion  ecus. According to  
the E U  Commission there are 7 b illio n  ecus to  be com m itted fo r the 
eastward enlargement during the next five years. But the EU's southern
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members threatened to  block the approval u n til th e ir northern counter- 
parts approve another 5.5 b illion  ecus fo r N orth A frica and M iddle East 
programs.23
Thus the financing o f the enlargement is a reason fo r the e x is tin g  
members to  be at loggerheads. On the other side, the backlog o f the East 
Europeans is so huge, that it  seems doubtfu l whether a sw ift equalization 
o f the output and income level between the east and west part o f the conti - 
nent can be reached. Bulgaria's and Romania’s economies should have to  
grow w ith  a remarkable pace— at least w ith  a constant 6% rate— to  approach 
w ith in  the next th irty  years the current per-head output o f Greece (Table 
8). I f  both countries could sustain a growth rate o f 6% they can expect to 
achieve the 1992 EU average per-head level in the next fo rty  five to  fifty  
years. Somewhat bigger is the gap between the advanced EU  members, 
namely Germany in 1992. I t  must be taken into consideration that the EU 
is expected to  grow w ith a rate o f between 2% and 4% in  the next decades. 
Apparently very long periods are needed to  shorten the distance. In  gen- 
eral a ll East European countries including Russia and the CIS should have 
to  prepare for a long lasting race w ith the West.
TABLE 8
Years Needed by East European Countries to  Reach 
the GDP-per-Head Level in the EU in 1992 
Depending on Two Growth Rate Variants
Greece (1992) Germany (1992) EU Avera®в (1992)
Crowth Rate Growth Rate Crowth Rate
Country 4% 6% 4% 6% 4% 6%
B ulgaria 43.0 28.9 72.7 48.9 66.9 45.0
Czech R. 27.5 18.5 57.2 38.5 51.4 34.6
Hungary 22.2 14.9 51.9 34.9 46.0 31.0
Poland 33.1 22.3 62.8 42.3 57.0 38.4
Romania 48.1 32.4 77.8 52.4 71.9 48.4
Slovakia 33.6 22.6 63.3 42.6 57.5 38.7
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
1 ^ i — — ^ _  _ _ _  -----------
Consequences o f the Isolation of Southeastern Europe by the EU
The new situation in the w orld and especially in  Europe a fte r the 
demise o f the communist system in the form er East Block revealed the de- 
pendances and feedbacks between it  and it ’s West European counterparts. 
There is evidence that the process o f European integration cannot be kept 
on track w ithout a proper economic recovery o f the southeast part o f the
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continent. One im portant feature o f the new situation is a rising wave o f 
m igration and asylum launched since 1990. I t  isn’t  a coincidence that the 
bulk o f asylum seekers and migrants in Central Europe now comes from  
the eastern part o f the continent. This means a considerable d ifference 
from  the seventies and eighties, when the M iddle East, A frica and occa• 
sionally Asia were the most im portant regions o f origin. The main destina- 
tion  o f these people in the early nineties was Germany, which received on 
average about 60% o f all asylum applicants in Western Europe.
TABLE 9
Asylum Seekers in  West European Countries (Persons)
Country 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
В 3.650 530 7.650 6,000 5.200 8,100 12.950 15,173 20,000
DK 4,300 8,700 9,300 2,750 4,650 4,600 5,300 4,609 17,500
D 35,300 73,850 99,650 57,400 103,100 121,300 193.050 256.000 438,100
F 15,900 25,800 23,400 24,800 31,600 58.750 49,650 46,545 30,000
CB 3,850 5,450 4,800 5,150 5,250 15,500 25,250 44.736 24,000
NL 2,600 5,650 5,850 13,450 7.500 1,390 21.200 21,600 24,500
A 7,200 6,700 8,650 11,400 15,800 21,900 22,800 27,308 1,628
S 12,000 14,450 14,600 18,100 19.600 30,350 29,350 27,351 82,000
CH 7,450 9,700 8,550 10,900 16,750 24,400 35,850 41,629 18,000
Europe 104,250 170,500 205,600 189,450 290,600 349,500 442,350 578,400 750,000
D:EU % 33.86 43.31 48.47 30.30 35.48 34.71 43.64 44.26 58.41
Source: UNHCR
As w ell Germany accepted up to 250,000 Bosnian and Yugoslavian 
c iv il war refugees and victims o f ethnic cleansing. Among the European 
applicants the group o f South East European countries o f o rig in  have risen 
rapidly since 1990, replacing step by step Poles and Hungarians com ing in 
the late eighties. Although in Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania there are no 
battles and ethnic conflicts except occasional political tensions, more people 
are fleeing after opening and paving the way to  a democratic development.
In  1994 applications fo r asylum in West European countries de- 
clined as a result o f a tough controls adopted in the summer o f 1993 in 
Germany, and in  several other countries as w ell. The effect is a ris in g  
pressure on Germany’s neighbors Holland, Belgium , and recently the 
Scandinavian peninsula. Besides the Yugoslav war, a main reason fo r East 
Europeans to  apply fo r asylum is the economic misery in  th e ir home coun - 
tries. A fte r abolishing the restrictions fo r traveling abroad, pa rticu la rly  
Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania have been abandoned by many hundred
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TABLE 10
Asylum Applications in Germany by Regions o f O rigin (Persons)
1984 1990 1993
Total, o f which 35,287 193,063 322,599
Europe 11,553 101,631 232,678
Europe: a ll countries 32.74% 52.64% 72.13%
South East Europe (SEE) 5,803 89,353 214,201
SEE: Europe 50.23% 87.92% 92.06%
SEE: a ll coun tries 16.45% 46.28% 66.40%
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
thousands o f citizens fleeing unemployment and lacking prospects w ith  
dreams o f welfare in  the West. W hile Albanians penetrated ille g a lly  
m ainly in  Greece and to  some extent in  Ita ly , Romanians and Bulgarians 
went prim arily to  Germany. There Romanians replaced even the Turks and 
Yugoslavs from  the firs t position on the lis t o f asylum applicants, and 
Bulgarians followed closely behind (see Table 11).
TABLE 11
Asylum Seekers in Germany 1993 (Person)
C ountry Asylees Share (%)
Romania 73,717 22.85
Rump Yugoslavia 72,476 22.47
Bulgaria 22,547 6.99




Arm enia 6,469 2.01
Afganistan 5,506 1.71
Russia 5,280 1.64
O ther 74,038 22.95
T o ta l 322,599 100.00
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
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The development discussed above is exacerbated by the economic 
effects o f the politica l transformation especially in South Eastern Europe, 
where this process is at a slower pace and the expectations o f the population 
haven't been satisfied sufficiently yet. The economic aspects provide the 
base fo r a lasting em igration potential from the region unlike the past, as 
the w ish to  em igrate was mostly motivated by dissatisfaction w ith  the 
existing politica l system. Now the economic differences deepen, and a lack 
o f prospects fo r many people able to emigrate compel them to  try  to  go to 
W estern Europe and Germany as well. Forecasts prove that income dis* 
parities between East and West w ill endure for a long tim e (see also table 
8). The social security systems in the South European countries o f trans- 
form ation are not yet accomplished and, nonetheless, they w ill not be able 
to  compensate income losses and decreases in the standard o f liv ing  in  the 
medium term . On the other side an improvement o f the employment situ- 
ation cannot be expected because o f deficient capital investment needed for 
the restructuring o f the economy and growth. As o f the m iddle o f 1993, the 
capital in flow  amounted up to  $4.7 b illio n  in Hungary, $2.7 b illio n  in 
Poland, and $1.9 b illion  in  the Czech Republic. In  Bulgaria there is a fig - 
и re o f $230 m illion  as o f the end o f 1993. According to  statistics from the 
Romanian Agency fo r Development, the total foreign equity investment in 
1993 amounted to  $670.5 m illion. And in South Eastern Europe not only 
are the dimensions o f the investment demand bigger, but the local condi- 
tions fo r the necessary foreign investments are less favorable than in the 
Vishegrad countries. This development w ill boost the wish to  emigrate or 
to  abandon the economically and socially unstable southeast part o f our 
continent fo r a long tim e, even by violation o f the legal framework and 
conditions. How great this emigration potential is cannot be estimated now 
w ith  certainty; doubtless it  seems to be considerable and it  threatens not 
only the chances o f the East to  rebuild and promote its transform ation. As 
recent negative examples in  Germany show, overwhelm ing im m igration 
threatens the social freedom and stability in the West itself.
NOTES
• The author is grateful to Lynda Fish for reviewing the text. Only the 
author bears responsibility for its contents. The views expressed here do not 
necessarily express the views o f the Federal Office for the Recognition o f 
Foreign Refugees, Germany.
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3. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
4. Serbia and Montenegro.
5. Yugoslav Survey, 2 (1994)
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Regional Disruptions and 
Regional Cooperation in the Balkans
Nada Švob-Dokic
Introduction
The identity o f the Balkans has undergone a drastic change in  the 
course o f the tw entie th century. Territories have been cut ana divided 
among old and new states. New states have emerged and the dissolution o f 
the o ld ones has engendered conflicts and wars. The restructuring o f the 
Balkans has taken place mostly through wars that invariably brought in to  
play the confronted interests o f the W estern and Eastern countries: the 
Austro-Russian coa lition  against the O ttom an Em pire, the orthodox 
(Serbo-Russian) coalition against the Austrian Em pire, the breakdown o f 
Yugoslavia along the borders between east and west, ancient Byzantine and 
Roman Empires, Catholicism and Orthodoxy.
The history o f the Balkans has produced examples also o f efforts to 
overcome differences and harmonize interests. The best such example 
perhaps was the establishment o f Yugoslavia in 1918, as a kingdom w itn in  
the framework o f the Versailles peace arrangements, and in 1943 as a re- 
public w ith in  the framework o f the post-W orld W ar I I  bloc divisions. The 
kingdom o f the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes functioned between the two 
w orld wars; the Yugoslav federation, established in 1943, acknowledged the 
existence o f o the r nations in  the  same te rr ito ry  (M acedonians, 
Muslims/Bosnians, Albanians, etc.) and proclaimed the provision o f equal 
rights fo r a ll w ith in  the frameworks o f the socialist system. As the system 
crum bled, the federation broke down in  1990, and issues such as the 
equality o f nations, the established borders among the republics, and the 
form ation o f new states were reopened, unfortunately through yet another 
war.
The nature o f this war remains to  be clarified. I t  started as the in - 
tervention o f the federal army against the separatist republics (Slovenia and 
Croatia), to  become the war between the newly recognized states on one 
side (C roatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the self-procla im ed Federal 
Republic o f Yugoslavia on the other (Serbia and Montenegro); the war then
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
00063378
partly  degenerated in to  a series o f e thn ic conflicts among the Serbs, 
Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Ted Robert G urr 
calls the s im ila r type o f wars “e thno-po litica l con flic ts  in  transitiona l 
states,” 1 which stresses the need to  cla rify this new type o f conflict, having 
in m ind the overall systemic change that has engendered them.
A new shaping o f the world that seems to  hold a great deal o f attrae- 
tion  fo r both policy-makers and academics nowadays has proceeded in the 
Balkans through most tragic developments, largely created o r supported by 
the incom petent, cynical, and disorganized representatives o f the in terna- 
tiona l com m unity. New developments have been eagerly analyzed, but 
they nevertheless remain far from  being fu lly  grasped e ithe r by particular 
ethnic groups or by national authorities, or, fo r that matter, by the intem a- 
tional com m unity (m ainly the UN and the European Union). New peace 
processes have been in itiated, but th e ir outcome is uncertain. Analytical 
tools and scientific methodologies have been qu ickly im proved and ad- 
justed, but the increased knowledge thus gained has hardly made possible a 
thorough understanding o f the ongoing processes. Rational and sometimes 
well-elaborated policies have been haraly implemented, and when im pie- 
mented they have sometimes produced unexpected results. In  this respect 
the situation in  the Balkans reflects the post-bipolar w orld  being trans- 
form ed in to  a m ulticentered structure through a “ hegemonic transition” 
(Barry G ills). Many actors o f th is transform ation are not quite aware o f 
th e ir proper interests and aims, particularly because these are undergoing a 
transform ation as well.
The Notion of Regionalism
M ultila te ra lism , regionalism  and b ila tera lism  are standardized 
types o f international relations, both economic and politica l. Bilateralism is 
confined to  the role o f a particular state, and is very much linked w ith  the 
prom otion o f particular, quite clear and neatly regulated interests that are 
m ore o r less successfu lly harm onized betw een tw o  partners. 
M u ltila te ra lism  is practically linked w ith  the globalization o f the w orld  
economy and w ith  ever more intense international exchanges. The notions 
o f m ultilateralism  and globalism are very strongly influenced by the ideas 
o f liberalism , liberal economy, and liberal exchange, which are supposed to  
prevail over the particular interests o f particu lar nation-states. The role o f 
states is therefore suppressed by global developments, and although the 
states are making serious efforts to  fo llow  global development trends, they 
at the same tim e try  to  preserve the trad itiona l national interests, often en- 
dangered by the global drive. Nevertheless, the states are the main actors 
o f both bilateral and m ultilateral arrangements.
Regionalism is a tw ofold notion, reflecting e ither the idea o f a large 
geographical area divided among a num ber o f states (e.g., Europe), o r a 
num ber o f smaller functional ana geographical entities w ith in  one single 
state. Regional arrangements among states are sometimes perceived as a 
form  o f reaction and resistance to  global liberalism . The idea o f regional
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integration is closely connected w ith  that o f protectionism , trade blocs, re - 
gional strongholds opposing the processes dom inating the global economy, 
etc. The interaction between the global and the regional is sometimes 
taken to  be the source o f dominant developmental trends in the w orld  to  - 
day. The localization o f development processes requires the iden tifica tion  
o f a smaller and much more functional un it that does not necessarily im ply 
any k ind  o f interstate arrangements and that is at the same tim e open to  
global communication and exchanges. Such a un it is also called a region, 
representing a part o f a country and therefore being a constitutive u n it o f 
e ither a state or a region in that w ider sense. Regional development, in te r- 
regional cooperation and exchanges are in  th is sense very typ ica l o f 
Europe, in  which the trad ition  o f neat differences between its d iffe ren t 
geographical parts, d iffe ren t peoples, cultures, and histories is very much 
pronounced.
I t  is im portant to  note that regionalism and m ultilateralism  are not 
confined to just one type o f economy o r society, and that trade and ex- 
change are far from being lim ited to  one o r a few particular types, governed 
by a set o f particular regulations. They are diversified, unstandardized, and 
barely controllable, which makes them adaptive to  all parts o f the w orld. 
This explains the polymorphous nature2 o f contemporary regionalism. O ur 
understanding o f polymorphous regionalization may very much depend on 
the understanding o f the term  “ region.”  When reference is made to  a re- 
gion linking  d ifferent states, processes o f integration are stressed. I f  rela- 
tions between d iffe ren t regions w ith in  a single country are discussed, then 
regional inequalities resulting from economic growth (particu larly in  the 
less developed countries) may become one o f the causes o f disintegration o f 
the state. In  contrast, differences among the states belonging to  a given re- 
gion may stimulate regional cohesion. In  any case, the state stands at a d i- 
vide between the integrative, o r interstate/outer and the potentia lly d is in - 
tegrative, or intrastate/inner regionalism.
For purposes o f th is analysis, the two aspects o f regionalism, outer 
o r interstate and inner o r intrastate, should be clearly distinguished. In  
the case o f outer regionalism, regional regulations are compulsory and re- 
quire a great deal o f adjustment and adaptation. They are subject to  an in  - 
terplay o f m ultiple, sometimes vague, economic, politica l, and social in te r- 
ests. Regionalism fails i f  there are no fast results, and the history o f re- 
gional integrations is sometimes said to  be the h isto ry o f fa ilu res. 
Regionalism cannot be confined to  the economic and trade sphere only, and 
that is why it  is extremely vulnerable. In  the process o f harmonization o f 
interests o f the subjects o f regional integration, the display o f differences 
cannot be avoided. Moreover, differences need to  be respected and to le r- 
ated. Inner regionalism, on the contrary, represents the affirm ation o f d if- 
ferences, and therefore avoids harm onization. The emphasis is on the 
identification o f particu lar interests and on interest-based cooperation and 
exchange. Henk Overbeck calls such an expression o f general in terest a 
“hegemonic or comprehensive concept o f control.” 3 Inner regionalism to l- 
erates the power and influence o f the central state, as w ell as the imposed 
regulations, its long as they do not prevent regional development.
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Both inner and outer regionalism challenge the position and role o f 
the national, either central or federal, state. One o f the essential functions 
o f the national state has been to secure the existence o f society and the 
function ing  o f production in a certain geographical space. This role has 
been contested by both outer and inner types o f regional integration, par- 
ticu la rly  at the tim e o f systemic and transitional crises. The role o f the 
state is dim inishing, ana some states are disappearing from  the w orld  
scene. The reemergence and reorganization o f tne state and its role in  de - 
velopm ent and exchange is becoming a crucial developmental issue in the 
contem porary world. I t  follows that the next im portant issue is the type o f 
interrelations among states, be they more or less developed. The present- 
day outer regional integrations, such as the European Union, are able to ab- 
sorb e ither states or regions and eventually reshape the w orld  so as to  pre- 
serve and develop regional integrations based on inner regional develop- 
ment. I f  they prove successful and develop further, the w orld  may not re- 
main d ivided along north/south lines any longer. A fte r the fa ll o f the 
east/west division, this may herald the fa ll o f the next major division o f the 
contemporary world. The fu rther successful development o f regionalism 
may therefore create a completely new global situation, as it is the most dy- 
namic process in the world today.
Regional Cooperation versus Regional Disruptions in the Balkans 
Outer/Interstate Regionalism
The tendency to  bring d ifferent Balkan countries together was par- 
tic u la rly  strong a fter W orld W ar I. The previous e lim ination  o f the 
Turkish dom ination (Balkan wars 1912, 1913) and the breakdown o f the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire (end o f W orld W ar I  in 1918) made it  possible to 
set up new states. Yugoslavia was established in 1918 as a kingdom o f the 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The borders between Albania, Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were partly readjusted. These Versailles ar- 
rangements d id  not particu larly stimulate cooperation among the Balkan 
states, w hich never fe lt at ease w ith th e ir neighbors and remained largely 
preoccupied w ith  the establishment o f th e ir inner cohesion. The strong 
involvem ent o f France, Great Britain, and Russia encouraged tendencies to 
a lly w ith  non-Balkan countries, while the low level o f economic develop- 
m ent never stim ulated e ither trade or any kind o f economic cooperation 
among these states. A fte r the W orld W ar I I ,  which produced a fu rth e r 
readjustment o f borders and te rrito ria l divisions, the Balkans were clearly 
d ivided between the Eastern and Western blocs. These divisions were 
particu larly marked in  the southeastern parts, as Bulgaria was very strongly 
a llied  to  the Soviet Union, while Greece and Turkey were members o f 
NATO . The central Balkan states were successful in creating fo r them - 
selves rather curious types o f international positions: Albania excluded it-  
se lf from  all formal arrangements and was strongly supported by China,* 
Yugoslavia was a founder and organizer o f the Non-A ligned Movement.
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The position o f Rumania witnessed strong tendencies o f autonomous 
foreign policy, too.
Regional cooperation among the Balkan countries began in  the late 
eighties, and was mostly understood as the need to  fo llow  the global ten- 
dencies supporting regional integrations. Yugoslavia took the lead. The 
firs t conference o f foreign ministers o f the Balkan countries took place in 
Belgrade, in  February 1988. A program o f m ultilateral cooperation in  eco- 
nomie areas, transport, ecology, ana tourism , as well as in  sports and cui- 
tu ra i activities followed. Meetings were held in  Sofìa, Athens, Plovdiv, 
Bucharest, Ankara, etc., and plans to  establish jo in t organizations, such as 
The Balkan Economic Cooperation Research Institu te  in  Athens, were 
elaborated and discussed.4
The second conference o f m inisters o f foreign affairs was held in 
Tirana, October 1990. Further development o f regional cooperation was 
defin ite ly accepted as the most relevant target. The incentives to  in s titu - 
tionalize the Balkan cooperation were rather strong. Parallels between re - 
gional integrations in Europe and in the Balkans were emphasized.
Regional cooperation in the Balkans was discussed and planned at 
the moment when most o f the Balkan countries had very serious in te rna l 
problems: the socialist countries were at the brink o f transitional changes 
and most o f them had already launched economic reforms; the socialist 
system was fa lling apart and signs o f the disintegration o f Yugoslavia were 
clearly visible; Albania was experiencing an em igration crisis; and d isor- 
ders in  Rumania were in fu ll swing. Nevertheless, the m inisters o f fo r- 
eign affairs o f these same countries paid a lo t o f attention to  historical as- 
pects o f inter-Balkan relations and tried  to  emphasize the need to  support 
positive changes and tum  to the challenges o f the tw en ty-firs t century. 
Security and inter-ethn ic relations were identified  as the most im portant 
fields o f cooperation among the Balkan states.
The issue o f regional cooperation in the Balkans, o f course, fits in to  
the w ider European and global cooperation context. In  this context, tw o 
main approaches dominate the rare discussions o f regional Balkan coopera- 
tion: the paradigm o f an autonomous regional security and cooperation 
system5 and the paradigm o f a loose, occasional and highly specialized co- 
operation6. In  both cases only the theoretical concepts o f such paradigms 
have been considered, while there is little  practical cooperation and trade.
A ll Balkan countries, including the newly emerged states o f ex- 
Yugoslavia, have signed a number o f bilateral agreements on cooperation 
between each other, and it could be said that most o f them are try ing  to  es- 
tablish closer links and overcome historical divisions. Such cooperation 
remains, however, bilateral. Partners are treated individually, and not ex- 
actly as regional partners. The major switch from bilateral to  regional coop- 
eration has not yet occurred.
The trad ition  o f divisions and disruptions is s till strong and very 
real. The long lis t o f inter-state problems is practically inexhaustible. A t 
the moment, Greece has open disagreements w ith Macedonia, Albania and 
Turkey; Bulgaria has problems w ith  Turkey, Greece, Macedonia; the re- 
gional hegemon, Turkey, has unsolved and open problems w ith  most o f the
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Balkan countries, and displays readiness to become more d irectly involved 
in  the crisis in  ex-Yugoslavia; Rumania has disagreements w ith  Hungary, 
Serbia, Turkey; FR Yugoslavia is in  war co n flic t w ith  both Bosnia- 
Herzegovina rød Croatia, and has open disagreements w ith  Albania and 
Macedonia; Bosnia is in war; Croatia has either war conflicts o r unresolved 
problems w ith  FR Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Slovenia, etc.
In  each particular disagreement or crisis, the Balkan countries rely 
on non-Balkan allies. They just do not depend on each other fo r the solu- 
tion  o f th e ir major problems. The Balkans are not a cohesive region, o r its 
inner cohesiveness lies in  the character and fate o f borderline areas. This 
region has been a borderline area between east and west, north and south, 
in  civilizational, religious, economic, and any other sense fo r centuries, and 
its id e n tity  is its diversity. Unfortunately, a model that would enable the 
fu ll respect fo r such diversity has not been found e ither on the regional 
level, or on the level o f individual countries. The Balkans are a polym or- 
phous region that could support only a very flexible type o f cooperation and 
exchange. I t  is open, and absolutely inclined to  a lly and cooperate w ith  
countries that are outside the region.
Such a polymorphous structure o f the Balkans explains the absence 
o f a hegemonic state or a hegemonic regional project. Tne levels o f devel- 
opm ent o f the Balkan countries are comparable, th e ir histories and posi- 
tions much more sim ilar than they appear at firs t sight. None o f the Balkan 
countries is able to  define its particular hegemonic role o r impose a com- 
prehensive political, ideological or economic concept o f harmonization over 
its neighbors. The rather strong outer influences and alliances result in a 
dispersion o f power. The real economic and politica l power o f any country 
has never been equal to  its m ilitary strength.
The outer regional cooperation in the Balkans has never developed 
institu tiona l frameworks, although a number o f m ultila tera l and bilateral
J eements have been signed. But they have hardly been im plem ented at The cooperation schemes have taken the form o f federal arrangements 
o r free trade arrangements. They might have been proposed as a way out o f 
serious crises and a means to stimulate regional cooperation. A recent ex- 
ample is the federation between Muslims and Croats in  Bosnia. The 
W ashington Agreements7 signed by the Bosnian and Croatian presidents 
on 18 March 1994 clearly define Bosnia as a federation o f the three peoples 
liv ing  in  it  (Muslims, Croats, and Serbs), and envisage the confeaeration 
between the Bosnian and Croatian states. This political move has so far had 
very positive effects on preventing further confrontations and suggesting a 
k ind  o f orderly regulation that seems to be applicable. Another federal 
proposal was launched by the Serbian side. Serbia has approached Greece 
and Macedonia, and also Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, suggesting the 
establishment o f a Balkan federation.8 So far the responses o f tne countries 
concerned have been very weak or openly negative. I t  seems that the 
Balkan countries are not ready to rush in to  any kind o f federal arrange- 
ments, particu larly not now that the results o f the collapse o f the form er 
Yugoslav federation are so visible.
Regional cooperation among the Balkan states thus remains a rather
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abstract idea. The dynamics o f integration o f the Balkan countries w ith in  
e ith e r the central European o r the M editerranean cooperation scheme 
m ight be more realistic and much less compulsory. Both these schemes are 
supportive o f a more open, flexible, ana interest-oriented cooperation, 
ra ttie r than cooperation based mainly on geographical o r historical reasons 
and motives.
The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) can ill us- 
trä te  the type o f regional cooperation that m ight be attractive fo r some 
Balkan countries. Tne Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak 
Republic have signed the agreement in order to strengthen th e ir regional 
cooperation and thus improve the ir cooperation w ith  the European Union. 
Slovenia has already established very good relations w ith  the C EFTA 
countries and has increased its trade w ith  these countries by 50% in only 
one year.9 The gravitation model shows that the increase o f Croatia's trade 
w ith  the CEFTA countries could amount to  about 35% i f  libera liza tion  is 
pursued. Further regional cooperation w ith  the Central European coun- 
tries is very much acceptable to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
other Balkan states that incline to the West.
Mediterranean cooperation is much more abstract and less in s titu - 
tionalized. I t  is inspired by the broad concepts o f common heritage and the 
historical role o f the Mediterranean. The identification o f areas o f cooper- 
ation (e.g., environmental protection, culture, sports, etc.) is easy, but in - 
centives to  trade and interest-led exchanges are weak.
Both the central European and Mediterranean regional cooperation 
schemes are at the same tim e attractive and non-compulsory fo r the Balkan 
countries. Like the regional cooperation o f the Balkan countries itself, they 
do not provide for close and effective links among these countries, but they 
may help to  w iden cooperation and introduce the Balkan countries to  
European and global arrangements.
In  th is respect, there exists a certain s im ila rity  among a ll the 
European peripheral regions (Balkans, M editerranean, C entra l Asia). 
M u ltila te ra l cooperation, particu larly regional, often d irectly opposes the 
autarky o f the semi-developed but at the same tim e interdependent coun- 
trie s .10 Any viable regional cooperation is focused on real regional prob- 
lems and interests, and therefore developed in  the specialized economic 
and infrastructural areas, such as environmental protection, transport, en- 
ergy, trade, etc. Such regional cooperation is hardly institutionalized. I t  is 
m ainly project-oriented. Except fo r the central European regional a r- 
rangements, it  is not designed as long-term  cooperation, propped by the 
clear aim o f further integration in to larger regional organizations. Such co- 
operation may represent a valuable input in  any security arrangement or 
system, but it  cannot stimulate o r influence any security arrangement es- 
sentia lly.
The polymorphous character o f such cooperation is thus revealed, as 
well as the reluctance o f partners to be too much com m itted to  each other. 
I t  has become quite evident by now that the Balkan countries and peoples 
have no strong reasons to  insist on closer mutual cooperation. These coun- 
tries would therefore hardly fo llow  global trends in  strengthening th e ir
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regional cooperation, and w ould probably p re fe r to  stick to  sm all, 
polym orphous and dispersed structures, follow ing only th e ir short-term  
common interests. Resistance to  other types o f regional alliances m ight be 
h istorica lly induced and should be respected in  a ll fu ture arrangements 
that should increasingly be based on a specific cooperation m atrix adjusted 
not only to  the functional economic development o f the region but to  its 
ethnic structures and historical experiences as well.
Inner/Intrastate Regionalism
The iden tifica tion  o f regions w ith in  the states and in te rest in  
regional development and policies are rather new phenomena in the 
Balkans. Concepts o f regional development m ight f it  the general polym or- 
phous structure o f the region, while the “geography o f weak and strong re - 
gions”  now reveals the developmental realities in the states that have a l- 
ways represented composites o f peoples, cultures, economic po ten tia lities, 
etc.
N either the socialist nor the market economies in the Balkans were 
able to  overcome o r suppress considerable inner regional differences in 
levels o f development. The narrowing o f regional differences was, how- 
ever, an im portant developmental goal fo r most o f the Balkan countries, 
notw ithstanding the ir political, social, or economic systems.
The pursuance o f this goal was openly stressed in ex-Yugoslavia, fo r 
example, where north-south relations between d iffe rent regions emerged 
to  be a relevant problem, particu larly when the notion o f the region 
equaled the notion o f a federal republic (e.g., Slovenia) o r autonomous 
province (e.g., Kosovo). The inter-regional or in ter-republic income redis- 
trib u tio n  included assistance to  the less developed regions, which were 
defined as the Republics o f Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
and the Autonomous Province o f Kosovo.11 Such red istribu tion was re- 
sented by the more developed republics and regions, particularly because it 
was compulsory and very often invested in projects that did not pay off.
In  the particular Yugoslav case, the formal and functional d iffe r- 
ences between the republics/national states constituting the federation and 
the regions w ith in  these republics were not quite clear. In  Croatia, fo r ex- 
ample, more locally adjusted development and structura l differences 
among regions led to an open acknowledgment o f regions such as Dalmatia, 
Istria , Slavonia, etc. In  Macedonia or Bosnia this was not the case, and the 
republics as politica l and administrative entities stood form ally fo r regions. 
This situation did not change much during and after the dissolution o f ex - 
Yugoslavia. The establishment o f independent, sovereign states, the over- 
a ll drastic fa ll o f the CNP in all o f them, as well as the d irect and ind irect 
effects o f the war, are now causing increased centralization in  a ll the states 
that emerged from ex-Yugoslavia. The issues o f regional development and 
regional iden tity  are considered to be an internal problem rather than an 
internal advantage. A heated political debate in Croatia, fo r example, over 
the regional position o f Istria has lasted for more than four years now, and
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is spreading to other regions too.
The concept o f a newly formed national state can hardly be harmonized 
w ith  the ideas o f inner regions as functional entities. Regions are even 
taken to  be the cause o f in ternal disintegrations. The dissolution o f ex• 
Yugoslavia was partly caused by structural and economic differences among 
the republics, which fe lt that the federal state was no longer functioning as 
a representative o f m ultiple interests. A lthough the federal state trie d  to  
balance such interests, it  could not harmonize them w ith in  the existing so- 
cia list system. This experience is now wrongly projected to the new situa- 
tion . Instead o f a systemic support fo r the diversity o f regions and local 
development, regions are being divided in to  smaller adm inistrative units 
and put under the control o f the new centralized state, e.g., in  Croatia.
The Balkan countries may need more tim e to accept the modern no- 
tion  o f inner regionalism as one o f the guiding principles o f th e ir devel- 
opment. This is a touchy issue in the context o f over-all regional ins tab ili- 
ties and ethnic divisions. The general polymorphous structure o f the 
Balkan states and the Balkan region offers, however, a sound basis fo r prac- 
tic ing  inner regional development and outer regional cooperation w ith in  
the fram ework o f clearly defined interests and flex ib le  cooperative 
approaches.
C onclusion
The specific feature o f the Balkans is its polymorphous structure and the 
concentration o f diversities (geographical, historical, ethnic, c iv iliza tiona l, 
and cultura l) in a comparatively small space. The long history o f strong in - 
fluences o f non-Balkan hegemons in the region creates the impression tha t 
the Balkans have been put together by outside pressures rather than as a re- 
suit o f regional development itself. In  this transitional and borderline area 
the inner links are d ifficu lt to preserve. Reactions to  attempts at homoge- 
nization have so far been deep and painfu l disruptions. Oscillations be - 
tween closer cooperation and deeper disruptions indicate that there is no 
need to  impose any kind o f hara, institu tiona lized cooperative schemes 
upon the societies undergoing ra ther fast changes o f th e ir p roper 
iden tities.
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Conflict Resolution by 
Economic Cooperation and Integration? 
The Case of Cyprus
H ansjörg  B rey
W ithout any doubt, the Cyprus question is o f one o f the most com ־ 
plex and most protracted conflicts in  southeastern Europe.1 And Cyprus 
has been a kina o f laboratoiy o f peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts o f 
international bodies and national peacemakers alike. The U nited Nations, 
the European Union, the Council o f Europe, the United States, and others 
have been extensively engaged in  the issue.2 More than tw enty years a fter 
the invasion and occupation by the Turkish m ilitary o f northern Cyprus, a ll 
e fforts to  find  a solution to  the con flic t are deadlocked. Anyone who is 
surprised o r disappointed about the uselessness o f UN resolutions con- 
ce m ine the con flic t in  form er Yugoslavia would have had his illusions de- 
stroyea long ago had he observed the role o f the international state com- 
m unity in  the Cyprus conflict. N oticing the modest engagement o f west- 
em  governments in  the containment o f the Yugoslav crisis, we reach a con- 
elusion from  yet another po in t o f view: how should we expect western 
governments to  engage in the solution o f a re latively m inor co n flic t like  
the one in  Cyprus?
Focusing on Cyprus and the countless efforts to  solve the Cyprus 
problem  through intercom m unal talks, proxim ity talks, o r high level 
m eetings, I  agree w ith  the analysis o f H ad jipavlou-T rigeorg is and 
Trigeorgis that most o f the efforts to  solve the Cyprus conflict so far “ have 
been h igh ly form al and legalistic, rig id , and narrow in  approach.” 3 The 
authors call fo r an evolutionary approach that identifies fields o f common 
interests rather than emphasize com petitive and antagonistic interests. I t  
is my argument that interests common to the Cypriot conflicting parties can 
be iden tified  in  the fie ld  o f economic cooperation. S im ilar suggestions 
have supposedly been made by UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali in  his 
more recent efforts toward a permanent peace fo r Cyprus focusing on con- 
fidence bu ild ing  measures in  the economic field.
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The Main Characteristics of the Cyprus Conflict
In  order to  make comparison w ith other conflicts easier, I w ill now 
try  to  b rie fly  characterize the Cyprus conflict, bearing in m ind, o f course, 
that it  is impossible to  outline here the history o f the conflict:
1) There is no consensus on a de fin ition  o f the problem . The 
Greek-Cypriots view the problem as one o f foreign invasion and occupa- 
tion , ana violation o f international law and human rights since 1974. Thus, 
the Greek-Cypriots emphasize in ter alia:
a) the unlawfulness o f the invasion o f Cvprus by mainland 
Turkish m ilitary forces in the summer o f 1974;
b) the perm anent displacem ent o f about 160,000 Greek- 
Cypriots who had to leave the ir homes and land during that 
m ilita ry  intervention;
c) the m ilita rily  enforced de facto division o f the island since 
1974; moreover, the ‘T urk ish  occupied area״ covers about 
37% o f the island’s surface, an area much greater than the 
share o f Turldsh-Cypriots in the overall population (18% in  
1960);
d) the unlaw ful declaration o f independence o f a “ Turkish 
Republic o f N orthern Cyprus” Ъу the T urk ish -C yprio t 
leader Rauf Denktash in  November, 1983; the “TR N C ” has 
indeed not been in te rna tiona lly  recognized except by 
Turkey
e) the occupation o f the pseudo-state’s area by a contingent o f 
at least 30,000 soldiers from Turkey and the stationing o f 
Turkish tanks and other m ilitary equipment;
0 the planned settlement o f a great num ber o f population, 
mostly peasants, from Turkey on G reek-Cypriot properties. 
This colonization, together w ith  a massive em igration o f lo - 
cal Turldsh-Cypriots has seriously altered the demographic 
structure o f northern Cyprus; Turkish-Cypriots are in  dan- 
ger o f becoming a m inority there.
Contrary to this, the Turkish-Cypriot side sees the problem  as one 
o f neglect, domination, and oppression o f the m inority, based on its experi- 
ences from  1963 to  1974. Tne Turkish-Cypriot position stresses in te r alia 
that:
a) the Greek-Cypriots have never given up th e ir irredentist 
dream o f enosis, i.e., the unification w ith  th e ir mother 
country Greece;
b) already in 1963 the Greek-Cypriot side had destroyed the 
basis to r peaceful coexistence o f the two communities; in 
November 1963, President Makarios had suggested a 
revision o f the constitution o f the Republic o f Cyprus. This 
revision was considered to  aim at depriving the Turkish- 
Cypriots o f the ir m inority rights;
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c) the injustices suffered by the Turkish-Cypriots since the 
intercommunal clashes o f December 1963 have fu rther 
proven the unwillingness o f the Greek-Cypriots fo r 
peaceful cooperation based on equal rights;
d) the intervention o f the Turkish army in the summer o f 1974 
is considered to have been a peace operation legally ju s tifie d  
by the Treaty o f Guarantee that the Republic o f Cyprus had 
established w ith Greece, Turkey, and Great B rita in in  1960; 
after all the Greek junta had toppled Makarios in  July 1974 
and tem porarily put a well-known nationalist terrorist,
Nikos Sampson, in power. Foreign intervention was thus 
unavoidable in order to safeguard the Turldsh-Cypriots’ 
security.
2) Views o f a desirable solution to  the problem are very d iffe re n t 
on both sides o f the Green L ine .4 The Greek-Cypriot side’s aspiration is a 
bizonal federation w ith  a single sovereignty and a strong authority o f the 
federal government. This option is seen by most Greek-Cypriots as a com - 
prom ise to the ideal o f a unitary state like  the reunited Germany. The 
leadership o f the Turkish-Cypriots has u n til recently accepted a loose fed - 
eration or confederation as a maximal compromise to  the status quo. A t the 
end o f August, 1994, even this option was abandoned by the T u rk ish - 
C yprio t parliament. According to  a parliam entary decision, negotiations 
should not be resumed u n til the Greek-Cypriots have acknowledged the 
po litica l equality and sovereignty o f the Turldsh-Cypriots.
3) Another im portant factor applying to  the situation in Cyprus has 
been described as “the absence o f a hurting stalemate.”  N either com m u- 
n ity  on the island is suffic iently dissatisfied w ith  the status quo to  make 
the d iff ic u lt com prom ises necessary fo r reso lving the c o n flic t.5 
A dditionally, the permanent presence o f the U nited Nations Forces in  
Cyprus (UNFICYP) has since 1964 facilitated a certain adjustment to the de 
facto  partition.
4) So far, numerous efforts to find  a substantial solution have 
failed. In te r alia, negotiations have centered around the fo llow ing ques- 
tions:
a) the size o f the two cantons form ing the new federation;
b) the powers o f the federal and cantonal governments and the 
representation o f both communities in the tw o houses o f par- 
liam ent;
c) dem ilita riza tion, namely the w ithdraw al o f the Turkish  
m ilita ry from northern Cyprus;
d) continuation o f Turkey as a guarantor power for Cyprus;
e) the so-called three freedoms, claimed by the G reek-Cypriot 
side: freedoms, fo r both communities, o f movement, property, 
and settlement in the new federation.
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R eactions to  F a ilu res
I t  would be unjust to  put equal blame on the Creek- and Turkish- 
C yprio t leaders fo r failure to  find a solution so far. In  his report to  the 
Security Council o f 31 May 1994, UN secretaiy-general Boutros Chali un i- 
la tera lly blamed the Turkish side fo r a general lack o f po litica l w ill and for 
blocking an agreement on major confidence bu ild ing  measures by raising 
numerous objections.6 The reluctance to  agree on any change o f the status 
quo has indeed been a constant factor in  Turkish-Cypriot policy.
Presently, the government o f the Republic o f Cyprus reacts to th is 
stalemate mainly in  two ways: First, w ith  the moral bacldng o f UN résolu- 
tions, the government tries to  fu rther isolate the Turkish-C yprio ts in te r- 
nationally. On 5 July 1994, fo llow ing a C reek-C yprio t in itia tive , the 
European C ourt o f Justice declared export certificates from  northern  
Cyprus invalid. The court's decision was perceived by the G reek-Cypriots 
as an im portant diplom atic victoiy, as it  was supposed to  pu t a defin ite  end 
to  illegal exports from the occupied areas to  member countries o f the EU. 
Concerning the prospects fo r a settlement w ith  the T urk ish-C yprio t side, 
the po litica l mainstream in the Republic o f Cyprus seems to  pre fer to  leave 
the situation as it  is. Hopes focus on a speedy in teg ra tion  in to  the 
European Union, especially after the recent setting up o f a schedule for the 
commencement o f accession talks.7 The process o f integration is supposed 
to act as a catalyst fo r the solution o f the Cyprus problem. This hope is in - 
deed notoriously optim istic. A t present it  seems more like ly  that only the 
rum p-R epublic o f Cyprus w ill be integrated in to  the EU whereas the 
‘T R N C ” w ill be further integrated in to Turkey.
M y fu rther remarks are based on the assumption that there is s t ill 
enough reason to  search for a political solution to  the Cyprus problem  w ith  
the aim o f integrating the whole island into the EU. I t  is my argum ent 
that, to  this purpose, projects o f a lim ited  economic cooperation between 
the tw o communities are most like ly to  yie ld tangible results.
Boutros-Ghali’s Initiative to Introduce Confidence Building 
Measures (CBM)
CBMs were for the first tim e put on top o f the negotiation agenda 
in  the high level talks between President C lafkos C lerides and R auf 
Denktash in  New York in May and June 1993. In  previous documents, 
Boutros-G hali had proposed a num ber o f such desirable measures. 
Included among others, were reduction o f m ilita ry  spending and troops, 
freedom o f movement fo r tourists crossing the Green Line, and revision o f 
textbooks used in  schools on both sides. The general purpose o f the CBM  
was to  be the creation o f an atmosphere o f mutual trust between the Greek- 
C yprio t and Turkish-C ypriot comm unities through intense com m unica- 
tion , w hich trust would become the basis fo r a future comprehensive solu - 
tion  o f the problem.
The efforts o f the UN peacemakers and intercommunal negotiations
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since May 1993 focused on a package o f two major projects o f confidence 
bu ild ing  concerning m ainly economic aspects. This package consisted o f 
the fo llow ing elements:
1) Reopening o f the ghost town o f Varosha, south o f Famagusta, and 
its resettlement by members o f both communities. U n til 1974, Varosha had 
been the major tourist resort on the island and ever since the area has been 
kept as a kind o f pawn by the Turkish-Cypriots. Both Greek- and Turkish- 
Cypriots should be allowed to  set up businesses in  the area and to  se ll 
products and sendees from th e ir respective communities.
2) Reopening o f the Nicosia In te rna tiona l A irp o rt w hich lies 
w ith in  the B uffer Zone controlled by the UN and which has not been used 
since 1974.
Both areas were supposed to be tem porarily adm inistered by the 
U n ited  Nations. A team o f experts from  the W orld  Bank ana the 
International M onetary Fund reported in  December 1993 that the package 
would y ie ld  significant benefits to  both communities:8
1) G reek-Cypriots, who owned most properties and hotels in  
Varosha, would benefit by th e ir recovery. Rebuilding both areas would in  
general boost investment and the demand fo r skilled labor in the Republic 
o f Cyprus.
2) The Turkish-C ypriot side would benefit from a quick and sub- 
stantial im provem ent in  the standard o f liv ing . The Gross Dom estic 
Product was supposed to  increase by as much as 20% annually during the 
firs t few years. This would be possible through increased em ploym ent, 
better m arketing opportunities fo r Turkish-Cypriot products, and increased 
tourism . The package w ould also alleviate the G reek-Cypriot embargo 
against the “TR N C ” .
In  order to  enforce the acceptance o f the package, Boutros-Ghali 
launched an intensive diplom atic in itiative w ith  consultations in both parts 
o f Nicosia, in  Athens, Ankara, Washington, and several western European 
capitals. A t the end, as already mentioned, the in itia tive  failed in May
1994.
A t present, according to  President Glafkos C lerides “ the G reek- 
C yprio t siae holds the view that im plem entation o f the CBMs w ithou t 
finding a common basis on the main issues w ill not contribute to the solu- 
tion, but w ill perpetuate the status quo.” 9 Rauf Denkt ash, who was the one 
to  abandon the negotiation table on the CBMs last year, recently said that 
he is now ready to  im plem ent the CBMs.
The UN  as w ell as o ther in ternational institu tions s till see the 
CBMs as a significant, i f  not the last chance to  solve the problem. A t the 
end o f January 1995, the General Assembly o f the Council o f Europe reaf- 
firm ed that it  considers the CBM  proposed by the UN secretary general to  
“constitute the best prospects fo r a settlement, on which foundation fu rth e r 
progress can be made.” 1”  An analysis o f the logic behind the CBMs reveals 
much more than just the last chance to  get out o f the stalemate.
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Let me summarize the arguments in favor o f CBMs, specifically in 
the economic fie ld :
1) Generally, the CBM-proposals contain elements o f an evolution- 
ary approach to  a solution mentioned earlier, as opposed to  the classical 
static approach. Such an approach tries to satisfy the needs, concerns, and 
interests o f both com m unities. According to  Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and 
Trigeorgis, “ the only way to  test each other's intentions in  practice w ithout 
risking ru in  is precisely firs t to  try  an integrated solution on a lim ite d  
scale, w ith  an option  to  expand in  case o f success and an option to  
contract/abandon w ith  lim ited  losses in  the case o f fa ilu re .” 11 Opening 
lim ited  zones o f economic cooperation is exactly such an option. In  the 
case o f fa ilure the loss remains lim ited.
2) In  general, the willingness to change the po litica l status quo is 
supposed to  be much greater i f  such a change im plies substantial gains 
rather than fear o f severe losses. For the Turkish-C ypriot side, CBMs can 
o ffe r prospects o f significant economic im provem ent. The present eco- 
nomie situation in  the N orth is indeed desolate compared to  the South: 
GDP per capita is less than one-th ird (around U.S.$3,500) in  the N orth. 
P roductiv ity is low  and underemployment is notorious. The economy is 
highly dependent on Turkey, which provides more than one-th ird  o f the 
GDP in  grants, loans, and other forms o f transfers. In  1990, Turkey cov- 
ered more than 30% o f the highly deficitary budget. I t  must be noted that 
along w ith  th is financial aid from  Turkey a high rate o f in fla tion  is im - 
ported as w e ll.12
Analysts had already realized in the 1960s a need to  balance the 
great income disparities between Greek- and Turkish-C ypriots fo r the sake 
o f p o litica l and social s ta b ility .13 The Commission o f the European 
Com m unity in  its “Avis”  o f 30 June 1993, concerning the C ypriot applica- 
tion to  the EC has expressed sim ilar concerns about the present situation. 
The commission is optim istic that follow ing accession to  the EU the eco- 
nomie backwardness o f the N orth can be outweighed by a considerable im - 
pact fo r economic growth. Such an impact, according to  the commission, 
should be based on a careful procedure and accompanied by appropriate 
measures.14 In  its recent d ra ft resolution on the accession process o f 
Cyprus, the Council o f EU M inisters has proposed that the advantages o f 
an integration in to  the EU should be made more obvious to  the Turkish- 
Cypriots than before.
3) I f  we are to th ink o f ways to  prevent the Turkish-C ypriot leader- 
ship from  seeking fu rthe r rapprochement w ith  Turkey and give them in - 
centives to  agree to  accession to  the EU, we have to  take in to  account the 
Turkish-C yprio t desires and options. Besides separate sovereignty, which 
is indeed unacceptable to  the Greek-Cypriots, such options in the economic 
fie ld  are supposed to  be a) h igher standard o f liv ing , b) econom ic 
independence from  Turkey, and c) opportunities fo r trade and attainm ent 
o f a greater share o f international tourism.
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The Turkish-C ypriot side considers the G reek-C ypriot economic 
embargo to be a major obstacle to the economic development o f the N orth. 
W ithout a doubt, the decision o f the European Court o f Justice in  1995 to  
ban Turkish-C ypriot products from the EU m arket has considerably in - 
creased the burden o f the embargo on the Turkish-C ypriot side. A fte r all, 
u n til recently, around 80% o f the export from  northern Cyprus went in to  
markets o f EU members. Soon after the ru ling  o f the court, the Turkish- 
C ypriot parliam ent announced a policy o f more intense cooperation w ith  
Turkey in  the fields o f politics, defense, and economy. I t  is obvious, that 
the increase in the embargo has induced the Turkish-C yprio t leadership to  
take such steps. The po litics o f embargo against the “TR N C ”  may be 
m orally justified . Indeed, policy-makers in  the Republic o f Cyprus must 
realize that the embargo policy may be a strong weapon against the Turkish- 
C yprio t side. I t  is obviously not a means fo r bu ild ing  confidence, bu t 
ratner a step backward on the way to  fin d in g  an evolutionary solution. 
There are lessons to be learned from the UN embargo against Serbia and 
Montenegro and from the Greek economic embargo against the FYROM . 
They have accentuated social inequalities and strengthened the nationalist 
factors w ith in  the societies affected, but have not yielded many po litica l re- 
suits in  the desired direction.
L iftin g  the embargo may be a painfu l compromise fo r the Greek- 
Cypriot side. But, i f  a solution o f the Cyprus problem  is s till a p rio rity  fo r 
the Greek-Cypriots, CBMs seems to  be tne only viable path. O pportunities 
to  open zones o f lim ited  economic cooperation should be reconsidered. 
Such economic projects should be accompanied by a whole set o f CBM s, 
like efforts to  lim ited  dem ilitarization, opening the Green Line fo r regular 
visits, and the revision o f textbooks used in the schools on both sides o f the 
Green Line.
In  the case o f Cyprus, w ith a booming economy in the South, even a 
lim ited  redistribution o f  wealth from the South to  the N orth  w ould cer- 
tainly impose no major financial problem s.15 There are certa in ly additional 
problems to be overcome. By choosing the CBMs path to  an evolutionary 
solution, any C ypriot government w ill be hard pressed to  fin d  m ajority  
support in the parliament (and President Clerides has in  fact never had the 
consent o f his parliament fo r the CBM s). This, however, should not pre- 
vent the government from try ing  once more. The gains from  a auite lim - 
ited stake could be great. I f  successful, the Cyprus laboratory would proba- 
bly invent a model fo r conflic t resolution through economic cooperation to  
be repeated by others.
NOTES
1. For further reading on the history o f the Republic o f Cyprus and the 
genesis o f the Cyprus conflict, see Michael Attalides, Cyprus, Nationalism and 
International Politics (Edinburgh, 1979); Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations 
since 1955 (San Francisco/London, 1990); Pavlos Tzermias, Geschichte der 
Republik Zypern (Tübingen, 1991); for a brief account, see Hansjörg Brey, “The
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3. Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Lenos Trigeorgis, “Cyprus. An 
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(2) (1993):340-60.
4. See Brey, "A Solution to the Cyprus Question.”
5. Brian Mandeli, “The Cyprus C onflict: Explaining Resistance to 
Resolution,” in Norma Salem (ed.), Cyprus, pp. 201-26.
6. Report o f the UN secretary-general to the W orld Security Council, 
31 May 1994 (Document S/1994/629).
7. Following severe pressure from Greece, the EU has decided to start ne- 
gotiations on the Cypriot accession six months after the intergovernmental 
conference scheduled for 1996.
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Nicosia International A irport Package; (unpublished), December 1993.
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(1995).
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1995.
11. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis, “Cyprus,”  p. 352.
12. For an analysis o f the economy o f the “TRNC,” see C. H. Dodd (ed.), 
The Political Social and Economic Development o f Northern Cyprus (Huntingdon, 
1993).
13. See Stahis Panagides, “Communal C o n flic t and Economic 
Considérations: The Case o f Cyprus,” Journal o f Peace Research, 5 (1968):133-46.
14. Statement o f the Commission of the European Community concerning 
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Bulgaria’s Trade Relations 
With Its Balkan Neighbors: 
What They Are and What They Could Be
M ichael L . W yzan*
The m anifold economic and po litica l changes taking place in  the 
countries o f Central and Eastern Europe (C EE) and the fo rm er Soviet 
Union (FSU) since 1989 have had particularly laige effects on th e ir foreign 
trade behavior. In  keeping w ith  the theme o f this volume, they have been 
challenged by enormous falls in  trade volumes w ith  th e ir c h ie f erstw hile  
trad ing partners, the member states o f the form er C ouncil fo r M utual 
Economic Assistance (C M EA), and in  the post-Soviet case, o ther form er 
Soviet republics. Additional challenges are presented by the UN sanctions 
against the rump-Yugoslavia and Iraq, major trading partners fo r several o f 
these lands.
On the other hand, these states have also seen new opportunities in  
enhanced possibilities fo r trade and other economic links w ith  th e ir capi- 
ta lis t neighbors. However, these opportunities are lim ited  by protection- 
ism in the W estern w orld, especially on the part o f the European U nion 
(EU ).
Nowhere have these effects been more dram atic than in  Bulgaria. 
As to  challenges, the country was the most tied  in to  the C M E A  trad ing 
system o f a ll o f its European member states and suffered the b iggest de - 
cline in  Eastern trade among them. Today Bulgaria has the highest share 
o f exports to  the EU which that body views as sensitive (i.e ., in  need o f 
special protection against imports); it has also been h it as hard as any coun - 
try  by the UN sanctions. As to opportunities, Bulgaria has an in teresting 
and diverse set o f neighbors: two medium-developed, dynamic, but rather 
unstable m arket economies (Greece and Turkey), a struggling fe llow  fo r- 
mer CM EA member-state (Romania), and two b lockadedform er Yugoslav 
republics (rum p Yugoslavia and Macedonia).
Trade w ith  Doth Greece and Turkey offers opportunities to  avoid 
the bilateral payments problems that inhere in  economic intercourse w ith  
CEE and FSU states. I t  also allows the country to  circum vent (legally) the 
UN sanctions on rum p Yugoslavia and, in  the case o f Turkey, EU  protec- 
tionism , although, o f course, the level o f protectionism  in  Turkey can also 
be quite high. To the Bulgaria-based scholar, such trade is a particu la rly
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appealing object o f examination. Data produced in Athens and Ankara are 
available over a longer period and are categorized in  a more consistent 
manner than Bulgarian figures. These partner data may also be more accu - 
rate. Although such a claim is unverifiable, we shed ligh t on the question 
below by reporting on the results o f a detailed comparison o f Bulgarian and 
Turkish data on th e ir bilateral trade in 1992.
A num ber o f interesting questions present themselves:
To what degree does Bulgarian data portray a d iffe re n t p icture  o f 
the level and structure o f the country's trade w ith  Greece and Turkey than 
do the data from these countries?
To what extent is Bulgarian trade w ith  Greece and Turkey below its 
potentia l levels?
To what extent are changes in  the structure o f Bulgaria’s trade w ith  
Greece and Turkey consistent w ith  expectations derived from  economic 
theory? W hat do such changes indicate about the progress o f economic re - 
form  in  Bulgaria?
In  this article, we attem pt to  shed some ligh t on each o f these ques- 
tions. The rem ainder o f the article is organized as follows. In  the next 
section, we b rie fly  describe the general trends and issues in  Bulgarian fo r- 
eign trade since the fa ll o f communism. The th ird  section compares 
Bulgarian and Greek data on Bulgarian-Greek trade, and Bulgarian and 
Turkish data on Bulgarian-Turlash trade, w ith  a view to  evaluating the re li- 
ab ility  o f Bulgarian trade data.
The fourth section has two subsections. The firs t examines the de- 
viation o f actual trade flows from potential ones based on em pirical work by 
other authors em ploying cross-country data. The second subsection con- 
tains a statistical analysis that evaluates the consistency o f changes in the 
structure o f Bulgarian-Greek and Bulgarian-Turkish trade w ith  economic 
theory; the analysis also sheds ligh t on the progress o f Bulgarian reforms. 
The fifth  section summarizes ana concludes.
Trends and Issues in Bulgarian Foreign Trade since the Fall of 
Communism
Bulgarian foreign trade since 1989 has seen a huge fa ll in  trade vo i- 
ume and an adverse movement in the terms o f trade. These phenomena, 
largely the result o f the break-up o f the CM EA trading bloc at the start o f 
1991, were the most severe in the region. This was the result o f the coun- 
try ’s high degree o f trade dependence on the bloc, w ith  in 1990, 80% o f ex- 
ports going to  the CM EA and 76% o f imports coming from it. M uch o f the 
decline in output during 1990-93— 27.5% fo r GDP and 40% fo r industria l 
production— can be traced to  these foreign trade shocks.
There was a large fa ll in 1990 in both exports and im ports. Another 
large decline occurred in 1991, but it  was masked (especially fo r exports) by 
the fact that now all trade w ith  form er CM EA partners was conducted in 
convertible currency. The modest trade and current account deficits regis- 
tered in  1992 reached alarm ing proportions in  1993, largely due to  the
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strong real appreciation o f the lev in  the la tter year. In  1994, the country 
enjoyed its firs t favorable annual trade and current account balances since 
the start o f the reform s.1 Both the increase in exports and decrease in  im - 
ports can be traced to  changes in the real exchange rate; the lev moved from 
33 per U.S. do lla r in early 1994 to  about 55 by the spring and about 65 by 
the fa ll.
L ike other countries in the region, Bulgaria has seen a sh ift in  the 
structure o f its trade away from Eastern Europe and toward the O ECD, es- 
pecially the EU . By 1992, the O ECD accounted fo r 42.2% o f Bulgaria’s ex- 
ports and 43.8% o f its imports, w ith  Eastern Europe responsible fo r 39.2% 
o f exports and 36.3% o f its imports. Since then the weight o f the O ECD in  
both Bulgarian exports and im ports has increased to  between 46% and 47% 
(fo r the EU alone, between 33% and 34%), w ith  most o f th is increase oc- 
curring  in  1994.2
Bulgaria was the last European form er CM EA member state to sign 
an in te rim  free trade agreement w ith  the EU. The agreement was ra tified  
w ith  considerable delay, going in to  effect on 1 January 1994, instead o f the 
expected 1 July 1993. This delay was largely the result o f objections raised 
by poorer EU  member states concerned about Bulgarian exports o f food 
ana other low-tech products. On the other hand, the period o f va lid ity o f 
the in te rim  agreement was unusually short, as a more comprehensive 
Europe Agreement came in to force on 1 February 1995, the same date as 
those w ith  the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia. Like that signed by 
Romania, the interim  agreement was less favorable than those reached w ith  
the Visegrád lands, bu t th is is generally not a feature o f the Europe 
Agreements, which involve cooperation as well as trade liberalization.
Bulgarian specialists expect that the current d irection o f trade, w ith  
approximately equal shares for CEE, the EU and EFTA, and the rest o f the 
w orld, w ill persist in  the future. They also po in t to  a tendency fo r the 
share o f exports to the EU consisting o f sophisticated m anufactured a rti- 
cles (e.g., machinery, electronics, weaponry) to  decline in  favor o f pro- 
cessed foods, chemicals, and metals. However, th is trend is not visible in  
w ith  commerce w ith  C EE and Arab countries.3
Despite Bulgaria’s increasingly Western trade orientation, the EU 
represents a lower share o f its exports than fo r any other nation in  C EE, 
except fo r Slovakia and the Baltic states. A lthough th is is partly the result 
o f physical distance from  the center o f Europe and the country’s relative 
paucity o f export goods suitable fo r Western markets, two other factors de- 
serve mention. Tne firs t is the fact that Bulgaria has a higher share o f the 
products o f so-called “ sensitive sectors”  in its exports to  the EU than any 
other C EE state. The figure was 75.1% in  1993, vs. 46.2% in  Polana, 
39.3% in  the form er Czechoslovakia, 56.6% in  Hungary, and 62.5% in  
Romania.4 These sectors are those fo r which trade libera liza tion is less 
rapid and extensive than fo r other goods.
Second, Bulgaria sees itse lf as h it particularly hard by the UN sane- 
tions against the rump Yugoslavia in  place since June 1992. I t  is impossible 
to find  a re liab le estimate o f the losses arising from  these sanctions, a l- 
though the M in istry o f Trade has come up w ith  the figure o f $6.139 b illio n
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fo r the period through September 1994.5 This is an im probably large sum, 
in  view o f the fact that CDP in 1994 was on the order o f only $10 b illion .
Moreover, certain geographical regions o f the country and segments 
o f the population have earned large economic rents by smuggling fuel and 
other scarce goods in to Serbia. F inally, trade w ith  Macedonia has o ffic ia lly  
reached large proportions— number two in the export ranking and num ber 
six fo r imports during 1994.® The form er Yugoslav republic is a co rrid o r 
fo r products w inding up, largely illegally, in  Serbia/Montenegro. Indeed, a 
controversia l study by the then sem i-o ffic ia l Agency fo r Econom ic 
Coordination and Development estimated direct losses from  the lengthen- 
ing o f transport links, unpaid exports, and reorientation o f production to  
new markets through June 1993 to  be only $230 m illion .7
Before proceeding any further, a few words are in  o rde r on the 
quality o f Bulgarian foreign trade statistics. Two sets o f figures are avail- 
able, one based on payments statistics produced by com m ercial banks and 
other from the customs authorities. These data vary considerably in  magni- 
tude and even in  whether they portray a trade surplus o r a d e fic it fo r a 
given period. A t the IM F ’s urging, the Bulgarian National Bank took the 
unusual step o f including the customs-based figures in  the balance o f pay - 
ments. This move was motivated by the fact that the banks are unable to  
distinguish between payments related to  exports and im ports and o ther 
foreign transactions, lending a substantial upward bias to  trade statistics. 
On the other hand, the customs statistics are subject to  a considerable de- 
gree o f under-reporting o f transactions to  avoid the payment o f duties.
We compare below the pictures portrayed by b ila te ra l customs 
statistics from Bulgaria and two o f its major trading partners. I f  Bulgarian 
and partner statistics on the ir mutual trade te ll largely the same story, it  
would support the notion o f relying on the customs-based trade figures.
Trade with Greece and Turkey 
Issues
Trade w ith  Bulgaria’s two southern neighbors, Greece and Turkey, 
is a particu larly interesting case study o f the general trade developments 
described above. Greece is in the EU, but one o f its least developed mem- 
bers, and the only one fo r which Bulgarian trade is not d irectly  affected by 
the U.N. sanctions against rump Yugoslavia.
Greece is a major trading partner, th ird  fo r exports and fou rth  fo r 
imports in  1994,® one w ith which Bulgaria trad itiona lly, bu t no longer, ran 
trade surpluses. I t  is a major source o f d irect foreign investment, having at 
end-1994 the largest number o f projects, about 20% o f the to ta l. However, 
the investments are on the average fa irly  small, approxim ately $58,000, 
pu tting  it  eighth in  to ta l amount o f money invested. Trade and other 
bilateral economic activities are lim ited  by the fact that the countries share 
only one border crossing northeast o f Thessaloniki.
The characteristics o f Bulgarian-Turkish trade and o ther economic
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activity are in some ways sim ilar to  those o f between Bulgarian-Greek eco- 
nomie relations. In  1994 Turkey was in  seventh place in the export ranking 
and eleventh fo r imports.® Trade levels have increased substantially in  re- 
cent years, w ith  trade balances heavily in  Bulgaria’s favor. Even more so 
than Greece, Turkey has a large num ber o f tiny investments in the countiy. 
As o f August 1994 Turkey was second in the number o f o ffic ia lly  registered 
investments, but the ir average value was but $7,000.10
In  trade w ith  Turkey, Bulgaria does not face EU protectionism (e.g., 
sensitive sectors) o r such other distortions as the Common A gricu ltu ra l 
Policy. Nonetheless, trade w ith  Turkey is far from  free. Options fo r 
avoiding protectionist measures like port fees o r additional taxes, by in - 
vesting in  jo in t venture plants in  Turkey are rarely employed by less- 
developed and inexperienced trad ing partners like Bulgaria. Moreover, 
even before, and in  anticipation of, its recent free trade agreement w ith the 
EU, Turkey unilaterally reduced its ta riffs on EU products, d iverting trade 
away from Bulgaria.
Bulgarian-Turkish trade relations during the transition period have 
not been com plicated by the sort o f po litica l disagreements tnat have at 
times shadowed ties w ith Greece (e.g., over Macedonia). A t the same tim e, 
economic relations w ith  Turkey have an ethnic dimension missing in the 
Greek context: Turkish investments tend to be in  regions w ith  mixed 
Bulgarian and ethnic Turkish populations, such as Kürdzhali or Haskovo.
Data
The top ha lf o f Table 1 presents officia l Bulgarian and Greek data on 
the country’s b ila tera l trade from  1986 through 1993. D uring the m id- 
1980s the differences between what the two sides reported on that trade for 
a given year were astonishingly large. This was especially the case fo r 
Bulgarian exports, fo r which, fo r example, in 1988 Bulgaria reported $326 
m illion  and Greece only $47 m illion , but it  is also true fo r Bulgarian im - 
ports. Interestingly, during 1986-90 Sofia always reported a much higher 
figure on a given trade flow  than d id  Athens.
For Bulgarian-Turkish trade, the differences in the data reported by 
Ankara and Sofia in  the mid-1980s were also large, i f  not to  the same ex- 
tent. Once again, from 1986 through 1990 Bulgaria always registered a 
larger flow  than its partner. However, unlike in the Greek case, the pro- 
portiona! difference between what the two countries reported generally 
grew over tim e. Note also that Bulgarian data on trade w ith  Turkey realis ־ 
tica lly  depict a growing dollar trade volume, a pattern not reflected in  
Bulgarian data on trade w ith  Greece.
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
00063378
212 Michael L. Wyzan
TABLE 1
Bulgarian Trade w ith  Greece and Turkey 
(m illion  U.S. dollars)
Exports Im ports Turnover
Partner Bulgarian Partner Bulgarian Partner Bulgarian 
Year Data Data Data Data Data Data
Greece
1986 34.17 271.73 58.79 102.58 92.96 374.31
1987 78.63 322.99 50.41 102.63 129.04 425.62
1988 47.06 325.87 33.85 116.13 40.91 442.00
1989 69.03 418.90 68.56 116.18 137.59 535.08
1990 108.10 210.01 52.97 82.64 161.07 292.65
1991 128.53 71.01 87.79 23.18 216.32 94.19
1992 161.00 182.00 167.17 261.24 328.17 443.24
1993 197.57 198.75 303.36 261.08 500.93 459.83
Turkey
1985 98.75 n.a. 7.70 n.a. 106.45 n.a.
1986 41.47 76.74 15.52 43.46 56.99 120.20
1987 9.36 21.85 14.49 30.98 23.85 52.83
1988 15.71 49.93 28.15 69.10 43.86 119.03
1989 3.30 22.03 26.72 58.03 30.02 80.06
1990 31.88 92.63 10.37 70.18 42.25 162.81
1991 139.90 100.97 75.36 21.32 215.26 337.55
1992 224.53 252.70 72.09 69.00 296.62 321.70
1993 243.25 288.11 86.21 62.67 330.16 350.78
Source: Institu te  o f Trade, Sofia; Export Research Centre, Panhellenic
Exporters Association, Athens; State In s titu te  o f S tatistics, 
Ankara.
I t  is useful to  pause to reflect on the causes o f the enormous d iffe r- 
ences in  the data reported by the two parties to  one and the same trade 
flow. Before 1992, Bulgarian trade data adhered to  the classification system 
employed by the CM EA. During this era, Bulgarian exports transported 
through Greece o r Turkey to a th ird  country m ight w ina up in Bulgarian 
statistics as exports to  one o f those two lands. A special problem  w ith  re- 
spect to  trade w ith  Greece was an apparent tendency to  record goods trans- 
ported on Greek ships as exports to Greece.
On the o the r hand, since 1992, Bulgarian data fo llo w  the 
Harm onized System o f Commodity D escription and C oding (H SC D C ), 
and such blatant m isreporting presumably is less like ly. Indeed, the data 
in  Table 1 fo r 1992 ana 1993 reveal a greater degree o f s im ila rity between
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the data produced by the two sides to each annual trade flow  than in  the 
past. In  some instances, such as Bulgarian exports to Greece in  1993, the 
data are v irtua lly  identical. Interestingly, in tnat year, Greece reported a 
considerably higher volume o f exports to  Bulgaria than d id  Bulgaria. This 
may reflect the fact that Greek exports to  Serbia/M ontenegro and even 
M acedonia are recorded in  Greek statistics as exports to  B ulgaria. 
However, Turkey continues to  report a lower trade turnover w ith  Bulgaria 
than does Bulgaria, although as noted the differences are by now rather 
modest.
In  term s o f the product categories appearing in Bulgarian-G reek 
trade, Bulgarian exports are dom inated by e lectrica l energy, metals 
(especially copper), and chemicals (especially ammonium derivatives). In  
Bulgarian im ports from  Greece, food products (oranges, bananas, coffee, 
biscuits, beer) and household appliances have pride o f place; Bulgaria also 
buys a significant share o f the total Greek exports o f certain vehicles.11
For Bulgarian-Turkish trade, data are available fo r 1992 by 4 -d ig it 
HSCDC from both Ankara and Sofia. This allows a comparison not only o f 
the levels o f bilateral trade reported by the two sides but also o f what they 
lis t as the detailed structure o f that trade. Table 2 provides an overview o f 
the instances in which there are large differences between what the two 
countries report. Over a ll, there is considerable s im ila rity  between the 
stories to ld . Bulgarian exports are dominated by metals, chemicals, and 
food products, w hile Turkey specializes in  agricultural products, textiles, 
and vehicles.
S till, despite the sim ilar trade totals fo r 1992 (see Table 1) and the 
general s im ila rity  o f the product categories making the top 25, there are 
strik ing differences fo r some sectors. For example, Bulgaria reports having 
exported to  Turkey $5.6 m illion  worth o f “ fla t-ro lled stainless steel prod- 
ucts o f less than o r equal to  600mm” (7220), a category en tire ly  missing 
from Turkish statistics on its imports from Bulgaria. In  the other d irection , 
Turkey claims to  have exported $1.5 m illion  in  “ fru its , vegetables, and 
other edible plant parts”  (2001) to  Bulgaria, while the la tte r does not adm it 
to  having im ported anything in  this sector.
The case o f “ iron bars and poles, fo r tw isting”  (7214) is s trik in g . 
Turkey says that it  exported $2.9 m illion worth o f them, but Bulgaria does 
not acknowledge im porting anything in this category. In  fact, Bulgaria 
claims to have exported $3.3 m illion in such items, while Turkey admits to  
$985,000 in  such im ports from  Bulgaria. Sector 2710 (“crude petroleum  
and oils from  bitum inous m inerals” ) also displays an in teresting pattern. 
Turkish data show $7.9 m illion  in imports from Bulgaria, w hile Bulgarian 
figures report $1.9 m illion in  imports from Turkey. Both partners claim  to  
have exported to  each other only something between $100,000 and $200,000 
in this category.
One explanation fo r these puzzles is d ivergence in  the 
categorization o f a given shipm ent, e ithe r w ith  respect to  sector o r 
,possibly, tim e. Another, at least fo r Bulgarian exports, is th a t the
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TABLE 2
Data Inconsistencies in Reported Bulgarian-Turkish Trade, 1992
BULGARIAN EXPORTS TO TURKEY1
Top 25 in Bulgarian data, not at all in Turkish data:
7220 Flat-rolled stainless steel products ( 600mm)
Top 25 in Bulgarian data, not in top 25 in Turkish data:
7214 Iron bars & rods, for twisting
4403 Unprocessed wood
Top 25 in Turkish data, not in top 25 in_Bulgarian data:
2710 Crude petroleum & oils from bituminous minerals
5403 A rtificia l fibers
8458_______ Lathes__________________________________________
BULGARIAN IMPORTS FROM TURKEY
Top 25 in Bulgarian data, not in top 25 in Turkish data:
2710 Crude petroleum & oik from bituminous minerals
6302 Bed, table, toilet, & kitchen linen; curtains, etc.
3923 Plastic transport or packaging articles
6902 Refractory bricks, blocks, tiles, etc.
6203 Outer garments, men’s & boys’, textile fabrics
1211 Plants & parts used in perfumery
8703 Passenger motor vehicles
1704 Sugar confectionery, not containing cocoa
1806 Chocolate & other food preparations containing cocoa
Top 25 in Turkish data, not at all in Bulgarian data:
7214 Iron bars & rods, for twisting
2001 Fruits, vegetables, & other edible plant parts
Top 25 in Turkish data, not in top 25 in Bulgarian data:
6305 Sacks & bags, of textile materials, for packaging
6115 Knitted pantihose
2603 Copper ores & concentrates thereof
4203 Leatner articles of apparel & clothing accessories
8514 Industrial & laboratory electrical furnaces
1905 Bakery products (bread, biscuits, cakes), etc.
0604_______ Foliage/pranches/other plant parts o f trees, etc.______
1Data are classified according to the Harmonized System o f Commodity 
Description and Coding. Sectors are ordered by the size of the relevant trade 
flow. Complete listing o f top 25 sectors according to Bulgarian and Turkish 
statistics available upon request from author.
Source: Institute of Trade, Sofia; State Institute of Statistics, Ankara.
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misclassification o f products destined for a th ird  country has not yet been 
com pletely elim inated. In  any case, it  is reassuring that these occurrences 
seem by now to  have become relatively rare.
Analytical Issues in Bulgarian Trade with Greece and Turkey
Trade P o ten tia l
A large number o f articles have appeared in recent years which em - 
ploy gravity models to  estimate potential trade flows among countries. This 
lite ra tu re  generally focuses on the extent to  which flows between EU 
(and/or EFTA) and form er CM EA members are below expected levels.12 
In  this section, we employ the results o f one o f these studies to  estimate 
the size o f potential trade between Bulgaria and Greece, and Bulgaria and 
Turkey, respectively. This analysis is useful in putting in to  perspective the 
trade patterns discussed above.
Among the typical variables appearing in gravity models are the two 
countries' GDPs ana populations, the distance between the countries' 
trading centers, and assorted dummy variables. As pointed out by Biessen 
and A lbers,13 national income can be seen as capturing potentia l export 
supply fo r the exporting country and potential demand fo r the im porting  
country. Population is expected to be negatively related to  a country's par- 
tic ipation in  foreign trade: a more populous country is like ly to  specialize 
in a w ider range o f goods and be less dependent on trade.
A lternatively, one may follow  Baldwin14 and reason by analogy w ith  
models o f the discrete choice made by a fam ily as to  where to  shop o r 
where to  migrate. Such models may explain that choice in  terms o f the 
characteristics o f the fam ily (e.g., income, num ber o f fam ily members) 
and/or the characteristics o f the choice set (e.g., distance from current resi- 
dence). I t  is straightforw ard to  extend th is logic by expla in ing the 
(continuous) trade between two nations w ith reference to  GDP, GDP per 
capita, population, and distance.15
For the present purposes, many articles could form the basis o f our 
estimate o f intra-industry trade. We have chosen to  use that derived by 
Biessen and A lbers16, because they estimate th e ir model fo r a pa rticu la rly  
inclusive set o f countries—twenty nations, including a ll eleven EC m em - 
bers, Luxembourg and Belgium having common trade data; a ll six EFTA 
members; and Hungary, Poland, and the form er Czechoslovakia (C E C )—  
during 1991, a recent year. They also include dummy variables fo r whether 
a country was a member o f the EC, EFTA, or CEC; whether the trade part- 
ners are neighbors; and whether the trade is between East and W est or 
between the East and Germany.17
Biessen and Albers's1® estimated gravity model fo r 1991 is as fo l-
lows:
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ln (X jj) = 6.03 + 0.99 ln(Y,) + 0.63 ln(Yj) - 0.34 ln(N ,) + 0.10 ln (N j)
- 0.98 in (D jj) + 0.54 In(N EIG H ) + 0.41 (EC) - 0.29 (EFTA)
+ 0.95 (CEC) - 0.45 (CEC/WEST) -1.55 (W EST/CEC)
+ 0.96 (CEC/D) + 0.07 (D/CEC) (1)
where Xy is exports from country i to country j  (dollars); Ym (m = i,j) is the 
gross national product o f country m (billions o f dollars); N m is the popula- 
tion  o f country m (m illions); Dy is the distance between the trading centers 
o f country i and j  (kilometers, overland or sea); N E IG H  is a dummy vari- 
able equal to  two i f  countries i and j  neighbor each other (and one other- 
wise); EC is a dummy capturing whether one or both partners was a mem - 
ber o f the EC; EFTA is a dummy capturing whether one or both partners 
was a member o f EFTA; CEC is a dummy capturing whether one o r both 
partners was a CEC country; CEC/W EST is a dummy equal to  tw o fo r ex- 
ports from  a CEC country to  an EC or EFTA member; W EST/CEC is a 
dummy equal to  two for exports from an EC or EFTA member to  a CEC 
country; C EC /D  is a dummy equal to two for exports froņi a CEC land to 
Germany; and D/CEC is a aummy equal to  two fo r exports from  Germany 
to  a CEC land.19
We have substituted values into equation (1) fo r the three countries 
in  1990 fo r population and GNP from W orld Bank,20 plus road distances 
from  an atlas— using Sofìa, Athens, and Istanbul as trading centers— and 
assigned appropriate values to  the dummy variables, treating Turkey as a 
European country. The results are in Table 3.
A  comparison o f the actual trade data in Table 1 w ith the estimated 
potentia l trade flows in Table 3 shows that actual trade is w ell below its 
potentia l level. For trade w ith  Turkey, Bulgarian exports in  1993 were 
45% o f what they should be, while Bulgarian imports were less than 21% 
o f th e ir expectea level (using Turkish data). There is also a considerable 
gap between reality and potential fo r Bulgarian trade w ith Greece, but that 
gap is smaller: in 1993 exports and imports were about 64% and 73%, re- 
spectively, o f potential (employing Greek data).
Two comments are in order in passing. F irst, as large as the devia- 
tions o f actual from potential trade volumes were in 1993, these gaps are at 
h is to rica lly  low levels and may be expected to  shrink in  tne fu ture . 
Second, note that Biessen and Albers’s21 estimated gravity model correctly 
predicts the trade surplus w ith  Turkey and trade defic it w ith  Greece that 
existed, at least according to  partner data, in 1993 and in most earlie r years.
In  order to  ascertain the sensitivity o f the estimated potentia l trade 
levels, a more realistic Bulgarian GNP figure o f $10 b illion  was substituted 
fo r the W orld  Bank’s22 estimate o f $19.8 b illio n . The resu lt o f th is 
substitution, as depicted in the second column o f Table 3, is to  cut potential 
Bulgarian exports approximately in ha lf and potential Bulgarian im ports by 
about one-third. This extreme procedure brings the estimated potentia l
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TABLE 3
Potential Trade Flows Between Bulgaria and Greece
and Bulgaria and Turkey
Bulgaria Greece Turkey 
Population 8.8 10.1 56.1 
GNP 19,800 60,499 91,443 
D istance-Bulgaria________ _________________ 8851______________ 5812_______
(m illion  U.S. Dollars)
W orld  Bulgarian Thessaloniki 
Bank GNP= replacing Both
_____ Exports________ Figures $10 b illion3 Athens4 Changes8
Bulgaria to  Turkey 538.8071 273.99 n.a. n.a.
Turkey to  Bulgaria 413.6916 269.0157 n.a. n.a.
Bulgaria to  Greece 307.7944 156.5173 849.7166 432.0914 
Greece to  Bulgaria 433.069 281.6165 1195.557 777.448 
1Road distance in kilometers between Sofìa and Athens.
2Road distance in kilometers between Sofìa and Istanbul.
3Potential exports recalculated w ith  Bulgarian GDP set at $9 b illio n , in - 
stead o f $19.8 billion.
4Potentia l exports recalculated w ith  Thessaloniki (314 road kilom eters 
from Sofìa) replacing Athens as the trading center o f Greece.
8Potential exports recalculated subject to both changes above.
Source: Guido Biessen and Henk-Jaap Albers, “Trade Reorientation: The 
Central European Case,”  W orking Papers International Economic 
Relations, Law Faculty, Leiden University, no. 3, 1993; W orld  
Bank, W orld Development Report 1992: Development and the  
E nvironm ent (Oxford and New York: O xford U niversity Press, 
_________ 1992), pp. 218-19.________________________________________________
trade flows close in line w ith actual trade volumes. However, substituting 
Thessaloniki fo r Athens as the trading center o f Greece (th ird  colum n o f 
the table) substantially raises the estimated potential trade w ith  Greece. 
Making both substitutions give estimates o f such trade far in  excess o f what 
has occurred so far (fourth column).
Explaining the Structure of Trade
An issue to which relatively little  attention has been devoted, at 
least un til recently, is the structure o f trade between post-communist and 
longstanding market economies. A iginger, Peneder, and Stankovsky 
(henceforth APS)23 argue that under communism the central and east
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European countries were abundant in capital. This was the result o f gener- 
a lly high investm ent/output ratios, according to  o ffic ia l data, and the p rio r- 
ities characteristic o f the system: investment over consum ption; heavy in - 
dustry over ligh t; and new, large projects over repair and maintenance. In  
contrast, labor inputs during this era were scarce, as evidenced by the v ir- 
tua l absence o f unemployment, high female labor force participation, and 
the use o f gastarbeiter from the socialist T h ird  W orld (e.g., Cuba, Vietnam).
The postcommunist economies now (unction closer to  the manner 
o f market economies. C entra lly planned factor movements have disap- 
peared, and substantial involuntary unemployment and low  o r negative net 
fixed investm ent have appeared in many countries, especially in  Bulgaria. 
W ith  th is in  m ind, APS advance the follow ing hypothesis:
The real test in  the s p irit o f the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory is tha t there should 
be s tru c tu ra l change in  the trade flow s: CEE countries should lose com- 
petitive strength in capital intensive industries, and gain competitiveness 
in labor intensive ones.24
We can take the APS reasoning a step further. Changes in  the fac- 
to r intensity o f export goods can be seen as indicative o f the progress made 
on economic reform . This is the case not only w ith  respect to  capital and 
labor inputs, fo r w hich the changes may fo llow  the pattern suggested by 
APS, but even more clearly fo r energy inputs. I f  Bulgarian exports con- 
tinue to  be energy intensive, or even increase in energy intensity, it  could 
be taken as a sign o f lack o f progress on privatization, hardening o f budget 
constraints, and/or liberalization o f energy prices.
Indeed, economic reform  in Bulgaria has been patchy. An estab- 
lished m arket-oriented economy was sufficient to  create substantial unem- 
ployment ( it peaked at over 16% in 1994 before fa lling to  12% in 1995) and 
low  and probably negative net fixed investment. On the other hand, form al
Eriva tiza tion  o f the leading state industria l enterprises has made little  eadway, financial indiscipline in state enterprises and banks has remained 
rife , and certain energy prices are among the lowest in the w orld. The em- 
pineal investigation tnat follows o f the factor intensity o f Bulgarian exports 
to  and im ports from Greece and Turkey aims to  shed lig h t on the relative 
strengths o f these contradictory tendencies.
As noted by APS, testing em pirically theoretical trade models is no 
easy m atter. In  particular, testing the Heckscher-Ohlin theory suffers such 
well-known problems as the fact that it  is designed fo r a tw o-country w orld 
and that input prices under autarky are unobservable.
In  à ie present context, testing the theory is fraught w ith  additional 
d ifficu lties. Before the fa ll o f communism Bulgaria d id not have a market 
economy and the extent to  which it  has one even now is questionable. 
Furtherm ore, Heckscher-Ohlin assumes that the exporting and im porting 
countries involved in  a given transaction use identical technology to  pro- 
duce the traded good, a troub ling assumption fo r East-W est trade. The 
other assumptions behind Heckscher-Ohlin include perfect com petition,
218 Michael L. Wyzan
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
219Bulgaria's Trade Relations With Its Balkan Neighbors
constant returns to  scale, and identical and hom othetic consumer pre fer- 
ences in both countries. These assumptions are perhaps not ill-su ite d  to  
analyzing Bulgarian trade.
F inally, the APS hypothesis may not be as w ell suited to  Bulgarian 
trade w ith  Greece and Turkey as it  was to  th e ir w ork on Austrian trade 
w ith  the Visegrád lands. The hypothesis was intended to  apply to  trade be- 
tween postcommunist and highly developed market economies. I t  is un- 
clear whether e ither Greece o r Turkey, especially the la tter, belongs in  th is 
category.
E veryth ing considered, however, the H eckscher-O hlin provides 
the best analytical basis fo r analyzing the development o f Bulgarian trade 
w ith  its neighbors in recent years. N ot only does it  remains the most 
w idely tested and discussed trade theory, it  also, when combined w ith  the 
APS thesis, provides an easily testable explanation o f the nature o f struc- 
tu ra i change in  trade. Data on the labor, capital, research and development, 
sk ill, and energy intensities o f production are available from  the EU  by 
th re e -d ig it N AC E, the EU 's in ternational trade classification system. 
These intensity estimates are based on the technology employed in  Great 
B rita in, France, Germany and Ita ly .25 Once we adopt the Heckscher-Ohlin 
assumption o f identical technology in Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, we can 
test the APS thesis fo r Bulgarian trade w ith  the other two.
Data were obtained from the Turkish State Statistical In s titu te  by 
fou r-d ig it SITC, revision 3, on trade in both directions between Bulgaria 
and Turkey fo r 1989-93. Sim ilarly, figures were acquired on trade between 
Bulgaria and Greece during 1988-93 from EUROSTAT (the EU's statistical 
office) by th ree-d ig it SITC. The data were then reclassified according to  
the NACE system, revision 1, a necessary step because the factor in tensity 
data are by th ree-d ig it NACE.
APS (1994) employ as th e ir dependent variable a version o f the so- 
called revealed comparative advantage (RCA).26 However, in  the present 
context this form ulation has been eschewed in  favor o f net exports, N X I 
(= X j - M j). One reason fo r this substitution is the fact that in many cases in 
our data e ither exports o r im ports in a given category are zero,27 making it  
impossible to  calculate Rj w ithout m anipulating tne data in some arb itra ry 
manner.
Second, a case can be made for analyzing separately the de te rm i־ 
nants o f exports and im ports. In  this manner the factors in fluencing  net 
exports can be broken aown in to  those that affect p rim arily  exports, those 
that largely influence im ports, and those that affect both. A s tro n g  ten- 
dency is one fe lt on both exports and imports, and a weak tendency is one 
influencing only one o r the other. Finally, estimated equations on large 
cross-sectional data sets such as this one typ ica lly do not f it  w e ll (R2's are 
low); a sim pler form ulation o f the dependent variable should be easier to  
explain.
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The equations to  be estimated (by OLS) for net exports are o f the
form
N X j=  ßo+ ß!(KI,) + Э2(и,) + ß3(RDIj) + ß4(SIj) + ß5(EI ,)
+ ß6(NX !,)  + € (2)
where K i, is the capital intensity o f sector i (based on the EU data); L I, is 
its labor intensity; R D I, is its research and development intensity; SI, is its 
sk ill in tensity; E l, is its energy intensity; N X .j, is the net exports o f the 
given sector during the previous year; and e is a well-behaved disturbance. 
The presence o f the lagged dependent variable is an innovation over the 
APS specification and is intended to improve the f it o f the equation by 
capturing sector-specific attributes other than factor intensity. S im ila r 
equations were also estimated, but w ith  X, and X .!, (exports) and M , and 
M .!, (im ports), respectively, replacing NX, and NX.! ,.28
The results o f these estimations are presented in Table 4. The pres- 
enee o f the lagged values o f the dependent variables means that each data 
set is one year shorter than it  w ould otherwise be, so that the data on 
Greece cover 1989-93 and those on Turkey 1990-93. The variable YEAR, 
essentially a tim e trend, is included in  a specification whenever doing so 
increases the adjusted R2.
For tracie w ith  Greece, other than the lagged dependent variable, 
few other regressors are statistically significant. One strik ing  find ing  is 
the positive and statistically significant coefficient on energy intensity fo r 
both net exports and exports. The only other result worth m entioning is 
the s ign ifican tly  positive coeffic ien t on capital in tensity in  the im port 
equation.
For trade w ith  Turkey, the findings are more interesting. Again 
there is a sign ificantly positive relationship between energy intensity and 
net exports and exports. Here there is also a significantly negative lin k  be- 
tween E l and im ports, a strong finding. Net exports are negatively corre- 
lated w ith  capita l intensity, w hile im ports are positively correlated w ith  
th is regressor. There is a significantly negative relationship between net 
exports and exports, on the one hand, and labor intensity, on the other. 
Again we have a strong result: im ports are positively related to  L I. R&D  
in tensity and sk ill intensity are never statistically significant in any o f the 
six runs.
These findings pertain to  the entire periods covered by the res pec- 
tive data sets on tradie between Bulgaria and the two other countries. I t  is 
also o f interest to observe whether the relationships have changed over the 
sample periods. Chow tests29 reveal that fo r net exports to  Greece there is 
no significant difference (F 1717 = 3.172) between the regression pertaining 
to  1989 and that fo r 1993. For net exports to Turkey (F 1537 = 41.131), there 
is a significant difference between the relationship in  1990 and that in
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1993. In  1990 the findings fo r capital in tensity and labor in tensity  are 
especially weak and that fo r energy in tensity particu larly strong; in  1990 
the f it  o f the equation is much better (R 2 equals 0.330 vs. 0.134 fo r 1993).
TABLE 4








Dep. Var.: NX X M NX X M
Constant: 140,040 588.47 -217.320••1 3,080.7•• -308,220 -175,860•:
1.5942 1.478 -3.949 3.330 -1.694 -2.143
KI: -74.277 ־26.644 71.533• -440.95” -260.19• 178.06•״
-1.313 ־0.613 2.001 -4.579 -2.94 4.503
LI: -39.920 ־19.384 28.494 -195.67•• -143.77•• 48.873••
-1.549 -0.979 1.757 -4.442 -3.551 2.710
RDI: -1.638 -0.293 1.469 2.773 1.995 -0.996
-0.729 -0.170 1.045 0.055 0.043 -0.048
SI: -1.075 -4.961 -5.366 7.354 -2.024 -9.802
-0.155 -0.932 -1.236 0.503 -0.151 -1.631
El: 95.931•* 60.710״• -33.608 402.19•• 328.68•• -77.126••
3.160 2.608 -1.782 7.723 6.887 -3.756
Dep. Var.j: 0.556•• 0.632•״ 0.364•• 0.170•• 0.169•• 0.070
13.229 16.028 7.782 3.460 3.321 1.524
YEAR: -70.037 109.1•• 156.00 88.051•
-1.587 3.948 1.708 2.137
R2: 0.219 0.288 0.107 0.182 0.182 0.058
No. of Obs.: 764 764 764 532 532 532
Notes: AU regressions are o f the OLS type and were run w ith  the software 
package L IM D E P  6.0. See text fo r definitions o f variables.
1Two asterisks denote that the relevant independent variable is 
significant at 0.01; one asterisk denotes that it  is significant at 0.05. 
2t-statisties are in parentheses below estimated coefficients._________
— I ■ 1 11 Ē — « д м — Н И И  .. 1 = ж
Overall, the findings o f this em pirical exercise can be summarized 
as follows. F irst, the positive association o f energy intensity w ith  net ex- 
ports is undoubtedly an indicator o f the lack o f progress on restructuring 
and privatizing heavy industry in Bulgaria. Second, at least fo r trade w ith
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Turkey, the APS hypothesis is supported fo r capital in tensity (Bulgarian 
net exports are negatively associated w ith  th is variable). However, the 
findings are the opposite o f what APS expect fo r labor intensity, which is 
also negatively correlated w ith  net exports.
Conclusions
The main findings o f this paper can be summarized as follows:
Bulgarian exports to  Greece are dom inated by e lectrica l energy, 
metals, and chemicals; foods and household appliances figure prom inently 
in  its im ports from Greece. Bulgaria’s exports to  Turkey are comprised 
largely o t metals, chemicals, and foods; Turkey sells Bulgaria foods, tex- 
tiles, and vehicles.
Through the late 1980s the differences between what Sofia reported 
on Bulgarian trade volumes w ith Greece and Turkey and what Athens and 
Ankara, respectively, reported were huge. However, the differences be- 
tween the bilateral trade flows registered by Bulgaria and these tw o trade 
partners have recently fallen considerably, in some cases to  insignificance.
Bulgarian trade volumes w ith  Greece and Turkey are w ell below 
th e ir potentia l levels as estimated from gravity models, especially fo r im - 
ports from  Turkey.
A sta tistica l exam ination o f the thesis advanced by Austrian 
economists that CEE nations should have shifted from  specializing in  
capital-intensive products to  labor-intensive ones was conducted using re- 
cent data on Bulgarian-Greek and Bulgarian-Turkish trade. A related issue 
was also addressed: whether Bulgarian exports continue to  be energy in - 
tensive. O ur findings support the notions that the capital in tensity o f 
Bulgarian exports is low and that th e ir energy in tensity  remains high. 
However, th e ir labor intensity is also low, in contradiction to  the APS hy- 
pothesis.
We have seen that Bulgaria’s trade volumes w ith  its tw o southern, 
always-capitalist neighbors are well below th e ir potentia l levels. We have 
also observed that Bulgaria continues to  export its trad itiona l, energy-in- 
tensive products from the heavy industrial and chemical branches. These 
two “problems” may be related, in  that more attractive export goods w ill be 
produced only after the economy undergoes a thorough restructuring. No 
evidence o f Bulgaria’s specialization w ith in  the CM EA in  electronic p rod - 
ucts can be found in its trade w ith Greece and Turkey.
On the other hand, Greece and Turkey may not m ind follow ing the 
lead o f the EU as a whole and exporting th e ir po llu tion-producing indus- 
tries to  Bulgaria and other CEE nations. Recall that Bulgarian exports to 
the EU  are becoming less sophisticated, a fact that seems not to apply to 
trade w ith  Arab or CEE states.30 I t  is in teresting  tha t in  th is regard 
Turkey seems to  resemble more an EU than a M iddle Eastern country.
In  the end, given the old vintage o f most o f Bulgaria’s heavy indus- 
tria l and chemical plant and equipment, the country’s curren t export pro- 
file  may be short lived. Joining the ranks o f the modern market economies,
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w ith  th e ir orientation toward intra-industry trade, w ill require substantial 
volumes o f foreign investment. Bulgaria has not been notoriously success- 
fu i in  attracting such investment, /dthough this fact is partly the result o f 
deficiencies in  the local investment clim ate, it  also reflects the country's 
physical and cu ltu ra l isolation from the heart o f Europe. W ith th is m ind, 
deepening economic cooperation w ith  Greece and Turkey is an absolute 
necessity i f  Bulgaria is to  shake o ff the shackles o f its communist past.
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The aim o f this article is to demonstrate some traps o f transforma* 
tion  due to  form ing basic networks between economy and politics. The 
d iffe ren t views affect the shaping and the m aintaining o f certain gover• 
nance and management structures and politica l structures. In  transform ing 
societies o ld  rules o f governance are abolished. New patterns o f gover■ 
nance, w hich relies on interre lations between government, parties and 
economic élites, emerge and take over complete control upon establishing a 
new legal system. Companions to  such developments are varieties o f ille - 
gal and socially undesirable activities w ith  questionable economic effects. 
The article traces some aspects o f the so-called business-politics re la tion- 
ship w hich are im portant fo r creating and m aintaining new governance 
systems. A lthough known from Western experience, these aspects have a 
significant in itia l impact on transform ing economies.
A num ber o f developments and events in recent Slovene history, 
which we like to  range among those pertaining to  the process o f transfor- 
mation, call fo r additional explaining o f the po litica l and economic rea li- 
ties. W e understand transform ation as a m u lti-le ve l and m u lti- 
dim ensional transition  process. In  that context in terre lations between 
economy and politics w ill be outlined. The second part o f the article pre- 
sents the concept o f the avant-garde mistake. The th ird  part introduces the 
paradox o f revolution as a framework fo r discussion o f d istributional coali- 
tions, found in  part four, and the role o f the state in form ing the new eco - 
nomie and financial system discussed in part five. The sixth part outlines 
possible analytical approaches to  deal w ith  relations between voters and 
parties. In  the final part some conclusion are given.
I t  w ill be useful to  start from the beginning and to  review the 
meanings o f terms and concepts that serve as framework or foundation for 
discussion. W ith  the help o f a dictionary and Max W eber1 as our main 
sources, we can construct a useful framework (Table 1).
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TAB LE  1— Reminder
meaning
a continuously organized sys- 
tem of economic action
a peaceful use of the actor's 
control over resources, 
which is primarily economi- 
cally oriented
1) a group engaged in eco- 
nomie action
2) an economic organization
3) an organization regulating 
economic activity
4) an organization enforcing 
formal order
action that takes account of 
the behavior of someone else
1) every action which takes 
account of economic consid- 
e rations
2) that makes use of physical 
force as a means
aims at exerting influence on 
the direction authority of a 
corporate political group
a social relationship which is 
either closed or limits the 
admission of outsiders by 
rules so far as its order is en- 
forced by the action of spe- 
dfic individuals whose regu- 
lar functions this is (*the per- 
son of authority')
an associative social rela- 
tionship characterized by an 
administrative staff devoted 
to continuous purposive ac- 
tivity
the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship 
will be in position to carry 
out his own will despite re- 
sistance regardless of the 
basis on which this probabil- 
ity rests
an imperatively coordinated 
group enforcing its order by 
tne application and threat of 


























the management, regulation, 
and government of a nouse- 
hold s affairs; the ādminis- 
tration of the internal affairs 
of a State; a system of laws, 
principles, doctrines, rites, 
etc.; (political e.) the science 
of the production and distri- 
bution of wealth
to manage domestic or pe- 
cuniary affairs with economy
the science or art of civil 
government
conduct of private affairs
to make political
the form, system, or consti- 
tution of the civil govern- 
ment of a state; the state; an 
organized community; the 
form of organization of any 
institution
a united body; a corporate 
body empowered to act as an 
individual
a society or association for 
the promotion of some par- 
ticular object
a body of persons associated 
for some common object
a system used to direct and 
control, to rule with author- 
ity, to regulate
ability to do or act so as to 
effect something; influence; 
right or ability to control
power of carrying out one’s 
intention or dominating oth- 
ers
changing common, socially־ 
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W hy lis t concepts w ell known to  everybody? Sim ply because they 
convey the core o f some traps o f transformation that emerge from the in te r- 
relation between economy and politics. These traps are com pletely ne- 
glected by international advisory involved in  potentia l reform ing processes 
o f previous socialist societies.
D uring the transformation, i.e., w hile old ties are com ing loose and 
the codification o f new ones and/or shaping o f a new and stable legal system 
is delaying, certain developments, bringing fo rth  socially and econom ically 
questionable and undesirable consequences, are on the rise.
2. The Avant-Garde Mistake
There is e ither no well-argued and cool anatomy o f events, o f the 
conduct and the functioning o f major actors in  terms o f economic policy, or 
one-sided and noncomprehensive interpretations prevail. Many economic 
problems are generated by, among others, in terna lly caused factors o f the 
political-business cycle. They are manifested in  the changed a ttitude  to- 
wards the form er Yugoslav markets, social gains o f the form er system, un- 
em ploym ent and development issues and towards industria l policy. The 
overall situation is also reflected by the fragm entation o f the budget, the 
controversial viewpoints regarding the issue o f how fast and to  what extent 
the country should jo in  the European integration formations, by the priva- 
tization sp lit, and by growing tensions in tne financial restructuring o f the 
banking and the enterprises sector. These tendencies fu rthe r confirm  the 
assumption that an increase o f economic efficiency as a target has been 
com pletely pushed aside and has become subject to  the struggle fo r control 
over resources. The la tter is manifested firs t in  the struggle to r a dom inat- 
ing influence over the budget and the resources, which in tu rn  guarantee a 
dom inating influence over the economic and po litica l situation, and second 
in pressure to  take over the power-related bodies. The often trie d  avant- 
garde mistake about the superior force o f common w ill, and/or the be lie f 
that a ll options are available, and that it is only a m atter o f the righ t choice, 
is s till present. I t  is a mistake to assume tha t w ill relies on common 
wealth, public good, o r altruism . The theory o f common wealth does not 
urge one to  seek fundamental principles o f po litica l engagement, w hich 
suggest the follow ing words o f the statesman Kućan:2
In spite o f such declarations based on principles that speak on behalf of 
the significant role o f a constitutional state, it occurs that political prac- 
tice clash with such declarations. Politics put into practice, seems not 
always to go hand in hand with declared principles. Moreover, it is 
prone to use criteria o f profitability and political opportunity prevailing 
over the criteria o f constitutionality and lawfulness....If we are to accept 
a kind o f pragmatic understanding o f law and tolerating voluntaristic and 
an inconsistent attitude o f the holders o f political power towards constitu- 
tionality and legitimacy, is only a step to an autocratic power, which in 
submitting the law to itself, declares the benefits o f one group, which it
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represents, for common wealth and understands its criterion o f justice
for justice alone.
N ot a ll options are always available, or put on the table, and it  is also 
not just a m atter o f the right choice. But, i f  w ill is linked w ith  interest, and 
furtherm ore interest w ith  the gain, things become more clear. We have 
reached a point where an economist finds his way around much better. We 
realize, how much the principles o f economic policy are in terre la ted, and 
how the m eiging o f economic and politica l principles impacts organizations, 
the state, power bodies and the rules o f action. These rules can be e ith e r
1) rules benefiting the mafia and corruption, 2) democratic and legal insti- 
tutions, o r 3) a combination o f the two.
A lthough economics regarded as a discipline is focused on the nor- 
mative and positive market analyses, it  is often not rational to  overlook the 
connection between economic policies and po litica l decisions. There is a 
prevailing impression that the normative approach to  the economic policy is 
the only one that counts: the w ell-in tentioned ru le r o r the social planner 
has the best intentions, he perfectly knows the preferentia l function o f so- 
ciety, and optim izes the interests o f the society through his action. Such 
th ink ing  generally results in p icturing a com bination o f optim um  policies, 
and makes believe, especially the economists, tha t they are able to  te ll 
which policies seem to be the best fo r all, whereby po litica l factors always 
range among exogenous factors. Thus, the fact tha t common voters are 
m ainly concerned about th e ir own welfare and the welfare o f th e ir fam ilies 
and friends has been neglected. We may say that, in  doing so, they also 
take care o f the economic prosperity in  its entire ty. On the other hand, 
politicians are in  the firs t place concerned about th e ir own welfare and the 
welfare o f th e ir fellow-people. The interests o f the two groups rarely con- 
verge, and i f  they converge, they do so only by chance, but by a ll means the 
one who in  his main concern tor his own welfare has also the opportun ity 
to  take advantage o f the power is in a much better position.
The w ell-in tentioned ruler, the social planner, or the representa- 
tive consumer do not exist as archetypes necessary fo r the normative analy- 
sis and norm ative advice, therefore help needs to  be sought on the other 
side as w ell, i.e., in  positive analysis and by forsaking the exogenous factor. 
A comprehensive consideration o f the economic situation should s im ply 
not neglect the interconnection o f po litics and economy, and should not 
overlook the interaction o f politica l and economic factors. In  order to  bet- 
te r comprehend the role o f the state in the economic process, it  is im por- 
tant to  nave an insight in  these connections. According to  one defin ition , 
the state must establish a constitutional fram ework fo r a sound economic 
system and a just legal system, and leave all the rest to  the self-regulative 
mechanism o f interests o f the privately-owned economic units. According 
to  another de fin ition , the state shoula also in terfere in  the fie ld  o f busi- 
ness activities, when necessary. Regardless which o f the two roles o f the 
state one likes better, it  makes a difference what kind o f economic and legal 
system the state implements: it may be that the system is based on corrup -
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Aware o f that, the government o f the Republic o f Slovenia has w rit- 
ten as follows:3
The aim o f reshaping o f the economic and political svsterns, now under 
way in Slovenia, relying on fundamental principles o f the new constitu- 
tion o f Slovenia, is to adopt a permanently market-oriented economic 
system, encouraging a free private initiative, safeguarding the right o f 
private ownership, all these to guarantee the implementation o f eco- 
nomie, social ana ecological objectives. A transparent model o f public 
services should be laid down, a system o f local self-administration, eco- 
nomical public administration, and a system of a modem parliamentary 
democracy are to be introduced. The fundamental orientation o f the 
legal system w ill be in promoting and encouraging a sound enterprising 
initiative, and in reducing the possibilities of the spread o f various forms 
o f damaging and dishonest activities o f diverse entities and individuals, 
in the enterprises as well as in the public sector—in public services and 
politics. It w ill be committed to rendering impossible the prohibited and 
harmful activities and misconduct, and/or keeping them under control. 
Corruption is not, or cannot be only the subject o f the penal legislation, 
the aim of which is to prevent, to investigate and to punish, giving and 
receiving bonuses and bribe money for more advantageous and illegal 
settlement o f official matters. There is a large number o f matters and 
developments which cannot be covered by legislation alone, namely 
widespread irregularities not based on legal regulations or being adverse 
to them, offering the chance for certain privileges and/or advantages 
that may be frequently observed in the public sector, in politics and/or in
Eublic services. The said irregularities and the damaging misconduct are kely to occur especially within legal entities, but also in individuals, in- 
volved in laying foundations for decisions, or being directly involved in 
decision-making, who may be prone to them. There is a fundamental 
need to attain a complete transparency of the functioning o f the public 
sector. The legal system, which is in its formative stages, aims at that 
goal....The reason why all kinds o f inappropriate and damaging miscon- 
duct and/or criminal offenses may emerge during the transition period is 
that the rules o f conduct and action have not been yet set clearly. 
Nevertheless, such offenses ought to be investigated, punished and kept 
under control.
Regardless o f the legality o f co rrup tib ility , control over the state is 
also contro l over the d iffe ren tia tion  processes in  transform ing societies. 
We can understand the economic d ifferentia tion as d iffe ren tia tion  o f own- 
ership, management, and employment, and po litica l d iffe ren tia tion  as d if- 
ferentiation o f state adm inistration and politica l parties.
3 .  The Paradox of Revolution or Quid pro Quo!
The acknowledgment that common wealth or public good seems not 
to  be the reason for action by the state elite, politica l parties e lite  and eco- 
nomie e lite  can be merely concluded from em pirical and observable facts. 
W hat is surprising is that the realization came so soon. The em pirical and
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the observational character are connected w ith power, which according to  
G albra ith4 can be illustrated by a double triad o f power. Galbraith defines 
three kinds o f power: the power based on force and fear from punishment 
(condign power), the power founded on the reward fo r being subordinate 
(compensational power), and the power based on persuading those who one 
wishes to  subdue (conditional power). In  the same background there is an- 
o ther triad : personality, ownership, and organization. Both triads are in - 
terre lated in  many ways. We may say that in the past the prevailing re la- 
tion  between personality, meaning the ab ility o f leadership and fam ily ties, 
and power used to  be practiced by physical force, where nowadays it  is 
conditional and relies on the ab ility  o f persuasion. Ownership, together 
w ith  earning capacity, is connected w ith  compensational power, i.e., fo r 
purchasing acquiescence, and also encourages conditional acquiescence. 
The most im portant source o f power which is connected w ith  conditional 
power is organization. Organization combines all three instrum ents and 
forms o f power and is directly linked w ith the other two sources o f power, 
personality, and ownership, and therefore may punish, may give rewards, 
and may persuade. I t  can differentiate.
Aside from the fact that it  cannot be considered a drive fo r asserting 
one's own w ill and power, common wealth or public good too is not a deci- 
sive reason fo r one to  subordinate to  the w ill o f the holder o f power. In  his 
search fo r an answer to  the question o f how an individual reacts when con- 
fronted w ith  the assertion o f someone else’s w ill and power, fo r example to  
the revolutionary's and the counterrevolutionary’s, and w ith  a choice o f 
w hich o f the two sides he should subordinate to, Tu llock5 named such 
conduct the paradox o f revolution. The firs t step is certain ly to  evaluate 
the general desirability o f the predicted changes which is defined by equa- 
tion  (1) in  Table 2. TTiis equation relies on the public good fo r a ll people. 
An inactive ind ividual participates (Pin), i f  everybody else participates 
(PC), depending on the probability o f success o f the changes (L v). In  that 
case there is no personal interest/benefit other than the benefit o f im - 
proved government. Equation (2) defines the total payoff o f the individual 
who decides to  participate actively in the changes. His participation may 
slightly increase the probability o f change to succeed, and he has a chance 
o f reward (R,). Hence, he can expect a reward in case o f success and pun- 
ishm ent in  case o f fa ilure (Pj). The activity o f those being in  favor o f 
change are illustra ted in  equations (3) and (4). Thus, equation (3) ex- 
presses the opportunity cost (G r) o f the individual who decides to  p a rtic i- 
pate on the side favoring change, and equation (4) the payoff (Pd) fo r coop- 
eration w ith  the other side, w ith reward (D j) and punishment (Pp). In  both 
cases public good (PG) was le ft out, fo r the simple reason that due to  the 
participation o f an individual, which is true for tne m ajority o f individuals, 
the probability o f failure or success o f change is very small. Hence it  fo l- 
lows that it  is the benefit/interest that gains importance. The paradox o f 
revolution lies in  the fact that the action o f an individual on behalf o f h im - 
se lf (selfishness) can, as a byproduct, also contribute to the common wealth, 
so tha t we can place T u IIock’s concept alongside Sm ith’s concept o f the
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TABLE 2 
Equations o f paradox6
(1) Pta ־  P G -L,
(2)Pr=PG״L v+R,״L v-Pi״( l- L v)
(3) G r = R,״L V- P , 1 -״( L V)
(4) Pd = D je( l- L v)-Pp״L v
4. Distributional Coalitions, Corruption and Spontaneous 
Privatization
Any change may bring benefits to some groups and losses to  others. 
In  case o f success, common wealth refers only to successful groups. Thus, 
we come to  pressure groups, which influence formation o f special relations 
between institutions and policies, on one side, and economic efficiency on 
the other side. Olson7 te lls us that organized groups o f producers are 
com m itted to  seeking special interests/benefits fo r the ir members, benefits 
w hich are not available to others. Such groups cause a low er economic 
growth rate than would exist w ithout them. A society w ith  a laige num ber 
o f such groups w ill probably have lower growth rates than societies w ith  
less groups o f th is kind. But i f  such an organization includes the m ajority 
o f the population, the conflict between its interests and the general in te r- 
ests disappears, and w ith  it  also the reasons fo r a low er grow th rate. 
Corporative institutions rely on solidarity. Hence, it  follows that the rela- 
tion  between economy and politics should also rely on it. Since solidarity 
expresses relationships among people, the relation between human capital 
and development comes to the fore, the la tter relying less on market mech- 
anisms at h igher levels o f technology. A com m unity where so lidarity is 
considered a higher value than ind ividua lity may become unsuccessful i f  
institu tions and patterns o f behavior re lying on in d iv id ua lity  are in tro - 
duced. That leads us to  Zysman's8 thought o f the relation among changes 
(economic development) and distributional coalitions. The separation o f 
costs and benefits from changes takes places in the course o f the economic 
and po litica l processes. Market positions represent the source o f po litica l 
power, therefore the state influences the functioning o f the market. The 
stability o f the market depends on the stability o f the said separation. The 
state may m aintain long-term acceptable d istributional relations by impos- 
ing a certain distribution, by allowing the d istribution to take place on the
desirab ility  o f changes:
planning and 
realization o f changes:
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market, by m inim um  interferences and compensations, o r else the state 
takes care o f the division by negotiations w itn  society groups. V irtua lly , 
those who lose must be compensated, or else they w ill be le ft out o f the po- 
litica i process. In  other woras, they must be e itner offered a bribe or pun ־ 
ished.
Proceeding from  the em pirical realization, that a large increase in 
the state’s activities can not be explained by the w e ll-in ten tioned  ruler, 
tha t maxim izing the social function o f welfare, and tha t the increasingly 
regu lating mechanism, increase o f governm ent subsidies, and various 
forms o f restrictions o f com petition do not go along w ith  the concept o f so- 
cial welfare function, Becker9 had a recourse to  the analysis o f com petition 
riva liy  fo r po litica l influence among groups having common interests. He 
showed tha t p o litica l equ ilib rium  depends on the success o f pressure 
groups, the size o f these groups, and the final expenditures in  the forms o f 
taxes and subsidies. The increase o f fina l expenditures reduces pressure 
from  the group obtaining subsidies, and increases pressure on taxpayers, al- 
though th e ir resistance dramatically decreases. Politicians and the state act 
according to  the outcome o f the com petition among groups w ith  common 
interests, i.e., the w inning groups that constitute them and could remove 
them from  power. Regardless o f the kind o f po litica l system, Zysman’s d i- 
vision is set by altruism , selfishness, envy, and the morals o f the stronger 
groups w ith  common interests, which brings us back to  G albra ith ’s three 
sources o f power. Aside from that, more e ffic ien t co llecting  o f taxes and 
granting o f subsidies, reducing the resistance o f tax-payers, gradation o f 
pressure from  the side o f potential receivers, and increasing technical d ivi- 
sion o f labor make the significance o f the size o f individual groups in th e ir 
influence on po litica l process relative.
A general prerequisite o f the theory o f public choice is that groups 
w ith  common interests exercise pressure on po litica l groups to  influence 
form ation o f po litica l goals, in  a way that would maximize th e ir own bene - 
fits, and not the social preferentia l function or common wealth. On the 
other hand, po litica l groups aim to increase th e ir power by m onitoring en- 
terprises, regardless o f th e ir form  o f ownership, in  order to  achieve th e ir 
goals. The adjustment mechanism relies on subsidies and bribes.10 W hile 
managers m onitor enterprises, politicians use subsidies and bribes to  sub- 
ordinate them to  th e ir po litica l goals. The same holds true  in  the reverse 
case. W hile politicians m onitor enterprises, managers bribe them , so that 
enterprises would pursue other goals. Corporate structuring and privatiza- 
tion  o f enterprises may increase the chances o f restructuring o f enterprises, 
provided that lim itations are imposed on corruption, whereby introducing 
hard budget lim ita tions induces reduction o f budget subsidies to  in e ffi- 
cient enterprises. In  such situations, potentially good enterprises are given 
a much greater chance to  reduce the pressure from po litica l factors.
Due to  the disbalance between private and social preferences, in - 
su ffic ie n t regulations and contro l, unconventional underground busi- 
nesses, i.e., dishonest spontaneous privatization, may grow .11 Certain c ir- 
eu ms tances may encourage owners o f enterprises to  destroy the net 
assets/capital o t th e ir enterprises, i.e., declare bankruptcy, in  o rde r to
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increase th e ir own p ro fits , yet not necessarily by means o f ille g a l 
procedures. That may be due to  the p o ss ib ility  o f representing 
overestimated value o f assets, fo r example by showing goodw ill, the value 
o f long-term  bonds and certain investments w hich are d iffic u lt to  assess. 
That facilita tes the representation o f false capita l adequacy, thereby 
postponing regulatory interferences by supervising authorities. D iffe re n t 
from  the case o f excessive risk-taking, where owners provided w ith  a state 
guaranty do make decisions w ith  regard to  the p ro b a b ility  o f p ro fit 
realization, in  the case o f spontaneous privatization, owners try  to  m axim ize 
profits by diverse means o f transferring resources from  society d irec tly  to  
owners who exceed the loss due deliberately induced fa ilure. Searching 
fo r new owners the government can deliberately induce th is transfer w ith  
prescribed valuation procedures.
Spontaneous privatization is a constituent part o f the Slovene trans- 
form ation. Procedures used include unpayable transfers o f capital, false 
d istribu tion  o f p ro fit, unjustified w rite-offs o f debts, un justified costs, false 
revalorization reserves e tc .12 I t  is important to  realize that th is kind o f p ri- 
vatization could not possibly occur w ithout the involvem ent o f the execu- 
tive and jud ic ia ry branches o f the ruling power.
5 .  The State, the Economy and the Financial System
The financial system is one o f the most im portant elements o f the 
economic system. An established be lie f prevails that the role o f the finan - 
cial system is m ediating among units w ith financial surpluses and the cells 
o f financial deficits. The narrowness o f such an understanding neglects the 
second im portant task o f financial regulation, the d is trib u tio n  o f risks. 
Since the beginning o f the seventies, a second viewpoint has steadily been 
gaining ground, as well as a be lie f that the essence o f financial systems and 
financial companies is the manner o f dealing w ith  risks and the contro l 
over risks. In  general the fie ld  o f financial services covers co llecting  de- 
posits, cred iting , issuing debtors’ and owners’ securities, the securities 
trade, investments management, counseling, insurance, operations w ith  
foreign currency, and w ith  derivatives. The units w ith  excess savings can 
always invest surplus d irectly to  defic it units so that they accumulate m ort- 
gages, ordinary snares and other securities. I t  is a general characteristic 
that the smaller part o f finances flow in that way, and the bigger part o f cur- 
rents run through financial agents/mediators/brokers. The modern theory 
o f banking and financial m ediating emphasizes that such delegating occurs 
due to  inform ation lim itations encountered by savers-investors. Thus the 
financial mediators specialize in  producing in form ation services. They 
have access to  inform ation on debtors, mediate incentives to  lenders, and 
control the debtors. A basic lim ita tion o f lenders and borrowers w hich is 
being solved by the help o f mediators is insurance against liq u id ity  risk. 
And fo r this reason in  particular the state plays an im portant role in  finan - 
cial m ediating as a whole. I t  offers various forms o f insurance to  reduce 
the range o f risks fo r economic agents due to  inform ation im perfections,
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regulates obligatory ways in  the dealings o f financial mediators, and con- 
tro is th e ir activity. This is why financial flows are channeled towards the 
state and its d irect (budgetary) and ind irect (off-budgetary) financial medi- 
ating. The crucial problems encountered by financial mediators and th e ir 
regulator (the state) are 1) im proving the quality o f investments, capital ad- 
equacy, 2) increasing dependency on floating interest rate on the liab ilities 
side, and 3) in te rtw in ing  o f balance and off-balance operations. The basic 
changes occurring in  tne banking system are shown in  Table 3. These 
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Zysm an13 enumerates three d iffe ren t types o f financia l systems 
w ith  various consequences due to  connections between politics ana econ- 
omy (enterprises, banks and other mediators). The firs t system is based on 
capital market w ith  resources allocated by prices established on com petitive 
markets where the enterprises and the mediators operate. The second is 
the credit-based system w ith  critica l prices contro lled by the state. The 
th ird  is the credit-based system dominated by the financial institu tions. 
The state may appear in  a ll three roles simultaneously, even though th is
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brings it  in to  con flic ting  situations. One such conflic ting  situation is con- 
nected to  its debt financed by subordination o f financial mediators and fi- 
nancial regulation. The second interesting con flic ting  situation emerges 
when the state decides fo r a monetary po licy o f the target quan tity  o f 
money aim ing not only to  stability o f prices, but also to  subordination o f fi-  
nancial mediators.
The three systems mentioned are an im portant series o f connec- 
tions between enterprises and the state and between the state and the 
banks (o ther financial mediators) and th e ir governance. A ccording to  
Zysm an14 the model o f adjustment in  the firs t type o f financial system is 
company-led, in  the second type state-led and in the th ird  type negotiated. 
Another classification relates to  corporate governance structures: pure out - 
sider system, pure insider, and u ltra  insider system. The pure outsider 
system is the closest to  the financial system based on the capital market. 
Individuals are d irect owners o f enterprises and banks and in d ire c t owners 
through investm ent funds (institu tiona lized investors). There is a free 
market o f shares and no crosswise ownership. The pure insider system is 
suitable fo r both types o f cred it financial system. Typical o f th is k ind  o f 
system are in im ical takeovers which affect the response o f the managers o f 
enterprises and force them to  act according to  the demands o f the owners. 
Crosswise ownership between banks and enterprises is allowed in  th is type 
o f regulation. The banks perform  the role o f com m ercial and investm ent 
banking and the control over enterprises. The capital m arket is not w ell 
developed. This type o f system does not foresee hostile takeovers against 
the w ill o f the managers. In  the ultra insider system crosswise ownership 
among enterprises is allowed. Banks are the core o f crosswise ownership. 
Hostile takeovers are practically unknown. In  each o f these types o f regu- 
lations the state and the parties intertw ine. The state may pursue a number 
o f policies w ith in  two extremes: from la issez-fa ire , where it  provides for 
m acropolicy only, the policy o f competitiveness and foreign trade policy, 
and leaves a ll the rest to  market mechanisms, to  a partia l o r a complete 
ownership over corporations, regulation o f cred it system, and to  directives 
o f central planning. The parties seek support fo r th e ir objectives, and open 
and concealed ways o f financing the ir own activities.
A special type o f takeover should be mentioned here, the so-called 
EFSA L approach.*8 A fte r the firs t wave o f changes fo llow ing the m u lti- 
party elections, putting forward privatization firs t and then restructuring, a 
wave o f soberness followed, bringing an awareness that the re structuring o f 
enterprises should not be delayed. On the outset the reform  program had 
at its disposals three alternatives: 1) the so-called market solution leaving 
enterprises w ithou t outside (government) help a fte r hyperin fla tion , the 
breakup o f Yugoslavia and collapse o f previous Yugoslav external markets 
and o f Yugoslav internal market; at the very beginning such a view was a 
flagship o f new politica l parties; 2) the so-called po litica lly  driven takeover 
o f enterprises understood as purely removal o f existing managerial struc- 
tu  res and im posing outside control over enterprises; and 3) restructuring  
o f existing enterprises w ithout significant market prospects. A t the end, 
the restructuring  strategy was, as in  o ther C entral and East European
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Countries shaped by the W orld Bank. I t  included a m ixture o f po litica l 
and economic tasks, performed by this institu tion, that interfered w ith  the 
in te rna lly  induced process o f changing the existing rules. Such a process 
was established in Slovenia in  m id-1992, when an emergency activity was 
channeled in order to stop the increase in the num ber o f money-losing en- 
terprises and banks by the help o f the so-called prebankruptcy res truc tu ring  
o f enterprises and banks. A continu ity w ith  understanding o f the tim e be- 
fore the politica l changes took place was thus established, which dictated a 
financial and production restructuring o f economy in  those times, inc lud - 
ing privatization. Such an awareness was promoted by the presence o f the 
W orld Bank in form er Yugoslavia, especially its studies on the mechanisms 
o f generating and allocation o f losses and th e ir macroeconomic conse- 
quences. The change o f emphasis d id  not remain w ithout consequences. 
The process o f a state reorganization o f economy is more pronounced than 
privatization. I t  is a consequence o f a financial crisis, which cannot be 
abolished in a centralized way by the economic units themselves. An in - 
tervention in creditor-debtors relationships among enterprises (m utual in - 
debtedness), between enterprises and banks (baa loans and financing o f 
curren t activities), between enterprises and the state (governm ent credits 
and guarantees fo r enterprise restructuring, the unresolved question o f 
state succession), between the state and banks (transfer o f bad loans to  en- 
terprises to  the government, old foreign currency savings o f households 
and th e ir monetary system counterpart— claims towards Yugoslav centra l 
bank o r to  the new state, the government as the most im portant debtor in 
economy), is a form o f forsaken expectations according to  which privatiza- 
tion  and an entire ly decentralized operation should save the accumulated 
problems. The EFSAL approach introduced by the W orld Bank to  central 
and east European states is meant fo r solving internal indebtedness o f en - 
terprises and bad outstanding loans o f banks by the help o f an active role o f 
banks' incentive fo r restructuring o f enterprises. Even though there are 
certain modalities from state to state, the adopted approach is based on two 
governm ent institutions, the development fund and the agency fo r bank 
rehabilitation, which are taking control o f enterprises and forcing them  to  
restructure. This actually means an im plementation o f government force to 
trigger changes in  enterprises. In  practice th is resulted in actual stratifica- 
tio n  o f rules adopted fo r dealing w ith  d iffe ren t groups o f enterprises and 
banks and o f the transformation process as whole. A t the heart o f the prob- 
lem was the debt overhang problem. Two main features o f the whole pro- 
cess are partia lly giveaway privatization and giveaway government debt as 
vehicles transferring previously incurred losses from the business to  the 
government sector and transferring net wealth to  new owners. Yet the re- 
structuring results fo r enterprises and banking sectors expecting high ou t- 
side pressure from which newly established investment funds, from banks 
as senior creditors, and from bankruptcy legislation are s till ambiguous. 
Am biguity is generated by d ifferentiation o f newly created institu tions and 
applied rules on the one side and by possibilities o f development o f e ither 
state ownership or in terna lly governed enterprises, both generated from  
previous social ownership, on the other.
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6. Voters and Parties
The relationships between economy and politics and th e ir influence 
on governance structures and élites are numerous and m utually in te r• 
tw ined to  a great extent. In  a democratic society they are verified in  voting 
cycles when the voters and the parties are confronted. From th is viewpoint 
one can observe the fo llow ing questions,16 which are gaining w eight in  
new democracies as w ell, and which can no longer be neglected.
1) W hat is guiding the voters? How do economic and social events 
influence th e ir behavior? Do they take in to  account experiences w ith  pre - 
vious parties and th e ir results, or are the voters oriented only towards the 
fu ture?
2) W hat is guiding the po litica l leaders and parties? How do they 
behave: in  an opportune o r a pragmatic way on the one hand, which means 
that they adapt th e ir behavior each tim e to  w in the greatest possible num - 
ber o f votes or, on the other, in  a ideological, visionary manner, tha t is, they 
are bound to  realize certain economic and social goals, even at the risk o f 
losing part o f the voters?
3) W hat kind o f economic system (structure) prevails? How are the 
economic policy instruments allocated, and how are the economic and p o lit- 
ical roles arranged among the most im portant parts o f the state? W hat is 
th e ir system o f control? Can parties influence the economic conditions as a 
whole, do they want to  influence the whole at a ll, o r are they in e ffic ie n t 
econom ically and po litica lly?  W hich instrum ents are im portant to  certain 
parties (taxes, transfers, subsidies, monetary policy, and the like)?
4) To what influences (economic and politica l shocks) are the econ- 
omy and politics exposed? Are there external exogenous events operating, 
or are the events and phenomena o f endogenous nature dependent on po- 
litica i processes?
5) Are the parties capable and e ffic ien t in  realizing th e ir goals, do 
they feel responsible to  th e ir voters, o r are they inclined to change th e ir 
goads and voters?
There are two predom inant approaches in  the analysis o f these
?[uestions. The firs t arises from the ra tiona lity o f the voters, the second rom the behavior o f the parties. As far as the rationality o f the voters is 
concerned, the central question is the form ation o f th e ir expectations re - 
garding economic policy and party programs. The voters are rational when 
th e ir expectations are rational, when they have access to  a ll necessary in - 
form ation, and when they evaluate th e ir parties according to  expected re- 
suits. I f  the expected requirements are not fu lfille d , the voters are irra - 
tional. Regarding parties, th e ir ideological o r opportunistic nature is the 
gist o f th e ir behavior. They are opportunistic when they decide fo r a policy 
which w ould maximize the possibility o f th e ir election, regardless o f th e ir 
behavior in  the past, faithfulness to  th e ir program and also regardless o f 
economic conditions. They are ideological when follow ing th e ir set goals 
regardless o f politica l reason.
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The enumerated factors allow for at least five hypotheses fo r the 
study o f po litica l and economic cycles, that is the influence o f politics on 
economic conditions. The firs t type can be named the opportunistic cycle, 
based on opportunistic parties and irrational voters. Voters evaluate past 
achievements and election promises o f the parties, they look in to  the past, 
they therefore have a memory which, on the other hand, ascribes greater 
weight to recent events and behavior o f the parties. The parties lead a po i- 
icy o f maximizing the number o f voters in future elections and, when in  
power, they adjust the ir current economic policy to that end. The second
Г  is the ideological cycle. Its parties can be identified ideologically, and voters are irrational. Parties d iffe r according to  the ir objectives and ac- 
cording to  the weight ascribed to the ir identical goals. Voters decide fo r 
those parties which are most suitable to th e ir preferences. The economic 
policy changes in  ideological cycle, when the parties in power change, and 
not aue to  adapting to  the desired election results. The th ird  type repre- 
sents u ltra  rational voters and parties. Voters have identical inform ation as 
the parties, they look forward only, and do not have memory obstacles in 
assessing the circumstances. W ith such voters, parties are po litica lly  ine f- 
fic ien t, because each o f th e ir maneuvers is foreseen and evaluated by the 
voters who adapt th e ir behavior to that and annul the results expected by 
the parties. Therefore the parties themselves are forced to  be u ltra  rational 
and renounce the firs t two cycles mentioned above as a tool fo r realization 
o f th e ir goals. The fourth type concerns the changes (shocks) conditioned 
externally, and are independent from internal economic and po litica l c ir- 
cumstances. The reactions to  them are various. W ith the opportun istic 
parties they depend on the rationality o f the voters. The u ltra  rational vot- 
ers w ill im m ediately conclude that it is not the responsibility o f the par- 
ties, therefore these events w ill not cause th e ir popularity to  be reduced, 
w hile economic and politica l reactions w ill depend on the party in power. 
The irra tiona l and not well inform ed voters w ill ascribe the changes to  the 
party in  power and w ill not vote for it  anymore. I f  the parties are ideologi- 
cal parties, the rational voters w ill weigh which party can better absorb 
disturbances, which may lead to a simultaneous change o f the economic and 
po litica l regime and policy. The fifth  type relates to  ab ility  and effective- 
ness and not to  ideological characteristics or pragmatism o f the parties. The 
effectiveness is in both cases a characteristics o f both types o f parties which 
cannot afford an ineffective activity.
7. Conclusion
These approaches do not exhaust a ll possibilities fo r analysis o f 
transform ation processes in  previously socialist societies. T he ir common 
foundations are the theory o f élites, àie power and network o f the élites, 
the regulatory mechanism b u ilt by the élites, and th e ir influence on eco- 
nomie and po litica l differentiations. What differentiates post-socialist so- 
cieties from  capitalist states are unfinished differentiations (econom ic—  
in to  owners, managers and employees and po litica l— in to  parties and
240 Neven Borak
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
government adm inistration). C ontra iy to  capitalist states that introduce 
m odernization impulses in to post-socialist societies, these societies are in  
the stage o f disintegration. A t the same tim e, capitalist states are in the 
process o f reintegration based on supra-national entities like economic and 
security blocks that strengthen the ir dominant position.
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Economic Relations between 
Central and Southeastern Europe: 




I f  we take in to  consideration economic relations among fo rm er 
C M EA countries it  is quite clear that they are now at a much lower leve l 
than th e ir cooperation w ith  the EU. The common features o f trade reori - 
entation o f central-eastern European countries mainly determines the re - 
lations among them. This is best reflected in  the lim ited  achievements o f 
p re fe ren tia l trade agreements that took shape during past years, e.g., 
Hungary concluded trade agreements w ith  Poland, Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia, while among other countries these institu tiona l- 
ized links are generally missing (see Appendix)
The slow realization o f the importance o f cooperation can be at - 
tribu ted  to  several factors, but the most im portant reason is undoubtedly 
mutual distrust and disrespect.
Today, w ith  the reintegration o f southeast European countries in to  
the w orld economy, the questions and possible future perspectives o f re- 
gional cooperation, o r I could instead say regional trade, have again been 
spotlighted. Some say the establishment o f strong regional cooperation 
may substitute fo r reintegration in to  the world economy and the quest fo r 
becoming integrated in to the EU. Others say there is no need fo r regional 
cooperation, instead the countries should concentrate on creating stronger 
ties w ith  the EU . Anyway, we should be aware that throughout h istory 
trade links among these countries never developed naturally, but only un- 
der the ru ling  hand o f a non-regional great power.
U nder these circumstances the impetus fo r establishing closer ties 
w ith in  the region should be in itia ted  and prom oted outside the region 
(e.g., creation o f the Vishegrad group, ana the conclusion o f C E FTA  
agreement). Outside in itia tives are also im portant to  get southeastern
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European countries to  realize that they should pursue m odernization by 
themselves, since, fo r the tim e being, external financia l assistance can 
hardly be expected. However, un til now, ne ither real economic develop- 
ments nor politica l initiatives gave much hope fo r this expectation.
I f  we consider just the stric tly  southeastern European (form er so- 
cia list) countries, it is clear that the starting situation o f th e ir economies 
and the economic performances since then are more unfavorable than in 
the Vishegrad countries. We may say that, i f  the transform ation to  a market 
economy and the general development level o f the economies are crite ria  
fo r jo in ing  Europe, then, in  this sense, these countries are far from even 
the central European countries. In  spite o f this evaluation these countries 
made significant steps in  the economic and also in  the po litica l fields, espe- 
c ia lly  compared to tn e ir desperate starting situation. T h e ir steps are re- 
spected by western Europe as w ell as granting membership in  European 
po litica l organisations ana strengthening links w ith  the EU.
The structure o f this stuay is as follows:
In  the firs t part I try  to  enumerate pro and contra arguments in 
connection w ith  regional cooperation, then I  analyze intra-regional trade 
developments and future trade potential in  southeastern Europe (using 
“ case studies” ), while in the last part I  form ulate some conclusions ana 
questions. In  the Appendix I present m ajor trade agreements concluded 
w ith  the countries in question, outline trade regimes, and give some de- 
ta ils on geographical d istribution o f individual countries’ foreign trade.
Problems of Cooperation. Pros and Cons
I t  is quite natural to th ink o f cooperation among neighboring coun- 
tries. These countries— because o f geographical proxim ity ana common his- 
torica l ties— generally share cultural, ethnic, ana even economic and social 
values and interests. This is sometimes considered to  be useful; however, 
many times bad experiences related to  this common past make any kind o f 
cooperation d ifficu lt. These problems and d ifficu ltie s  become evident in 
times o f dramatic politica l ana economic changes when a new economic and 
po litica l identity should be created. Southeast Europe, w ith  the weakening 
and slow disappearing o f socialist rule, has had to  face too suddenly the 
challenges o f approaching the developed w orld , and especially the 
European Com m unity (Union). They were not prepared fo r drastic eco- 
nomie restructuring since in itia l steps were not made during the seventies 
and eighties.
When less-developed countries are to  catch up w ith  the west, or 
more exactly to  start on the long and arduous path towards modernization, 
a natural, but— from the point o f view o f cooperation possibilities— mostly 
unfavorable phenomenon, appears. This is the phenomenon o f strong com- 
pe tition  among the best perform ing countries o f the group and those likely 
to  become the best students o f the west. (This is most obvious in  the 
Vishegrad group, especially in the case o f the Czech Republic.) The reason 
fo r th is attitude is tne fear that i f  a region o r a subregion is considered to
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be homogenous, western judgement on the region would be determ ined by 
the w orst-perform ing country. I t  is true that a lack o f m odernization, o r 
slow pace o f m odernisation, can influence negatively the life  o f o ther 
countries. That can partia lly explain the attitudes o f certain countries. 
However such behavior does not promote a sp irit o f cooperation, bu t gives 
rise to  hostile th ink ing  in  partner countries.
One o f the problems which raises further doubts about integration 
is that, during the past decades, the industrial structure o f the countries in 
the region generally were not developed in  accordance w ith  revealed com- 
parative advantages. That is why parallel capacities were b u ilt, causing 
these countries to  be competitors today rather than cooperators in  foreign 
trade. This results in  a simple regional cooperation which offers on ly lim - 
ited  advantages to  these countries.
The countries in question are facing more-or-less the same trans- 
fo rm ation  challenges. However the starting situation among southeast 
European countries is d iffe ren t. T he ir development levels were qu ite  
d iffe ren t at the beginning o f the transform ation process and these d iffe r- 
ences have not yet disappeared. The same could be said about the attitudes 
towards m odernization and/or towards Europe. These attitudes were 
m ainly developed in  the past ten to  twenty years, e.g., the Romanian o r 
Albanian attitude, which were developed during the eighties under to ta l 
autarchy, are d iffe ren t from  the Bulgarian one (Bulgaria was bound to  the 
fo rm er Soviet U nion in  its foreign trade at the highest rate o f a ll the 
CO M ECO N countries). The Yugoslav attitude and experience was d iffe r- 
ent from  the above-mentioned ones since this country, due to  po litica l rea- 
sons, had the closest connections w ith  western Europe. And, o f course, the 
experiences and attitudes o f the Yugoslav republics were also qu ite  d iffe r- 
ent from  one another’s, which is best illustrated by the developmental d if- 
ferences between, e.g., Slovenia and Macedonia. Just in these few sen- 
tences we illustrate the complexity o f the situation and the significant d if- 
ferences which are present in the central and southeast European region.
A fte r th is evaluation our conclusion could be that ind ividual coun- 
tries should fo llow  d iffe ren t ways because th e ir d iffe ren t situations re- 
quires d iffe ren t treatments and the contradictions are close to  unbearable. 
D iffe ren t development levels may im ply that the speed o f catching up w ith  
Europe cannot be the same for each o f these countries. Intentions fo r in te - 
gration on the regional and European levels are, therefore, ju s tifie d  only i f  
they are supported by the realisation o f fa irly sw ift and successful economic 
development and by closing the gap between the western w orld  and east- 
central Europe. I f  the perception is that individual countries can approach 
Europe more successfully than parts o f any kind o f in tegration, there 
would not be grounds fo r integrational aspirations. Sooner o r la ter a ll the 
countries in  tne region w ill face th is dilemma. Perhaps in  southeast 
Europe the situation is a b it sim ilar, since some o f the measures necessary 
to  transform  economic systems have not yet been taken. The d iffe ren t eco- 
nomie policy measures taken by the countries and the difference in  the 
ways they are conducting th e ir transition and making th e ir stab iliza tion  
policies makes cooperation d ifficu lt. S ignificant instab ility  and unsettled
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questions exist concerning foreign trade regimes or privatization issues or 
prom otion o f foreign investments, which are supposed to be essential in 
the process o f modernizing an economy.
Under these circumstances a kind o f coordination is imaginable. O f 
course, countries w ill fo llow  th e ir own national interests, and th e ir a tti- 
tude towards cooperation w ill be determ ined by the attractiveness o f other 
alternatives. One very pressing issue could be the in ten tion  o f some 
countries to  jo in  w ith  central European countries and neglect southeast 
ties, w hich could cause tensions sim ilar to  those experienced w ith in  the 
Vishegrad group.
Another reason why regional cooperation is not necessarily viewed 
as an a ttractive  solution is bad experiences rem em bered from  the 
CO M ECO M  era. This era represented a veiy bad image o f products pro- 
duced in the region. Besides, the structures o f industiy which were not 
com petitive o ffe r only lim ited  scope fo r cooperation. The socialist era 
ruined most o f the natural trade connections among these countries.
E thn ic tensions also can pose long-term obstacles to regional coop- 
eration, and are obvious in  many cases. However, in  my opinion ethnic 
tensions m ight be cured most successfully by strengthening economic co- 
operation, especially at the m icro-level, e.g., by prom oting jo in t ventures 
among countries.
The experiences o f development in  other regions show that mod- 
em ization and fast development do not necessarily require trad itiona l in - 
tegration patterns. For example, the far eastern region achieved its envi- 
able development w ithout taking part in any classical regional cooperation.
Ana thus we are now facing the question o f how and in wnat shape 
integration could really help the catching up o f these countries w ith  tne 
E U .
The key question is whether the current levels and perspectives o f 
regional convergence are so hopeless that it  is better to build  relations w ith  
the EU  by individual countries and to compete w ith each other w ith in  the 
region, or whether it  is possible that the forms o f cooperation (association 
agreements w ith  the EU, form s o f cooperation— C E FTA , C entra l 
European In itia tive — and possible new jo in ing  countries) are w orth noth- 
ing and elaboration o f alternatives is needed?
M any th in k  that jo in t e ffo rts could help in approaching the 
European Union, which I th ink is the ultim ate aim o f a ll the east-central 
European countries. This b e lie f is endorsed and supported by the 
European Union. According to  this judgem ent, countries w ith  s im ila r 
backgrounds (in  spite o f significant differences in  th e ir development 
strategies) could help make stronger mutual relations. A strong in tra re - 
gional trade is considered to be a useful method o f helping the country’s 
developm ent and preparing them fo r closer cooperation w ith  the EU. 
According to  this approach the interests o f countries in  the region are gen- 
erally the same, and in an economic sense market agents o f the region have 
knowledge and extensive understanding o f each other (and o f ways o f do- 
ing business) that could promote cooperation.
This is partly true, but the motives o f the EU behind this “ region
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prom otion” policy can be found elsewhere. The EU knows very w ell that 
several products coming from east-central Europe could become quite  
com petitive in western markets. One reason fo r this is low production 
costs. Especially so-called sensitive products may threaten the positions o f 
western products. They would like to  d ivert the trade o f these type o f 
products to the eastern European region. And this is not very healthy from  
the point o f view o f modernization. I t  is generally accepted that the mod- 
em ization o f underdeveloped countries should be linked to  one o f the 
most-developed trading centers o f the world. From this it  clearly follows 
tha t the developm ent o f in tra -regional trade among the east-central 
European countries cannot be a goal in itself, but is rather a result o f sue- 
cessful integration in to the developed world economy.
Closer regional cooperation— because o f an underdeveloped re- 
gional market, a low level o f intraregional trade, a lack o f financia l re- 
sources, weak infrastructural ties, and a sim ilar export structure— w ould 
conserve noncompetitive structures and exclude these countries from  the 
mainstream o f European developments. Besides, because o f above-men- 
tioned facts, the southeast European region never (or more exactly only 
during Ottoman times) was an organic economic region. In  fact, these 
countries have never relied upon each other, but rather on d iffe ren t pow- 
ers, the Austrian Em pire, Russia, Germany, o r France, so natural ties, in  
spite o f geographical proxim ity, did not lead to  cooperation w ith  neighbor- 
ing countries, but rather w ith countries outside the region. Thus in tra - 
regional ties can only be supplementary factors to  successful m oderniza- 
tion .
Another im portant consideration w orth  m entioning is tha t the 
European Union supports regional grouping only i f  it  is not able to  form  a 
common foreign economic policy, in  other words i f  it  is unable to  enhance 
successful cooperation and to effectively protect against European protec- 
tion ist foreign trade. In  fact, common economic policy against the EU 
would strengthen negotiating power. I t  is hardly imaginable tha t the EU 
would be interested in this development. This policy is obvious i f  we look 
at the past. European powers continued th e ir power-balance policy in  the 
region while try ing to spread the ir sphere o f influence to  other countries.
The association agreements concluded by Romania and Bulgaria 
w ith  the EU, providing favorable trade conditions fo r extra-regional trade, 
could push other countries to liberalize th e ir intra-regional trade in  order 
to elim inate fu rthe r trade diversion. Perhaps these association agreements 
could prom ote the development o f intra-regional connections in  o ther 
countries, in  ligh t o f experiences gained during the past few years by cen- 
tra i European countries, since after the conclusion o f these agreements the 
balance o f trade w ith  the EU has worsened significantly, which was caused 
especially by declining exports and increasing imports.
And finally, I  would like to  raise the question of, o r more exactly to  
speculate on, power and emphasis shifts in the EU ’s policy towards the 
Mediterranean region, which obviously can influence the future o f south- 
east European countries. Today it  seems that there is potentially a compe- 
titio n  between the Mediterranean (Turkey, Cyprus, Malta) and east-central
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European countries in  jo in ing the European Union. And here perhaps the 
riva lry o f Germany ana France for the leading role in the EU appears on 
the scene. France may be em inently in terested in  a llow ing the 
M editerranean countries (and perhaps the Balkan countries too?) to  enter 
in to  the EU, since this area can be considered a French sphere o f influence 
rather than a German one. W ith closer ties to  this region, France perhaps 
can counterbalance the excessive German role in Central Europe. I f  th is 
consideration holds some tru th , then disinterestedness from  western 
Europe towards this region could change significantly, which may in flu - 
enee a positive impact on regional connections. In  this sense we cannot ex- 
aggerate the importance o f Serbian recovery.
Areas Where Cooperation is Required
I f  we are considering cooperation in  the region, we should make 
clear what we are th inking about. We have seen that creating close in te  - 
grat ion is very d ifficu lt and its outcomes are uncertain fo r many reasons. 
In  spite o f this, some kind o f higher-level cooperation is imaginable i f  it  
could strengthen the jo in t power o f these counties, but today the outlines 
o f the future are quite vague.
A lower level o f cooperation is obviously highly welcome. An espe- 
c ia lly  im portant fie ld  could be the micro-sphere. Joint ventures could be 
the vehicle o f creating vivid economic relations between the countries.
Another im portant fie ld  could be in frastructu ra l cooperation. 
Countries o f the region are trying to  take part in  d ifferent cooperation and 
regional organizations. The two most im portant organizations which have 
attracted countries from the southeast European region are the C entral 
European In itia tive  and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. (There is 
clear interest in CEFTA also.) U nfortunately these organizations have not 
yet enhanced modernization because o f the divergent interests o f the 
countries involved and a lack o f financial means. The projects form ulated 
in  the Central European In itia tive  could be especially im portant in  the in - 
frastructural development o f the region. Its  main sponsor would be the 
EBRD , but because o f mainly organizational problems the realization o f the 
projects is making very slow headway. The most im portant projects are
1) Trieszt Budapest-Záhony highway, 2) W ien-Budapest-Belgrad H ighway 
and Railway, 3) Balticum -Adria Highway and Railway, and 4) C entra l 
Europe-Balkans intraregional telecommunication network
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation is an organization in  w hich 
Greece, a member o f the EU, and Turkey take part and which has am bitious 
aspirations in the Black Sea region. These aspirations perhaps a little  b it 
frightens some neighbors. N aturally the orientation towara th is region 
cannot substitute fo r an approach to  the EU, but could contribute to  the 
m odernization o f participating countries.
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Some Words on the Experiences of the Vishegrad Countries and 
Future Possibilities of CEFTA.
I t  is im portant to  evaluate the chances and perspectives o f CEFTA 
which is the firs t free trade agreement in this region ana which one o r tw o 
countries from the region are perhaps intending to  jo in . This w ould be 
quite natural, since the two most im portant factors o f its creation are im por- 
tant in southeast Europe as well. The firs t is that the objective o f a ll the 
participants is to  jo in  tne European Union, which is also true fo r southeast 
Europe. The second is that a ll participants wish to  halt declin ing trade 
among the region’s countries by granting the same conditions in  th e ir mu - 
tual trade as were granted in EU and EFTA agreements. The aim o f a free 
trade area is not to create preferential conditions fo r intra-regional coop- 
eration but to elim inate discrim inating barriers from already existing refa- 
tions. This is not an easy task at all, since the differences between the 
countries’ practices are too great (which is also true o f Balkan countries as 
w e ll).
For example, the scale o f markets is very d ifferent. Furtherm ore , 
the methods o f market protection also d iffe r as far as ta r iff and n o n -ta riff 
barriers are concerned. According to the treaty, the countries involved 
agreed on establishing a free trade area covering ail agricultural and indus- 
tria l products. The ta riffs and non-ta riff barriers to trade should be e lim i- 
nate a gradually, by January 1, 2001, and some benefits could be as follows:
1) E lim inating discrim ination against traders in  the region could 
provide benefits in  terms o f better allocation o f resources as w e ll as in - 
creased com petition among entrepreneurs o f the region.
2) Trade diverting effects caused by Association agreements should 
be compensated w ith in  the region. O f course, deeper integration could 
cause fu rthe r trade diverting effects— but in  a reverse direction. Caution 
is necessary during the implementation o f the treaty, since in th is case do- 
mestie producers would give preference to  trading in  regional markets 
where com petition is weaker than in western Europe. D uring  econom ic 
restructuring this may threaten adjustment to  market forces.
3) The CEFTA was created in order to improve economic relations, 
but it was also supposed to  contribute to politica l co-operation. P olitica l co- 
operation could promote the creation o f a common po litica l stance during 
negotiations w ith the EU.
4) C urrently the intraregional trade among CEFTA countries is 
a rtific ia lly  low. The CEFTA agreement could help in the restoration o f a 
normal level o f trade among the participating countries.
5) The message o f the EU has been that higher levels o f regional 
cooperation prove the readiness (or m aturity) o f these countries to  jo in  the 
EU. A bloc m entality was supposed to  improve the chances o f C entral 
European countries in jo in ing  the EU. Experiences w ith  regional cooper- 
ation could prepare these countries for participating in larger economic in - 
tegration.
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Foreign Trade Developments in Southeast Europe, Emphasizing 
Intraregional Reorientation
In  southeast European form er socialist countries the transition  or 
the reform  process to  a market economic system began in the early n ineties. 
The socialist countries had a quite d iffe ren t heritage because o f th e ir past 
system. In  spite o f these differences, economic perform ances, except 
Slovenia and Croatia, have sim ilar features.
Essentially, all the countries in  the region have liberalized foreign 
trade in  spite o f the differences in  ta r iff and no n -ta riff barriers structures. 
Export prom otion cannot be considered a significant economic policy tool. 
However, from  1993 we can see traces o f strengthening protectionist ten- 
dencies due to  the general tendencies in  w orld trade during the past two 
years. We may assume that these protectionist tendencies appeared firs t in 
the most advanced transition countries, not surprisingly in  the Vishegrad 
group. These tendencies also can be observed in Bulgaria and Romania. In  
Macedonia and Albania this trend has yet been seen, which is quite under- 
standable. But as Hungary has experienced, these protective measures are 
m ainly effective against regional partners. Besides, foreign investors de- 
mand additional protective measures.
But in  spite o f these new tendencies, foreign trade regimes in  the 
region are more liberal than in  the beginning o f the reform  processes. And 
o f course it  contributed significantly to— although d iffe ren t— successes in 
foreign trade. This more libera l attitude also positive ly influenced the 
num ber o f foreign trade actors, making foreign trade less concentrated. 
The growing number o f trading companies is essential and perhaps the firs t 
im portant step in  the way o f strengthening regional ties. M icro  level busi- 
ness cooperation is the natural way o f regional cooperation. This is espe- 
c ia lly  true when a key country, Serbia-Montenegro, is isolated from  the 
main trading partners o f Europe.
Creating m icro cooperation now is essential fo r fu rthe r deepening 
any kind o f cooperation in the future.
The evidence fo r this is that the main d irection in trade reorienta- 
tion  o f southeast European countries is the European Union. Keeping this 
fact in  m ind, I  now examine the trade reorientation o f four (central) south- 
east European countries concentrating on in traregional trade develop- 
ments.
Romania
A t the end o f the eighties about 50% o f Romanian foreign trade was 
conducted w ith  the CM EA countries while th is ratio fo r the year 1992-93 
fe ll below 20%. The volume o f foreign trade in  th is region has decreased 
at various rates in  the case o f d ifferent countries.
The most obvious development is that the geographical reorienta- 
tion  o f Romanian foreign trade among form er CM EA countries has became 
significant. I t  is enough to  mention that, e.g., the value o f foreign trade
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w ith  Poland in  1988 was about U.S.$893 m illion while in 1993 th is amount 
was not more than U.S.$100 m illion. The same decline can be traced in  the 
case o f the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The decreasing trend character- 
ized Hungarian-Romanian foreign trade also for a while, bu t th is trend re - 
versed drastically during 1992, both in  exports and im ports. (In  the firs t 
seven months o f 1994 the volume o f foreign trade between the tw o coun- 
tries  d id  not decrease in  comparison to  the same period o f 1993, but 
Hungarian exports decreased by 20% w hile im ports from  Romania in - 
creased by 20%.)
The above decreases were in part due to  the reorientation o f in te r- 
ests o f form er socialist countries towards trade w ith  the developed w orld  
and partly to  Romanian domestic trade policy. A t the beginning o f the eco- 
nomie transform ation they in  fact stopped export prom otion, which created 
an almost unsolvable problem fo r exporters. Besides, there was no in ten- 
tio n  and in terest fo r cooperating in  the fie ld  o f trade w ith  C entra l 
European countries and this was the case from the other side also. The 
overall result was the significant decrease in  foreign trade w ith  fo rm er 
C M E A  countries which was ju s t partly compensated by increased trade 
w ith  the EU.
The trade reorientation among form er C M EA countries is related 
to po litica l connections, coincidence o f interests and geographical proxim  - 
ity . For today Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia have become the most 
im portant trad ing partners in  th is region (disregarding the fo rm er SU). 
There is a general attitude today that Romania should cooperate w ith  its 
neighbors. Bulgaria is a natural partner, and both countries are now partie- 
ipating in  the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and m icro-level business 
connections are prospering. I t  has also been realized that stronger in tra re - 
gional connections ao not mean alternative solutions to  strengthening con- 
nections w ith  the EU, but they are certainly essential in  creating favorable 
local conditions and can help trade diversification, which could contribute 
to  economic growth.
The trade w ith  Yugoslavia shows a tendency to  increase in  spite o f 
the embargo imposed on Serbia. (In  fact, the volume o f trade is not much 
higher now than in 1988, but since then the total volume o f foreign trade 
has decreased by at least 50%.) The reason is simple: Romanian products 
do no face strong com petition in  the Yugoslav market, and good relations 
(even po litica l) are im portant fo r both countries. Romanian entrepreneurs 
are encouraged to  be present in  Yugoslavian markets (or more exactly they 
are not punished fo r doing th is) in order to  create good conditions fo r 
business after sanctions are lifted .
Now there is a strong intention to  increase trade even w ith  central 
European countries. I t  was expressed by the w ill o f jo in in g  C EFTA. 
(However, i t  is a closed agreement.) This in terest is seen to  meet 
Hungarian economic and po litica l interests. Im proving relations are im - 
portant fo r both countries, thus an increase in the volume o f foreign trade 
is expected to  be an economic policy target in the future also.
The countries o f the form er Soviet Union are s till im portan t in  
Romanian foreign trade. Russia is today the second most im portant trad ing
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partner after Germany. The relative importance o f CIS/Russia trade in the 
form er C M EA trade has decreased more sign ificantly in comparison to 
Hungary o r Bulgaria, but the decrease was less significant than in the case 
o f Poland and the Czech Republic. For Romania Moldova, a member 
country o f CIS can be considered especially im portant (its relative im por- 
tance compared to, e.g., Russia is quite high). This is mainly due to  geo- 
graphical proxim ity and certain ethnic ties between the two peoples.
Summarizing, we can assume that Romanian policy recognized the 
importance o f the Balkan region and this policy option decides tne empha- 
sis in  foreign trade strategy as w ell. Central European countries may be- 
come the focus o f foreign trade policy when jo in ing  CEFTA. In  fact, ap - 
proaching CEFTA is connected to economic and, o f course, po litica l rela- 
tions w ith  Hungary. Since Hungarian and Romanian trade interest meet at 
a certain point, Hungary may become a more and more im portant trading 
partner. The most im portant change has been experiencea in  trade con- 
nections w ith  Yugoslavia. This phenomenon can im plicate long term  con- 
sequences. The same is true fo r trade connections w ith Bulgaria.
In  Romania custom tariffs remain the main instrument o f trade poi- 
icy. Beginning w ith  1 January 1992, a new im port custom ta r iff has been 
im plem ented. This ta r iff includes 5018 ta r iff lines. The global level o f 
p ro tection  is about 17.8% calculated as a sim ple a rithm etic average. 
According to  G ATT and IM F  experts, the level o f ta r iff protection is s till 
high compared to  that o f the main partners o f Romania. However, taking 
in to  account the reductions and exemptions o f custom duties, includ ing 
the trade w ith  the EU, the real level o f protection is only about 10%.
By a special law, Romania has several free trade zones (e.g., Sulina, 
Constanta-Sud, Braila, G alati) extending trade fac ilities such as un re - 
stricted goods im ports and reexports, custom duties and VAT exemption, 
and exemption from p ro fit tax fo r the duration o f company’s operations in a 
free trade zone.
Exchange rate policy is one o f the least clearly defined and most 
vo la tile  parts o f macroeconomic policies in  post-com m unist Romania. 
Under the successive stabilization programs, exchange rate policy has been 
assigned the role o f contro lling the balance o f payment developments and 
bu ild ing  in ternational reserves and assisting the control o f in fla tion  and 
avoiding a vicious spiral o f inflation-dépréciation by d irectly holding down 
the prices o f im ported raw materials and intermediate inputs.
As a consequence o f these somewhat contradictory policy objectives, 
the authorities have not sought to  set the exchange rate at a market clearing 
level bu t rather have controlled it  adm inistratively. Repeatedly unsuccess- 
f il l attempts to  fix  the rate have been followed by sharp devaluations o f the 
o ffic ia l exchange rate. However, these devaluations have repeatedly lagged 
the “ m arket”  exchange rate, so that another devaluation was b u ilt in, vali - 
dating expectations o f depreciation and fu rther underm ining confidence. 
A t the second h a lf o f 1994, after sharp devaluation o f Romanian currency, 
the exchange rate stabilized, even the le i has appreciated. (Taking th is fact 
in to  account, it  is very interesting that last year Romanian exports could 
increase by 4%.)
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B u lg a ria
Bulgaria is the country which was most strongly dependent on 
C M EA trade. In  1989, 90% o f its tota l trade was conducted w ith in  the 
C M E A  area. Bulgaria’s most im portant trad ing partner was the Soviet 
U nion and it  is now Russia. Russia is o f utmost importance fo r the country 
because o f its strong dependence on Russian energy resources. Bulgaria 
has trie d  to  ease this energy dependence by bu ild ing  connections w ith  the 
Black Sea region. However, in  the short run th is d iversification e ffo rt can 
only be moderately successful, thus connections w ith  Russia should be the 
focus o f trade policy. On the other hand, many o f the CIS countries o ffe r 
significant markets fo r low quality Bulgarian products.
Trade connections between Russia ana Bulgaria are expected to  ex- 
pand. A very im portant fie ld  is the arms industry, w hicn is a w e ll- 
grounded industry in Bulgaria. W ith the po litica l system change, the value 
o f arms trade between the two countries fe ll to  one-seventh its previous 
level. But last year trade connections in  th is fie ld  started to  expand. 
Russian orders are favorable fo r both parties, since Bulgaria can im port 
s tra teg ica lly  im portan t raw m aterials, and in  exchange can export 
“ sophisticated”  devices.
The o ther prom ising possib ility fo r developing connections is 
Bulgaria’s in tention to  make itse lf a reexporting center fo r Russian natural 
gas. A Bulgarian-Russian (Gas) Joint Venture was established in  order to  
handle the trading issues. Furtherm ore, new pipelines are going to  be 
constructed toward Greece, Serbia and Turkey. These considerations im ply 
that the importance o f trade connections w ith  Russia is unquestionable.
In  trade w ith  small central eastern European countries sim ilar con- 
ditions and im plications should be considered as in  the case o f Romanian 
foreign trade strategy toward these countries. Drastic decreases in  foreign 
trade value were experienced especially in  the case o f Poland and tne 
Czech Republic. The main reason fo r th is— besides the genera] d is in te r- 
estedness from  the part o f central European countries— was the sw itch 
from a transferable ruble trade to a convertible one. However under the 
new conditions the new prices— because they were calculated in  1990 
transferable ruble prices and the governm ent gave in su ffic ie n t export 
support— became very unfavorable fo r Bulgarian exporters. Thus u n in te r- 
ested exporters turned towards other regions. This tendency was not re- 
versed, especially since the central European countries concluded the 
C EFTA agreement, which offers significant advantages fo r participants 
against non-participants such as Bulgaria.
According to trade strategy, regional, Balkan, trade should be p ro - 
moted. D etailed plans are non-existent, but it  is understood tha t Balkan 
cooperation, and thus developed trade w ith form er C M EA countries in  the 
region, is required. Naturally, it is not an easy task since there is not a suf- 
fic ient product base to promote the process.
The reorien ta tion o f trade connections among fo rm er C M E A
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countries is basically determ ined by the low quality o f Bulgarian products. 
Uncom petitive products can be sold only in markets even plainer than the 
Bulgarian one (e.g., Russia or Macedonia). Thus it  is not surprising that 
the value o f trade w ith  Macedonia has risen significantly. (Macedonia last 
year absorbed almost 6% o f tota l Bulgarian export, in  terms o f value.) The 
Bulgarian export offensive was prom oted by the isolated situation o f 
Macedonia as w ell (Greece closed trade routes to Macedonia).
The same was partly true for Yugoslavia. New Yugoslavia accounted 
fo r 4% (1993) o f the total Bulgarian trade. (In  1989 the form er Yugoslavia 
accounted fo r only 0.9%.)
We should remark here that such reorientation among the form er 
C M EA countries and Yugoslavia can only partly be explained by trade po i• 
icy. In  fact, not trade policy, but mainly tne historical situation has forced 
the changes in  the geographical structure o f foreign trade. We may assume, 
that fo r today the central European and the Balkan regions are almost sepa- 
rated in  terms o f foreign traae relation, w ith  the possible exception o f 
Romania and Hungary. In  the Balkan region this has meant that in tra re - 
gional trade has had to increase. This increase up un til last year was m ain ly 
due to  a natural development o f business connections. However, th is year 
the realization o f the importance o f development in trade relations and the 
necessity fo r a kind o f cooperation seems to be a general assumption in the 
Balkan region. Besides, it  was realized that the natural area fo r the in ten- 
sification o f trade connections is the neighboring region. We may expect 
that in  the case o f Bulgaria there is a strong to  medium in tent fo r foreign 
trade w ith  Balkan countries.
When we are evaluating the foreign trade developments o r ex- 
change rate policy in  Bulgaria, we should not disregard that the country 
during the past four years (u n til the agreement on Bulgarian foreign debt 
was reached) was cut from the international financial market. D uring  this 
tim e there was a lack o f sources fo r im porting goods, and only a fte r drastic 
currency devaluation could the country participate in international trade.
One problem which makes foreign traae calculations d iffic u lt is the 
hectic behavior o f the exchange rate. Some say that the Bulgarian lev 
should be pegged to  a foreign exchange which would e lim inate unpre- 
dictable changes. But un til 1994 this was impossible since there was an in - 
su ffic ien t level o f foreign exchange reserves and it  lacked the support o f 
western countries.
The trade policy uses ta riffs  and non-ta riff barriers also. The aver- 
age ta r iff is arouna 16%, but on industrial products it  reaches 22%. A t the 
beginning o f the 90s there was a decreasing trend in the level o f tariffs, but 
a fte r that it  started to  increase again. They use export quotas on six p ri- 
mary commodities. Occasionally export bans on agricultural products are 
also in  force. Registration and licensing restrictions are s till operative.
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Croatia
The situation o f the Croatian economy was essentially determ ined 
by the war, which ravaged the country's te rrito ry , by the flow  o f refugees 
from  Bosnia, and by the disruption o f the country by the Krajins. D uring 
the war, trade relations narrowed and the orientation and reorientation o f 
Croatian trade cannot be viewed as decided by long-term  strategy.
For Croatia connections w ith the form er Yugoslav republics were o f 
utm ost importance in  the past. Today trade relations w ith  these countries 
are less significant and this tendency is continuing. Slovenia remains the 
most im portant partner in  foreign trade, although its w eight in  Croatian 
fo re ign trade during the past few years has continuously decreased. 
However, it  is s till Croatia’s most im portant partner in  central Europe. 
Trade w ith  other central European countries is much less im portant, but 
recently several steps were considered to  develop relations.
This is especially true in the case o f Hungary. As a neighboring 
country, Hungary is now becoming a more and more im portant partner. 
This was clearly expressed in  several p o litic a l declarations o ffe rin g  
Hungary, e.g., seaport custom free area. Tne most significant sign was the 
Declaration o f In tention, according to which Croatia indicated its w illin g - 
ness to  conclude a Free Trade Agreement w ith  Hungary. Foreign traae 
data show an intensification o f traae; in 1994 foreign trade between the two 
countries increased by almost 60%. The lion 's share o f th is increase in  
trade volume was due to a massive Hungarian export expansion. C roatia 
bought from Hungary mainly foodstuff and energy resources.
Trade connections w ith  the Balkan countries (especially w ith  
Romania and Bulgaria) have experienced serious dow nturn. The reason 
for th is is that these countries are maintaining good economic and po litica l 
re lations w ith  FR Yugoslavia, which makes the connections between 
Croatia and these Balkan countries especially precarious. Besides, because 
o f the sanctions imposed on FR Yugoslavia and the hostile po litica l and 
economic relations between Croatia and Serbia, trans it routes towards 
southeastern Europe are closed, which, even physically, makes it  d iff ic u lt 
to maintain trade connections.
Since last year Croatia has experienced sign ificant recovery in  its 
foreign trade. Im ports, especially, nave im proved sign ificantly (w ith  a ll 
trade partners) but exports too have shown favorable signs. The main rea - 
son fo r this is the end o f the war and a great demand fo r im port products. 
I t  is expected that Croatian foreign trade strategy in  the fu tu re  w ill be 
based on stronger economic ties w ith  central European countries. The fu  - 
ture role o f trade w ith  the form er Yugoslavian republics is qu ite  vague 
now. But the natural area for Croatian foreign trade activity is th is region. 
I t  is expected that steps w ill be made to  conduct norm al economic and 
trade relations w ith  Serbia after liftin g  sanctions.
As a result o f the macroeconomic stabilization program introduced 
at the  end o f 1993, the in terna l economic s itua tion  has im proved. 
According to  the aims o f the program, solid foreign exchange reserves
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should be b u ilt up in  order to  control the money supply, thus preserving 
the value o f local currency. To achieve this goal, all export activities have 
been liberalized, thus prom oting foreign exchange reserve accumulation.
In  the firs t phase o f stabilization the local currency was devalued, 
but a fter a few months it  appreciated by 15%. Since then heavy Central 
Bank intervention can be observed. As part o f the stabilization program, a 
10-20% im port tax was introduced in autumn 1993. For a few products a 
higher rate o f ta riffs exist. Only a few quantitative or licensing restric tions 
are in  force, mostly fo r health and national security.
Export taxes range between 2% and 30%, but in most cases they are 
close to  the lower lim it. A quota and licensing system is in force fo r eleven 
p rod uct categories, m ain ly energy, raw m aterials, and fo o d s tu ff. 
Q uantitative restrictions were substantially reduced in  1994.
S loven ia
Slovenia, as part o f the form er Yugoslavia, was not a member in  the 
CM EA group o f countries. The beginning o f economic and po litica l transi- 
tion  in  the Slovenian case was thus d iffe rent from the other form er social- 
is t countries. In  fact, the specific historical position o f Slovenia caused 
some positive and some negative influences fo r future trade and economic 
cooperation w ith  the central European countries.
For Slovenia, trade w ith  the rest o f Yugoslavia was especially im - 
portant. Exports (relative to  GDP) to  the other Yugoslavian republics de - 
creased from  40.4% (1991) to  only 7.7% (1993), and im ports from  32.1% 
(1991) to  5.3% (1993). A t the same tim e, trade w ith  the central European 
countries remained as low as it was earlier w ith  the exception o f the Czech 
Republic.
The main reason fo r this, presumably, is that the relative im por- 
tance o f foreign trade o f goods and services in the case o f the Czech 
Republic is the closest to  the position o f Slovenia. Its  slowly increasing 
export o f goods per capita suggest future interest in export expansion. This 
com bination, w ith  the product structure o f exports and im ports, creates a 
good starting point fo r mutual trade expansion.
Lack o f numerous form er d irect business contacts among firm s 
w ith in  the C entral-Southern European Region (CSER form er socialist 
countries) is perhaps the most im portant reason why trade decline w ith  
parts o f ex-Yugoslavia were not compensated by expanded trade w ith  the 
CSER. The potentia l fo r more trade between Slovenia and the CSER ex- 
ists because o f the necessary export orientation o f Slovenia.
The creation o f CEFTA w ithout the participation o f Slovenia was a 
very unfavorable development as far as the potential increase o f Slovenian 
trade to  CSER markets is concerned. The system o f Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) partly can balance this negative development and clearly 
shows that expanding o r not reducing the trade w ith  this region is in  the 
interest o f Slovenia. Slovenia concluded FTA w ith  the Czech R epublic 
(Decem ber 1993), the Slovak Republic (December 1993), Hungary (A p ril
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1994), Estonia (May 1994) and is currently preparing such agreements w ith  
Poland and Romania.
Slovenia realised that the m odernization o f its economy and the 
creation o f a firm  basis fo r future growth is based on strong ties w ith  the 
developed w orld . This orientation toward developed countries can be 
traced to  the differences between the level o f trade w ith  CSER countries. 
The Czech Republic became the most im portant partner in  th is region, fo l- 
lowed by Hungary and Poland.
Trade expansion in the CSER is econom ically and strategically im - 
portant fo r fu ture economic progress in Slovenia. I t  supports the process o f 
successful economic catching up w ith  the countries o f the European U nion, 
and creates better possibilities for realization o f membership in the E U  
(according to  Slovenian opinion).
D uring the existence o f the form er Yugoslavia, strong ties were es- 
tablished among the Republics. The most im portant partner was and is s till 
Croatia. But because o f unfavorable conditions created by the war in  the 
neighboring country, the significance o f th is relation during the past years 
has decreased. However, it  is expected that its importance w ill grow in  the 
fu ture. This market means a pool fo r Slovenian products not com petitive 
enough in  western markets. Besides there are very strong ties at the 
m icro-level between Slovenia and Croatia. The other reason why C roatia 
s till remains a significant trading partner is the slow grow th in  foreign 
trade w ith  other central European countries.
U n til now Slovenia was unable to  conclude an AA w ith  the EU  be- 
cause o f reluctance on the part o f certain member states, but in the near 
fu ture the country w ill have closer ties w ith  EFTA (which today could o f- 
fe r only lim ited  possibilities, since the size o f EFTA marked has shrunken 
s ign ifican tly .)
In  Slovenia imports are generally ta r iff free. When ta riffs  are ap- 
plied, rates range up to  a maximum o f 25%. The customs fo rm ality tax is 
1%. Some quotas on agricultural and textile  products exist, bu t 98% o f 
products are free o f quotas. On the export side, there are tem porary export 
duties o f 10-25% on raw materials. Permits are necessary fo r the export o f 
susceptible goods. In  Slovenia fu ll current account co n ve rtib ility  exists, 
w ith  some restrictions on capital accounts.
Exchange rate policies and manipulations are determ ined by the 
figh t against in fla tion  and by structural changes fo llow ing secession from  
Yugoslavia. Due to the small size o f the Slovene market and a divergence 
between the structure o f domestic demand and the structure o f supply 
adapted to the Yugoslav market, sales to Yugoslavia can only be substituted 
by exports. The aim has been to  lower in fla tion  and keep it  under contro l, 
and to  preserve the real exchange rate at a level which makes exports com - 
petitive. These conflicting goals have resulted in  a period ica lly changing 
depreciation and appreciation campaign o f the Slovenian tolar.
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Trade connections between centra l Europe and southeastern 
Europe are today at a very low level. Slovenia is a central European coun- 
try  in  every sense and has the tigh test connections w ith  tne central 
European countries. However, it  conducts insign ifican t trade w ith  the 
Balkan countries, except fo r Croatia. For Bulgaria and Romania, southeast- 
em  Europe is becoming more and more im portant, and this can be traced i n 
foreign trade data. A special feature in the case o f Romania is the increas- 
ing significance o f trade relations w ith  Hungary. (This is also true  vise 
versa.)
Concluding Remarks
Summarizing we should stress the follow ing:
1) A ll countries in the Balkans essentially have the same goal, 
namely to  catch up to  Europe as soon as possible.
2) The west European countries and the U nited States are 
interested in  a po litica lly  stabilized Balkan region which does not pose a 
threat to  other parts o f Europe. However it  is now entire ly clear m at no 
financia l support can be expected from  these countries. They are not 
interested in  spending money fo r economic revival in  the Balkan region.
3) Developing regional ties seems to  be the only way to  create a 
firm  basis fo r economic improvements. I t  now supports the interests o f a ll 
parties. Balkan countries have no other choice, because the ir needs for eco- 
nomie support are rejected by western Europe. I t  is also in the interest o f 
W estern Europe and the U.S., since Balkan countries would thus be en - 
gaged w ith  each other, instead o f applying fo r financial support.
4) Hungary could be a bridge between central and southeastern 
Europe. I t  has great potential fo r developing trade connections w ith  
Romania and the form er Yugoslav republics. Trade data show that the de- 
velopm ent o f trade connections already has started and there is s till huge 
potentia l fo r fu rthe r improvements. When we evaluate the trade o f south - 
east European countries w ith  other central European countries, in  most 
cases negligible data could be found.
5) Serbia could be the key country in the region. Its economy, after 
the liftin g  o f sanctions, w ill have great demand fo r almost everything. 
C reating good economic relations now (or at least try ing  to  speak w ith  each 
other) w ill la ter create a strong basis fo r fu rthe r developments. Southeast 
European countries should use this opportun ity. According to  data, in  
spite o f the restrictions on foreign trade flows, the w eight o f Serbia- 
M ontenegro in  Romanian and Bulgarian foreign trade during past tw o 
years has grown significantly. This may im ply a natural way to  develop 
trade connections.
6) The countries in  question, step by step, realize the necessity o f a 
higher level o f intraregional economic policy. Unfortunately, foreign trade
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data clearly shows that intraregional trade today is almost neglig ib le. Its  
improvem ent is necessary. The main reason fo r this can be found in  eco- 
nomie factors. We cannot disregard the fact that the economic performance 
(especially o f foreign trade) o f the eastern central European countries, after 
a prom ising start at the beginning o f transition, has, fo r the past tw o years, 
clearly shown signs o f crisis. We may say that foreign trade data can be re- 
garded as the most reliable indicator o f the economic situation, as opposed 
to  other macroeconomic indicators. A deteriorating foreign trade balance 
may im ply a lack o f real structural change in  the affected economies. I t  is 
most obvious in the case o f Hungary, where m issing adm inistrative steps 
(u n til now) meant that Hungary could not prevent serious imbalances in 
foreign trade. In  fact, these adm inistrative steps could not prevent, but 
only postpone, th is type o f crisis even in  Poland and the Czech Republic, 
where domestic demand was reduced significantly at the beginning o f the 
nineties. This means that these economies, which conduct 50-60% o f th e ir 
foreign trade w ith  the EU, have been unable to  improve th e ir export pe r- 
formance in this region, as would have been desirable. And since modern- 
ization o f the economic structure requires considerable tim e, th is in a b ility  
may be prolonged. D uring this period im proving intraregional economic 
ana other relations is necessary. This w ill in  part contribute to  the avoid- 
ance o f economic collapse in central eastern Europe. Perhaps th is consid- 
e rat ion m ight be the s till missing common interest o f these countries fo r 
jo in t efforts.
7) I t  is tim e to  consider the negative consequences o f granting 
favorable economic status to  countries outside the region, at the expense o f 
interregional cooperation. There is no doubt that a regional economic mod- 
em ization pool is necessary. However, this should in no way prevent coop- 
eration w itn  other countries. For Europeans, the EU is such a force fo r 
modernization, but it  has not contributed to  the ecnomic growth o f form er 
CM EA countries. Modernisation, which is driven by investments, has not 
been facilitated by EU transfers toward the region.
8) I t  is unnecessary now to th in k  about the creation o f a new 
institu tiona lized  econom ic organisation. I t  is evident tha t regional 
cooperation (e.g., the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, o r the C entral 
European In itia tive ) has not contributed to  closer economic connections. 
As a firs t step to  remedying this, it  seems necessary to  give preference to  
trading partners w ith in  the region.
However, the opposite could also be true. This depends on the 
question o f the boundaries o f a region, and how the EU views these 
boundaries. D iffe ren t viewpoints exist. We can handle the countries which 
concluded AA w ith  the European Union as a group. A nother approach 
could be to consider southeast Europe as part o f the M editerranean region. 
From this perspective, the outlook o f these countries is prom ising, since 
the EU toaay is dom inated by northern countries. This shows how the 
question o f (im)balances w ith in  the EU may determ ine fu tu re  relations 
w ith  the regions.
9) Greece could be a vehicle o f regional cooperation. Its  EU 
m em bership may a llow  b e tte r access to  C om m unity financ ing .
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F urthe rm ore , Greece— like  fo rm er socia list coun tries— should fin d  
alternative routes fo r economic growth. Since Greece jo ined the European 
Union, its yearly economic growth is lower than fo r most EU  countries. 
The resu lt: today the per capita GDP in  Greece in  the  ra tio  o f 
Com m unity’s average is lower than it  was at the tim e o f it  jo ined the EU.
10) Relations between Greece and Turkey are another barrie r 
against effective, close cooperation. U n til this relationship is settled, it  is 
d iffic u lt to  speak o f significant jo in t e ffo rt in southeast Europe.
Appendix: Foreign Trade Agreements and Trade Regimes 
Albania
1) M ajor Trade Agreements
GATT observer status, working party on accession (1992)
EC Trade and Cooperation Agreement (Sept 1993)
EFTA Free Trade Agreement (in  force since July 1993)
A ll other OECD countries have granted M FN  and/or GSP status
2) T a riff and N on-Tariff Im port Barriers
Four rates o f im port tarins from 0-30% ad valorem , excluding tem - 
porary surcharge o f 5%. Quantitative restrictions
3) Export Quotas and O ther Export Barriers
E ight product groups subject to  export licences. Tem porary export 
tax on six unprocessed natural-resource-based products
4) Exchange Regime
Restrictions on current account, heavy controls on capital account. 
F loating rate
Bulgaria
1) M ajor Trade Agreements 
GATT working party
EU Europe Agreement signed March 1993, In te rim  Agreem ent 
covering trade components entered in to force January 1994
EFTA Free Trade Agreement in force since July 1993.
A ll other OECD countries have granted M FN  and/or GSP status
2) T a riff and N on-Tariff Barriers
Average ta riff from 13% (1989) to 11% (1991) to 16% (1995). An av- 
erage ta r iff o f 22% on industrial goods reported in 1994. M inim um  prices 
fo r tires and steel pipes. Restrictive im port licences fo r a lim ited  num ber 
o f products. Some ta r iff quotas on processed foods and agricu ltu ra l 
products
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3) Export Quotas and O ther Export Barriers
Export taxes on 30 items, mainly foodstuffs, have replaced most ex- 
port quotas. Export quotas on six prim ary commodities. Occasional export 
bans on agricu ltura l products. Registration and licensing restrictions s till 
operative
4) Exchange Regime
Few restrictions on current account, heavy controls on capital ac- 
count. F loating rate
Croatia
1) M ajor Trade Agreements
GATT observer status, working party on accession (1993).
Terms o f EC Cooperation Agreements w ith  Yugoslavia (1980), ap- 
plied to  Croatia as o f 1991
M FN/GSP status pan ted  by Japan. W ith  other O ECD countries 
the situation is not settled
2) T a riff and N on-T ariff Barriers
A 10% im port tax introduced in  autumn 1993 as part o f m acro- 
economic stabilization program. No quantitative restrictions
3) Export Quotas and O ther Export Barriers
H igh degree o f liberalization, most exports ta r iff free
4) Exchange Regime
Few restrictions on current account, some controls on capital a0־ 
count. F loating rate w ith  CB intervention
M acedonia
1) M ajor Trade Agreements
GATT observer status.
Terms o f Cooperation agreements w ith Yugoslavia in  1980 applied 
as o f 1991
2) T a riff and N on-T ariff Barriers
Average ta r iff o f 4.7% in  1993. Quotas on only 4% o f im ports 
(mostly agriculture). Over 90% o f im ports free o f licensing requirements
3) Export Quotas and Export Barriers
Export quotas removed in  Jan 1994. Over 90% o f exports free o f li-  
censing requirem ents
4) Exchange Regime
Few restrictions on current account, controls on capital account.
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1) M ajor Trade Agreements 
GATT contracting party (1971)
EU  Europe Agreement signed February 1993. In te rim  Agreem ent 
covering trade components in  force since May 1993
EFTA Free Trade Agreement in force since May 1993 
A ll other countries have granted M FN and/or GSP status
2) T a riff and N on-Tariff Im port Barriers
M ost licensing requirements elim inated in  May 1992. W eighted 
average ta r iff 11.7% (1993), maximum rate 40%. Restrictions only fo r 
arms, drugs and items affecting national health. An anti-dum ping duty o f 
30% on alcohol, vehicles, TV's and video recorders imposed between May- 
Oct. 1993
3) Export Quotas and Export Barriers
Export quotas on raw materials fo r conservation reasons 
Occasional export bans on food, fru its and wood products. Reduced 
export licensing requirements since June 1993
4) Exchange Regime
V irtua l current account convertib ility  (except tourism ), but capital 
controls. Floating exchange rate
Slovenia
1) M ajor Trade Agreements
EC Trade and Co-operation Agreement (A p ril 1993 
EC Commission expected to  receive mandate fo r negotiation o f 
Association Agreement soon
EFTA negotiations on Free Trade Agreement (possible m em ber-
ship)
Free Trade Agreements signed w ith  Czech Republic (dec. 1993), 
Slovak Republic (Dec. 1993), Hungary (A p ril 1994) (tariffs to  be phased out 
by 2001) and Estonia (May 1994)
2) T a riff and N on-Tariff Im port Barriers
Generally ta r iff free. Where ta riffs  are applied, rates range up to  
maximum 25%. Customs form ality tax o f 1%. Some quotas on agricultural 
and textile  products (98% o f products free o f quotas)
3) Export Quotas and O ther Export Barriers
Temporary export duties o f 10-25% on raw materials. Perm it fo r
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export o f susceptible goods.
4) Exchange Regime
F u ll current account convertib ility, some restrictions on capital ao- 
count. F loating exchange rate
H u n g a ry
1) M ajor Trade Agreements 
GATT contracting party (1973)
EU  Europe Agreement in force (fu lly  ratified) since February 1994. 
In te rim  Agreements covering trade component in  force since March
1992
EFTA Free Trade Agreement in force since Oct. 1993
A ll other O ECD countries have granted M FN and/or GSP status
CEFTA in force since March 1993
Free Trade Agreement w ith  Slovenia in  force since July 1994 
(tariffs phased out by 2000)
2) T a riff and N on-T ariff Im port Barriers
About 10% o f imports subject to  quota or licensing in  1994. Average 
inveighed ta r iff changea from 13% (1989) to 11% (1991) to 16% (1992). 
Further increase in ta riffs in 1995 (+8%)
«
3) Export Quotas and O ther Export Barriers
Exports o f fuels, wheat and industria l raw materials subject to  li-  
cences (slightly less than 25% o f tota l exports). O f the agricultural budget 
in 1993, 80% devoted to  export subsidies. In  1992, these amounted to  an 
estimated 13% o f export value
4) Exchange Regime
C urrent account convertib ility (except tourism ). Some restrictions 
remain on capital account. Peg to  U.S.$/ECU basket. Since March 1995 
pre-announced crawling peg regime
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E U 54.9 57.4 61.3 50.1 55.7 57.2
Ita ly 13.3 12.5 14.9 13.7 16.2 18.1
Germany 27.0 29.5 30.5 22.7 24.5 23.7
Republics o f Form er 
YU 22.6 16.1 14.4 19.8 10.7 82
Croatia 14.3 12.1 9.7 13.9 9.1 7.0
C IS 3.4 4.9 4.6 4.1 3.2 2 5
C E R -in c lu d in g
Austria 8.6 9.3 9.5 12.8 13.6 16.1
Czech Rep and 
Slovak Rep 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.4 32
H ungary 1.1 1.4 1.3 2.5 2.5 22
Poland 1.0 1.4 1.5 03 0.2 03
Source: Andrej Kumar, Regional Trade in  Central Europe— Slovenian 
Perspective, Regional Business M eeting Point, 1994 Bled.
TABLE 2
Geographical D istribution o f Croatian Foreign Trade
1994
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Л -Ѵ ІІ/
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
European Union 38.2 55.0 61.3 42.8 53.5 52.9
EFTA 8.0 7.1 7.6 11.1 52 10.4
O ther Developed 8.2 7.0 5.0 2.4 3.1 3.6
Eastern Europe 28.6 18.6 11.8 5.8 7.8 8.4
D eveloping Countries 16.2 12.1 12.0 3.6 4.9 5.4
Ex Yugoslav Rep 32.0 24.8 15.9
O ther 0.8 0.2 2.4 2.5 0.8 1.8
J50urce^QoatianJEconomi^Surve^^994
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TABLE 3






TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(form er) CM EA 55.1 32.7 26.8 46.8 34.7 30.0
SU/CIS 49.8 24.9 18.9 43.2 28.6 22.6
C entral- Eastern Eur. 52 6.3 6.8 32 6.0 6.4
O ECD 26.3 42.3 47.6 32.8 46.5 54.8
EU 15.7 30.8 33.8 20.7 32.6 38.9
EFTA 3.4 3.8 43 7.8 6.7 6.6
Source: D irection o f Trade Statistics
TABLE 4
Regional D istribution o f Romanian Foreign Trade
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994*
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Form er CM EA 36.4 25.7 20.4 20.9 19.4
Central-Eastern Europe 11.0 6.0 6.4 8.3 n.a.
SU/CIS 24.2 19.6 13.9 12.6 n.a.
OECD 37.0 43.3 50.5 52.4 55.4
EU 24.2 30.4 35.3 41.2 45.5
EFTA 3.8 6.4 6.1 5.3 5.5
Others 26.9 31.0 29.1 26.7 25.5
Source: D irection o f Trade Statistics
*Data fo r 1994 refer to  the period January-November.
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Foreign Trade Balance in  Certain Countries o f the Region
(U.S.$— m illions)
1991 1992 1993 1994
Hungary -1.194 -374 -3.600 -3.820
Slovenia -257 250 -672 -320
Bulgaria 788 45 -28 -100
Romania -1.358 -1.651 -1.541 260 (I-X I)
Croatia -536 -303 -956 -500 (I-X )
Source: Business Central Europe, National Trade Statistics
Sources:
Bulgaria - Country Report, Bank Austria, 1994.
Croatian Economic Survey, 1994, Institute o f Economics, Zagreb, National Bank 
of Croatia.
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Inotai, András: Some Remarks on Developments in Foreign Trade in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Working Paper, No 36, Institute for World Economics, 
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Banking as a Basis for Economic Cooperation 
in Less-Developed Europe
Fran jo  Š tib la r
The less-developed regions o f Europe include the south, east, and 
central European countries. In  the present study, among fourteen coun- 
tries under discussion,1 eleven are post-communist countries in transition. 
This article  intends to  evaluate current cooperation between countries be- 
longing to  backward Europe and its fu ture prospects. Cooperation in 
banking w ill be the focus o f the analysis.
The starting hypothesis is that large and quickly increasing gaps 
between these countries pose a natural obstacle for cooperation in banking, 
w hich is the most sophisticated sector o f the economy. The basic underly- 
ing elements o f financial cooperation (international banking) are usually 
trade flows, which are low among these countries w ith th e ir com petitive 
rather than compatible economies. W ith  the collapse o f communism, most 
o f these countries replaced one center o f gravity (form er Soviet U nion) 
w ith  another (EU) thus confirm ing the valid ity o f gravity model. Renewal 
and enhancement o f regular trade flows is the only realistic maximum fo r 
cooperation in  the region. Institu tiona l alignments are out o f the question.
The question arises whether there is an independent ground, above 
trade flows, fo r cooperation between banks in the region. The possibilities 
lie  in  establishing offshore financial centers (Cyprus), or supplying techni- 
cal assistance in  the banking fie ld  by more developed countries in  the re- 
gions to  less developed ones. In  some cases banks from the region could be 
more acceptable than banks from developed Europe (or other parts o f the 
w orld) as advisors because they know the region be tte r and are less like ly  
to  exploit th e ir dominant position. W ith th e ir own experience in  rehab ili- 
ta tion  and adaptation to  new m arket conditions (as fo r instance Nova 
Ljubljanska Banka from Slovenia), they could share th e ir experience w ith  
the banks in the region, which are only now undertaking rehabilitation. In  
a more optim istic view, an active financial deepening in these countries 
could be used as a tool fo r catching up w ith  economically and financia lly 
more developed Europe. A t the same tim e, fo r backward Europe, im - 
provements in  required banking standards are a way to fu lfil conditions fo r 
jo in ing  European associations, the EU above all.
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This article begins w ith an analysis o f the economic differences 
among fourteen countries in the region, and continues w ith  a description 
o f the present situation in the region's banking sector. The th ird  section 
deals w ith  future prospects for banking cooperation in  the region, and the 
last section illustrates the possibility o f cooperation from  the po in t o f view 
o f Nova Ljubljanska Banka, the largest commercial bank in  Slovenia.
Large and Increasing Economic Differences among Countries
Differences in  economic development between countries o f back- 
ward Europe were already significant before the transition took place. In  
the 1990s they just exploded thereby decreasing fu rthe r chances fo r finan - 
cia l and especially banking cooperation. Practical and theoretica l views 
m aintain that most trade and financial cooperation occurs among countries 
w ith  a sim ilar level o f development.2
Several indicators are calculated to  measure the relevance o f ana- 
lyzed countries in  1992, the ir external position in  1992, and th e ir economic 
performance in 1993. Aggregate ranking o f countries is calculated as an il-  
lustration o f individual positions o f the analyzed countries in  the group.
The data are not the most recent ( 1992, 1993), but the m ajor goal o f 
calculations is in obtaining a feeling about the situation in  the region, not 
in the most up-to-date calculations. W ith that in  m ind, certain estimates 
were made where reliable figures were missing. For the purpose o f the 
article  it  seemed more im portant to include a country in the analysis, even 
w ith  only approximate figures, rather than exclude it. Data used to  f ill the 
tables came from  d iffe ren t available sources, o ffic ia l (country statistics, 
EBRD, W IIW , UNCTAD), and also reports from d iffe ren t research insti- 
tutes.
Two features distinguish present samples (and calculations) from 
data presented usually by international organizations (U N , IM F , W B, 
EBR D ). F irst, economies in transition are compared w ith  three im portant 
market economies in the region (Greece, Turkey, Cyprus). Secona, post- 
Yugoslavian countries are taken in to account (Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, 
Slovenia; but not Bosnia and Herzegovina due to lack o f data).
Relevance
The geopolitical and economic relevance o f the countries analyzed 
fo r 1994 is measured by four indicators: area, population, С DP, and GDP 
per capita (Table 1). Sums o f ranks by each o f the four indicators gives an 
indication o f the relevance o f each country to  backward Europe.
Table 1 shows a large variation in area, population (both being posi- 
tive ly  correlated) and GDP o r GDP per capita. The largest countries 
(Tuncey, Poland, Romania) are defin ite ly not the most developed (Cyprus, 
Greece, Slovenia).
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TABLE 1 








Albania 28.7 33 660 200
Bulgaria 110.9 9.1 9.6 1.055
Croatia 56.5 4.8 9.6 2.000
Cyprus 9.5 0.6 6.6 11.000
Czech R. 70.0 10.3 26.1 2.534
Greece 131.0 10.3 77.9 7.576
H ungary 93.0 10.3 35.5 3.441
Macedonia 25.7 2.7 2.9 1.336
Poland 312.7 38.3 83.8 2.189
Romania 237.5 23.5 13.8 588
Serbia 88.4 9.7 16.0 1.645
Slovakia 57.0 53 10.0 1.879
Slovenia 20.2 2.0 12.2 6.086
Turkey 779.4 58.1 110.3 1.898
External Position
The external position o f the fourteen countries analyzed for 1992 is 
measured by the usual six indicators (Table 2):




- debt service/export ( ־ debt service ratio)
:foreign position ־
foreign reserves/imports (in ־  months)
foreign d ־ irect investment/GDP 
Aggregate ranking is made again as a sum o f the country’s rankings 
by each individual indicator. This should indicate the quality o f external 
position which is by our hypothesis directly related to  the country's ab ility  
fo r economic cooperation in general, and in the banking sector in specific.
Again, results confirm  a big diversity between countries w ith  re- 
gard to  th e ir openness, external indebtedness, external liq u id ity  and a t- 
tractiveness o f foreign capital. Some o f the countries established from  re-
Ēublics o f form er Yugoslavia lead in openness, as th e ir in ter-republic (lows ecame autom atically the international (lows o f goods and services w ith  the 
proclamation o f th e ir independence.
Among the countries o f backward Europe are some o f the most c rit- 
ical debtors in the w orld (Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, Hungary, Serbia and 
even Greece). External indebtedness is a big problem o f the region.
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1





External Position, 1992 
in Percentages
Reserves
Exp+Imp Debt Annuity Months/ Equity/ 
GDP Debt/GDP Export_____Export______ Imp.______ Invest
Albania 14 91.5 1320.0 120.0 1.0 0.60
Bulgaria 71 132.1 288.1 25.3 2.2 0.40
Croatia 89 28.0 67.5 13.0 1.6 0.20
Cyprus 58 27.8 162.4 13.6 10.2 5.0
Czech R. 54 26.5 61.0 11.9 0.8 3.76
Greece 24 53.9 279.6 53.2 2.4 2.41
Hungary 53 60.7 156.2 31.7 3.7 4.14
Macedonia 83 29.2 70.7 12.3 12 0.25
Poland 33 56.1 289.8 16.7 2.9 0.34
Romania 66 26.8 78.4 9.6 1.6 0.53
Serbia 22 40.6 433.3 51.4 5.0 0.10
Slovakia 70 25.7 54.4 14.3 1.1 0.72
Slovenia 79 14.5 27.5 6.4 1.5 0.92
Turkey 34 49.6 215.9 33.6 2.4 0.35
Despite moderate economic performance and critica l indebtedness
3uite a few countries in  the region are favorable destinations fo r foreign ire c t investments. Leading in  th is regard is Cyprus, fo llow ed by 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Greece.
Economic Performance
Differences in  starting positions are established. Now, it  is re le - 
vant to  find  out whether they are presently increasing o r decreasing. O nly 
later development gives rise to  a more optim istic view regarding economic 
(and especially financial) cooperation among countries in the region.
The usual indicators o f economic performance were chosen fo r a 
single year, 1993 (Table 3): 1) G DP grow th ; 2) in fla tio n  rate;
3) unem ploym ent rate; 4) current balance o f paym ents/GDP, (external 
equ ilib rium ); 5) budget deficit/G DP, (internal equ ilib rium ); and 6) average 
investment rate: investment/GDP.
Again, at the bottom o f the table, the countries were ranked by each 
indicator, and the aggregate indicator o f economic performance was calcu- 
lated fo r each country as a sum o f its ranks by individual indicators.
Results indicate that in  1993, the economic performance o f Cyprus 
was the best among all countries under discussion. I t  was follow ed by the 
Czech Republic. In  the second group were Slovenia and Greece.
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TABLE 3 
Economic Performance, 1993
GDP Inflation Unemp. Budget/ Investment
Growth Rate Rate BOP/GDP GDP /GDP
Albania +11.0 31.0 26.3 -64.3 -22.0 10.0
Bulgaria ־4.2 72.8 16.4 -7.3 -11.1 19.6
Croatia -3.7 1517. 17.4 +2.9 -4.1 10.0
Cyprus 3.5 5.5 2.8 2.5 -3.5 23.0
Czech R. -0.3 20.8 3.5 1.8 0.1 24.3
Greece 0.9 15.9 8.0 -2.7 -12.0 19.9
H ungary -2.3 22.5 12.6 -9.1 -5.7 20.2
Macedonia -15.2 244. 28.7 -0.6 -6.8 14.2
Poland 3.8 35.3 15.7 -2.7 -3.2 12.4
Romania 1.0 256. 10.2 -5.4 -4.6 17.7
Serbia -25.0 9993 30.0 0.0 -25.0 8.0
Slovakia ^ .1 23.2 14.4 -5.2 -6.8 30.4
Slovenia 13 32.3 15.5 1.2 0.4 16.3
Turkey 4.8 70.1 20.0 -0.9 -14.0 23.0
The worst economic performance was experienced by Serbia, FYR 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Albania.
Surveying indicator by indicator, growth was not yet reestablished 
in  most countries by 1993, hyperinflation was present in  some countries 
(Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia), unemployment was s till not at its peak, only 
four countries experienced balance o f payments surplus (Croatia, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, and Slovenia) and only two o f them budget surplus 
(Slovenia and the Czech Republic). Domestic propensity to  invest was re i- 
atively low in  the region, the worst among countries o f form er Yugoslavia.
To summarize, the results show tha t not on ly the  s ta rting  
(development, external position) position d iffers w idely among countries 
in the region, but also that w ith better economic performance o f the more 
developed among analyzed countries, th e ir d iffe ren tia tion  increases fur- 
ther. These are not prom ising characteristics fo r good economic coopera- 
tion  w ith in  the region.
Aggregate Position
The aggregate position o f each country was obtained by adding to* 
gether its ranks by three previously introduced criteria : relevance, exter- 
nal position and economic performance (Table 4).
Results have only illustra tive  and very approximative value, and 
should be interpreted w ith  caution. But s till, they are auite in form ative. 
In  the overall ranking, the Czech Republic is in firs t place, fo llow ed by
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Л У X I I (R)
15 14 9 3 1 2 2 31 56 (14.)
36 3 5. 6 3 5 8 30 90.5 (11.)
52.5 5. 2 5 14 10 3 39 114 (10.)
62 11 14 14 13 11 12 74.5 155.5 (2.)
56 7 12 13 12 13 13 70 163 (1.)35.5 8 13 13 6-7 4 9 52.5 134 (5.)
47 6 11 10 2 8 10 47 135 (4.)
39 2 4 2 9 6-7 5 28.5 79.5 (12.)
33 12 7 7 6-7 12 4 48.5 129.5 (8.)
53.5 9 3 11 4 Ѳ 7 43 132.5 (6.)
26 1 1 1 10 1 1 15 71 (13.)
56 4 10 9 5 6-7 14 48.5 128.5 (9.)
69 10 8 8 11 14 6 57 149 (3.)
35.5 13 6 4 8 3 12 45.5 130 (7.)
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Albania 4 4 1 1 10 1 2 1 1 2 8
Bulgaria 10 7 4-5 3 24.5 11 1 4 6 8 6
Croatia 5 5 4-5 8 22.5 14 9 11 10 6-7 2
Cyprus 1 1 3 14 19 8 10 7 9 14 14
Czech R. 7 9-11 10 10 37 7 12 12 12 1 12
Greece 11 9-11 12 13 46 3 5 5 2 9-10 11
Hungary Ѳ 9-11 11 11 41 6 3 8 5 12 13
Macedonia 3 3 2 4 12 13 8 10 11 4 3
Poland 13 13 13 9 48 4 4 3 7 11 4
Romania 12 12 8 32 34 9 11 9 13 6-7 7
Serbia 8 8 8 5 30 2 7 2 3 13 1
Slovakia 6 6 6 6 24 10 13 13 8 3 9
Slovenia 2 2 7 12 23 12 14 14 14 5 10
Turkey 14 14 14 7 49 5 6 6 4 9-10 5
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Cyprus, Slovenia, Hungary, and Greece. In  1992/93, Albania was in  the 
w orst position  among the countries analyzed, fo llow ed by Serbia, 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Croatia.
The Current Situation of the Banking Sector in Backward Europe 
Status of Banking and Monetary Policy
The credible and detailed figures fo r financial and monetary sector 
in the countries analyzed is very d ifficu lt to  obtain. Indicators fo r the cur- 
rent situation in  the banking and monetary sectors are given fo r on ly  
eleven countries in  Table 5 (missing are Albania, FYR Macedonia, ana 
Serbia).
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TABLE 5 
Financial Sector, 1992
la 1 2 3 4 5 6
Bulgaria 168 54 insign. -17.5 -17.0 -20.3 -14.7
Croatia 120 40 small • f -10.0 •
Cyprus 14 43 large • • 3.5 3-3
Czech R. 215 48 31% 32 10.6 -3.3 -10.6
Greece (381) (27) sizable -5.1 -1.3 3.4 •
Hungary 229 45 25% -11.7 43 -0.1 -0.4
Poland 364 105 small 12.3 -17.6 -27.0 -0.2
Romania 980 24 small 33.9 20.6 • -522
Slovakia 189 28 small 9.8 -6.0 -2.4 -9.1
Slovenia 63 32 9% -10.4 11.3 5.0 -10.8
Turkey (726) (80) sizable -4.6 6.9 -1.4 •
la : Thousands o f citizens per bank
1: Numbers o f banks (recent)
2: Percent o f foreign capital in banks' capital
3: C redit real growth rates
4: Broad М2 real growth rates
5: Real bank deposit rates
6: Real central bank discount rates
According to a cross section o f data fo r 1992 (num ber o f banks is 
more recent) disparities are well present in the banking and monetary sec- 
tors. Larger differences are impediments to cooperation in banking.
Table 5 shows that the absolute number o f banks and number o f c iti- 
zens per bank differs significantly among the countries under discussion. 
Romania, Turkey, Greece, and Poland have the largest numbers o f banks, 
which is not surprising since they are (by size and area) the largest coun- 
tries. The story is quite different w ith the ratio o f population to  number o f 
banks. Here, Cyprus leads due to  offshore banking legislation. I t  is
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followed by Slovenia w ith  100,000 inhabitants per bank; in the next group 
are Croatia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria w ith  200,000 inhabitants per bank. The 
Czech Republic and Hungary nave more than 200,000 but less than 300,000 
inhabitants per bank. In  the last group are Poland, Greece, and Turkey. 
The numbers for the last two, being among the above-average developed 
countries and w ith a trad ition in  financial markets, indicate that, in  most o f 
the countries in transition, just regarding th e ir population, the num ber o f 
banks is too large and woula be decreased during norm alization o f the eco- 
nomie situation.
Data on presence o f foreign capital in  the banking sector are d iffi-  
cu lt to  obtain. Estimates in the second column o f Table 5 indicate tha t 
longer market orientation (Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey as the only three 
representatives in the sample) brings, ceteris paribus, more foreign capital 
to  the banking sector. The numbers related to  the com m ercial banking 
sector in  the Table 5 are real bank deposit interest rates fo r 1992. In  most 
countries they were negative (Poland, Bulgaria, and Croatia led the group), 
w hich is an indication that restructuring o f the financial sector has not 
even begun. Rates were positive only in Cyprus, Greece, and Slovenia.
In  1992 the real volume o f bank credits strongly decreased in  
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovenia by more than 10%. I t  increased in  
Romania, Poland, and Slovakia indicating an expansive cred it po licy in  the 
banking sector.
Two fu rthe r indicators are given which represent the situation in 
the monetary sector. Broad money (real balances) was increasing in  
Romania, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia by more than 10%. For 
Romania th is was related to  cred it expansion; fo r the other tw o countries 
w ith  increased cred ib ility  and thus propensity to  save in  financial in s tru - 
ments. F inally, the real central bank discount rates are given. Am ong 
e ight countries fo r w hich data were obtained, it  was positive on ly in  
Cyprus. On the other hand, it  was strongly negative in Romania, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. However, the discount rate 
was not used frequently as a monetary policy instrum ent in  these coun- 
tries.
International Banking Ties
Cooperation in  the banking sector among countries in  backward 
Europe could be measured by in tra -regional in s titu tio n a l ties (F D I, 
brandies and subsidiaries) and/or functional ties (correspondent banking 
w ith  open accounts and credit lines).
W ith  some exceptions, strong intra-regional banking ties have not 
yet developed. For most countries in  the sample, in  fact, in ternationa l 
banking is only at the firs t stage o f development. And, as much as it  is de- 
veloped, the m ajority o f international ties are frequently interregional and 
not intra-regional. I t  means that banks from  developed W estern Europe 
are com ing to  these less developed countries in  the region opening offices 
o r establish ing w orking cooperation (capita l involvem ent, techn ica l
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assistance) w ith  domestic banks. A t the same tim e, some banks from  
countries in  the region are opening th e ir representative offices more 
frequently in  developed Europe than in  neighboring countries o f the 
region. Such a tendency is probably the result o f a strategy fo llow ing trade 
flows o f goods (which are frequently stronger w ith  EU countries than 
intra-regional) and/or o f establishment o f presence in the w orld financia l 
centers (Frankfurt, London).3
There are exceptions to this conclusion, most notably Cyprus, w ith  
its relaxed offshore banking regulations. I t  became a center o f banking 
(sometimes illegal) fo r many post-com m unist countries (Russia), among 
them also countries from the region under discussion (Serbia, fo r avoiding 
embargo). The more mature m arket economies in  the region (Greece, 
Cyprus, and less Turkey) do invest among themselves, but also in  some, 
usually neighboring post-communist countries (as Bulgaria). As an illu s - 
tra tion , Slovenia’s largest bank Nova Ljubljanska Banka has offices in  
Hungary and the Czech Republic and banks in  other parts o f fo rm er 
Yugoslavia, but w ith  undefined status a fte r the collapse o f the fo rm er 
Yugoslavia. A t the same tim e it  has functional (correspondence, open ac- 
counts) relations w ith  at least one, but usually more, banks from  each 
country under discussion. I t  has also developed an institu tional presence 
in  F rankfurt and M unich, New York and London, Vienna, M ilano, and 
Moscow which confirms the above statement.
I t  is clear that such a region (and form er countries as Yugoslavia or 
CSSR) is not and w ill not be a special reason fo r closer banking ties. Mere 
geographical proxim ity, even in additional to  h istoric ties, is no longer 
enough for economic integration in the present developed w orld  in  which 
economic determinants prevail in seeking ties among countries. D iffe ren t 
regional economic cooperation schemes w ill be developed in  the fu ture as 
they were in the past. Especially countries on the edge o f the region 
would probably strengthen the ir economic ties w ith  neighboring countries 
outside the region. A t the same tim e, almost all o f them w ill try  to  increase 
banking cooperation w ith developed Europe and the EU particularly, as a 
new gravity center (since the form er Soviet Union is no longer an eco- 
nomie power and thus not a gravity center).
The legislation on F D I in the banking sector in the countries under 
discussion d iffe rs w idely. But, w ith  some exceptions, most notably 
Cyprus, countries in transition are reluctant to  open the doors wide to  fo r- 
eign banks at this early stage o f restructuring th e ir economies. The bank- 
ing and financial sector as a whole is very im portant fo r retaining an inde- 
pendent national economy (sometimes it  is compared w ith  ownership o f 
land and real estate). As long as national states constitute Europe (the 
Europe o f regions remains only a distant fu turistic idea), one way fo r these 
countries to  protect the ir own national states in transition seems to  be re- 
taining m ajority control in  the ir banking sectors.
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Future Prospects: Banking Cooperation as a Basis for Economic 
Cooperation
Future Development of the Banking Sector in the World
The future development o f banking and cooperation in  the region 
w ill be determ ined by future developments in  w orld  banking. According 
to  some, European banking w ill be controlled by only four to  five banks a f ■ 
te r the year 2000. In  such a black scenario there is no place fo r banks from  
backward Europe as independent institu tions. O ther less pessim istic pre- 
d ic tions4 ta lk about w inning banking strategies fo r 1990s in  w hich banks 
w ill o ffe r new products and services to  th e ir clients, and d iffe re n tly  than 
before. Data shows that in recent years, bank p ro fitab ility  and economic e f- 
ficiency constantly has been decreasing worldw ide.5
In  the future banks w ill have to  cover three m ajor forms o f banking 
services:
1) processing (payments, automatic clearing, e lectronic transfer, as- 
set management, cred it letters collecting, brokerage, stock exchange and 
other capital market sendees);
2) core banking (unctions (collecting deposits and extending cred- 
its, leasing, trading, guaranties, investments, issuing insurance and credits 
letters);
3) advisory functions fo r clients (mergers and acquisitions, issuing 
bonds and stocks, financial engineering, business finances, personal finance 
planning, investment consulting, investment management).
Besides, qua lity  in  banking services w ill become cruc ia l fo r 
successful banking, since it  depends on c re d ib ility , re sp o n s ib ility , 
knowledge, attitude, communications, safety, understanding and personal 
touch.
According to  the same sources, a w inning banking strategy should 
include: maximizing non-interest income, increasing the value o f assets, 
optim izing the volume o f capital, enforced m arketing o f financial services, 
adequate management o f financial risks, and control o f expenditures.
I t  is clear from the outset that banks in  backward Europe lag behind 
developed banks from Western Europe in most o f the above listed fune- 
tions and efforts. Thus, a lot needs toDe done just to catch up w ith  them .
Development of Banking in the Region
The question is how realistic a starting po in t is the view that bank- 
ing could become one o f the mechanisms fo r decreasing gap between back - 
ward and developed Europe?
The idea is that w ith  a fast development o f the banking sector back- 
ward Europe can establish preconditions fo r catching up faster in  the real 
sector o f the economy. For achieving that the above future banking fune- 
tions should be established and developed even faster in  backward Europe 
than in the banks o f developed Europe. Realistically, this is not probable
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because o f lack o f knowledge and experience (comparative disadvantages). 
Banks in  post-communist countries learn modern banking from  banks in 
the W est through technical assistance in restructuring programs. The only 
advantageous fact is that banking in post-communist countries is in the pro- 
cess o f establishing to ta lly new foundations, which means that there w ill be 
fewer obstacles in  starting new banks than in  the case o f existing well-es - 
tablished banking. But that is probably not enough.
Regardless o f the catching-up idea there is an independent, addi- 
tiona l reason fo r banks in  the region to  modernize and catch-up w ith  
W estern standards; that is, the intention o f most o f the countries in the re- 
gion to  jo in  the EU. In  order fo r that to  happen sometime in the future, 
one o f the preconditions would be to  establish banking sectors according to  
EU standards (E U  directives on banking), which means, in  many cases, 
more than meeting BIS standards fo r prudential regulation and supervi- 
sion.
Related to  the quest fo r jo in ing  the EU as a prim ary goal o f most 
countries in  the region is the immediate question o f how im portant (and 
relevant) is the strategy to  achieve th is as a country block. I t  means
1) establishing economic (and fo r some even more) ties between countries 
in the region, and 2) negotiating entry to the EU as a stronger block- 
power. I t  is clear that present EU members would not like such a block- 
negotiator and that they (as a stronger negotiator) w ill enforce bilateral ne- 
gotiatíons and entry to  the Union. A t the same tim e, some more developed 
countries in  backward Europe are not w illing  to  wait, and prefer th e ir own 
(ind ividual) negotiations hoping thereby fo r an earlier entry to  the EU.
Trade Patterns as a Primary Reason for Banking Cooperation in the 
Region
Trade flows, which need to  be supported by banking activities, re- 
main a m ajor and well-founded reason fo r banking cooperation in  the re- 
gion.
Table 6 indicates directions o f trade for ten out o f the fourteen 
countries in the sample (mostly fo r 1992, but also fo r some other years be- 
tween 1990 and 1993). Based on the UNCTAD Yearbook for 1993, pub- 
lished in  the fa ll o f 1994, the results clearly show a relatively small share o f 
to ta l trade between countries in the region. The reasons fo r th is are the 
po litica l situation, the existence o f large centers (EU, Soviet Union), war, 
and embargoes (form al or actual).
Data is given only on an aggregate level. The three categories are: 
Europe (European Union, Eastern Europe, and O ther Europe), developed 
countries, and non-European less-developed countries. Two sectors which 
should approxim ately cover trade w ith in  backward Europe in  the sample 
are Eastern Europe and O ther Europe. But even w ith in  O ther Europe 
there are not only Turkey and Cyprus b u t also EFTA countries.
In  any case, results show that in 1992 Bulgaria directed over 78% o f 
its exports to  Eastern and O ther Europe, while its im ports from these two
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1




Directions o f Trade, Structure in  %, 1990-93
Europe EU Eastern Other Developed Non-Europe
Europe Europe Countries LDCs
Bulgaria, 91
E xport 86.0 7.6 76.9 15 11.2 11.8
Im port 
Cyprus, 92
69.3 50.9 8.1 10.3 68.3 23.4
E xport 66.4 59.3 3.1 4.0 67.3 27.2
Im port 
Czecn R., 92
60.3 52.4 2.5 5.4 78.6 13.8
E xport 74.0 45.1 19.7 9 2 56.9 11.3
Im port 
Greece, 92
85.3 33.1 38.8 13.4 48.3 12.8
E xport 76.0 64.1 6.4 55 76.4 15.4
Im port 
Hungary, 92
71.2 62.7 4.0 45 79.4 15.4
E xport 80.1 45.8 19.4 14.9 66.6 13.9
Im port 
Poland, 92
70.0 42.8 6.7 20.5 69.4 5.5
E xport 74.2 57.9 5.9 10.4 71.3 11.8
Im port 
Romania, 92
70.6 53.1 4.4 13.1 72.1 10.5
E xport 57.1 32.5 19.0 5.6 42.9 36.2
Im port 
Slovenia, 93
62.8 25.2 24.7 12.9 38.3 36.5
E xport 69.6 57.4 5.3 6.9 70.4 -
Im port 
Turkey, 92
73.1 55.7 5.4 12.0 74.4 •
E xport 63.6 51.0 8 2 4.4 64.2 27.4
Im port 
ex-Yugo., 90
53.8 43.9 3.7 62 68.6 22.5
E xport 80.0 45.7 28.3 6.8 58.6 13.2
Im port 77.4 44.3 23.3 9.8 62.1 14.6
Source: UNCTAD Yearbook, 1993, published in  November 1994.
regions counted fo r less than 19% o f total imports. The only other country 
w ith  over 50% share in trade w ith in  th is region is Czechoslovakia in  1992 
w ith  52% o f im ports coming from both regions. N either export nor im port 
from  the region o f other countries in  the sample exceeded 1/3, w ith  more 
significant numbers fo r Hungarian export (over 34%), Romanian im port 
(37%), and ex-Yugoslavian export (35%) and im port (33%).
Especially low shares o f exports and im ports w ith in  the region are 
observed for Cyprus (each less than 10%), Greece (exports less than 12%,
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im ports less than 9%), Slovenia in 1993 (export 12%, im port 17%), Poland 
(export 16%, im port 17%) and Turkey (export 12%, im port 10%). A ll these 
countries are on the outer lim its o f the region and at the same tim e more 
developed, or under some other institu tiona l arrangements (fo r instance, 
Greece is a member o f the EU).
Practically speaking, less than one-third o f trade flows w ith in  the 
region were significant (measured w ith  more than 33% share) in  1992. 
M ore recently trade flows w ith in  backward Europe de fin ite ly  decreased 
further. Among reasons fo r that are economic sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro, sanctions by Greece against FYR Macedonia, and the war, 
w hich disrupted transportation even between other countries in  the re - 
gion.
AU this gives a slim  prospect fo r developing banking on the basis o f 
trade flows (as th e ir support), because trade flows w ith in  the region are 
small and continue to  decrease even further. Some bilateral trade flows are 
stronger and they could lead to  stronger bilateral banking ties.
Are There Grounds for Cooperation between Banks beyond 
Servicing Trade Flows?
W ith  weak trade ties, the question arises whether o r not there is 
reason fo r establishing banking cooperation regardless o f o r even over in - 
tensity o f trade flows. Two factors could be mentioned in  that regard.
The firs t is establishment o f offshore banking centers, fo llow ing a 
prosperous idea practised already by Cyprus. Most o f the countries from  
the region and many countries from  outside the region (Russia, western 
countries, Arabic countries) established in recent years representative o f- 
fices, subsidiaries, branches in  Cyprus or d irectly  invested capital in  
Cyprus domestic banks. The banking business is flourishing in Cyprus and 
the density o f banks, as already observed above, is by far the largest in  the 
region. Offshore banking is not subject to  s tric t domestic banking regula- 
tion . Instead, regulations fo r it  are less stringent thus making establish- 
ment o f banks ana th e ir offices attractive to  foreign countries.
To prevent unstable (hot) capital influencing domestic m onetary 
policy, assets and liab ilities o f offshore banks are not included in  domestic 
financial systems at all. A negative side to  this is that a lo t o f grey and black 
market financial business flows are directed to  these offshore banks. There 
is ce rta in ly  a tra d e -o ff between clean prudent banking and additional 
earnings on taxes imposed on offshore banks. Cyprus opted for business.
But, even i f  Cyprus is a good example fo r other countries to  fo llow , 
how many countries could establish such offshore centers? These centers 
are attractive only i f  they are rare. There would certainly not be enough 
offshore business fo r a ll countries in backward Europe.
The second way o f intensive banking cooperation could be supply- 
ing the know-how and technical assistance, from banks in  financially more 
developed countries in  the region to  banks in  less developed countries o f 
the region. Banks from developed Europe are penetrating aggressively
Theofanis Stavrou and John Lampe - 978-3-95479-686-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:08AM
via free access
Franjo Stibia г280
in to  backward Europe, especially countries in  transition. But compared to 
banks from  developed Europe: more developed countries in  the region can 
have certain advantages: 1) they know the region better; 2) they could have 
already some business relations established which only need to  be intensi- 
fled; 3) they could be accepted as more friend ly (less dangerous) in  the 
eyes o f the countries and banks which w ould receive technical help; and
4) many such banks in the more advanced countries in  the region already 
w ent (successfully) through sim ilar rehab ilita tion  procedures and thus 
could share th e ir own experiences in the rehabilitation o f banks w ith  banks 
in other countries in  the region.
One bank in  the region w illin g  to  share through consultancy its 
own experiences w ith  rehabilitation, which is coming to  a successful con- 
elusion, is Nova Ljubljanska Banka from Slovenia’s capital Ljubljana.
A Special Case: Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB) as Partner to Banks 
in tne Region 
Identification Card of NLB
Nova Ljubljanska Banka (N LB ) was established by constitu tional 
law in  July 1994. Ljubljanska Banka, which at the beginning o f 1990s was 
among the 250 largest banks in  the w orld , was divided in to  the o ld  
Ljubljanska Banka (which ceded certain liab ilities and guarantees incurred 
during the existence o f form er Yugoslavia, on behalf o f or related to  en ti- 
ties located w ith in  the form er Yugoslavia’s te rrito ry ) and Nova Ljubljanska 
Banka which ceded all other assets and liab ilities from the form er bank. A t 
the mom ent o f this institutional change, one o f the last steps in the reha- 
b ilita tion  o f the bank, supervised by the State Bank Rehabilitation Agency, 
N LB  had around 200 M illion  D EM  o f founding capital and a balance o f 
around 3.5 B illion  D EM . Its capital adequacy ratio was 9.2. Its share in the 
banking market in Slovenia was reduced to around 30%.
Rehabilitation o f bank problems started w ith  a new management 
team in  early 1993. Problems appeared to  a great extent to  be due to  the 
dissolution o f the form er Yugoslavia and due to  previous relaxed banking 
policies in  the socialist system. R ehabilitation led to  positive trends:
1) positive net operating income and net operating cash flow; 2) increasing 
re ta il and commercial deposits; 3) norm alization in  the level o f provision 
fo r doubtfu l debts; 4) reduction in  s ta ff level to  2,300 employees and re- 
duction o f operating costs; and 5) disinvestment o f some businesses, 
which are not d irectly related to the bank core business.
Nova Ljubljanska Banka is w ell known fo r its developed interna- 
tiona l banking orientation. Despite its disinvestment efforts it  retained a 
foreign branch in  M ilano, foreign subsidiaries (LBS New York, Proteus 
Finanz Zurich), foreign affiliates (LH B  Frankfurt, Adria Bank Vienna), and 
representative offices (Budapest, F rankfurt, London, Moscow, New York, 
Paris, Prague, Trieste).
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Internalization of Technical Assistance by NLB
Nova Ljubljanska Banka has correspondence relations and open ao- 
counts in practically all countries in the region. I t  has successfully in te r- 
nalized technical aid obtained from the EU, USAID, Know-how Fund, the 
IFC , and the W orld Bank. Most o f it  was executed in  cooperation w ith  the 
A llied  Irish  Bank.
Special fields for potential fu rthe r dissemination o f its own experi- 
enee ana knowledge are: 1) financial and strategic planning and contro l;
2) c re d it risk  management; 3) treasury and balance management;
4) in form ation technology: strategy and supervision; 5) securitization;
6) financial bookkeeping; 7) development o f the retail banking sector; and
8) development o f human resources in  banking.
Institution Building and Functional Changes in the NLB
N LB  continues to expand its range o f products and services in  re- 
sponse to  developments in  Slovenia and in  w orld  financia l markets. 
Recent examples are: 1) expanding investm ent banking business;
2) factoring was established in cooperation w ith  IF C  and Vienna based fi- 
nancial enterprise; 3) LB  trading company was established recently; and
4) new subsidiary, LB Maxima, has been established to provide po rtfo lio  
investment management fo r selected newly established investment com- 
panies.
An in tegra l component o f rehab ilita tion  was an in s titu tio n a l 
strengthening program, designed to  ensure N LB ’s competitiveness w ith in  
the international financial market place. Progress in  this regard was made 
especially in  the fo llow ing areas: 1) new credit policies and procedures 
were introduced to  preserve quality o f loan portfo lio ; 2) management in - 
form ation system is being improved to support consumer-focused strategy;
3) in ternal policies and controls were im plem ented w ith  help from  the 
Irish  A llied  Bank as consultant; and 4) internal reorganization o f bank has 
been completed.
The fina l step in  the rehabilita tion o f N LB  is its privatization, 
which should fo llow  the o ffic ia l conclusion o f rehabilitation procedures in
1995. W ith the beginning o f rehabilitation in 1993 the state became the 
only owner o f a bank through swapping government bonds fo r bad debts 
from the N LB ’s portfo lio. Among potential future owners o f N LB  are fo r- 
eign partners, the state, and domestic economic entities. Among foreigners 
there could be EBRD, IFC , and possibly strategic private foreign owner 
(bank). The state w ill retain m inority share and the last th ird  o f ownership 
w ill go to  pub lic  at large, enterprises, and ins titu tiona l investors in  
Slovenia.
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T ransfe r o f  N L B ’s Experiences to  Banks in  O the r C ountries o f the  
R eg ion
M ajor steps in  transferring N LB ’s experiences to  banks in  o ther 
countries in  the region w ould include 1) dissemination through consult- 
ing, 2) in-place cooperation, and 3) upgrading institu tional and functional 
presence in  the region as a potential strategy o f the N LB fo r the future.
A team o f consultants is in the making in  N LB  includ ing people 
who took part in  the major rehabilitation efforts o f the N LB . The best way 
fo r advisory work w ith  potential users o f NLB consultancy services would 
be in-place cooperation, as this proved the best solution fo r N LB  in its re- 
habilita tion. In is  way N LB  could upgrade or establish a new institu tional 
presence in the region. Part o f its long-term strategy is to  become a central 
European bank w ith  strong ties to  a ll regions o f Europe, includ ing back- 
ward Europe.
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